China’s economic growth, growing diplomatic leverage, and improvements in the PLA’s military capabilities, contrasted with Taiwan’s modest defence efforts, have the effect of shifting the cross-Strait balance in Beijing’s favour. Chinese air, naval, and missile force modernization is making it increasingly critical that Taiwan strengthen its defences with a sense of urgency.
Despite this imperative, Taiwan’s defense spending has steadily declined in real terms over the past decade. Taiwan has traditionally acquired capabilities, some asymmetric, to deter an attack by making it too costly, while buying time for international intervention. The growth of PLA capabilities is outpacing these acquisitions.
The Chinese Doctrine
Unsurprisingly, official Chinese views on potential conflict scenarios with Taiwan are difficult to come by. There is, nonetheless, a substantial body of writings produced by prominent Chinese thinkers and strategists. A recent RAND Corporation study analyzed these doctrinal writings, with their findings falling under five main strategic principles that Chinese military strategists lay out for engaging in any conflict with Taiwan that could potentially involve the United States.
Due to US Military superiority, Chinese strategists call for avoiding directs confrontation between sets of forces. This is consistent with the Chinese belief in the principle of limited strategic aims.
Seize the initiative early: The Chinese believe that surprise is important to maintain the initiative by forcing an adversary to react to China’s moves. The chances of achieving surprise are, in turn, greatly increased by preemptive action. Preemptive action, if it can produce a decisive outcome quickly, will also prevent superior US Forces from being brought to bear. Because China believes that the United States will inevitably intervene in a conflict on Taiwan’s behalf, Chinese planners see an advantage in attacking US Force prior to engaging in such a conflict. Whatever the historical examples to the contrary, some Chinese military strategists believe that a preemptive strike that causes many US causalities and high economic costs will dissuade the United States from further engagement, because the costs restoring the status quo ante will be high
Pursue Limited Strategic Aims: China believes itself still inferior to the United States militarily, and thus calculates that its best chances of winning and securing Taiwan lie in presenting the United States with the fait accompli that avoids harming any of the United States main interests. The speed required for such an invasion thus involves the use of covert operatives and special forces to attack such critical targets as aircraft; air bases, command and control facilities communications links, fuel storage distribution, and dispensing facilities and repair and maintenance facilities.
International sanctions against Beijing, either by individual states or by groups of states, could severely damage Beijings economic development. An insurgency against the occupation could tie up substantial forces for years.
Strike “key points”: The need therefore is to focus on striking five key points: command systems, information systems, i.e. weapon systems, logistic systems and the linkages around these. Massive destruction in these areas might be able to prevent the United States from bringing all of its fighting strength to bear in a timely fashion and discourage it from continuing the conflict.
Avoid direct Confrontation: The Chinese believe that they stand to gain more from defeating a handful of critical defenses, such as the “key point” enunciated above, than in directly confronting US and Taiwanese troops. Due to US Military superiority, Chinese strategists call for avoiding directs confrontation between sets of forces. This is consistent with the Chinese belief in the principle of limited strategic aims.
Utilize High Technology: Chi Haotian, a former state councilor and minister of defense said: “Our strategic principles must be based on the scenario of military intervention by United States at the deployment level. We should fight a high-technology war and more importantly be prepared against the military intervention by a bloc of countries led by the United States and fight modern, high-technology war of considerable scale.”
China’s Strategy in the Taiwan Strait
Beijing appears prepared to defer unification as long as it sees the tendency of events to advance that goal, or the cost of conflict outweighing the benefits. The mainland employs all instruments of power political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military at its disposal in a coercive strategy aimed at resolving the Taiwan issue in its favor. In the near term, Beijing’s focus is on preventing Taiwan from moving towards dejure independence. However, China is unwilling to rule out the use of force to achieve this objective.
The PLA is developing capabilities that will enable it to pursue several courses of action against Taiwan, allowing Beijing to apply pressure more flexibly against the island while minimizing the risks of confrontation with the United States.
China continues to offer a peaceful resolution under the “one country, two systems” framework that would provide Taiwan a degree of autonomy in exchange for its unification with the mainland. China’s military expansion and ongoing deployment of some 710-790 short range ballistic missiles, enhanced amphibious warfare capabilities, and modern, long-range anti-air systems opposite Taiwan are reminders of Beijing’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force. China sees the threat of force as an integral part of its overall policy to dissuade Taiwan from pursuing independence and pressuring it to unite with the mainland. Beijing, in its March 2005 “anti-secession law,” codified this threat and attempted to legitimize it through legal instruments, as part of what some Chinese military strategists refer to as “legal warfare.”
The circumstances in which Beijing has historically claimed it would use force against the island include: a formal declaration of independence by Taipei; undefined moves “toward independence;” foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue; Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; and internal unrest on Taiwan. These circumstances are not fixed and have evolved over time in response to Taiwan’s declarations about its political status and other actions, changes in China’s own military capabilities, and Beijing’s view of other countries’ relations with Taiwan. China’s “red lines” are vague, which allows Beijing to determine the nature, timing, and form of its response.
Beijing’s Options for Action against Taiwan
The PLA is developing capabilities that will enable it to pursue several courses of action against Taiwan, allowing Beijing to apply pressure more flexibly against the island while minimizing the risks of confrontation with the United States. The PLA is simultaneously developing the capability to deter and/or slow third party, including US, intervention to assist Taiwan; to defeat such intervention in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; or, fight to a standstill and pursue a protracted conflict.
PLAs special operation forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of economic, political and military sabotage. Beijing might also believe that it could use small numbers of coordinated SRBMs and air strikes against air fields, radar and communications facilities on Taiwan”¦
Persuasion and Coercion: With increased economic links, Beijing enjoys increased influence on Taiwan. It seeks to attract Taiwan investment in the mainland, while emphasizing that peace in the Strait will bring prosperity. At the same time, accelerating economic integration with the mainland also makes Taiwan increasingly vulnerable to Chinese economic leverage. Beijing is Taipei’s largest trading partner. It is Taipei’s largest destination for exports and foreign direct investment and the production site for many of Taipei’s most profitable information technology exports, Beijing is attempting to exploit these ties to press Taiwanese businessmen operating on the mainland to refrain from openly supporting pro-independence parties or persons in Taiwan.
Beijing has also intensified its campaign to further constrain Taiwan’s international profile. It competes with Taiwan in the developing world for diplomatic recognition and priorities. Its activities in these regions are to erode support among Taiwan’s 25 remaining diplomatic partners. In October 2005, Senegal became the latest nation to switch recognition to Beijing. China simultaneously employs diplomatic and commercial levers including its seat on the UN Security Council to increase pressure on other states to limit their relationships with Taiwan and discourage it from making any moves towards de jure independence.
The sustained military threat to Taiwan serves as an important backdrop to the overall political, economic and diplomatic campaign of persuasion and coercion. Exercises, deployments and media operation all contribute to the creation of an environment of intimidation.
Limited Force Option: A campaign employing limited force option could include computer network attacks against the Taiwan’s political, military and economic infrastructure to undermine Taiwan population’s confidence in its leadership. PLA’s special operation forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of economic, political and military sabotage. Beijing might also believe that it could use small numbers of coordinated SRBMs and air strikes against air fields, radar and communications facilities on Taiwan as non-war use of force to try to push the Taiwan leadership towards accommodation. Beijing might erroneously view such non-war uses of forces as a complement to non-military coercion and believe that such strikes would not trigger a response from either Taiwan or third parties. Resort to such uses of force could quickly risk escalation to a full-fledged military conflict.
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Air and Missile Campaign: Surprise SRBM attacks and precision air attacks could support a campaign designed to degrade Taiwan defences, neutralize its military and political leadership and break its will to fight before the United States and other nations could intervene. China could employ SRBM to saturate Taiwan air defense system including air bases, radar sites, missiles and communications facilities.
Blockade: Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval blockade either as a non-war pressure tactic in the pre-hostility phase or as a transition to active conflict. On one end of the spectrum, Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan ports must stop in mainland ports for inspection prior to transiting on to Taiwan.
Alternatively China could attempt the equivalent of a blockade of Taiwan ports by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches and roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffic, which it did with its 1995-96 missile firings and live- fire exercise. Chinese doctrine also includes activities such as air blockades, missile attacks and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and approaches.
More traditional methods of blockade would increase the impact on Taiwan but also tax PLA Navy capabilities and raise the potential for direct military confrontation. Any attempt to limit maritime traffic to and from Taiwan, whether loose or more restrictive, would violate international law, trigger countervailing international pressure and could lead to a more protracted conflict with the serious risk of military escalation. Although such restrictions would have an immediate economic impact, they would take time to realize decisive political results, diminishing the ultimate effectiveness and inviting certain international reaction.
Amphibious Invasion: Publicly available Chinese writings on amphibious campaigns offer different strategies for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of them describe what it called the Joint Island Landing Campaign. The objective of the Joint Island Landing Campaign is to break through or circumvent shore defences, establish and build a beachhead and then launch an attack to split, seize and occupy the entire island or important targets on the island.
Any attempt to limit maritime traffic to and from Taiwan, whether loose or more restrictive, would violate international law, trigger countervailing international pressure and could lead to a more protracted conflict with the serious risk of military escalation.
To achieve the final objective of the Joint Island Landing Campaign, a series of sub-campaigns, such as electronic warfare, naval and air campaigns including the underlying logistics and mobilization must be executed.
Amphibious operations are logistics-intensive and rely for success on air and sea superiority in the vicinity of the operation, and the rapid building up of supplies and sustainment on shore thereafter. The Joint Island Landing Campaign would tax the lift capacities of China’s armed forces and maritime militia, posing challenges to those charged with providing sustainment, and the commanders leading this campaign. Add to those strains the combat attrition of China’s forces. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be a significant political and military risk for China’s leaders. The PLA’s prospects in an invasion of Taiwan would hinge on establishing persistent air superiority over the Strait and Taiwan, the availability of amphibious and air lift capabilities, attrition rates, interoperability of PLA forces, the ability of China’s logistic system to support the necessarily high tempo of operations Taiwan’s will to resist and the speed and scale of international intervention.
Factors of Deterrence
China is deterred from taking military action against Taiwan on two levels. China does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with outside intervention. Beijing is also deterred by the potential political and economic repercussions of any use of force against Taiwan. China’s leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic development. Taiwan is China’s single largest source of foreign direct investment. An extended campaign would wreck Taiwan’s economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs. International sanctions against Beijing, either by individual states or by groups of states, could severely damage Beijing’s economic development. An insurgency against the occupation could tie up substantial forces for years.
Conflict with Taiwan also could lead to instability on the mainland. Maintaining internal security in wartime appears to be an important consideration in PLA planning, reflecting leadership concerns about political stability.
According to the Intelligence Community, China would have difficulty protecting its vital sea lanes of communication while simultaneously supporting blockade or invasion operations against the island. Conflict with Taiwan also could lead to instability on the mainland. Maintaining internal security in wartime appears to be an important consideration in PLA planning, reflecting leadership concerns about political stability. A conflict also would severely hurt the image China has sought to project regionally and globally in the post-Tiananmen years. If Beijing chose to use force against Taiwan, it would almost certainly face a boycott. Finally, Beijing’s planning must calculate the virtual certainty of US intervention, and Japanese interests, in any conflict in the Taiwan Strait. It views the United States, especially in combination with Japan, as having advantages over China in many scenarios involving the use of military force. China’s leaders also calculate that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would give rise to a long-term hostile relationship between the two nations.
The Taiwanese Apprehensions
Taiwan’s Minister of Defence is focused on what believes would be a blitzkrieg attempt on the PRC’s part to retake Taiwan with a goal: less damage, high effectiveness, rapid strike and decisive actions. Taiwan’s military planners believe that the PLA’s efforts in laser, information, aerospace and automatic technologies, as well as efforts to improve joint operation capabilities between naval and air forces in conjunction with the deployment of long-range strike weapon systems are all proceeding towards the goal of rapid and decisive victory.
“¦the Department of Defense, through the transformation of US Armed Forces and global force posture realignments, is maintaining the capacity to resist any effort by Beijing to resort to force or coercion to dictate the terms on Taiwans future status.
Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense foresees four possible scenarios for PRC military action, these are:
- Military Coercion: In this scenario, the PRC would fire ballistic missiles into the seas surrounding Taiwan, concentrate PLA forces directly across Taiwan Strait and possibly execute military expeditions to occupy Taiwan’s surrounding islets. PLA warships and fighters jets may initiate actual air and sea attacks or merely issue warnings to intimidate Taiwan. The media can become a tool of the PRC spreading fear and causing social unrest. Taken together with other psychological and economic pressures, this approach could secure Taiwan for the PRC with a minimum causalities and damage.
- Disconnected Warfare: In this scenario, the PRC would force Taiwan into reunification through three non-military forms of warfare – cyber warfare, electronic warfare and financial sabotage – as well as three limited forms of warfare – assassination and decapitation, precision strikes and raids by special forces to capture high value military and political targets. Another method might be to employ hackers, computer viruses, information bombs and electronic jamming to destroy or render inoperative Taiwan’s command, control and communications system. The PRC’s goal would be to cause unrest and ultimately a breakdown in economic societal and military order.
- Blockage Warfare: In this scenario, the PLA would attempt to seal off Taiwan’s seaports and cut off its lines of communication. The PLA can use ballistic missile defense tests, mine laying and military exercises to conduct a partial blockade and proclaim some portion of Taiwan’s offshore islets and sea route off limits. Alternatively, it could conduct a full-scale blockade of both maritime and air space to sever Taiwan’s export and import economic lifelines, depress morale and essentially force surrender through strangulation.
- High-intensity Strike: In this scenario, the PLA would utilize high-performance weapons and special forces to conduct highly destructive strikes that would achieve rapid and decisive dominance over Taiwan. Weapons involved here could include ballistic, cruise and anti-radiation missiles, as well as micro magnetic and electromagnetic pulse bombs. Saturated attacks and joint-precision strikes could destroy Taiwan’s centers of economic, political and military power. Taiwan considers a full-scale invasion by the PLA to be beyond the realm of possibility but it could in the future develop enough high-performance weapons to subdue Taiwan to the point that full-scale invasion might be possible.
Taiwan views the first three scenarios as ‘most likely’. Some Taiwanese Military strategists have put forward the idea of preemptive defence, that is maintaining a strong deterrence posture during peacetime and improving long-range precision-strike and information warfare capability. Other defensive measure possible during wartime would include anti-blockade, anti-submarine and cyber warfare against China’s command, control and communications systems.
The US Stance
The US Government has made it clear that it supports peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo. Yet Beijing’s sustained military build-up in the area of the Taiwan Strait risks disrupting the status quo. Accordingly, and consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, (1979), the United States is taking steps to help maintain peace, security and stability in the region by offering to sell defense system to Taiwan in order to correct imbalances in the areas of air and missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare.
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These systems, i.e. Patriot PAC-III air defense systems, P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel attack submarines were included in the original Special Budget (the PAC-IIIs have since been removed), which remains before the Taiwan Legislative Yuan, as it has since 2004. Simultaneously, the Department of Defense, through the transformation of US Armed Forces and global force posture realignments, is maintaining the capacity to resist any effort by Beijing to resort to force or coercion to dictate the terms on Taiwan’s future status.
The China-Taiwan economic engagement and horrendous cost of military confrontation is keeping the Chinese restrained. However their desire to unify Taiwan with mainland China remains as strong as ever. The other major factor is the support Taiwan gets from the US. Perhaps the Chinese are waiting for 2050 when they may overtake US as the largest economic and military power in the world before exercising the military option. No one can predict the outcome of such a venture on part of China and Chinese themselves will be naive to believe that US will take it lying down. It may result in a holocaust which the world can ill afford.
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