Indian Defence Review

Tejas

An ambitious project like the LCA is fraught with risks, more so when the design and development teams are venturing into uncharted waters driven by an insistence to forego any external help. Under such conditions the DRDO’s projections of timelines could at best be termed ‘optimistic’ by any standards. The Government was itself skeptical about the potential and capabilities of the scientific community to come together with the development of the airframe, engine, flight control software and multi-mode radar and get the LCA to fly.

An Unending Programme

“India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas, is to enter service shortly and two squadrons of this aircraft will be stationed at the Sulur Air Base near Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu,” screamed the headlines of a leading national daily. Another reported, “The Defence Minister AK Antony stated in Parliament in August 2011 that the Tejas Mk I would be ready for induction into the Indian Air Force (IAF) by March 2012.”

Statements and timelines such as these and various other milestones have featured in the media with predictable regularity. Despite assurances by the Defence Minister and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the LCA is yet to become operational even after two decades of being under development. The cost of the programme has also ballooned with the years. The Defence Minister stated recently that in 2001, the LCA programme had been estimated to cost Rs 33 billion but cost overruns had added an additional Rs 24.8 billion due to the expanded scope of the programme, increased cost of materials, manpower and maintenance of facilities. Military and civil aviation history is replete with examples where development of a new aircraft has suffered delays with costs far exceeding original estimates. Will the LCA have the dubious distinction of having the longest gestation period?

Development Objectives

A cursory examination of the genesis of the LCA programme would indicate that the original timelines for development were extremely over-optimistic and not in consonance with the capabilities of the design, development and manufacturing agencies involved in the programme. Launched in 1983 with two major objectives, the primary goal of the LCA programme was to roll out an indigenous replacement for the MiG-21 fighter, the mainstay of the IAF since the early 1970s. The IAF had projected that the MiG-21 fleet would reach the end of its life by 1990 and by 1995, the force structure of the IAF would have reduced to 60 per cent of its authorised strength if not augmented by a modern fighter. The MiG-21 fleet was to be replaced by the LCA, a state-of-the-art fighter which would match any modern combat aircraft in the world at that time. Estimates put the IAF’s requirement of the LCA as 200 single-seat and 20 two-seat aircraft.

MiG-21

The second objective of the LCA programme was not merely limited to the design and production of a new fighter aircraft. DRDO saw the LCA project as the formation of a national asset, the coming together of an integrated scientific/industrial combine with the capability to design and produce in vast numbers all the elements which go to make a state-of-the-art modern fighter. India would have a new technology base to independently develop modern composite material airframes, an afterburning jet engine, fly-by-wire technology and software, avionics, fire control systems, a multi-mode airborne radar, electronic warfare suites and a host of other components. Since Independence, India has aspired to be at least partially self reliant in respect of weapon systems. HAL had pursued this objective and produced under license the Folland Gnat and the indigenous ground attack fighter, the HF-24 Marut which saw service during the 1971 War with Pakistan.

There was a design hiatus for over two decades and the LCA offered the next opportunity for India to be a producer of aircraft instead of being merely a buyer. The scientific community thus saw the LCA programme as the route to building a modern technological conglomerate covering the whole spectrum of disciplines necessary for the design and manufacture of modern military aircraft. The Government appreciated the risks involved in such an approach as India had very little expertise in any of the disciplines required for the development of the LCA. Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd), who was closely associated with the development of the LCA, states in his book titled “The Tejas Story” that the complexities inherent in designing a new fighter from scratch are formidable even for a light-weight fighter like the Tejas. The Indian industry had significant experience deficits going into this project which delayed the project significantly and raised costs. The insistence in pushing the envelop with a new airframe design using large sections of composite structures, a new untested jet engine with no organisational experience in this discipline and in-house development of an airborne multi-mode radar have all contributed to delays and cost overruns. The end result is that the LCA has not been able to replace the ageing MiG-21.

A Monumental Task Ahead

An ambitious project like the LCA is fraught with risks, more so when the design and development teams are venturing into uncharted waters driven by an insistence to forego any external help. Under such conditions the DRDO’s projections of timelines could at best be termed ‘optimistic’ by any standards. The Government was itself skeptical about the potential and capabilities of the scientific community to come together with the development of the airframe, engine, flight control software and multi-mode radar and get the LCA to fly.

In 1983, DRDO obtained permission to initiate a programme for the design and development of a Light Combat Aircraft with the initial flight in 1990 and entry into service by 1995. The project was to be managed by a nodal agency, the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was to be the principal contractor with the primary responsibility for design and system integration, airframe manufacturing, final assembly of the aircraft, flight testing and technical support during service. The National Aeronautics Laboratory (NAL) in conjunction with ADA was to develop the Flight Control Systems (FCS) which included flight control laws and the fly-by-wire system. HAL and Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) were to develop the multi-mode radar and Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) was tasked to design and develop the GTX-35VS Kaveri afterburning engine. Conceptually, this arrangement provided a building-block for the second objective of the LCA project which was the emergence of an aviation and aeronautical conglomerate in India which could hold its own against what the West or Russia could offer. However, these agencies did not evoke the same level of enthusiasm in the IAF in their ability to build a state-of-the-art fighter. The Air Staff Requirements (ASR) were finalised by the IAF in 1985 and it was only to be expected that the IAF would incorporate a wish list of capabilities to meet its operational needs in the foreseeable future. The Project Definition commenced in October 1987, and was completed a year later. This phase defines the detailed design, manufacturing and maintenance requirements and provides critical inputs for the overall project costs. Dassault Aviation was hired to review the project and the design was finalised only in 1990. The IAF had reservations about the technological capabilities of DRDO and HAL to design and manufacture the LCA but a Governmental review committee formed in 1989 was of the view that DRDO had acquired much of the technological competence to undertake the project. However, it was decided that as a matter of prudence, full scale engineering development would be undertaken in two phases as under:-

GTX-35VS Kaveri

Phase I would focus on “proof of concept” with the design, development and testing of two Technology Demonstrators (TD-1 and TD-2) after which two Prototypes (PV-1 and PV-2) would be made.

Phase II would entail building three more prototype versions, including the production model (PV-3), the naval variant (PV-4) and a two-seat trainer (PV-5).

Dilemma for the IAF

The IAF did not place any firm orders for the LCA in the early stages and adopted a “wait and watch” policy. Viewed in retrospect, it is apparent that there were reservations on the capabilities of ADA and other agencies involved in the LCA project which may not have been stated in so many words but were reflected in the policy decisions.

Phase I of the development commenced in 1990 and HAL started work on TD-1 and TD-2 in mid-1991. On November 17, 1995, the first LCA TD-1 was rolled out with much fanfare and TD-2 was rolled out in 1998. The first flight of TD-1 could take place only on January 04, 2001 due to a number of reasons including the financial crisis of 1991, the imposition of sanctions post-1998 nuclear tests and delay in the development of the Kaveri engine. By April 2012, different versions of the LCA including the naval version, have flown 1,821 sorties albeit with the GE 404 engine and Israeli IAI’s EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar. This is proof that the secondary objective of the LCA programme of building India’s aviation technology has been achieved to a great extent. The prime objective of providing the IAF a replacement for the MiG-21 fleet and a modern light-weight combat aircraft for the IAF and the Indian Navy remains a distant dream.

The combat potential of the IAF is depleting rapidly and the fighter fleet may reduce hitting a low of 29 squadrons in the next five years as the MiG-21 and MiG-27 squadrons are retired from service without replacement. The Rafale has emerged as the winner in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender. Hopefully, the Rafale will fly under Indian colours in the near future but delivery schedules are dependent on finalisation of contract and establishment of facilities at HAL for licensed production. The IAF leadership has acknowledged the reduction in the number of combat aircraft but has indicated that the combat punch in war will be maintained as a result of the upgrades on the fleet of Mirage 2000, MiG-29, Jaguar and Su-30. However, in war, numerical superiority is as critical as technological capability and in this respect, the IAF is likely to be in difficulty.

F404 Engine

The very fact that the first squadron of the Tejas Mk I is to be based at Sulur air base near Coimbatore in a non-threat environment, speaks volumes about the confidence of the IAF in the operational capability of the aircraft. Maintenance glitches are expected and close proximity to HAL in Bangalore which is to provide maintenance support would have driven the decision to form the squadron initially in Bangalore and subsequently base it at Sulur. Air Force pilots who have flown the Tejas are extremely appreciative of the handling characteristics of the aircraft but these are all highly qualified and experienced pilots. It is only after the Tejas is flown extensively by young rookie pilots in operational squadrons and over the full range of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions that the Tejas can be branded as a ‘weapon of war’.

The Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) was granted to the Tejas on January 11, 2011. The Final Operational Clearance (FOC) can be granted only after the aircraft meets all stipulated operational parameters particularly carriage and release of armament, all-weather day and night capability, wake penetration and expansion of its flight envelop to the full design specifications which would take a few years.

Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, Chief of the Air Staff, admitted that the IAF will have a serious shortfall in its operational strength in the next five years and the build up to 42 fighter squadrons will begin only by 2022. The Government is unlikely to approve the purchase of additional MMRCA over and above the 126 aircraft already sanctioned nor will it be willing to abandon the Tejas programme. The IAF may have to make do with the LCA to meet inventory shortfalls.

The Imponderables

Progress made so far in the Tejas project is a visible measure of the success of the Team in designing and building a fourth generation fighter aircraft from scratch against heavy odds. However, if the aircraft is to be inducted into operational service before the end of this decade, the IAF, the Indian Navy and ADA would have to address a number of issues as under:-

ELM-2032 Multi-mode Radar

The IAF has ordered 40 Tejas Mk I and ADA reports of a projected requirement for the IAF of 83 Tejas Mk II with the GE F414 engine. But when will the Tejas Mk II fly?

HAL has a current capacity of producing eight to ten aircraft per year but this could be ramped up with a second production line the expenditure on which can be justified only if there is a firm order by the IAF. Will the IAF place a follow-on order beyond the initial for 40 Tejas Mk I aircraft?

The Tejas Mk I taking to the air is only one side of the coin. Product support of the fleet in peace time and also during high intensity deployments under simulated warlike conditions, demand ease of maintenance on the flight line. Will these be addressed before the FOC is obtained?

Composite structures save weight and reduce aircraft’s radar profile but composites have had issues with cracks and de-lamination. Will the Tejas hold up during extensive field use under the rigorous weather conditions and at high altitude bases? Only time will tell.

In the near future, HAL will be involved in the concurrent production of the Tejas Mk I and Mk II, Dhruv helicopter, licensed production of the Rafale, a new basic trainer for the IAF, Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft, the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft and the Intermediate Jet Trainer. Will the competing requirements of each one of these projects force HAL to relegate the LCA project to low priority particularly in view of the lukewarm approach of the customers to the Tejas Mk I?

ADA has contracted for 99 GE F414 engines for the Tejas Mk II and the first flight is expected in December 2014. Series production is expected to begin in 2016. Will this plan go as per schedule? General Electric Aviation is to supply the initial batch of ten engines but when will the balance be made in India through Transfer of Technology?

The naval version of the Tejas flew on April 28, 2012 nearly two years after roll-out. There are many unresolved issues on the naval Tejas including the heavier undercarriage and a comparatively under-powered engine. The initial test flight was carried out without retracting the undercarriage. The Defence Acquisition Council has sanctioned building only eight of the naval version of these planes. Besides, it is yet to be seen if the naval version of Tejas Mk I can operate from a carrier. It is understood that FOC will be considered only for the naval version of the Tejas Mk II and not for the Mk I. A team from the US Navy is providing assistance to make the Tejas capable of operating from a carrier. But when will this status be achieved?

Summary

The secondary objective of the LCA programme to boost the aviation industry in India has been achieved to a large extent but the Tejas must also meet the IAF’s need to fill a crucial gap in its combat potential due to the phasing out of the fleet of MiG-21 and MiG-27. The Tejas programme is poised at a critical stage and the IAF cannot afford any further delay in the programme. In February 2012, Defence Minister AK Antony urged HAL to realign its business processes and for strategic alliances and joint ventures so as to remain globally competitive. India’s rigid domestic-only policy has been relaxed so that the operational capabilities of the Tejas can be upgraded but more needs to be done to ensure that the Tejas Mk II is delivered on time. The success of the Tejas Mk I in the IAF will provide the impetus for the procurement of the Tejas Mk II.

Tejas

If the Tejas Mk I does not fit the bill as a multi-role combat aircraft, the fact that it helped to develop the aviation industry in India will not cut ice with IAF pilots tasked to fly it into harm’s way. The key to the future of the Tejas Mk I and Tejas Mk II lies in obtaining the FOC at the earliest.

The LCA offers a viable solution for the IAF to bridge the gap in its combat power within the next five years but the situation as it stands is riddled with imponderables. Collaborative consultation and policy direction at the highest levels are essential if the Tejas is to be inducted in large numbers as the future fourth generation fighter in the IAF.