Indian Defence Review

Paramilitary forces must also assist in enforcing forest laws to protect the interests of the tribals. Once sanctuary is denied, it would be easier to identify and eliminate the Maoists cadres progressively.

But tragically, the situation today appears extremely difficult if not irredeemable as the opportunity to re-establish the fundamentals of governance seems to be receding into oblivion. The first step therefore is to contain the violence so as to create the necessary space to set the stage for local governance to re-establish their roots in the affected areas. Thereafter, the state governments would have to implement a properly crafted strategy to remove the conditions that lead to the creation of ungoverned space. This needs to begin by demonstrating the necessary will and congruity in political thought, enhancing informational, economic and law enforcement paradigms.

As part of broad contours of the strategy implementation process the police and paramilitary forces must show an increased visible presence of well trained and equipped police personnel in areas controlled by the Maoists. Simultaneously measures must be taken to moderate the intellectuals supporting the cause of Maoists and manage the media to apply necessary objectivity and discretion in reporting. An empowered appointed body by the government must engage the top Maoist leadership into constant dialogue indicating readiness for ceasefire. In the absence of the desired response from the Maoists the security forces must take the war into the enemy camp and target the second rung leadership who control the armed cadres and execute missions.

To begin with, the government could also consider simultaneously increasing the recruitment through an ordinance if required to fill the void at all levels in the rank and file of the police forces of the affected states as well as that of the central paramilitary forces. Recruitment of ex-servicemen in police and paramilitary forces especially in the Maoist affected areas could also be considered. This would not only cover the existing deficiency in rank and file on a fast track and minimize training requirements apart from providing local intelligence as well; it would also deny the Maoists access to this disciplined and well trained human resource. Feasibility of lateral transfer of battle-hardened middle level military officers into police and paramilitary forces deployed to tackle Maoists with an option of absorption into permanent cadre could also be examined. This will enhance availability of experienced leadership in a short time frame. All agencies engaged in tackling the Maoists challenge must shed inhibitions and mutual suspicion as also desist from turf wars in the interest of national security.

It goes without saying that extraordinary situations require extraordinary measures. There is, therefore, an imperative need to take unconventional measures to prevent the Maoists from achieving their goal to overthrow the national government and seize power by 2050. Available paramilitary forces must be redeployed throughout the Red Corridor drawing fresh operational boundaries based on terrain, areas of operation, and tactical considerations. These boundaries may not always be coincident with the existing state boundaries. All paramilitary forces and the state police engaged in operations against the Maoists must be brought under a single unified command logically under the Home Ministry at the center. While operations by the paramilitary forces may transcend state boundaries, deployment and operations by the state police may be confined to state boundaries.

The Maoists certainly lack the capacity to threaten the National government but they do have the power to deter investments and development in some of the poorest regions which also happens to be among the richest in some vital resources ““ notably iron and coal.

Security forces must commence operations by clearing pockets and axes connecting these pockets in the areas under Maoist control. Simultaneously, the state government machinery must move in and quickly establish administrative control. Hand in hand, political parties must take steps to reassure the tribals about the security of their assets and their future. They need to organize a mass movement to counter the Maoist influence. There would obviously be a need for proper coordination amongst security forces, the administrative machinery, NGOs and political parties.

The central and state governments must set up coordinating agencies and in consultation adopt special measures on a war footing to wean away children from the clutches of the Maoists. The state governments must take over the responsibility of the education and care of children to prevent them succumbing to Maoist influence. While dealing with those children already in the rank and file of the Maoists, security forces will have to display a high level of maturity and restraint. Employment of the gun against them will be counterproductive as its deleterious effects have been witnessed in the Palestine Intifada. Every effort will have to be directed towards apprehending the child combatants instead of eliminating them. Apprehended children should then be sent to reform centres especially set up at state level for de-indoctrination and subsequently restored to their families and school.

The bottom line therefore, is that a clearly defined strategy and humane approach are needed to deal with combatant children. Security forces would also have to religiously guard against using locals and children for obtaining information either voluntarily or through coercion even when such denial is at the cost of undermining tactical or operational level plans. This will be a small price to pay for the sake of success in the long run. If the locals are not compelled to take sides, then over a period of time, it would be easier to win their hearts and minds. The local government will need to ensure that the tribals are accorded rights over forest produce and encouraged to trade through cooperatives. Schools, basic health care programme, functioning of local governing bodies comprising tribals and other important schemes, like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, must be revived.

The government must direct banks to move into such areas and offer easy financing options. Paramilitary forces must also assist in enforcing forest laws to protect the interests of the tribals. Once sanctuary is denied, it would be easier to identify and eliminate the Maoists cadres progressively. Sanctuary denial and interdiction are typical means for setting the stage for the government to address the root causes of insurgency.