Indian Defence Review

Building Capacity for Precision Strike

PLA planners have observed the primacy of precision strike in modern warfare and are investing in both the offensive and defensive elements of this emerging regime. China is pursuing an array of improved ISR assets ranging from UAVs, constellations of various satellites and more ‘informationalised’ Special Operations forces. Such forces could provide targeting data for long range precision strikes when strikes are linked by more robust communications systems.

To carry out the precision strike, in the near future, China will have the following:

• Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) conventionally armed.
• Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) conventionally armed.
• Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs)
• Anti-ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)
• Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs)
• Precision Artillery

Improving Expeditionary Operations

PLA expeditionary forces include three airborne divisions, two amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades, about seven Special Operations groups and one regimental size reconnaissance element in the Second Artillery. The capabilities of these units are steadily improving with the introduction of new equipment, improved unit-level tactics, and greater coordination of joint operations.

In addition to amphibious assaults, missions for these forces could include; Special Operations to facilitate amphibious operations and disrupt communications nodes, air defence and the movement of reserve forces reacting to amphibious operations; airborne assaults to seize airfields for follow-on infantry forces and reconnaissance to provide targeting information and battle damage assessments.

PLA ground forces in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions have received upgraded amphibious armour and other vehicles, such as tanks and armoured personnel carriers and may deploy additional armoured vehicles and air cushioned troops vehicles to improve lethality and speed for seaborne assaults. Airborne forces are likely to receive the newly purchased IL-76/CANDIDs from Russia and may acquire modern, armoured vehicles that can be airdropped. The quality and quantity of army aviation training has improved in recent years. Army aviation regiments actively study and explore new fighting tactics and training methods to increase their joint operations capability.

Expanding Air Defence

The PLA has shifted from point defence of key military, industrial and political targets to a new Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign doctrine based on a modern, integrated air defence system capable of effective Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Defensive Counter Air (DCA). Under this doctrine, the PLA will use aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, long range artillery, special operations forces, naval forces and guerrilla units to destroy an enemy’s ability to conduct offensive air operations and provide comprehensive defence of PRC airspace.

Space and Counter-space Developments

China has accorded building a modern ISR architecture a high priority in its comprehensive military modernisation, in particular the development of advanced space-based C4ISR and targeting capabilities. China’s access to space will continue to improve as it develops newer boosters to replace the aging Long March system. Acquiring more sophisticated space systems will allow China to expand the reach of its anti-access forces and could serve as a key enabler for regional power projection.

Small Satellites

China is studying and seeking foreign assistance for developing small satellites. It has launched a number of them since 2000, including an oceanographic research satellite, imagery satellites and environmental research satellites. China is also developing microsatellites, weighing less than 100 kg for remote sensing and networks of electro-optical and radar satellites. These developments could allow for a more rapid reconstitution or expansion of their satellite force given any disruption in coverage.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons

Beijing continues to pursue an offensive anti-satellite system. China can currently destroy or disable satellites only by launching a ballistic missile or space-launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. However, there are many risks associated with this method including adverse consequences from the use of nuclear weapons. Evidence exists that China is improving its situational awareness in space, which will give it the ability to track and identify most satellites. Such capability will allow for the de-confliction of Chinese satellites, and would also be required for offensive action. At least one of the satellite attack systems appears to be a ground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.

Enhanced Reconnaissance Capability

China participated in the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) programme with the CBERS-1 and CBERS-2 remote sensing satellites. These satellites can take 20 metre resolution images in swaths exceeding 100 kilometres and transmit those digital images to earth stations. The programme will continue with follow-on satellite CBERS-2B, CBERS-3 and CBERS-4 which reportedly increase camera resolution substantially.

China is interested in acquiring a disaster environmental/monitoring satellite constellation called Huanjing. Phase 1 of the programme calls for three satellites, two of which are equipped for visible, infrared and multi-spectral imaging while the third will possess a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) to see through weather. Phase 2 of the Huanjing programme allows for eight satellites (four imaging and four SAR) in orbit simultaneously.

In the next decade, Beijing most likely will field radar, ocean surveillance and high resolution photoreconnaissance satellites. China will eventually deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance and Earth resource systems with military applications. In the interim, China probably will supplement existing coverage with commercial SPOT, LANDSAT, RADARSAT Ikonos and Russian satellite imagery.

Exploiting Information Warfare

The PLA considers active offence to be the most important requirement for information warfare to destroy or disrupt an adversary’s capability to receive and process data. Launched mainly by remote combat and covert methods, the PLA could employ information warfare preemptively to gain the initiative in a crisis. Specified information warfare objectives include the targeting and destruction of an enemy’s command system, shortening the duration of war, minimising casualties on both sides, enhancing operational efficiency, reducing effects on domestic populations and gaining support from the international community. The PLA’s information warfare practices also reflect investment in electronic countermeasures and defence against electronic attack (e.g. electronic and infrared decoys, angle reflectors and false target generators).

China’s Future Technological Profile: 2020

Land-Based Missile Technology

Ground-based cruise missile capability is likely to have been developed. In addition, ground silo-based CSS-4, CSS-3, CSS-5 solid fuel ICBMS, road mobile DF31 and DF31A would have been developed.

Air Defence

The most important aspect of the PLA’s Air Defence development has been the acquisition and fielding of advanced, Russian made SA-10 SAM systems and their placement along the Taiwan Strait. The PLA is also working to reverse-engineer a domestic variant of the SA-10 (the HQ 9) of equal capability. This year, the PLA is expected to field the extended range S-300PMU2, which will allow China to engage targets over Taiwan airspace.

Radio Frequency and Laser Weapon Development

Long range beam weapons would use narrow radio frequency beams to engage targets such as aircraft or Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). Short-range systems would be packed into missiles or artillery shells and launched into the vicinity of targets such as radars or command posts before releasing an RF pulse. In recent years, the application of RF weapons has expanded to include deployment on small vehicles or in suitcases for targeting critical military or civilian infrastructures where close access is possible.

Computer Network Operations

China’s Computer Network Operations (CNO) include computer network attack, computer network defence and computer network exploitation. The PLA sees CNO as critical to seize the initiative and achieve ‘electromagnetic dominance’ early in a conflict and as a force multiplier. Although there is no evidence of a formal Chinese CNO doctrine, PLA theorists have coined the term “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” to outline the integrated use of electronic warfare, CNO and limited kinetic strikes against key C4 nodes to disrupt the enemy’s battlefield network information systems. The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks.

Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)

China is continuing to develop a joint Battle Management System which the entire PLA will use for strategic, campaign, tactical planning and operations.

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Socialisation of Logistics

China’s logistics reform features the integration of the civil sector with the military procurement system as a modern adaptation of “People’s War”. Under this concept, the PLA will acquire common and dual-use items on the market. Increasing number of logistics functions will be outsourced, especially when civilian industry can perform similar functions at low costs.