Indian Defence Review

The unexpected speed of the operations towards Dacca in this sector emboldened the Army Commander to allot 340 Mountain Brigade Group, then engaged at Bogra under Thapan, to harden the punch towards Dacca, little knowing that the allotted brigad was inextricably involved in the Bogra battle and there were no other formations handy to relieve it. And even if the bridge had been available the ferry sites across the Jamuna were either in Pakistani hands or rendered inoperable. This promise of support elated Nagra for a while, but the reality soon dawned on him and he set about dealing with the situation with his own resources, although he was looking forward to some armour to deal with the tanks holding up his advance beyond the Turag.

By the last light of 14 December, Nagra managed to establish a firm base on the Turag with 95 Mountain Brigade Group. 13 Guards and 13 Rajputana Rifles were on their way from the rear areas but had not yet fetched up. 167 Mountain Brigade Group under Irani was in the process of concentrating in the area of Tangail. 2 Para Battalion was also collecting itself. Although the essential fighting transport with the unit had come over its entire administrative transport fleet, as well as that of the sector, was still north of the Brahmaputra. Kler’s force had got stuck along the Turag, and the development of further operations along this axis would have to wait for the buildup of the remainder of the forces. But time was running out fast.

En route, Sant Singh was required to establish a roadblock in the area of Nayarhat to intercept Pakistani troops crossing from the west.

Nagra brought Sant Singh forward and, allotting him 13 Guards, just concentrated in the Chandpur area, asked him to advance along the Chandpur-Sabhar-Mirpur axis to secure Sabhar by the first light on 15 December and capture Mirpur Bridge by the next day. En route, Sant Singh was required to establish a roadblock in the area of Nayarhat to intercept Pakistani troops crossing from the west. On completing this forward movement, 167 Mountain Brigade Group was either to resume the advance towards Dacca if Kler had been able to establish a bridgehead across the Turag or cross the river south of Kler’s brigade and establish a roadblock astride the Tungi road, about three miles north of Tungi.

Sant Singh started his advance with 13 Guards along the Chandra-Sabhar-Mirpur axis about 2200 hours on 14 December. No information regarding the expected opposition along this route was available, but it was expected that some would be met near Sabhar, and that the bridge would certainly be held in strength and was likely to be supported by some tanks. Any advance beyond Sabhar in daylight would therefore have met with disaster. Nagra’s weakness in antitank potential was becoming apparent. After having established a block at Nayarhat, 3 Guards contacted Sabhar in the early hours of 15 December, and while the position was being outflanked the Pakistanis withdrew in haste without a serious fight. A military farm and transmitting station areas were cleared by 0900 hours while intermittent fire continued from the builtup area of the town.

A prisoner of war later revealed that a composite force of some 400 Razakars and Rangers under a major had been hastily dispatched and had reached Sabhar only on the afternoon of 14 December. According to him, about 800 men had followed them through the place from Magura to Dacca. By the end of the day, Sant Singh secured the town, causing casualties to the Pakistani holding troops to the tune of 18 killed and 20 wounded at the cost of his own two killed and 14 wounded, and capturing some 60 small arms. Fearful of the Pakistani tanks operating on the axis, Nagra brought in 2 Para Battalion, the only unit equipped with four 106-mm recoilless guns and RPG7s, to take over the advance from Sabhar in darkness.

The Para Battalion resumed the advance at 2200 hours on 15 December, leading with the modified jeeps on which medium machine guns were mounted. After overcoming a few minor delaying positions it contacted the Mirpur bridge defences about 0200 hours on 16 December. The battalion had firmed in on the western side of the bridge and made a bold effort to rush it with a modified jeep party and a commando platoon, but suffered heavy casualties. The casualties, both in jeeps and personnel, lay on the bridge, and the raiding party rejoined the battalion’s firm base to the west of the bridge.

The very fact that the Pakistanis were not able to destroy the bridge speeded the entry of Indian troops into Dacca the next morning.

Although the bridge was not physically secured, the Para Battalion dominated it with fire to the extent that although the bridge was prepared for demolition the Pakistanis were not able to execute this task. The Indian casualties comprised one officer wounded, four other ranks killed and one taken prisoner. Two jeeps were destroyed. This was a foolish, but nonetheless bold, action which failed.

Mirpur Bridge, across the Budhi Ganga, is the gateway to Dacca. It was surrounded by a sprawling colony on both sides of the river. The very fact that the Pakistanis were not able to destroy the bridge speeded the entry of Indian troops into Dacca the next morning. Otherwise, the construction of a bridge, with no equipment within easy reach, would have taken days.

With this came the end of the hostilities in East Pakistan. Although officially the northern sector had been placed under the operational command of Headquarters IV Corps, they had no contact with each other till the surrender ceremony.

Meanwhile, 167 Mountain Brigade was taking time to concentrate forward. To speed up the operation, Nagra pushed up 10 J and K Rifles, the only battalion concentrated so far, and two companies of 7 Bihar. These battalions crossed the Turag on the night of 15/16 December, at sites already reconnoitred and prepared for them by Kler’s brigade, and established themselves between Autpara crossroads and Tungi, on the main axis facing north and south, about midnight. A convoy of nine vehicles carrying troops and ammunition from Jaydebpur to Dacca was ambushed by this force about 0400 hours on 15 December. All the vehicles were set ablaze, 16 Pakistanis were killed, three captured, and the remainder got away.

Prisoners confirmed that about 400 to 500 men under the redoubtable Col Mahmood of 31 Baluch were holding the crossroads with two or three tanks. About midday on 16 December, when preparations were afoot for Niazi’s formal surrender of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, Mahmood attempted to break through the road-block and join the defences of Tungi. But this bid failed at the cost of heavy casualties to both sides. Fighting went on till late in the afternoon, when a ceasefire was effected by whiteflagged emissaries. It appeared that Mahmood had not received orders to halt hostilities. This valiant officer, who had earlier refused to withdraw Prom Jamalpur, had now spurned surrender orders and tried to break through with no more than 100 men of his own battalion and a few stragglers from other units. With this came the end of the hostilities in East Pakistan. Although officially the northern sector had been placed under the operational command of Headquarters IV Corps, they had no contact with each other till the surrender ceremony.

The British Broadcasting Corporation had announced in its evening newscast on 15 December that India had agreed to a ceasefire in East Pakistan at Gen Niazi’s request from 1700 hours to 0900 hours the next day. Later, at 0400 hours on 16 December, Kler picked up a wireless intercept from Niazi’s headquarters at Dacca advising his troops to observe a ceasefire from 0500 hours. Nagra was to pick up Kler at 0600 hours on 16 December and was apprised of this message. No such information had been received from Headquarters Eastern Command.

…there they got in touch with Niazis headquarters, and at 1100 hours on 16 December they were received outside Niazis office by Brig Bakar, Chief of Staff, Pakistan Eastern Army.

Nagra, accompanied by Kler and Sant Singh, moved to 2 Para Battalion position east of Mirpur Bridge to examine the possibility of a quick entry into Dacca city. On reaching there, he was briefed that there had been no exchange of fire at the bridge from 0500 hours on 16 December. The wireless intercept, as also the ominous silence over the battlefield, prompted Nagra to send through his ADC and two officers of 2 Para Battalion this message to Niazi: “My dear Abdullah, I am here. The game is up. I suggest you give yourself up to me, and I will look after you.” Nagra had been some years earlier Indian Military Attache in Pakistan and knew Niazi personally.

His ADC and the Adjutant 2 Para Battalion drove across the bridge in a whiteflagged jeep to deliver the message about 0900 hours. They returned after an hour and a half, followed by a staff car bringing Maj Gen Mohammed Jamshed, General Officer Commanding Pakistan 36 Infantry Division, operationally responsible for the defence of the Dacca fortress. A major incident was providentially avoided. A whiteflagged jeep carrying a Pakistani captain was on its way to inform Nagra that Jamshed was waiting on the other side of the bridge. Some trigger-happy jawans of Para Battalion opened fire on the jeep, hitting one of their own majors and inflicting a bullet graze wound on the Pakistani officer who had come as the representative of Gen Niazi with an offer of surrender.

Nagra, Kler, Sant Singh and Siddiqi got into Jamshed’s car (Nagra flew his 2 Mountain Division flag on its bonnet) and drove to Jamshed’s headquarters. From there they got in touch with Niazi’s headquarters, and at 1100 hours on 16 December they were received outside Niazi’s office by Brig Bakar, Chief of Staff, Pakistan Eastern Army. Niazi arrived later from his underground bunker, which was some distance away. After informing Headquarters Eastern Command at Calcutta, and also Headquarters IV Corps, Nagra drove straight to Niazi’s headquarters.

Click to buy

On seeing Nagra enter his office Niazi broke down, and sobbingly commented: “Pindi main bethe hue haramzadon ne marwa diya” (Those bastards at higher headquarters at Pindi have let me down). After crying on Nagra’s shoulder, Niazi turned to Kler, who was wearing a maroon turban and wings, and asked him if he was in command of the Para Brigade dropped at Tangail. He was told that they had dropped only one battalion and he did not quite believe this. He then asked Kler to name his regiment. When told that he belonged to the Corps of Signals, he quipped that in their army they did not give brigades to signal officers. Kler retorted: “No wonder you lost the war.”

For a while, jubilant mobs took over and went on the rampage, but order was soon re-established. Niazi had to be extricated from the crowd at the race course and placed under strong escort to prevent him from being lynched. On the other hand, his Indian counterpart Aurora was carried shoulder high with acclaim as the liberator of Bangladesh.

Niazis selection proved unfortunate for Pakistan. He was unimaginative and did not grasp the situation in the province in its true perspective.

Lieut Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi was selected to take over from Gen Tikka Khan in August 1971, when under local and international political pressures Yahya Khan made an effort to establish some measure of civil control in East Pakistan. Dr A. M. Malik was accordingly installed as Governor and Niazi as Martial Law Administrator and Commander Eastern Command. From the Pakistani point of view, it would have been preferable to retain Tikka Khan in command of the troops in view of his knowledge of local problems, but his image as the “butcher of Bangladesh” was becoming an obstacle to the pacification programme to be carried out under the new setup.

Niazi’s selection proved unfortunate for Pakistan. He was unimaginative and did not grasp the situation in the province in its true perspective. He was engrossed in platoon and company actions in the border outposts and failed to see the magnitude of the military, political and economic problems facing him. Although personally brave and known for his daring visits to forward troops under fire, he did not inspire confidence in the perception and conduct of operations at the higher plane.

Fear of defeat started germinating in Niazis mind from 6 December onwards, that is two days after the start of all-out hostilities in East Pakistan.

The eastern theatre, far removed from the Pakistani General Headquarters in Rawalpindi needed a man of crisis who could face up to the sensitive and ticklish problems confronting him both in the short and long terms and conduct operations with the minimum supervision and guidance. On the other hand, Niazi liked worldly pleasures and the pomp and show of the status he enjoyed, and he indulged in them freely. He was certainly not the man for the job in hand. He lost the battle before it started.

Fear of defeat started germinating in Niazi’s mind from 6 December onwards, that is two days after the start of all-out hostilities in East Pakistan. His appraisal of the situation, passed on to Pindi for the benefit of his superiors, was that India had invaded the province with eight infantry divisions, four armoured regiments, 39 BSF battalions, and 60,000 to 70,000 Freedom Fighters. Against superior air strength, the Pakistani Air Force had been shot out of the skies and as a result the Indian Air Force operated in complete freedom. Attacks by Indian troops were supported from the air with rockets and napalm. The Freedom Fighters were extremely active in the interior and had attacked bridges, ferries and lines of communication. Because of the extensive disruption they had caused, replenishment of supplies, reinforcing troops and readjustment of defensive positions had become extremely difficult.

He (Niazi) reiterated that he and his men would fight to the last man and to the last round,” a course that was belied by this earlier note of despondency. This massage was picked up by the Indian intercept services and was exploited in building up psychological pressure against Niazi and his troops.

Niazi’s fortresses at Dinajpur, Rangpur, Maulvi Bazaar, Brahmanbaria, Laksham, Chandpur and Jessore were under heavy pressure although still holding out. Chittagong was likely to be cut off any moment. His troops had been involved in counterinsurgency and other active operations for nine months and were battle-weary. Niazi counted the war in the east as having started on 17 November with the battle of Bayra, and the attrition of both men and material had greatly increased without hope of recoupment.

Paucity of armour, artillery and air support had aggravated the situation. Desertion of Razakars and Mujahids to the Indians had increased manifold. Niazi however assured the Pakistani higher command that his troops were in good spirits, had inflicted heavy casualties on the Indians, and would fight to the bitter end. He also informed them that they would fall back on the rear defensive positions, resorting to the fortress defences. He reiterated that he and his men would fight to the last man and to the last round,” a course that was belied by this earlier note of despondency.

This massage was picked up by the Indian intercept services and was exploited in building up psychological pressure against Niazi and his troops. With the ever-increasing pressure of the developing Indian thrust lines and psychological warfare, the tone of Niazi’s messages to Rawalpindi became more and more despondent. He went on emphasising the critical shortage of men and material, knowing fully well that these deficiencies could not be remedied at that stage. Battle conditions on 6 December were not however as grim as he reported to his superiors.

The Pakistanis had given a good account of themselves in fighting the initial battles closer to the border, and by and large had fallen back intact on the main defensive fortresses. In fact, they were putting up a spirited fight and resisting the Indian efforts to overcome them. The Indian thrusts had managed to bypass the islands of resistance at places, but no serious threat had developed in the rear areas so far. Instead of taking charge of reorganising and readjusting his defence zone, Niazi went on lamenting on the hopeless situation he and his troops supposedly found themselves in.

On 7 December, Yahya Khan, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, commended Niazi for the brave resistance put up by his troops against heavy odds and advised him to hold on to his defensive positions regardless of loss of territory. The Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army assured Niazi that Chinese and American intervention was soon likely and that he should sustain the resistance long enough to make this possible. But there did not however seem to be any tangible basis for such an assurance. Perhaps it was given to encourage Niazi to keep his end up while efforts were made to seek a political solution in the United Nations, which was debating the issue.

Yahya Khan could do little more than reassure the Governor that the world powers were making serious efforts at the UN to pass a ceasefire resolution.

Governor Malik joined Niazi in painting a hopeless picture of the situation, obviously based on Niazi’s briefing. He confirmed the collapse of the civil administration because of increasing rebel activities. The movement of supplies was paralysed, and he warned Rawalpindi that Dacca would be without food in seven days. Law and order had broken down and the writ of the Freedom Fighters ran in the entire countryside. Non-Bengali and other loyal elements faced sure butchery the moment the Indians broke through the Pakistani defences. Malik emphasised that if any friendly foreign power meant business nothing less than physical intervention would help, and that too should materialise within the next 48 hours.

If no help of this nature was possible, Malik asked for permission to open negotiations for a ceasefire on honourable terms. This would save unnecessary destruction of property and loss of lives. To prolong the struggle when the end appeared inevitable was, according to him, utterly futile. Yahya Khan could do little more than reassure the Governor that the world powers were making serious efforts at the UN to pass a ceasefire resolution. On 7 December, Pakistan managed to secure a favourable resolution in the General A ssembly, and it was apparent that within a short period a ceasefire would be forced on the warring nations by overwhelming world pressures.

Click to buy

This impelled the Indian forces to intensify their operations to make the maximum gains before hostilities ceased. Niazi should have made efforts to frustrate the Indian attempts to make further ingress, but he seemed to have given up altogether. He reportedly informed the Chief of Army Staff on 9 December that regrouping troops and readjusting defences had become impossible because of Indian mastery of the skies and the extreme hostility of the local population. He emphasised that movement even by night was difficult because of the extensive disruption of surface transport facilities. He however assured his superiors that his troops were putting up a good fight and would continue to do so as long as required by the national interest.