Indian Defence Review

In the overall context therefore, effective counter-Maoist actions would be contingent upon extension of effective governance to fill up the vacuums left so far and following up with amelioration of an unjust system. It is in their violent opposition to that effort of the state that the Maoists come out to be a real threat to the nation. However, as discussed, the situation in the country, burdened as it is by corruption and political opportunism at the cost of the society, has to be improved further before the dream of defeating the Maoist rebellion can come true. It is a long haul indeed !

The next question is as to why would anyone want the Maoist activities to be stopped? No one in particular, after all, seems to be adversely affected by it. Villagers continue to live as they did before, a deal better actually because the Maoists have caused their earnings to increase, while the state has started spending some of its allocations – what is left after collective graft is satiated – to create facilities, even if these are rudimentary and soon to go defunct in absence of a maintenance mechanism. Traders, transporters, contractors and miners continue to thrive while paying ‘levy’ to the rebels which comes cheaper than the bribes they had to pass on to various government functionaries and local ‘rangdars’. Thus traders and transporters may fix exorbitant rates,  contractors may escape the stipulations of scope and specifications and miners may exploit areas many times more that the allotted  blocks.

The Unemployed  have found sources of income through a gigantic industry of illegal mining, sale of mining explosives, gun running and as informers and ‘carriers’ of logistic loads for the Maoists. Some entrepreneurs have started bonafide business: tailoring, printing, supply of bottled water, batteries, medicines etc.; their life depends on these ventures. Politicians depend on them for garnering votes and state employees are having a bonanza, receiving higher ‘cuts’ from projects half done and no accountability in the name of Maoist threat. Employees of most public department and undertakings – Public Works, Health, Education, Civil Supplies, the Food Corporation, Petroleum Companies, etc. – are benefitted by the lack of accountability that the instability offers to them. Even the top industrialists, ‘class enemies’ of communists, continue to do pretty well in the affected areas. At the worst, even if someone does land up on the wrong side of the Maoists, relief can always be bought in exchange of a ‘reasonable’ consideration – after a good deal of friendly haggling.  There is bliss all around ! Yes, among those who should be concerned, there is no pressing need to battle the Maoists.

The third question is that as to who would fight the rebellion? Obviously, it must be the state. But the state is constituted of those very people who, as discussed, have no interest in doing so. No doubt, the armed actions would be progressed by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and some of the state armed police battalions under the overall management of state police. Similarly, the civic part of the counter-action would be undertaken by the state institutions. However,  even if funds are made available, the state does not have the institutional mechanism to plan and execute the large range of development works over vast and remote areas. Further, the culture being what it is in these departments, it may be fair to discard any thought of the state succeeding in bringing about any socio-economic transformation any time soon. That leaves the police, a disciplined force, as the sole recourse to stave Maoism off, with little, if any, conjoined effort from the rest of the state. That is not a condition that may defeat a rebellion so vast and so entrenched. Therefore the police forces are in for a long journey over undulating ground, till the rest of the state is able to gear up.

The fourth question has three sub-sets. One is, does the state have adequate police forces to clear and control one fifth of the Indian landmass, particularly when the people excuse themselves from offering support? The answer is: ‘no’. There are just 81 battalions of police forces deployed in an area so vast. The strength is expected to be raised to 102 in next three years, whereas even by conservative estimates, 150 are needed. Next, can the strength be build up soon? The answer is: ‘may be’, in three to four years. Lastly, can the state afford that kind of expansion? The answer is: ‘at great cost’; that cost could be better disposed in development. In any case, as discussed, there is a plethora of  ‘rebels’ of different shades; whom and how many will the state decimate?

The fifth question that arises is that as to who would replace the Maoists after it is defeated? Would the state expand its institutions to govern well the vast remote-land, or would there be another void for the muscle-politicians and ‘dons’ to walk in and carry on their trade – till another uprising gains momentum?

The last question to be taken note of is that will development, if and when brought about, succeed in turning people’s alienation? The fact is that appeasement by development whets the appetite for more freebees and starts another kind of manipulative race. Therefore, strong arm of law enforcement is still needed to reap the benefits of development.

State – Centre Relations

By far the most effective solution to the Maoist rebellion depends on the manner the State-Centre Relations are articulated. In this respect, the following factors have to be considered :-

One, the State-Centre Relationship is dictated by a struggle for the ‘chair’; Maoist rebellion is not on the main agenda.

Two, resolute leadership of any hue – among social activists, politicians or police – for efficient conduct of counter-insurgency operations are not being allowed to emerge due to petty rivalries, turf wars and the lure of graft. Most counter-insurgency ‘action plans’ stand hijacked in favour of personal or group agenda of the local power-brokers.

Three, even a semblance of law enforcement remains absent in Maoist infested areas. There is no fear of law.

A Quest

Having developed vested interest in continuation of their terror-based dictatorship, functionaries among the Maoists, the ideologues as well as the all powerful area commanders, have no pressing urge to seek accommodation within the democratic system. The Maoist rebellion would therefore have to be controlled by finding best answers to the questions discussed above. By adoption of terror tactics the Maoists have opened a window through which the state may be able to find a way.

However, the fight has not even gone past the first ladder yet.