If US/NATO are politically and materially unable to maintain the level of their engagement in Afghanistan, how will India find the resources to do so? Such a move in a situation of a quasi-civil war, with Pakistan serving as a hinterland for one of the parties, would be disastrous.
President Karzai’s relations with Pakistan have fluctuated between various degrees of distrust. President Musharraf has just acknowledged publicly how terrible his personal relations were with the Afghan President. In his strategy for survival Karzai made overtures to post-Musharraf Pakistan by, amongst other steps, easing out some prominent figures from important positions who were seen as too anti-Pakistan. But the overbearing way in which Pakistan treats Afghanistan has rocked the relationship again. With the problems created by the Pakistani Taliban on the Afghan side of the border and retaliatory action by the Afghans on the Pakistani side of the border, mutual recriminations continue.
Efforts by the US, Turkey, Iran, Russia and others to develop some cooperative arrangements involving Afghanistan and Pakistan haven’t succeeded. India has proposed to Pakistan talks on Afghanistan, if only to expose Pakistan’s self-serving canards about an Indian threat to Pakistan emanating from Afghanistan, but Pakistan calls such a proposal premature. Any tripartite India-Afghanistan-Pakistan talks are therefore out of the question for now.
India’s position on the reconciliation strategy has evolved from frontal opposition to any accommodation of the Taliban to supporting a diluted version of it in the form of re-integration to, finally, endorsing it as an Afghan-led initiative subject to acceptance of the provisions of the Afghan constitution. Any genuine reconciliation in Afghanistan in the present circumstances seems almost impossible. If reconciliation is manufactured so to say in order to provide a cover for US and NATO to withdraw prematurely because of the compulsions of an electorally-dictated political time-table, India cannot but have concerns. India has once again cautioned the US against any premature withdrawal from Afghanistan, but India has little say in formulating US policies in Afghanistan which are dictated by its own priorities.
India supports President Karzai, who, whatever his overtures to Pakistan and the Taliban, accords a place to India in Afghanistan’s regional strategy. Any enlightened Afghan leadership has to factor in India’s positive balancing role in the region in the years ahead, besides profiting from trade and investment linkages with a country growing as fast as India, not only within the SAARC framework but also the wider connectivity arrangements being forged in the Central Asian region. Karzai, it would seem, wants India to play a more robust and confident role in Afghanistan, the foundation for which is sought to be laid by the document on Strategic Partnership signed by the two countries during the President’s current visit to India.
The core problem is Pakistan as the safe-havens of the Taliban are located there. Those who sheltered Osama bin Laden for years will not deny shelter to those who are seen as kith and kin by some and strategic assets by others within the Pakistan establishment.
India remains cautious about being caught in the Afghan tangle more than necessary, even if India is firm about its right to be present in Afghanistan and rejects any veto in this regard by Pakistan. India is providing limited training to Afghan police and military personnel. It has earmarked US$ 2 billion as economic assistance to Afghanistan for development work, in projects in the medical and education sectors etc. For security reasons India may now be compelled to move away from large infrastructure projects to more of capacity building.
The question of India sending troops to Afghanistan is raised at times, without thinking through sufficiently the issues involved. It would be a grave mistake to induct Indian troops into Afghanistan while western troops are being withdrawn. Would one perceived occupying force be replacing another? If US/NATO are politically and materially unable to maintain the level of their engagement in Afghanistan, how will India find the resources to do so? Such a move in a situation of a quasi-civil war, with Pakistan serving as a hinterland for one of the parties, would be disastrous. Pakistan will exploit the situation to the hilt, directing the jihadi elements, both Afghan and Pakistani, at India. In the fractured sectarian situation in the sub-continent it would be unwise for a regional country like India to send troops to Afghanistan. In any case, how will India send and maintain armed troops in a country with which it has no direct borders, unless this is mandated by a Security Council resolution?
A regional solution to the Afghan problem is always an attractive idea, but the reality is less promising. Can a regional solution leave out US and NATO, especially as the US intends to maintain forces and bases in Afghanistan? What is the value of regional countries meeting without the US and NATO and recommending a solution? If the US and NATO as non-regional powers are included how can it be called a regional solution? Would it be a regional solution if a solution worked out by US/NATO in the light of their own needs is presented to regional countries for endorsement? In any case, who will take the lead in promoting such a regional solution? Can different perspectives of countries be accommodated? Can there be a shared view about the Taliban? How will Pakistan defer to India’s legitimate interests? India favours continuing US presence in Afghanistan. Does Iran have the same perspective? Or China? Or, for that matter, Russia?
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