Indian Defence Review

The Gandhian philosophy of ahimsa has affected the Indian attitude towards war and use of force. Nehruvian distrust of India’s armed forces and military leadership has coloured the dispensation national defence and the armed forces get. Historical, intellectual, cultural and administrative neglect of the need for national defence cause deep concern. The people and their elected representatives have indifference to and inadequate knowledge of defence matters, their imperatives, demands and consequences. Bhutto said, “We will eat grass, but produce an atomic weapon”. This awareness and determination does not sink in our Indian thought. Indian attitude resonates to its cultural ethos – waiting for something to happen, somewhere, somehow, some time and somebody to take care, without designing things.

As a civilization, over the past several thousand years, India has been a nation of an inward-looking, self-satisfying, complacent people, happy with God’s liberal largesse and enjoying his boon through muscle flexing and resorting to use of force as a noble, glorious, seasonal sport among our own kings and clans. Proving one’s superior strength and prowess, establishing one’s fame and power, feeding one’s ego and primacy were all that went into war-waging and notional territorial expansion. These were coined into such grandiose expressions such as Chakradhipati and Samrat.

Absence of a sense of integrated nationhood in the sub-continent apart, the geographical confines of chains of mountains and expanses of sea, which created a carapace of natural protection, resulted in a mental make-up of a delusional world of one’s own, keeping away the thought, interest and venture of looking out, going out of the carapace. Curiously though, trade and commerce, religion and moral flow ventured out amply to the West, North and South-east benignly, unhindered, without any trace of use of force. Military thought, conquest, use of force and even an offensive element of defence, creation of buffer zones outside the territorial confines (aggressive depth in defence?) and such reactive – proactive thoughts and usage have bypassed our history, thought and military heritage.

Indians have never gone out of the national (natural) boundaries to resist intrusion or undertake retaliation. Within the territorial confines all our actions against the opponents have been reactive, never proactive. And again, within the nation there have been alliances, friendships and helping hands among rulers and dynasties (Chanakya’s teaching) but at national level there have been none. In fact, many of our kings sought help from and invited outsiders to fight their battles.

We learnt but little from the waves after waves of invaders and intruders, their social solidarity, superior methods of warfare, advanced weaponry and organisational skills. We lost out to the invader’s cavalry even as we so diligently flaunted our elephantry. Why did we lose our cavalry spirit? Cavalry spirit is not merely mounted excellence; it is aggressive spirit, mobile mind, flexible opportunism and riding the storm. Up to the twelfth century at least in South India the horse as a mount in our temple sculptures is an exception; it is amply depicted as drawing chariot (chariotry) but never as cavalry. The stirrup was absent till the thirteenth century advent of the Khiljis. The same situation applies to paintings and a few historical writings of the period.

Kings and countries expanded their territory, secured them and entered into alliances to protect their lands and people. The British brought Tibet, Burma, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Iran under their influence to secure India as the jewel in their crown. Post World War II, the USSR grabbed Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Central Asian Republics (though subsequently it lost them). The Chinese have added Tibet, Sinkiang, parts of Mongolia, Manchuria and now the East and South China Sea islands. The USA has its predominant influence in a very large part of the world through its money and muscle. India, on the other hand, has lost Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, Afghanistan and Myanmar. Today, tiny island nations such as Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius are shooting away from it.

The Gandhian philosophy of ahimsa has affected the Indian attitude towards war and use of force. Nehruvian distrust of India’s armed forces and military leadership has coloured the dispensation national defence and the armed forces get. Historical, intellectual, cultural and administrative neglect of the need for national defence cause deep concern. The people and their elected representatives have indifference to and inadequate knowledge of defence matters, their imperatives, demands and consequences. Bhutto said, “We will eat grass, but produce an atomic weapon”. This awareness and determination does not sink in our Indian thought. Indian attitude resonates to its cultural ethos – waiting for something to happen, somewhere, somehow, some time and somebody to take care, without designing things.

In summary, we continue to be neglectful of national defence, armed forces and war preparedness. Our historical, ethical, military experience has no awareness or precedent of crossing our borders, of counter offensive, proactive actions and aggressive intent, in the context of defending our nation. Author Pawan Varma says, “Historically, Indians have a mediocre record of defending themselves against foreign invaders. (They) have never pursued military conquest outside the extended periphery of the subcontinent.” And Stephen Cohen states, “India is uniquely unassertive towards others.”

Awareness, ethos, philosophy and attitude find place in doctrine, approach and resolve. Our military doctrine (cold start) appears to tackle the superficial layer of the present and not the deeper and more relevant issues of our history, attitude, ethos and philosophy. In fact, we have apparently a wishful, if also a transplanted philosophy of war, or use of force to put it in better words.

War aims at deterring the opponent, containing his depredation, and evicting him from our soil. It needs wherewithal (armed forces, weaponry, warlike material), infrastructure (for movement, quartering, stocking, maintenance and deployment) and determination and will to use the armed force to the hilt. Determination and will are the most important factors at each of the stages. And it is history, attitude, philosophy and ethos which help develop that will and determination. This is where we stumble, the stumbling blocks being credibility and national military philosophy.

Today, after over six decades of freedom, there is talk of raising a Strike Corps against Chinese threat in Arunachal. China has, in the process of deterring India, containing its defence efforts and throwing it out of their territory (as they claim it), built up its wherewithal, infrastructure and displayed beyond doubt, its will and determination to use military force all along its border with India and in partnership with Pakistan. The new (Communist) regime in China has shed the erstwhile Chinese despondent, decaying shell and changed its-total stance attitude, and ethos into resurgent aggressive and ruthless mood, challenging the whole world in justifying and asserting its historical role as the Middle Kingdom, the fulcrum of the world. Obviously it is ready to pay a price. Determination to assert itself and readiness to pay the price are its salient contents of its will. It is against such an opponent that Indian response is pitched.

Tardiness, uncertainty, indifferent determination and weak will are all contributors to the low credence of what the government causes media to report, as a serious student of our defence matters sees them. Will this Strike Corps prove to be a deterrent? When, in what manner, to what extent? Is the infrastructure ready to sustain the employment, deployment and maintenance of such defensive and offensive troop levels? How is the nearly two week acclimatisation period being tackled in terms of mobilisation time factor? Are the troops going to be barracked in high altitude all the year round in order to reduce acclimatisation period? What is the financial implication of such quartering arrangement? Won’t building of infrastructure, including the proposed Misamari-Tawang rail line (IMR, Nov. 2013) in the difficult and restrictive mountainous terrain give an indication of likely area of counter strike and help China to thwart or contain it? Is India’s science and technology geared up and competent to sustain troops at such altitude? Where are the targets for hurting the Chinese in the Tibetan wilderness? How is the strike being supported and sustained by a weak and weakening air force with its fleet depleting regularly? While hundreds of such questions raise their shaking heads, the Prime Minister tells the Generals that there is likely to be a cut in defence expenditure! What credibility is this to the tom-tommed Strike Corps? Are we really serious about our defence arrangements?

In any case the projected plans indicate a timeframe of two decades. By then the Chinese, God forbid, may decide to occupy Tawang-Sela and sit tight there. Then what? As it is they are not trying another Foot Hills sojourn. They will only undertake border incursions, skirmishes and occupation of certain newsy features like Nathula, Tawang, Chushul, DBO, for instance. Even as prickly will be places like Sumdorong, LumIa, Kibithoo, Barahoti, Demchok. So then, how is this offensive-defensive strategy envisaged in the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps going to function, in what time frame, with what objectives and tasks?

On August 15, 1947, India became a free nation; free not only from foreign masters but also from many of its own chains. We chose a noble constitution, secularism, equality, did away with blind faith, realised the implications of nationhood, banished (at least on paper) casteism. In short, we chose a new life system, a suiting thought system, a collateral politico social system.

We have now to give up our erstwhile neglectful attitude towards national defence, change our philosophy of looking at and practicing military necessities, develop new calls on our own sense of responsibility towards national defence, come out of our self-imposed restrictive defence shell, cultivate an effective share of aggressive, assertive determination and will towards defending our lands and change our military doctrines accordingly. Without nurturing ourselves, our intellect and our attitude in that direction the raising of Strike Corps and employing it will be that much less credible and fruitful.

There has to be a radical change in our thinking, philosophy, culture and tradition. National defence and use of force demand these changes, demand suitably evolved doctrines, mindset, strategic, behavioural development and strong will.

If we do not change and amend our past mindset and adopt new thinking like the Chinese have done long ago then the Strike Corps will at best act as a deterrent of sorts for some time, and will, in all likelihood, get involved in containing ingress like any defensive component, with little scope for offensive employment. Raising and employing the Strike Corps has little meaning if the Indian Air Force complement too does not add to its strength and develop an ability to inflict unacceptable destruction on the opponent.

And how is the Strike Corps going to contend with the repeated border skirmishes the Sino- Pak partnership has established as a military strategy, a seemingly new genre of war in the sub-continent? The glee and euphoria over the Strike Corps drives us back into our cultural heritage of self congratulating and feeling easy and comfortable that we have done a great job to find the right answer to stymie the enemy. The enemy is unlikely to be impressed. So is any serious student of the conflict that is threatening to engulf us.