Indian Defence Review

The Red Sea has become a very hot spot in the middle east because of increasing tensions between Yemen’s Houthi group and American and British warships involvement in the classic asymmetric war. This has been brought about by the rising shoot downs of inexpensive Houthi drones and cruise missiles by multimillion-dollar air defence systems of the US and UK.

Since November last, Yemen’s Houthi rebel group has targeted vessels passing through the strait of Bab-al-Mandab, a 20 mile (32km) wide channel that splits north-east Africa from Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula. They claim to be targeting vessels with connections to Israel following the start of the war in the Gaza Strip.

In order to combat the Houthi danger to the commercial sea-borne traffic operating in the area, India has sent its warships to the Red Sea. INS Kochi and INS Kolkata are now conducting patrols in the Gulf of Aden, which links the Arabian Sea with the Red Sea and also to deter attacks on India-flagged and operated merchant vessels while maintaining a strategic distance and not being a part of the US-UK led Operations. The Houthis had been striking Israel-bound/owned shipping in support of Gaza, with its missiles. 

Warships like the US Navy’s USS Laboon, USS Gravely, USS Mason, and the Royal Navy’s HMS Diamond have shot down multiple Houthi cruise missiles and drones since mid-December. US forces on January 16 also announced seizing drone, rocket, and missile components, which they said were coming from Iran and bound for the Houthis.  

The US and the UK launched a large number of strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen as the Iran-aligned armed group continues to target commercial shipping in the Red Sea. A joint statement from the two countries said they had carried out strikes with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands, targeting a Houthi underground storage site as well as missile and surveillance capabilities.

The HMS Diamond, for instance, was described by UK Defence Secretary Grant Shapps as a “jewel in the naval crown” on January 9, “repelled the largest attack by the Iranian-backed Houthis in the Red Sea to date.” HMS Diamond shot down seven of the Iranian-designed drones, Shapps said, and he indicated the British vessel was “potentially” targeted by the Houthis.

Three US destroyers and F18/A warplanes operating from the USS Dwight D Eisenhower aircraft carrier were also repelling the attack, but no casualties or damage were reported.“Iranian-backed Houthis launched a complex attack of Iranian-designed one-way attack UAVs … anti-ship cruise missiles, and an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the southern Red Sea,” the US’s Central Command added.

The weapons used to shoot down the Houthi missiles and drones are a big drain on the economy of the US-UK. Each Sea Viper/Aster missile costs about $1 million to $2 million. But the Houthis’ one-way attack drones cost less than $20,000-$50,000 (up to Rs. 40 lakh), frequently cited as the price for an Iranian Shaheed 136 drone and its variants. Some Houthi drones have been assessed to be as cheap as $2,000. Likewise, the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM) air defence missile aboard most US warships costs $1.79 million. Meanwhile, a single F/A-18 Super Hornet costs $66.9 million. The heavily lopsided cost-to-benefit ratio has not gone unnoticed among military and strategic affairs experts. 

Obviously, it suits Iranian supported Houthis to go in for asymmetric warfare with superior well- organised militaries like the US-UK because they can penetrate their air defence easily with much cheaper armaments over the heavy cost technologically superior weapons. Moreover the US-UK naval personnel will get fatigued in the naval ships if the war is sustained for a long period of time. The Houthi’s advantages of being the ‘home defenders’ fighting from their home turf and suitable local geography take precedence over the strengths enjoyed by the Royal and US Navies. Also, Houthis can choose the time and place of the attack and conduct it in narrow waterways like the Red Sea by staging attacks on ships from nearby coasts.

The other Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which fought the Houthis in the nine-year Yemen civil war, might privately prefer some action against the Iran-affiliated Houthis but do not support a full-scale offensive chiefly for two reasons. Firstly, it will reverse the China-brokered Saudi normalisation with Iran, followed by extensive coordination of their positions and unprecedented diplomacy between the Arabs and the Persians. It conveys that the desire for de-escalation in Riyadh and Tehran was genuine. It reflected in Saudi Arabia and the UAE not naming Iran directly during the periodic missile and drone attacks by the Houthis. But it also bared that the Houthis commanded considerable autonomy from Iran. Its subsequent clashes with Saudi Arabia and UAE were independent actions and not under the complete tutelage of the Persian nation.    

Secondly, the Saudis and the Emiratis are also wary of angering both their domestic and regional Arab populations – across the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and Saharan North Africa – that are sharply opposed to Israel and deeply supportive of Palestine.  

After Hamas and Hezbollah, the Houthis have now won extensive popular support for their acts of solidarity with Gaza. Thus, backing any US and Western action against the Houthis in support of Israel will therefore unleash severe discontent and political backlash and impact their diplomacy with other Arab nations.  There are several reasons why Arab nations avoided formally joining Houthis, though most are related to discomfort with US policy in the Middle East, and, above all, its unconditional support for Israel’s devastating war on Gaza.