Every since the speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, the temperature in Taiwan Straits has risen perceptibly, not just because of global warming. China is quite obviously upset at the US for, what it termed as, meddling in its internal affairs and vowed a firm response which pointed to the use of force. China has, in fact, clarified may times that it does not rule out the use of force if peaceful means to ‘reunification’ do not work by staying that it reserves the right to use all available means including military force. To demonstrate its resolve on the Taiwan issue, which Beijing claims as a renegade province of China, Xi Jinping followed up these threats with military exercises in Taiwan Straits and around Taiwan itself in East China Sea and a sort of blockade of Taiwan for about a week.
The exercises included firing of missiles over and across Taiwan and regular crossing of the, so far accepted, median line in Taiwan Straits by a large number of PLAAF aircraft and PLAN ships. Such a show of force also laid down a new normal in the area with the PLA routinely violating the median line making it difficult for Taiwan to assess whether it is an actual attack in the offing or merely a feint for show of force. Such violations were also perhaps utilised by China to assess the defensive measures likely to be taken by Taiwan. So, does this all point to a likely invasion of Taiwan in Xi’s bid to ‘reunify’ the so-called renegade province with China, if Taiwan doesn’t cave in to such coercive show of force, which Xi has clearly stated as an unfinished agenda item not to be left to the next generation?
What is really different this time in the Taiwan issue is that the US has upped the ante by following up the Pelosi visit with visits of a number of US senators and representatives with bi-partisan support against any move by China to bring Taiwan in its fold through the use of force. For all these years since 1979, after the promulgation of the Taiwan Relations Act, the US had accepted the One China principle with strategic ambiguity on whether it will actually come to the defence of Taiwan with US forces or merely provide militarily aid to Taiwan towards its defence.
That strategic ambiguity strongly supported by Senator Biden in 2001 now seems to have been discarded by President Biden in repeatedly asserting that the US will defend Taiwan, if attacked by China, with the involvement of US military personnel on about four occasions in the last one year, with the White House walking back somewhat on this commitment every time. Except this time, the White House had no plausible walk-back when President Biden firmly stated in an interview aired on ’60 Minutes’ on September 18 that the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan and would use force if Taiwan was attacked. So far, the US had used the strategic ambiguity to remain ambivalent on the actual commitment of US forces while also adhering to the one-China principle by not supporting Taiwan’s independence.
As a matter of fact, just last month around Pelosi’s visit, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken had stated that the US does not support ‘Taiwan’s independence’. President Biden’s statement in the same interview that the issue of independence was for the people of Taiwan to decide thus marked a clear shift from the One China policy declared in the 1970s along with the rapprochement with China under the Nixon-Kissinger duo. The question that arises from all this is whether the US has now decided that policy of strategic ambiguity is too vague and is unlikely to deter China from using military force to ‘reunite’ Taiwan in the near future or is it merely President Biden making such statements for domestic political reasons?
Certainly, statements from President Xi since his coming to power in 2012 and increased military activity in Taiwan Straits have made it quite clear that China is not averse to use force if peaceful attempts including some coercion does not work. He has reiterated it in the ongoing 20th Party Congress. The statement from Xi that the ‘reunification’ of Taiwan should not be left to the next generation’ may have also convinced Washington that the status quo is unlikely to be maintained much longer and China is willing and preparing to initiate military action if coercion does not work in persuading Taipei and Washington in acquiescing to its one-China objective. Concurrently, Xi’s strong-arm tactics in Hong Kong after China having announced ‘One country, two systems’ have made it quite clear to the Taiwanese people what such a system has in store for them resulting in increasing public support for sovereignty and President Tsai Ing-wen’s party.
All activity and statements from China tend to indicate that, at least in the long-term, a military show-down over Taiwan seems inevitable. Though not clearly enunciated, it may well be that Washington may have decided that if such a confrontation is inevitable, it may be better to force the issue sooner rather than later when China is expected to become even stronger and rival or even overtake the US military, at least in Western Pacific. With Russia and China getting closer by the day, against a common adversary which is obviously the US, it may have been assessed that it may be better to confront China on this issue now when Russia is deeply involved in the Ukraine imbroglio and is increasingly unlikely to be able to come to China’s aid. As a matter of fact, recent reported reverses in Ukraine forcing Putin to promulgate a partial mobilization, apart from reports of Russia seeking munitions from North Korea and even drones and missiles from Iran, may tend to confirm that Russia would be unable to militarily support any Chinese moves on Taiwan in the near future.
It is also becoming growingly evident that the loss of Taiwan to Chinese occupation and control would seriously jeopardize Japan’s security as also an open and free Indo-Pacific particularly around the East and South China Seas apart from challenging the sole superpower status of the US. Japan has already voiced its security concerns emanating from any change in the current status of Taiwan, with Taiwan just about 100 Km from Japanese territory.
China is also currently engaged in a prolonged face-off with India in Eastern Ladakh and would be unable to withdraw any significant forces from that front in the near future unless a comprehensive border settlement with India is reached without loss of face for Beijing, a proposition that seems highly unlikely at the moment despite the recent agreement to disengage at Gogra-Hot Springs. So, while a status quo, though without the new normal of increasingly destabilizing military activity around Taiwan, may suit most nations in the area, the continuance of such a status quo seems highly unlikely due to the increased belligerence of China which is being responded to in equal or more measures by the US. This leads to further ratcheting up the tensions in the region with the possibility of serious escalation with the slightest misunderstanding or an inadvertent encounter between the PLA and US forces, particularly with the lines of communications for de-escalation becoming increasingly less usable and reliable for any crisis management.
At the same time, China is currently facing an economic downturn due to the housing and banking bubble, its zero-COVID policy as also the drought which may adversely affect its ability to successfully undertake a large amphibious operation to invade Taiwan in the near-term. While an outright conventional military engagement over Taiwan would hurt all sides, and recent war games in the Pentagon have been rather negative for the US, it seems that it may have been assessed by Washington that an exchange of blows would be far more harmful to China than to the US in the long-term and set back China’s growth as well as its ambitions to equal the US as a superpower by many decades. Combined with the prospects of an even stronger China in a couple of decades and the hawks in the US may have prevailed in convincing the policy makers that a confrontation in the near-term is likely to be more beneficial to the US in curbing China’s rise as a strong contender to replace the US as the global superpower. Increasing US decoupling from China including almost all-out sanctions and curbs on technology exports to China perhaps also point to an assessment that the US may have decided to deliberately push China towards some sort of military confrontation over Taiwan in a carefully thought-out plan. Should China take the bait and actually initiate an invasion of Taiwan, the US may have planned to inflict unacceptable costs on China, both militarily and economically, to thwart China’s rise by decades.
In this effort, the US would also be able to portray China as the aggressor, on the lines of Russia provoked into the Ukrainian War, and thus muster support of all its allies and even other nations not so amicable with China and, perhaps still smarting under China’s belligerence. Should China back off from a military confrontation, the US still stands to gain, both politically and diplomatically in terms of having called Xi’s bluff. This could make Xi’s position more and more difficult, particularly if there is sustained economic pain over the years coupled with curbs on basic freedoms and human rights in China. US readiness to go to war may, in itself, deter Beijing from initiating military action against Taiwan because whatever else Xi Jinping may be, he is realistic enough to know that China still has some ways to go before before militarily taking on the US and, hence, any precipitate action may be counter-productive. Another uncertainty in the situation manifests itself in this regard. Having shot or imprisoned most of the ‘messengers’, is Xi still getting sound military advice?
What is also worth pondering over in such a situation is which way is India going to go. Will it try and stay neutral on the sidelines, despite knowing fully well that China has always tried to handle adversaries bilaterally, one-on-one where its economic and military might has so far worked in coercing and mostly getting what it wants while keeping the adversary at bay without actually firing a shot? Or is India going to use this opportunity to resolve its border issues with China, as also the Tibet issue, in light of China’s claim on the five fingers of Tibet which is certainly going to come to the fore once China has resolved the Taiwan issue one way or the other?
In either case, it would be incumbent on the Indian political and military leadership to rapidly modernize its armed forces, as well as its nuclear arsenal, in the time that may be available, to adequately deter and otherwise impose unacceptable costs on China should it become adventurous against India again. In such turbulent times, it is good to remember that the only currency that works as the last resort is military might. This may also be a good time to recall Chanakya.
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