Indian Defence Review

“Of all kinds of dangers, internal dangers should be got rid of first, for it is internal troubles, like the fear from a lurking snake, that are more serious than external troubles.”  — Kautilya( 321—296 BC  )

Left Wing Extremism ( LWE ) in India, now over four decades in existence and spreading alarmingly, derives its maniacal inspiration directly from  Communist Maoist ideology which blatantly propagates the use of violence to capture political power. The principal advocate of this ideology and a India-hater, China’s ‘Father of the Revolution’ Mao Tse Tung, in the late 1940s, had succinctly expressed that “ Revolutionary warfare is never confined within the bounds of military action because its purpose is to destroy existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new structure.”

Maoism popularly known as Naxalism— both terms falling under the ambit of LWE in India — constitutes today the most grave internal security threat to India besides being a formidable socio- economic and political challenge to the nation. That this scourge has spread and now covers over 180 districts across 20 states with some areas under the Red influence totally bereft of governmental control and are referred to as ‘liberated  zones.’ The Naxal/Maoist influence traverses a wide swathe running in the centre of the Indian hinterland, from the porous Nepal-Bihar border to the Karnataka and Kerala borders in a south-west orientation referred to also by some as the “ Red Corridor.”   That these Indian Maoists are constantly and successfully pushing the boundaries of this corridor to create a “Compact Revolutionary Zone” and wage a “Protracted People’s War(PPR) and bring forth a” New Democratic Revolution” (NDR) is not surprising and these insurgents have managed to make their presence felt in some of the NE states, Assam in particular, and even in the deep south of India. LWE elements have in the recent past penetrated in urban centres like Delhi, the National Capital Region ( Gurgaon and NOIDA), Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, industrial belts of Jamshedpur, Surat, Ahmedabad, Rourkela and the cities of Chandigarh, Guwahati, Patna, Hyderabad, Raipur among others.

In the last 10 years, LWE violence has been instrumental in causing nearly 6500 fatalities to 2677 innocent civilians, 1697 security forces personnel and 2115  Maoist terrorists themselves.[1] The majority of civilian casualties are tribals and villagers who are often branded as ‘Police informers’ before being brutally tortured and killed by the Naxals. That these terrorists are now armed with more modern weaponry and equipment clearly indicates their extra-territorial linkages and the varied forms of support they are getting from their foreign mentors.

Historical Perspective   

Naxalism, as a violent creed, erupted in 1967 as an agrarian rebellion, by the Santhal tribes of an unknown small village, Naxalbari( Darjeeling district of West Bengal) allegedly to fight for their basic rights usurped by rapacious and exploitative feudal landlords of the region. That this village was selected to commence the Red struggle, owing to it being located at the tri-junction of India, Nepal and then East Pakistan ( now Bangladesh) was not merely an innocent coincidence. The movement rapidly spread to many parts of the nation where tribals, peasants and workers were being exploited and the poverty and unemployment levels were high. During its earlier stages, even some educated youth joined the movement romanticizing the struggle for a new social order for bringing succour to the exploited and the downtrodden. Most got disillusioned within a short period of time when they  confronted  its violent ideology.

The Naxal uprising was initially spearheaded by Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) ( CPI-ML)—– an organization which derives its ideology from the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung. The former, one of its leading ideologues, summarized the mission of this party as “ the physical annihilation of class enemies.” Initially this movement spread to some districts of West Bengal and also the Telengana region of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh, but it was kept well in check by the state governments. The death of Charu Mazumdar in 1972 also led to the Naxal movement losing its initial momentum. However, the insurgency resurfaced in the 1980s with the rise of the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). These two organizations merged in 2004 to form the CPI( Maoist) and the movement thence onwards picked up momentum and a pan India orientation.  In addition, this merger has augmented the military capabilities, organizational and technological skills and thus the offensive reach of the Naxal movement.

The CPI (Maoist) has established linkages with the Maoist groups of 13 nations under the aegis of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM).  The RIM was formed in 1984 by Maoist cadres from India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Iran ,Nepal, Peru, Turkey, Italy, Tunisia, Colombia, USA and Afghanistan. Earlier, some media reports also had indicated the linkages of Indian Naxals with the erstwhile Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka. The latter allegedly trained and equipped some Naxal cadres some years back. In addition, the Naxals have also received active support from other insurgent groups like the ULFA in Assam, Maoists in Nepal and militant groups based in Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The Maoists have also established a fair number of front organizations which carry out subtle propaganda on their behalf extolling their movement as one fighting for the legitimate rights of the tribals, peasants and other oppressed sections of  society. Some of these NGOs also display a propensity of being critical of the efforts of the state machinery in combating the Naxals and tend to paint the state as indulging in human rights violations. Some of these NGOs are led by left leaning intellectuals who constantly harp on ‘corporate exploitation’ and ‘displacement of tribals’ to tarnish the image of the State.  The funding of some of these NGOs remains suspect and needs monitoring by the government.

Naxal Strategy and Organisational Structure     

The Naxal movement has its own peculiar dynamics unlike the insurgencies in J&K, North East or earlier in Punjab which, generally speaking, were confined to a single state or area. Currently, 20 states of the nation with Chattisgarh, Jharkand, Odisha, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra are gravely affected. This geographical spread in inter connected under developed terrain, also hilly and forested at places, assists the movement of the Naxals in striking at governmental targets at will and eluding the state police and the para military forces easily by moving from one state to the other. These Naxals also draw sustenance from sympathetic villagers including those intimidated by them and thus in some of these regions, the insurgents virtually run a parallel government. The Naxals ensure that no governmental presence even at the panchayat level or government schools function, do not allow even postmen to enter or even allow any electricity or telephone towers to operate, thus keeping the locals totally separated from any state developmental activities and isolated from the national mainstream. A well established network of informers keeps them warned in advance of any counter actions being taken by the security forces who invariably, frequently, fall to successful ambushes and take in many casualties caused by innovative planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by well trained audacious Naxals. The latter constantly target bridges, culverts, police stations and posts, health infrastructure and even remotely located railway stations to keep the State infrastructure totally non-existent in their areas of control.

The Maoist organization currently comprises a Party, a United Front and the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army( PLGA) which is guided by the CMC at its apex. The apex structure consists of the Central Committee, Higher Committee, Sub Committee and a few other departments.

In states like Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand, Maoists have formed children militias known as ‘Bal Dastas’. Young children, instead of being given education, are being indoctrinated with Maoist ideology and given military training and groomed as potential recruits for the PLGA.

Likely Causes of Naxal Emergence     

The phenomenal spread of LWE in many parts of the nation can be attributed to the dismal record and performance of the State to ensure a minimum acceptable standard of living to its poor citizens especially in the rural and tribal belts. This insensitive and poor governance of the State has been fully exploited by the Naxalites who offer an alternative programme albeit violent to all the exploited and oppressed to obtain their basic rights. Some of the major reasons, among others, for the exponential emergence of the Naxal movement are as follows : –

• It is a well established fact that, for centuries, there exists exploitation and oppression of adivasis, dalits and the landless attributable to our antiquated feudal system. The Adivasis solely depend on the forest for their livelihood and sustenance but have been deprived of even picking rights and minimal forest produce owing to archaic forest laws and the practice of caste and class discrimination in these areas. 

• In most remote areas of India, there exists poor network of roads, healthcare, education facilities, drinking water or electricity and the Naxals fully exploit the lack of development in these areas promising better alternatives for the poor.     
• Nearly 80 percent of India’s coal reserves and 20 percent of rich mineral resources abound in Naxal affected tribal areas. However, as mining rights are given to big mining barons, mostly on corruption infested deals owing to the nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and the mining mafias, hardly any money is ploughed back on raising the living standards of the original inhabitants of the land namely the tribals and the adivasis.
• In the interiors, the state police forces are numerically inadequate, ill trained and ill equipped with virtually no intelligence inputs to back their endeavours in confronting the Naxals. Para military forces sent as knee jerk and reactive reaction to combat Naxals also suffer from the same maladies to successfully take on the highly motivated Maoist cadres.
• Importantly, the Fifth Schedule of our Constitution lays down that all Scheduled Areas of the nation which are the Forest Reserves and that are inhabitated by Scheduled Tribes are to be administered by the Governors of the States by appointing Tribes Advisory Councils from among the local tibals. Amazingly, no Governor of any State in India has felt it essential to do so, leaving the Chief Minister of those states to lease forests for mining to private companies who thence evict these poor tribals with impunity from their land.
• The Ninth Schedule of India’s Constitution lays down that cultivable land, in excess of the land ceilings held by the rich farmers, has to be acquired by the State government and distributed to the landless farmers. However, only three states namely West Bengal, Kerala and J&K have implemented this Act so far. Such lethargic implementation of the nation’s laws naturally will contribute to movements seeking economic and social justice for the oppressed.
• According to a study by D Bandopadhay, Chairman, Expert Group of the Planning Commission on “ Development Issues to deal  with Causes of Discontent, Unrest and Extremism ”,  because villagers in the Maoist dominated areas lost trust in successive governments as nearly 5.5 crore of the rural population was displaced between 1951 and 2005.[2] The numbers would have gone up considerably by now causing further alienation and giving an opportunity to the Naxals to exploit the situation and widen the chasm between the populace and the state machinery.

Aspects Requiring Addressal in Resolving LWE  

Though both the centre and state governments, since years have been seriously addressing the Naxal problem yet much more has to be done, in a holistic manner, to prevent the spread of this scourge. Prior to formulating a comprehensive national strategy to tackle LWE in all its manifestations, the nation has to ponder over the relevant burning issues which define LWE. Some of these are:-

• Is Maoism a law and order or a socio economic or a national security problem ?
• Is Maoism a movement by anti-national elements to capture political power or is it, in reality, a struggle for emancipation of the poor and oppressed ?
• How effective has been the role of Maoist ideology in causing unrest against the State.
• Where all has the State faltered in addressing the genuine grievances of the adivasis and other poor people in the nation ?
• Is there any peaceful solution to the problem, or a pure military solution is necessitated or a combination of both? Should the new government endeavour to get the top Naxal leadership to the table for negotiations ?
• What should be the role of the Armed Forces, especially the Indian Army, in tackling LWE ?
• What are and how strong are the external linkages with the Maoist movement in India?
• What measures should be taken to strengthen our police and para-military forces to successfully confront these insurgents.
• Is there any fresh legislation required including incorporating amendments to the Constitution to guarantee basic rights to the tribals and those residing in the forests and interior areas since centuries ? How can the State ensure equitable distribution of rich natural resources with these poor folk and those given mining contracts etc.

A Suggested Road Map for the New Government    

In resolving any age-old problem facing the nation, a new government at the Centre or in a State has its task relatively simpler as it does not carry any historical or weather- beaten baggage of faults and foibles but can address any problem afresh with a newer and dynamic approach. Thus the recently installed Modi government has all the advantages now to comprehensively address the LWE dilemma in all its nuances. It has been an encouraging development that they have gone down to immediately address this serious problem afflicting India.

To start with, the Union Home Ministry has rechristened its ‘ Naxal Management Division’ as ‘Left Wing Extremism Division’ as it has opined that the term ‘Naxalism’ is ‘’misleading and restrictive”. The change in nomenclature comes exactly after PM Narendra Modi took over, and  in a pre-election interview to the Times of India had stated that “ the use of the term Naxalism is outdated and incorrect and Maoism would be a more correct description.” Narendra Modi, during his electoral campaign had rightly expressed that he had “ always advocated a zero-tolerance approach”[3] to the problems of terrorism and Maoism. The then Prime Ministerial candidate had further unequivocally stated that “ We need a clear-cut legal framework to address these challenges. Regardless of what are the reasons for the people to resort to violence, our ability to deal with it should not be compromised by lack of preparedness……… modernizing our police forces and our central paramilitary forces is something which cannot be delayed any longer.”

The nation has been combating LWE since many years in a fairly coordinated manner and the Ministry of Home Affairs had raised the LWE Division in October 2006 to effectively  strengthening and modernisation of the state police forces and the Central Police organizations (CPOs) to tackle Maoist insurgency. Unified Commands had also been set up in the States of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa which have been most affected by LWE. In addition, 400 fortified police stations @ Rs 2 crore each in LWE affected districts had been sanctioned on 80:20 basis. The Planning Commission is also implementing the Integrated Action Plan ( Additional Central Assistance) for 82 selected tribal and backward districts for accelerated development. Road Requirement Plans for LWE areas and Civic Action Programmes had also been set into motion. Nevertheless much more has to be done with allocation of additional resources and importantly, cohesion, dynamism and sincere implementation of sanctioned schemes is the need of the hour to successfully tackle LWE insurgency. Some of these recommendations to gear up the national effort are addressed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Overall Assessment of Maoist Threat.  Notwithstanding some isolated spectacular strikes by LWE insurgents in different parts of the nation causing  considerable casualties, it is a fact that overall,  Naxal violence, has shown a marked decline in the past three years. This could be attributed to firstly, an increased deployment of security forces, relentless operations by them attributable to better training and equipping of them. Secondly, the Maoists themselves may have tactically retreated  to consolidate and protect even their leadership which has suffered some setbacks in the past few years. Nevertheless, the Maoists retain the initiative to strike ad-lib as was witnessed during the recently conducted Lok Sabha elections where they had targeted some polling booths and inflicted a few casualties on government poll officials. These insurgents have successfully established the Maoist Base Areas, especially along the so-called Red Corridor, and each of these bases has its own independent capability including military, administrative and political structures in place. In addition, Maoists are reportedly very dynamic and innovative in changing their tactics as they strike at governmental assets and our security forces thus need to cater for all such eventualities. Overall, the Maoists are planning for protracted war against the Indian state and despite all their shortcomings are determinedly seeking to harness all elements like the Military ,Political, Economic, Social, Cultural and Judiciary in their overall strategy. 2014 is of special significance to them as they will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of  establishment of the Unified CPI(M) and thus may likely endeavour to target governmental assets in a bigger and dramatic manner.

Suggested Response.   It is more than evident that countering LWE is unlike any other internal security challenge the nation has faced—– in J&K, the North East or earlier in Punjab, factors of shared geography, religion, ethnicity and major external linkages have played their part but the Maoist movement in India is predominantly indigenous in content and character. Thus it needs to be tackled simultaneously at all levels namely political, socio-economic, psychological, judicial and off course in the security dimension. The State while countering the violence of the Maoists has to restrain itself, in military terms, for the Maoists are , at the end of the day, India’s own strayed people. It is to India’s credit that we have, unlike no other nation in the world, not employed heavy weapons or artillery or the indiscriminate use of the Air Force against our own people. Our strength lies in our patience and restraint.

It has been indeed prudent that the Indian Army has not been employed against LWE insurgents. The Army has its hands full preparing to counter the challenges of a two front war ( China and Pakistan) while it remains engaged in counter insurgency operations in J&K and some parts of the North East. Presently, our State Police Forces and supported by paramilitary forces and the CPOs are more than adequate to take on the Maoists. However, the Army must provide all assistance in terms  of  training, intelligence gathering and overall capability building of the Police and para military organizations to counter the Maoist challenge. Some States have inducted ex-servicemen in their task forces to counter the LWE threat and this is a step in the right direction. However, the Army cannot remain totally aloof of its responsibility of providing security to the nation—-even internal—- and thus be prepared  in case matters go out of the reach of the Police and para -military to resolve. Consequently, some advance planning will be in order for the Army especially as regards terrain studies, intelligence gathering and coordination with the state apparatus. Other states could emulate the example of the Chattisgarh Govt who have established, with the help of the Army, a Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare College at Kanker.

The Indian Air Force should be employed in a benign role for reconnaissance and surveillance, intelligence gathering, casualty evacuation, movement of troops and commanders etc. In addition, the Air Force can be utilized in the operation of unarmed drones for information gathering and their larger helicopters for various forms of logistics support. In case of hard intelligence available, small Special Forces teams of the Army could be ferried in Air Force helicopters to undertake surgical strikes against the top LWE leadership apart from raids on the LWE main bases as identified.

India’s Counter Naxal Strategy must emerge from a well thought, experience based all encompassing endeavour embracing security, developmental, judicial, administrative instruments of the nation synergized to take on the Naxals comprehensively. Such a strategy must determinedly strike at eliminating the mass base of the LWE elements and militarily reduce them to ineffectiveness. Thus both the security and the developmental instruments of the State will have to penetrate into the ‘Red Corridor’— no matter whatever be the cost— and re-establish the control of the government. All those insurgents who voluntarily lay down arms must be fully rehabilitated and even others should be encouraged to do so. Different approaches in resolving insurgencies in different states may be called for. Overall,short, medium and long term plans to counter LWE has to be conceptualized. Some of the other socio- economic measures and security steps which need to be taken are as follows:-

• The administrative machinery of the respective State Governments needs massive re-structuring and re-energising to gear up to the arduous task of bringing Maoist afflicted areas into the developmental grid.
• The Centre and State Governments need to address with the utmost sincerity the age-old problems of land and forest rights of the tribals and the landless. Deprivation and exploitation of the poor only leads to the birth of violent movements.
• Well regarded NGOs and social institutions including those working for women and children welfare must be encouraged to spread their  social service into remote areas in the fields of education and healthcare etc  and even left leaning intellectuals be encouraged to bring the misguided Maoists out of their violent mindsets.
• The policy of industrialization and mining must be local-people friendly and some of the revenues earned must be pumped back into the same areas from where earned and efforts made to educate the locals about the benefits of industrialization by inclusive participation.
• Supply of rations, medicines, books and essential supplies, even by air, should be endeavoured and such a step will have a positive effect on all.
• Gradually, tribals and all those living in remote areas must be encouraged to adopt self-governance as a tool as an answer for their day to day problems.
• Innovative efforts must be made by the government to intensify WHAM ( Winning the Hearts and Minds) operations employing the media, leaflets, radio and TV as applicable. Such operations do take time but have been eminently successful in many insurgency hit areas.
• Coordinated military strategy, based on past experiences in tackling the armed Maoists needs to be put in place which embraces better inter-state coordination, information and intelligence sharing, logistics support, good communications and  determined implementation to eliminate the Maoists from wherever they are.

• Local police forces must be speedily strengthened with additional well trained manpower and better equipped weaponry and communication systems. The leadership of the counter Naxal forces must be younger, physically fit and be highly motivated individuals. The Andhra Pradesh Grey Hounds has been a good example for other State Police forces to emulate. Some elements of the Police and Para military forces could be trained by the Indian Army’s elite Special Forces in the mounting of swift surgical strikes against Maoist leadership and mass bases.
• The Indian Government must take full measures to seal the porous Indo-Nepal border as a fair amount of weapons, explosives and insurgents trickle through this border including those sent by Pakistan’s sinister Inter Services Intelligence. Similarly, the Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Myanmar borders need to be strictly monitored to prevent movement of insurgents and weaponry from across the borders.

Conclusion 

The quagmire of Maoist insurgency requires a multi-dimensional approach, a multi-pronged and cohesive implementation strategy employing all the instruments of National Power which indeed are available to the Indian State in abundance. The nation, however, must appreciate that confronting LWE is not merely a security problem but has a distinct socio economic dimension where good and sensitive governance is sine qua non in winning the hearts and minds of one’s own misguided people. The newly installed Modi government has already put into motion the early steps to combat Maoist insurgency in the country and now determined implementation of an all pervading cohesive strategy is the need of the hour to rid India of its most serious internal security affliction.

Courtesy: AGNI