Indian Defence Review

When we talk of China, I will talk of two things. One is how we look at China today and second thing is what it is that was in 1962 and whether it is something that we can put it in future from that perspective so that it allows us to look at things differently—militarily, politically and diplomatically—whether it is because without these three combinations, it is difficult for any nation to deal with any neighbour who is either friendly or inimical. Where is China today? It is aspiring to attain the status that it had when it was called the Middle Kingdom.

It is aspiring to be the peer competitor of the US and it has made tremendous economic progress from the time when Deng Xiaoping said: Whether a cat is black or white so far it eats a rat it is a good cat. And then liberalisation started. China has done its liberalisation very pragmatically, if I can say that. It has prepared it from the point of view as to what gains would accrue to China besides whatever the gains came out of its gains.

China has made gains in terms of infrastructure; it has made gains in terms of entrepreneurial skills; it has made gains in terms of technology that it has been able to acquire and that is something that needs to be seen because it is this technology that is helping China grow the way it is growing today. There have been a lot of writers that have predicted that the economic growth in China may implode because actually they know that whether the statistics that have been put out is actually true or not. In fact, there have been lots of people who say that if the central leadership says that this year the growth is 9 per cent, all the provinces which were saying so for that the growth rate is 8.9 per cent or 8.8 per cent, will subsequently start correcting it to 9 per cent.

Nobody knows what exactly the statistical growth is in China. But what is visible is certainly good and this implosion that was predicted almost a decade back. Still there are people who say that the way China has progressed, it has created its haves and have nots and this is going to create a problem in the future if not dealt with properly. And I am sure that Chinese leadership would be as aware of this phenomena as we are because the developmental work has been mainly concentrated in eastern part and then moved towards the west.

But still there are large minorities that play their dynamics in China and which is something that needs to be done and which needs to be monitored. For, this will have a certain effect as days go by, as certain amount of more liberalisation occurs. The interesting part is that there is a certain statistical part of China that we need to note. You will be surprised to know that China has less arable land than that of India. Yet productivity of agriculture of China is three times more than that of India. So what our farmer produces, let’s say one acre, is one third of that produced in China. This makes a difference. Similarly, if you see at literacy figures, officially our literacy rate is 67 per cent. But if you take functional literacy away, because the governmental definition of literacy is anybody who can write his name is literate, we are just 34-35 per cent literate, whereas in People’s Republic of China, the literacy rate is 97 per cent. So a tremendous progress has been made, which percolated down in all spheres to take China where it is today.

That is something we need to know for our future thinking as to how to deal with China. China has invested a great deal in ensuring that higher education becomes a priority. It has sent its people outside. It has done a great job as far as education is concerned. If we compare these things with ours, then we find that it has got 1100 universities, wheresas we have got 500 universities. There is a great amount of work done on the social front also because China’s leadership realised that there had to be an all-round development if you want the nation to move forward. And this is what has given China strength.

Today when we talk of cyber army of China, where does it come from? It comes from such universities where people are taught higher learning and they are forging ahead despite the fact that India remains a software hub of the world. China is catching up and it is making progress in fields where it can make a mark. Cyber security is one of those which has got both military and economic connotations. If this is the type of economic progress that it has made, if this is the technology it is able to borrow back and steal, if this is the energy that it is able to channelise both monetarily and otherwise into its forth modernisation that was military then where does it go? And that is something that needs to be thought of very carefully because as China grows and looks at its capabilities and goals, I am quite sure it would be ensuring in its own mind that it settles that is left to settle.

And so far as India is concerned we have got a very long border, and disputes over it need to be resolved. When we are dealing with a stronger person, the weaker person will always suffer. That is something that is the law of the nature and that is something which we need to keep at the back of the mind. Hence it is important of what we craft out as a policy in terms of diplomacy, in terms of our political initiatives and in terms of our military preparations in “coping up with China”.

I think that this phrase chosen is very good to say that is “coping-up-with-China” because we need to cope up in economic field, we need to cope up the way it has forced its links the world over because of its economic powers, because of its diplomatic initiatives. China has got much larger presence in the continents of Africa and South America than India has ever had. India doen’t have it and it will take a long time for India to catch up, given the way our procedural systems are. Similarily, it has been able to forge links on our peripheries, which are much stronger than what we are able to do on China’s peripheries. So there is a great deal to look at this perspective if we want to cope up with China—a great amount of energy, a great amount of single-minded-aimed policy is required if you want to cope up with China.

Without this concentration, without such policy, we will fritter away our resources and we won’t be able to deal with China which is resurgent in a very big way. One more issue where we need to look at where China is concerned is that the leadership changes that are taking place have always their own dynamics. Whenever there has been something in China which has had the effect on either the leadership equation or the way the leadership is challenged the way within, it has directed the energies of the people and attention to outside forces. That is where you will find a link between where China has been teaching lessons to various countries on its periphery. It has been able to direct the attention of the people, direct the attention away from the domestic issues to external issues and that is something that we need to watch as the leadership changes take place and the leadership solidifies. If the leadership doesn’t solidify, this question mark remains on our minds.

Let me now turn to what is termed ignominy of 1962. I think the people from that time always remember 1962 and I term it a kick which woke us up. It made us aware of what can happen to us if we are not prepared properly. And if we look at political field, diplomatic field or military field, everything seems to have gone wrong. We did not make a correct political assessment. Our diplomatic measures to engage China and to know the intentions of China were not there. Our intelligence failed to see the way the troops were moving from one place to another and we were actually caught napping. As far as the military is concerned, the general philosophy before 1962 was that the military was not needed in India. And the military was used for constructing housing projects. There are still many projects which are still standing; they have not fallen. That is the good quality of work that the Army did. And people are still living in them. That is the kind of work the Army was engaged in. Less attention was paid to modernisation. Less attention was paid to the type of threats that could come up. Certain amount of training was given but the training was restricted to what happened in the Second World War. It was not looking at the future.

Therefore, when things came up, we were caught napping because troops moved up without equipment, without preparation, without adequate clothings, except for good morale, except for the determination that they will fight for the country, they had nothing else. I can quote an example from the unit in which I was commissioned. The CO of that unit was captured and he wrote a five-page narrative after he returned and in that he said that they had fifty rounds each. They constructed defensives which had been overlooked by the Chinese. And they had nothing to construct them except cutting trees and using them. And when the shelling started, they could see Chinese, who were able to directly fire into their bunkers and destroy them. They lost 282 people. The survivors were only one officer, one JCO and 30 other ranks—rest were wounded and captured. The unit was almost totally destroyed.

The lesson is that we were unprepared to deal with somebody who had the experience. The Chinese had prepared themselves—their troops were battle hardened in Korea and they knew exactly what was to be done. They had better intelligence of our area. In fact, we were able to get an account of the 1962 war which was written in China and was translated. What emerged out is very interesting. They knew exactly where the troops location was. They knew exactly the type of tracks that were used by the sheep, goat and yak herders. They knew exactly where the population was. They were able to put in people who were able to make friends with local people. So we were actually caught in a manner, which no military would like to be caught. In all this, there was a great amount of intelligence failure.

Despite all bravery, despite all valour, despite all determination, we suffered a crushing defeat. Nobody actually knew what was happening. Because the type of political interference that took place in nominating military commanders, things went totally wrong and it is something no military would like to think of. And our redemption came much later. But one thing did happen after this. The military woke up. There was a great amount of emphasis on what Chinese military had done and the lessons that we learnt and the things that we were able to do in 1965 and 1971 was thanks to this lesson learnt. The military became much prepared—mentally, physically and economically and in terms of equipment—because of what it learned from 1962. And there were a lots of interesting lessons that were learnt.

If you take your mind back to what happened in 1967 at Nathu La, we gave a very good account of ourselves. And a stage came when the Chinese pleaded that if we didn’t stop the shelling, they would have to use their air force to come inside and start bombarding our places. They suffered so much. And it was only because we learnt certain lessons in 1962. One of the main important things to be learnt was for any country of a size of China and the pride that it has. The most important thing is that China would not like to suffer a loss of face. And if that lesson is interpreted correctly, we will find a lot of military options that can be pragmatically applied to ensure that deterrence is there till the time we want or till the time we ensure that this philosophy is followed.

I would not elaborate particularly on this particularly philosophy. There was an incident at an old bunker at Dokala, where some Chinese troops came and destroyed it. That was in 2008. And what was said was that it was on the other side of the border. Words were said in terms of that it doesn’t concern us etc. The bunker was destroyed by the troops. In the latter part of that year, in 2009, there was a fence where Chinese patrol led by a major came. And they said that it was a new fence, though it had existed for last two decades. They told us to take it out. If we would have gone by the philosophy that was prevailing after the Dokala incident, we would have meekly submitted and said, “Remove it.” But we adopted a different methodology. The troops were told to deal politely but firmly. So when this patrol came and this officer from China came and touched this fence and started shaking it saying: “Take it out.” There was a young officer, a lieutenant from the unit who got hold of his hand and jerked it away and said, “If you touch it, I will shoot you.” The patrol went away and it has never come again to that place.

We have to be firm when dealing with somebody who is trying to test your weakness. If you show your weakness you will be overwhelmed. If you show firmness as well as a determination to take things forward, then the other man has to think twice that if he initiates something, it can result in damage. That is the damage that I call loss of face. So this loss of face is something that needs to be programmed into our approach at least in the military approach so that it ensures that we do not show the kind of weakness or appear to be weak or to be overwhelmed by something that is initiated by the other side.

Intelligence is another field which needs to be looked at very seriously. My experience has been that it is one of the major weaknesses of our country—whether it is any agency that is involved. Somehow, the focus on this issue is lacking, because resources get dwindled for something that is not actually required. And if you do not know what is happening around you, if you do not know what is happening on the other side of the borders, obviously you will be caught sleeping. This is something that needs to be looked at very seriously.

Lastly, how do we diplomatically and politically deal with China that has started saying in recent years that Arunachal Pradesh is southern Tibet? It never used to use these terms. If its troops come to Sona Zone and tell the local people that look here after five years Tawang will be theirs, how should we repsond? This diplomatic and political handling has to be crafted most astutely so that China knows that it won’t be able to do what it wants to in future. If these two issues are lacking, then we may find ourselves in different shoes altogether. Our border issues are very complex.

Somehow before 1962, there was no cogent and coordinated machinery which looked at the border issues. It was always one man’s opinion, one man’s mind or maximum two-three people were involved in it. And that is why we didn’t even know of what existed. We didn’t have any intelligence; we didn’t have any knowledge. We didn’t do adequate reconnainsance of those areas. I think the situation has to change. Today, things are better but they can be made better by a more coordinated, a more comprehensive mechanism, involving all stakeholders. Otherwise, we will have problems in the future.

( Keynote address at Uday India roundtable: Dealing with China)