The recommendation of the Group of Ministers after Kargil, to set-up a post of Chief of Defence Staff and an Integrated Headquarters under a Four Star Officer remains still unfulfilled. It appears that the political leadership and the senior bureaucrats remain uncomfortable with this idea. So, in other words we shall remain where we were and continue to muddle through. All the ideas and proposals shall remain only a dream. Is this how we are going to face the challenges confronting us now and in the immediate future?
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To date nothing appears to denote that we are serious about implementing the much felt necessity of having structured decision making machinery in government, to deal with emergent situations such as Kargil which occurred ten years ago or Mumbai which happened in 26/11. As far as is known, we still have a situation where each Service and each Agency is operating and acting on its own.
When Kargil erupted in 1999 literally in our homes, thanks to television, our then Chief of Army Staff was absent, being feted around in Poland! It was so clear that the Army was caught on the wrong foot and found napping! It involved a lot of difficulties and a grueling fight of guts and courage, which took 25 days of hard action before the Indian Army could prevail over the enemy and declare a victory. This action clearly exposed all our weaknesses for the world to see. Ultimately, after the intruders were thrown out or they withdrew, due to the supreme sacrifice of our brave officers and men who fought under impossible conditions at extreme altitudes in the mountains of Kashmir, our Generals and high ranking officers celebrated the victory with champagne. But the fact remains that it was a pyrrhic victory! One can only hope that India has learnt her lesson.
Recently in Vishakhapatnam, the wife of our Prime Minister launched our first indigenous nuclear submarine, INS Arihant. It was a red letter day for the Navy and India. It is the logical accomplishment of India’s basic arrangement of its nuclear deterrent. It completes the strategic triad. But a nuclear submarine without the commensurate complement of arms is hardly a deterrent.
This should now mark the beginning of a debate on India’s Nuclear Doctrine. One does not know if we have such a doctrine or not! A doctrine determines our policy of building nuclear weapons and how they will be deployed. It will make no sense to build such weapons if there is no doctrine. An ambiguous situation can lead to a nuclear arms race which could be ruinous to a developing country. An informed consensus must be reached for the quantum of nuclear weapons needed for a minimum deterrent. It has to be adequate and realistic. Such a situation eases the situation for the adversary also, to calibrate the size and nature of his deterrent accordingly.
India should never forget that it lies between two nuclear weapons states, with one of them regularly showing signs of going astray!
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