Indian Defence Review

Here the blame would not just rest with the diplomats; the political leadership must bear the greater burden of retrieving the situation. It is primarily the responsibility of political leadership to challenge the simplistic narrative that induces a sense of belief that disputes can be settled by use of force. We must remember that foreign policy can be as intelligent as the people’s ability to understand the nuances of it, and here the role of political leadership becomes crucial in educating the masses.

The following are the major imperatives that necessitate a debate on oversight:

• Military as a panacea for shortcomings in civilian governance and failure of foreign policies
• Frequency of deployments of the armed forces in internal security roles
• Number of casualties of the armed forces
• Cross border terrorism

Frequent resorting to use could be leading to overstretching of the armed forces and this might have a potential of internal haemorrhaging. It is time we start looking at this tendency from the prism of quality of governance and inadequate policy responses. Therefore, a parliamentary mechanism must be created that oversees the working of the armed forces. A standing committee on the lines of US Armed Services Committee of the Senate could be explored. This committee could oversee the functioning of the armed forces, provide guidance for the evolution of the military strategy and above all, ensure that precious national treasure is properly conserved and discretely applied in service of overall national goals (or the ‘grand strategy’). There is actually a Parliamentary Committee on Defence, but neither any salience to its conduct, nor to its recommendations are accorded by our governing system.

Involvement of the Armed Forces in Policy Making

Civilian control of the armed forces in any democratic set up is a foregone conclusion. However, in our case, the evolution of the civil-military relationship in the backdrop of dominant narrative of pacifist, although anti-status quo, its foreign policy of Nehru somewhat obfuscated the real significance of the armed forces. This resulted in the military being pushed to the sidelines from the standpoint of policy making. The situation was been further aggravated by the happenings in the neighbourhood where the army has never desisted from overstepping its mandate and taking over the leadership of the country. This is the backdrop that spawns an environment of trust deficit between the political and the military leadership. Furthermore, the complex, technologically sophisticated and interconnectedness to a vast canvas of geopolitics, makes the subject of defence quite unwieldy for the usual politicians. As Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw had to say, “I wonder whether those of our political masters who have been put in charge of the defence of the country can distinguish a mortar from a motor; a gun from a howitzer; a guerrilla from a gorilla…!”

So we rarely have the leadership of the MoD in the hands of ministers well versed with the subject. This creates the need of utter reliance on generalist civil servants for running the affairs of the Ministry. Thus the intended civilian control gets reduced to civil service control of the armed forces. Unlike in other democracies such as the US where even the civil servants of the Department of Defence possess adequate domain knowledge, the MoD is generally manned by personnel with a background not particularly suited for the highly complex and dynamic needs of managing the armed forces.

This predicament of defence planning is further depicted by the definitions in vogue till recently in the ‘Business Rules of the Government of India’. These rules defined the Service Headquarters (of Army, Navy and Air Force) as ‘subordinate offices’ of the MoD. According to these rules, the Secretary MoD was assigned the ‘responsibility’ of the defence of India and thus responsible for the armed forces of India. This setup introduces another anomaly that whereas the Service Chiefs hold the same status in the order of precedence as that of Cabinet Secretary, but functionally they are subordinated by the Defence Secretary’s authority! Hullabaloo raised some years back has caused to Government to remove, on paper, such banal anomalies, but the ‘system’ remains unmoved.

The effect of this archaic structure almost insulates the leadership of the three Services (Army, Navy and Air Force) from the policy making process. The ensuing situation is not optimal because the professional inputs necessary for decision making are not directly accessible to the political leadership. This set up has the potential of not only delays in decision making, but is also inherently incapable of critical evaluation of the working and needs of the military.

We need to recognise the fact that the conventional role of military is undergoing a sea change; its role is no longer confined to the territorial domain. In case of India, this aspect is further important because of the rising power of India and the fast changing geo-political landscape where we are situated. In the years to come, our traditional problems with Pakistan will be less and less demanding and the military will be called in more often to chart the turmoil induced by resurgent China.

Furthermore, in the backdrop of nuclearisation of our region, the possibility of protracted conventional military conflict has receded. Of course, the deterrence value of powerful armed forces cannot be overstated. However, the application of force will be more often for power projection, securing Sea Lanes Of Communication, fighting piracy and other out-of-area operations. This reorientation of the role of the military will demand increasing jointness in operations.2

Therefore, the importance of a unified military in the furtherance of our foreign policy can hardly be overstated and an overhaul of the MoD is long overdue. One of the possible models that could be adopted could be the UK model of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This will ensure that the CDS works side by side with the Secretary MoD and will be professional head of India’s armed forces. The CDS will be the single point of Military Advice to the Government. The creation of the CDS will also adequately address the ‘jointness’ or the unified operability needs of our times.

Political Leadership and the Necessity of Domain Knowledge

Going back to Clausewitz’s famous postulation that, “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”, this establishes the dominance of political goals and defines the role of the military as an instrument for achieving the said goals. The government of the day has to enunciate the grand strategy outlining the political and economic goals essential to safeguard national interests. It is the responsibility of the military leadership to determine military strategy in consonance with the grand strategy of that government.

These formulations of the strategy and the working thereof can be realised only when the political leadership is adept in handling the complexities of the subject. As discussed above, India’s rising power under a challenging geo-political backdrop puts onerous responsibility on our political leadership. If we aim to secure for ourselves a global positioning commensurate with our power, then the political leadership will have to develop the knowledge and expertise to establish civilian (political) control in the real sense. This implies that they should be able to succinctly define national goals and have direct and intensive discourse with the military leadership, so that an enabling military strategy could be developed.

The leadership will be more often confronted with difficult policy choices both in terms of the massive fiscal commitments and the efficacy of choices in addressing the critical challenges to our security. A classic example would be our problems in the Himalayas – is raising a Mountain Strike Corps more effective than enhancing the naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean that could pose credible interdiction capabilities in the approaches to choke points of Malacca Straits or will it require both in some proportion? These choices will impose costs of billions of dollars and years of lead time and the right choice holds a key to the attainment of national goals.

One way of fostering the domain knowledge for the future political leadership could be to have ‘shadow ministers’ for the key ministries such as Defence, Home, Finance and External Affairs, as it is in the UK. These shadow ministers should be not only critiquing the policies and working of the concerned ministry but also offer alternative policies. Furthermore, as discussed above, parliamentary functioning along the lines of US armed services committee could also provide a pool of would-be defence ministers conversant with the intricacies and complexities of the defence portfolio. A collateral benefit of this will be that the Parliament could witness more vigorous and informed debates. This could elevate the general awareness levels about the needs and the working of the armed forces.

Conclusion

India can surely be proud of its disciplined, apolitical and brave armed forces. Our military not only represents a potent force, but is a unique force in the world that is constituted by the amalgam of various races and religions held together by their loyalty to the nation and pride in their service. It is incumbent upon the nation and its leadership to nurture and conserve this national treasure, and be profoundly discrete in its application.

We are at the cusp of tectonic shifts in global geo-politics. Therefore, the real challenge for our leadership will be to skilfully leverage our military power in such a way that victories are achieved with the least suffering and attrition – or better still, the adversary finds discretion as a better bet. Thus, our leaders can ensure that the nation moves steadfastly towards realising Mahatma Gandhi’s dream of wiping tears from the eye of every Indian, without compromising on strategic autonomy.

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And then we will not have to echo what The Atlantic magazine said, “The American public and its political leadership will do anything for the military except take it seriously.”