Geopolitics

Need a Muscular Indian Strategy in Afghanistan
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Issue Courtesy: Aakrosh | Date : 19 Mar , 2013

With the “stick” of a possibility of rearming Northern Alliance in hand, India can afford to talk softly in the post-2014 situation and be heard. It can even try to become an honest broker between Karzai and the other tribal factions, who may seek to go under the umbrella of the Taliban for the sake of buying future peace and prosperity for themselves.

This establishment of communication lines to the tribes, who lack a stake in the Kabul government, should be made into an interim goal for the country as 2014 is also when Afghanistan goes to the polls to elect a new president. While Karzai has stated that he would not be contesting the presidential polls, he and his cohorts will hardly be expected to cede their powers to such an extent that they go out of reckoning. India would do well if it plays a role even in this transition, independently, without being seen as a standard-bearer of the Western alliance.

…India-centric Pakistan army must realise that the Indian nuclear doctrine is not an exercise in passivity. It says clearly that whether an attack with nuclear first strike is on a battlefield or on a city of the country, the attackers would have to countenance a massive retaliation.

It is uniquely evident that Pakistan cannot provide necessities that the new state of Afghanistan needs, for example, trade, economic benefit and non-partisan political support to the government. Pakistan’s obsession for “strategic depth” actually empowers Kabul by its denial. If a time comes that Kabul is able to have reasonable sway over most of the country, it could wrench Pakistan’s arms and legs out of their sockets by leveraging the latter’s desire to get that depth to counter Indian incursion.

No talk of Karzai about India being a friend and Pakistan a “brother” could ensure Kiplingesque Afghanistan to back Islamabad over its tribal nations’ desire to bleed to death a country that has not allowed its western neighbour to grow and thrive.

Ironically, Pakistan’s desire to keep Afghanistan subjugated to its will stems from the same blind self-belief that east Pakistan could be kept as an adjunct to the larger desire of being with the co-religionists. It does not take into account the strong bonds of kinships that grow between tribes and clans or the culture of self-help.

The same tribal affinities that range along the Hindu Kush mountains from central Afghanistan to northern Pakistan are far stronger than any of Pakistan’s Punjabi-dominated army could withstand. As the past year’s military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have shown, the mountains of Hindu Kush provide such perfect hideouts that they could be sanctuaries for a continuous insurgency, which can go ad infinitum.

At the moment, tribal attachments are divided in terms of old-world “loyalties” and “honour” on the one hand and over the cash the U.S./ISAF have doled out on the other. Pakistan does not have pockets deep enough to cater to those primal interests of the tribal lords. What it had was an appeal that it was a co-religionist. And it had built relationships on the basis of cash and materiel out of the largesse of the CIA during its proxy war with the then Soviet Union in the 1980s.

The completion of the Indian triad, with the launch of INS Arihant, would remove any doubts about the country’s ability to survive an attack and retaliate.

Generations have changed since. The public affairs teams of the United States and the NATO have corrupted the innocent tribal minds already with the desire for a good life. Will Pakistan be able to satiate those needs?

Conclusion

Unlike Afghanistan after the U.S. and Saudi intervention against the Russians, this time around, Pakistan security agencies, including the army, will not have an unlimited war chest with a free hand to deal with the country.

This time, the United States and its Western allies will stay engaged so that Afghanistan does not become a haven for al Qaeda-like organisations once again. This time, they want India to play a larger role in stabilising the south Asian country. And this time, Pakistan is at the deep end, exposed as a country whose army harbours all kinds of malcontents, lets them thrive and allows them to launch insurgent operations against countries like China, Afghanistan and India.

In Pakistan army’s parlance, this is supposed to be “asymmetric” warfare with powers that it cannot confront conventionally. Its desire to produce tactical nuclear weapons is also supposedly based on this logic. But an India-centric Pakistan army must realise that the Indian nuclear doctrine is not an exercise in passivity. It says clearly that whether an attack with nuclear first strike is on a battlefield or on a city of the country, the attackers would have to countenance a massive retaliation.

The completion of the Indian triad, with the launch of INS Arihant, would remove any doubts about the country’s ability to survive an attack and retaliate.

So, like its insurgency theory, its nuclear weapons theory will also get thrown out of the window when it comes to the crunch. Of course, one understands that these theories of the Pakistan army need to stay afloat to maintain its public support base, which would otherwise dwindle to the extent that the army will not be able to expropriate 3 per cent of an ailing gross domestic product for a tinpot force. This supposedly mighty army cannot even subdue an internal insurgency without the help air force jets and heavy artillery, thus killing thousands of its own innocent citizens and displacing millions.

India cannot afford to have a similar attitude towards Afghanistan. The country is far too important for the geopolitics of the region, including central Asia. India seeks access to the energy sources in those countries that are vital to its economy.

But a cautionary note seems overdue on the issue of Afghanistan post 2014. No power, be it the United States and its Western allies, or India, or China, or Iran or Russia can hope to stabilise the country without accounting for Pakistan. Islamabad/Rawalpindi will have to be brought on board for any long-term solution for Kabul.

Pakistan needs to feel secure as a nation state that its western and northern borders will not be in a quagmire similar to its eastern border. In turn, it will have to shed the highly ambitious project of finding its secure “strategic depth” in case of a war with India. First, Pakistan’s army shall have to realise that conventional wars are passé, especially after the two disastrous U.S. adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, it needs to comprehend that it is barely able to rule its own country by surviving on the handouts of the United States. It does not have the ability to subjugate another country to its own will and remain at the top of that country’s own national interest.

The creation of Bangladesh proved that a common religion is not glue that can bind two disparate regions of a country together. It is even more true for Afghanistan, with the majority Pashtuns remaining differentiated by tribes. On top of that, about 30 per cent of the territory under Kabul does not even have Pashtun influence, with minorities like Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks populating it. So, can Pakistan army exercise control on Afghanistan the way, let’s say, it can over Sindh? The answer is self-evident.

India, on the other hand, has to come out of its self-resignation that marked its Bangladesh venture. It did not indulge in nation building from Dhaka. It did not seek to impose on Bangladesh even a “friendship” treaty, which would be embarrassing to the countries involved. It was in lines with the treaty it signed with the Soviet Union. It did not suggest one of the kind it had with Nepal.

Despite this, it basically allowed Bangladesh to drift apart to the extent that it did not have the knowledge of the conspiracy against the leader of the country Sheikh Mujibur Rehman before he was gruesomely assassinated, meaningfully on 15 August 1975, the day of India’s independence anniversary celebrations.

The Chabahar port, which India was building for Iran, is about 75 per cent complete on Iranian money; the latter now expects India to chip in with its share. This port is to be connected by road to Afghanistan, partly built by Iran and India.

India cannot afford to have a similar attitude towards Afghanistan. The country is far too important for the geopolitics of the region, including central Asia. India seeks access to the energy sources in those countries that are vital to its economy. Plus, New Delhi also seeks access to these markets, which have still remained mostly untouched by Western goods.

The country’s frenetic efforts at establishing a route to Afghanistan through Iran, bypassing Pakistan, is an attempt to open up land-locked Kabul to opportunities in accessing the modern-day commerce.

During the recent Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran, a lot of time was invested in the talk about reviving the old Silk Route. But not much headway was made because a crucial link on that route, Iran, remains under the sanctions regime of the Western countries. Iran-Afghanistan-India still had a meeting to find a way forward.

The Chabahar port, which India was building for Iran, is about 75 per cent complete on Iranian money; the latter now expects India to chip in with its share. This port is to be connected by road to Afghanistan, partly built by Iran and India.

The reports coming out of the bowels of Indian bureaucracy show that India is keen on developing the Iranian port, with or without the American sanctions, for its national interest lies in the development of this route not just to resupply the Afghans but also to provide a much-needed land route to the central Asian countries.

When this kind of hard-headed realism directs policy in New Delhi, usually the mandarins of South Block make the right choice, irrespective of their ideological predilections. It only remains then to bring the political leadership on board. In case of Afghanistan, the political leadership seems well attuned with the new realities.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Pinaki Bhattacharya

Pinaki Bhattacharya, writes on Indian strategic security issues. He is currently working as a defence correspondent for a leading newspaper published from New Delhi.

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