Indian Defence Review

“¦”Security means development into a modernising society; security is not just military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military though it may involve it; security is not traditional activity though it may encompass it”.

The debacle in 1962 did lead to soul stirring within the country and it was realised that something was amiss. Among many steps taken, JIC which was a subcommittee under the Chiefs of Staff, was given an independent status and the role of being a single point referral agency for the preparation of assessments. The Defence Committee of Cabinet was converted into the Cabinet Committee for Political Affair. A separate organisation, the R&AW, was created to deal with foreign intelligence. Most of these however, amounted ultimately to cosmetic changes, because defence and foreign policy­making continued to remain with key individuals who were not necessarily professionals themselves. The assessments of the JIC were not taken seriously. In fact these assessments were prepared routinely and superficially, with Ministry of External Affairs keeping most of its information to itself. The same was the situation with regard to technical source information obtained by the Armed Forces.

The real cause of this state of affairs was the presence of a frigid mindset and absence of a security culture. These accounted for the irony that the essence of what constituted national interests or security was not still understood by most players in the bureaucratic or political class. Nobody had seen the wisdom of clearly identifying India’s interests or values, much less articulating them.

One of the best definitions of security is from Robert McNamara “Security means development into a modernising society; security is not just military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military though it may involve it; security is not traditional activity though it may encompass it”.

“¦a mechanism was brought into existence in 1970-71 in relation to Bangladesh operations. Highest level representatives from the MEA, Ministry of Defence, Army HQs and R&AW met to plan, coordinate and execute. A brilliant strategy was thus produced with equally brilliant results.

This definition underscores why there should always be a National Security Management mechanism present in the country. Such a mechanism was brought into existence in 1970-71 in relation to Bangladesh operations. Highest level representatives from the MEA, Ministry of Defence, Army HQs and R&AW met to plan, coordinate and execute. A brilliant strategy was thus produced with equally brilliant results. However, the mechanism did not last beyond 1971. It, therefore left no permanent imprint. Furthermore, this is what caused the political dialogue at Simla in 1972 to fail in taking full advantage of the military victory in the 1971 war. At the end of the Simla agreement, the J&K issue returned back to square one. Pakistan has since repeatedly demonstrated that LOC is not sacrosanct.

The years following have seen no basic changes in the national security decision making systems though some new ideas were tried. Following examples will illustrate:

Some new institutions like Strategic Care Groups or Core Committee of Secretaries had functioned in 1980s and 1990s where ideas were bounced back and forth to reach a consensus on specific security related policies. Constitution of such groups indicated a desire to decentralise policy making and to consult a wider spectrum of opinion but these objectives failed to be realised as membership was confined to individuals who were more bureaucratic than professionals and whose memberships flowed from the official positions they held rather than the expertise they possessed if any. Often the decisions in such groups degenerated into desultory chats rather than indepth debates or examination of the issues.

A feeble effort was made in 1990 to give a new direction to decision making by setting up a National Security Council but a change of government at Delhi reduced this effort to naught. Status quo continued in the rest of the decade but in its last year the concept of NSC has been revived.

This NSC exists merely in form. To be effective it has to be fully and properly structured. The handling of the highjack of IAC 814 in December 1999 would indicate that national security management in the country is still in an embryonic stage.

Non state actors like the media, academics and thinktanks have taken upon themselves to direct national issues and recommend for adoption policies and postures.

The highjack posed two perspectives before the policy maker. One was humanitarian, saving 160 lives. The other was of capitulation to the State behind the overt face of the highjackers and to the ideology which has been the inspiration of this State and which we recognise as having no validity. Most people in the country, including some leaders in the ruling Parivar saw the final decision in the case to be contrary to the supreme national interests. Sentimentality played a big role when national security decision making needs to be entirely objective and cold­blooded.

However there is reason to believe that in the new millennium wind of change would be blowing, improving decision making. Non state actors like the media, academics and thinktanks have taken upon themselves to direct national issues and recommend for adoption policies and postures. Public interest litigations are compelling the judiciary also to be involved in decision making. Such activity is being noticed at the centre of power, creating an impact. CTBT is a good example of how such pressures are operating.

These pressures will ultimately hopefully result in the enunciation of a national strategic doctrine and creation of a proper national security management mechanism. The vacuum that exists in public consciousness about national security thinking may then start disappearing, compelling the policy makers to remain always on their toes.