Indian Defence Review

The Shillong Accord

The defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pak war was a grievous blow to Naga insurgency. The insurgents lost their bases in East Pakistan. During the war self-styled General Thinsullie, chief of the underground Naga Army (Phizo Group), and self-styled Brigadier Nidellie were captured by the Indian forces inside Bangladesh. In a major development, a section of Nagas who were supporters of the underground and had formed a political party, the UDF, decided to confront the Government on a political plank.

Also read: Nagaland: The Beginning of Insurgency – I

UDF contested the general elections of 1974 with the promise to bring genuine reconciliation between the underground and the Government of India. The election did not produce a clear majority but UDF formed a government with the help of some independents under a moderate Naga, Vizol.

The government did not last long as there were defections from its ranks. Political instability forced the Governor to impose President’s rule.

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The pressure on the underground was resumed. There was an attempt to send another gang of hostiles to China led by Issac Swu. The bulk of the gang was prevented from crossing the border into Myanmar and many were either killed or captured. A small number, however, succeeded in escaping the security dragnet.32

The defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pak war was a grievous blow to Naga insurgency. The insurgents lost their bases in East Pakistan.

The imposition of internal emergency by Smt Indira Gandhi in 1975 gave a free hand to the security forces to flush out the insurgents from their jungle hideouts. Between April and August 1975, a spate of surrenders took place. A total of 1,214 surrendered.33 The church leaders again took initiative to broker peace. A liaison committee, under Rev Longri Ao with Dr Aram among others, was formed to facilitate talks with the underground.

The liaison committee held talks with Biesto Medom, Keviyalle (Phizo’s brother), Ramyo and M Asa of the underground. When it became clear to the Governor, Shri LP Singh, that the agreement had a fair chance of success, he met the committee at Shillong. The Governor was assured that the underground on their own volition accepted without condition the Constitution of India and promised to deposit their arms at an appointed place. The agreement, which came to be called the Shillong Accord, was finally signed on November 11, 1975.34

Formation of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)

When the Shillong Accord was being negotiated, Isak Swu and Muivah with a group of 150 hardcore rebels were on their way back from China. It may be recalled that a group had managed to exfiltrate and reach the Chinese territory towards the end of 1974. This group had begun to return in small batches. When Muivah and Isak Swu were informed about the developments, they rejected the Accord and termed it as betrayal by the NNC and swore to fight on.

The situation has turned worse by trafficking in drugs and gunrunning. Insurgency provides an ideal cover for such operations.

Chinese hand was discerned in the rejection of the Accord, as it was in their interest.35 This group did not physically enter Nagaland but established itself in Myanmar’s territory, where they had the support of Chin Nagas. They set up a camp on a mountain top, identified as Sapha camp. Soon cracks developed in the group. Isak and Muivah made derogatory remarks against Phizo and the policy adopted by the NNC.

The UDF government of Nagaland had established a camp at a place called Pangshe on the Indian side of the border to negotiate with Isak-Muivah group but no progress was made till September 1979. As an interim measure, the dissident group had set up a military council. In March 1979, Isac-Muivah group called a National Assembly, which elected Khaplang, a Hemi Naga from Myanmar, as the Federal President. Isak and Muivah were able to convince Khaplang to break with the NNC. On February 2, 1980, the trio announced the formation of the NSCN, replacing the FGN36.

Over the years it has extended its influence to the Naga inhabited areas of Assam, and some parts of Meghalaya and Arunachal and has become the mainspring of insurgencies in the North-east.

The period leading up to the formation of NSCN was bloody. Those who had lived and fought together were engaged in killing each other, all in the name of ideology and the future of Nagaland. 20 top underground cadres lost their lives at the hands of their erstwhile colleagues. It was one of the darkest periods in Naga’s struggle for self-determination.

The NSCN Manifesto

The manifesto of NSCN included the following: –

Split in the NSCN

Sometime in 1985, feelers were sent through Rev Longri Ao for talks with the NSCN without pre-conditions. The Government of India agreed to hold talks but reportedly backed out. The government once again proposed talks but within the framework of the Indian constitution. The offer was rejected. Soon differences arose over the response to the Indian Government’s persistent proposal to start dialogue. Rumours were spread that Isak and Muivah have sold out and planned to oust Khaplang.37

An effort was made to patch up the differences but in a pre-emptive strike, Khaplang aided by Myanmar’s troops attacked Muivah group on April 30, 1988. 140 men of Muivah group were killed while 230 others including women and children escaped and fled to the jungles pursued by Myanmar’s troops. Many died but a handful under Muivah joined up with Isak and trekked to Konyak area. The NSCN formally split into two factions; the Konyak Nagas under Khaplang and Khole Konyak formed NSCN (K) and the Thangkhul Nagas under Isak and Muivah formed NSCN (IM).

NSCN considers collection of taxes as legitimate on the plea that it is the Government, a formulation that no government can accept.

The split has led to bloody feuds between the two groups. The NSCN (IM) has made a strong comeback since the split in 1988. Over the years it has extended its influence to the Naga inhabited areas of Assam, and some parts of Meghalaya and Arunachal and has become the mainspring of insurgencies in the North-east. The NSCN (IM) has established a government-in-exile called the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland; the name Nagaland has been replaced by Nagalim to include the areas claimed in Greater Nagaland.

The NSCN (K) areas of influence are in parts of Mokokchung district and Tuensang. It also has a government-in-exile and its headquarters is located in Myanmar. There are frequent raids and killings by both sides to extend their areas of influence. Elimination of rivals and betrayals has marked the course of events since the split.

Admission to the UNPO

The cause of NSCN (IM) received a boost after it was admitted to the UNPO, which is a Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) based in Hague and has nothing to do with the United Nations Organisation. Muivah has been attending the meetings of UNPO. He had also attended a UN Human Rights Committee session in Geneva in 1993 under a pseudonym. NSCN (IM) admission to UNPO has enabled it to open offices in a number of countries in South East Asia, Europe and North America.38

Drift in Naga Movement

Naga underground are now divided into three main groups: NSCN (IM), NSCN (K) and NNC. NNC still survives in Angami area but has split into two factions; NNC (A) under Phizo’s daughter Adino and NNC (K) under Khadao Yanthan. Muivah group enjoys influence among Thangkhuls, Semas and Phoms in Zunheboto, Wokha, Ukhrul, Dimapur and Kohima, whereas Khaplang group among Konyaks and Aos in Tuensang, Mokokchung and Mon. In Angami and Chakesang areas the legacy of Phizo still lingers.

NSCNs contention is that carrying of arms is permitted, except inside the prescribed areas. This interpretation is obviously illogical. No movement of arms was permitted outside the prescribed area.

The character of Naga insurgency has undergone sea change over the years. What was predominantly a rural guerrilla movement is now mainly confined to towns and urban centres like Dimapur, Kohima and Mokokchung. The commitment to the cause, which illuminated the movement in the fifties and sixties, is now absent. Today, militancy is a way to make easy money. Extortion, kidnapping and killings of innocent civilians have replaced the guerrilla warfare. A nexus of corrupt officials, ministers and contractors siphon off funds for development. They in turn finance militants belonging to different factions. It is a vicious circle.

The situation has turned worse by trafficking in drugs and gunrunning. Insurgency provides an ideal cover for such operations. Baptist Pastor Rev Nu laments “there is not a single MLA in 60 member assembly without links with Muivah or Khaplang faction.”

A Fresh Peace Initiative

People of Nagaland are disillusioned and are fed up with violence and bloodshed. Fifty years of strife has taken its toll. It is this realisation that, perhaps, prompted NSCN (IM) to agree to a cease-fire and political negotiation with the Union Government. Talks began in February 1997 followed by a cease-fire agreement, which was first signed on August 1, 1997 and has been in force since then. Several rounds of talks have taken place, first with Swaraj Kaushal as the official interlocutor and subsequently with K Padmanabhaiah.

The Naga delegation had laid down three conditions before talks could start: firstly, it shall be without any pre-condition; secondly, the talks shall be at the highest level; and thirdly, the venue shall be outside India. Three rounds of talks have taken place outside India since 1997. A cease-fire-monitoring cell was established at Dimapur, which had representatives of the centre, the security forces and the NSCN (IM). Despite differences in the interpretation of the provisions of the agreement, the cease-fire has held on. Some major differences are listed below:-39

According to Lt Gen Narahari40, who visited Nagaland in 2000, the security forces insisted and enforced, as much as they could, the rule regarding carrying of weapons outside the prescribed area. The villagers whom he met during his visit confirmed that extortion and tax collection by the underground was going on.During the talks in Amsterdam in July 2002, Isak and Muivah agreed to come to India to hold talks with the Indian leaders. To facilitate their arrival they were promised safe passage and the Government of Nagaland withdrew arrest warrants against them. So far, the talks have made little progress. During the talks held in New Delhi in January 2003, Muivah and Isak Swu made a significant statement and said that insurgency in Nagaland has come to an end and vowed to stop the campaign of guns. (Promise of Peace, Frontline, January 31, 2003) But subsequently, as the talks faltered on the question of Greater Nagaland, Muivah was ambivalent and in the ‘Walk the Talk’ interview with Shekhar Gupta in June 2005, he was not very sure if the cease-fire would continue to hold. (Indian Express, June 21, 2005)

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In April 2000, NSCN (K) announced a formal cease-fire with the Indian Government, which resulted in a meeting between the two sides in September 2001. During the meeting of the Cease-fire Supervisory Board on February 19, 2002, the Khaplang faction agreed to shift its cadres to designated camps.

In May 2001, Myanmar launched a massive combing operation against NSCN (K) on their side of Naga Hills to flush them out. Many were injured in the firing between the two sides in Konyak region along the Indo-Myanmar border.

There is a view in the security forces that the cease-fire has given the insurgents a breather to enlarge their influence in the North-east. Despite the cease-fire both factions of NSCN have been indulging in extortion, levying taxes and killings. It has been reported that Muivah had visited Pakistan in January 2000, raising doubts about his continuing links with the ISI. It has links with almost all militant groups in North-east India. It has links with Hynnilwtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and A’chik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) of Meghalaya, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), A’chik Liberation Matgrik Army in the Garo Hills and Hmar People’s Convention in Mizoram.

NSCN (IM) made a real breakthrough in extending its area of operation by gaining a foothold in the Imphal Valley. The Meiteis and Nagas have never had very friendly relations. So, when Namoijam Oken Singh left UNLF and formed Kangli Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), the NSCM (IM) promptly gave support and arms to this group and thus got a foothold in the crucial Imphal Valley. The extended linkages of NSCN (IM) with the insurgent groups in all the states of the North-east are extremely profitable for them. The small splinter groups have no ideology; they are in business of insurgency only for extortion, the major share of the extortion goes in the kitty of NSCN (IM). The organisation is also believed to have contacts with the LTTE of Sri Lanka and People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh. It has established network of contacts for arms procurement in Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh and other South East Asian countries.

NSCN (K) faction has an equally wide area of influence and is believed to enjoy the support of the former Chief Minister, SC Jamir. The organisation has been engaged in fratricidal feud with Muivah faction, which considers it as traitor. It has bases in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan. In May 2001, Myanmar launched a massive combing operation against NSCN (K) on their side of Naga Hills to flush them out. Many were injured in the firing between the two sides in Konyak region along the Indo-Myanmar border.

Demand for Greater Nagaland

The success of the current initiative hinges on the response to Naga’s demand for the creation of Greater Nagaland comprising the present Nagaland and Naga inhabited areas of the neighbouring states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal and in Myanmar. Whether the proposed Greater Nagaland will be an independent entity or part of the Indian Union has not been spelt out clearly by the NSCN. The demand has, nonetheless, raised the hackles of Manipuris, who fear that the Centre may agree to carve a Southern Nagaland comprising the Naga inhabited districts of Senapati, Ukhrul, Chandel and Tamenglong in order to appease the Nagas. Their fear is rooted in the unanimous resolution passed in the Nagaland Assembly in 1994, which favoured the establishment of Greater Nagaland.

Whether the proposed Greater Nagaland will be an independent entity or part of the Indian Union has not been spelt out clearly by the NSCN.

Manipuri suspicion was reinforced when in 2002, the cease-fire with Naga militants was extended without territorial limits; earlier extensions were only within the territorial limits of Nagaland. The announcement was a grievous blunder. It caused widespread resentment and shock amongst Meiteis cutting across all barriers. The anger of the people turned violent and for days Imphal was literally burning, forcing the government to withdraw Manipur from the ambit of cease-fire.

Appraisal

The Nagas remained isolated during 600 years rule of Ahom kings in Assam. The isolation continued even after the British annexation of Assam, which resulted from the Treaty of Yandeboo in 1826. The British devised the policy of ‘Excluded Areas’ to keep the tribes of the North-east isolated from the plains, primarily to prevent raids in the plantations.

The Nagas were first exposed to the outside world during the World War I when they were recruited in the labour corps for service in France. The World War II and particularly the Battle of Kohima were to have a profound effect on the psyche of Nagas. They were exposed to the war as a frontline state and became aware of the nationalist movements that were sweeping across most of South and South-east Asia.

They were exposed to the war as a frontline state and became aware of the nationalist movements that were sweeping across most of South and South-east Asia.

The spread of Christianity gave the Nagas a sense of identity or “more specifically a sense of separateness” from the plainsmen. This sense of separateness was exploited by Phizo to politicise the Nagas on a separatist platform. Unfortunately, in the early years the church played a role, which willy- nilly encouraged this sense of separateness.

There is a widespread belief among the present day Nagas as also in the minds of many other Indians that there was unanimity amongst Nagas for separation from India at the time of transfer of power and in the years immediately after Independence. This is not borne out by facts. The speech given by T Alibaimti, president of NNC, in a public meeting in Kohima on December 6, 1948, where he exhorted, “I have but one word to say, our country is connected with India in many ways. We should continue that connection,” underlines the differing approaches of leaders like Alibaimti and Sakhrie on one side and Phizo and his supporters on the other. Sakhrie was one of the founders of Naga movement and differed with Phizo on use of violence and had warned that Nagas were ill prepared for such a clash. His criticism of Phizo led to his brutal assassination by the followers of Phizo.

Clause 9 of Akbar Hydari Agreement proved one of the most contentious between the two opposing sides. Phizoite Nagas interpreted the clause as their right to declare independence after the expiry of ten years whereas the Government of India held the view that it only meant that Nagas could decide the changes in the administrative arrangement for the Naga Hills. In any case the Government of India held the view that after the adoption of the Constitution the agreement was subsumed in the Sixth Schedule.

When insurgency started in 1956 neither the political leadership nor the army had any experience in fighting insurgency.

Lt Gen Narahari in his book “Security Threats to North-east India” rightly observes that Nagas have psyched themselves that Naga Hills was never part of India. There are several parts of India that never came under one legislative or administrative authority, but they all came under one colonial authority. The Government of India Act of 1935 brought Naga Hills, which was under British rule, into British India and on August 15, 1947, under the Indian Union as successor state. It is worthwhile recalling that the Nagas recognised the overlordship of Ahoms and paid tributes to their kings. Ahoms on their part left the Nagas to live, as they liked, as long as they did not create any trouble for them. There is enough evidence to believe that Manipuris in earlier days penetrated Naga Hills and exacted tributes when they felt strong enough to do so.41

A few comments on Naga insurgency and counter-insurgency are called for. The harsh measures taken by the army in the face of violent guerrilla attacks in the fifties contributed to the sense of separateness even among that section of Nagas, who favoured a peaceful settlement. When insurgency started in 1956 neither the political leadership nor the army had any experience in fighting insurgency. The then Army Chief, Gen KS Thimaya, is reported to have candidly told Nehru that it required political wisdom rather than military muscle to solve the Naga problem.42 It must, however, be said to the credit of Nehru that he had rightly grasped the nature of the problem, but the government failed to evolve a long-term politico-military strategy to deal with the situation. It will serve no purpose to deny that in the initial stages there were widespread violations of Human Rights and acts of vendetta in which innocent lives of civilians were lost and villages burnt. Torture to elicit information was quite common.Grouping of villages to deny the guerrillas public support was experimented for a while but wisely given up, as it proved counter-productive. However, the brutalities and violations of Human Rights by the underground have not been adequately documented. They have an unflattering record of assassination of dissidents and opponents. Sakhrie was kidnapped, tortured and then killed because he opposed Phizo. His erstwhile comrades physically liquidated Kaito Sema, who was one of the most charismatic underground military leaders, after he broke with Phizo and formed a separate party. He was shot dead in broad daylight in Kohima in August 1968.

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The underground opposed to any agreement with the Government of India and assassinated Dr Imkongliba Ao, who was the Chairman of Nagaland Interim Body pending elections to the first Assembly of the newly created State. Some assailants killed Kevichusa, who was the general secretary of NNC, in his house in Dimapur in June 1994. The treatment of captured Assam policemen by the underground was equally deplorable. Armed Nagas attacked the few police posts established by Assam Police, captured the bewildered policemen, stripped them of all clothing and ordered them to march back to the plains in nude. In fact in Satakha, 72 policemen were stripped by the rebels and ordered to start walking to the foothills.43

Armed Nagas attacked the few police posts established by Assam Police, captured the bewildered policemen, stripped them of all clothing and ordered them to march back to the plains in nude.

In the early years of insurgency the guerrillas were galvanised by idealism. There was romance in operating from jungle hideouts. There was a well-defined aim to fight Indian imperialism. The support of Pakistan and China boosted their morale and provided them a platform for anti-India propaganda. The charisma of Phizo kept the insurgency alive.

The Indian Army had no experience of counter-insurgency operations when it was sent to Nagaland but it soon learnt its lessons. It became better organised and developed tactics to keep the guerrillas on the run. It also realised that the insurgent war must be fought on two fronts simultaneously; one military and the other psychological, to win the hearts and minds of people. This realisation brought greater accountability and control over the actions of units in counter-insurgency operations. On the political front the creation of a new State of Nagaland and encouragement to over-ground politics took the wind out of the separatist movement.

The underground Nagas missed a historic opportunity to find a lasting solution to the Naga problem when they refused the offer of a settlement by Smt Indira Gandhi not within the Indian Constitution but within the framework of Indian Union, meaning thereby that the constitution could be amended to accommodate a settlement. The Shillong Accord was another turning point in the chequered history of Nagaland. The opportunity to usher in an era of peace was lost due to the refusal of a section of underground to accept the accord, ostensibly in the name of ideology but in fact due to external influence and personal egos.

The Indian Army had no experience of counter-insurgency operations when it was sent to Nagaland but it soon learnt its lessons.

The failure also brought into focus the failure of the negotiators to enter into wider consultations with various factions before finalising the agreement. The split in NSCN complicated the situation further. Internecine war between the two groups has taken many lives. Although the divide may suit the security forces at the tactical level, but the rift makes the search for a lasting peace all the more difficult. The overground politics has also got mired into fractious rivalries. SC Jamir (former Chief Minister of Nagaland) is reported to be siding with Khaplang group whereas Rishang Keishing (former Chief Minister of Manipur) is reported to be supporting NSCN (IM).

Five decades of insurgency has taken its toll on many fronts. The Naga society is today beset with doubts and people are sullen and tired of senseless violence. The centre has pumped in crores of rupees year after year as central assistance. Unfortunately, over the decades a nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and contractors has developed which appropriates the major portion of the funds in the name of development projects.

The insistence of Nagas to incorporate Naga dominated areas of Manipur in Greater Nagaland will prove to be a major hurdle in the final settlement of the Naga problem.

The character of Naga insurgency has changed over the years. No longer the guerrillas contemplate a life in jungle hideouts. The scene of action has shifted to towns. In the early years the emphasis was on mass mobilisation and guerrilla tactics of hit and run. Now the emphasis is on extortion, kidnapping, arm-twisting and blackmail. The community is held to ransom by fear of militants who are running a parallel government. Every government employee including ministers pay a part of their salary to the underground as tax. So do professionals like doctors, traders and shopowners. For every contract, a commission is paid to one militant group or the other: The exchequer is part financing the insurgency.

Naga-Kuki confrontation has further complicated the problem. The insistence of Nagas to incorporate Naga dominated areas of Manipur in Greater Nagaland will prove to be a major hurdle in the final settlement of the Naga problem. The continuance of cease-fire is, however, a silver lining in an otherwise gloomy scenario. Muivah’s acceptance of New Delhi as the venue for further talks and his travel on Indian passport are positive signs and give hope for the future.

Perhaps, the realisation has dawned on him and his other colleagues that the Nagas do not have a strong case for demanding the inclusion of small pockets of Naga enclaves in Assam. His posturing suggests that he is looking for an honourable escape route. Even more propitious is the emergence of powerful non-political organisations like the Naga Hoho that represents 25 Naga tribes, the Naga Student Union and the Naga Mothers’ Association. They are exerting great moral force on the polity of Nagaland today.

Notes and References

1. Alemchiba, A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland, (Kohima: The Naga Institute of Culture, 1970,) p. 26.
2. AM Mackenzie, The North-east Frontier of India, (New Delhi: Mittel Publication, 1979), p. 91.
3. A Mackenzie, History of Relation of the Government with the Hill tribes of the NE Frontiers of Bengal, (Calcutta: 1884), p 114. Quoted by Prakash Singh, Nagaland, (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1972), p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 116.
5. Ibid., p. 26.
6. Ibid.
7. Asoso Yonuo, The Rising Nagas, (New Delhi: Vivek Publishing House, 1974), pp. 105, 106.
8. L Wati, Facts and Growth of Naga Nationalism, 1993, Published in Mokokchung, p. 18.
9. Phanjoubam Tarapot, Insurgency Movement in North-east India, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House), p. 105 and SK Chaube, Hill Politics in NE India, Reprint (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), p 157.
10. L Wati, n.8., p. 29.
11. Ibid, p. 30.
12. Governor of Assam Memo No 88-c/47, Shillong, dated June 22, 1948, addressed to the Deputy Commissioner Naga Hills, Kohima, and signed by Bordoloi, Akbar Hydari and NK Rustomji, advisor to the Governor, reproduced in L Wati, n. 8., pp. 31,32.
13. RD Palsokar, Forever in Operations: History of 8 Mountain Division, p. 24.
14. Asoso Yonuo, n. 7., p. 203.
15. L Wati, n. 8., p. 55.
16. Ibid, p. 60.
17. RD Palsokar, n., 13., p. 28.
18. Ibid, p. 31.
19. Ibid, p. 32.
20. Tungti Chang had formed the Naga Home Guard and Kaito had formed Naga Safe Guard. The two were later merged to form Naga Home Guard, which later became the underground army. Ao Senba, The Naga Resistence Movement, (New Delhi: Regency Publication, 2001), p. 54.
21. A daughter of Phizo married an Indian Army officer and embraced Hinduism and took a Hindu name, Radhika. Phizo’s body was brought to New Delhi by British Airways plane on 10 May 1990 and was taken to his village where he was buried. .Kiran Shankar Maitra, The Noxious Web: Insurgency in North-east India, (New Delhi: Kaniska Publishers, 2001), p. 10.
22. RD Palsokar, n 17., p. 45.
23. Shankar Rao Deo did not take part in the deliberations due to ill health.
24. The extension of cease-fire was finally terminated in 1972 after an abortive attempt on the life of the Chief Minister, Hokise Sema.
25. YD Gundevia, War and Peace in Nagaland, (Dehradun: Palit and Palit, 1975), pp 129 -133. Chapter vii of the book describes the negotiating stance of the Naga delegation.
26. L Wati, n. 8., p. 112.
27. YD Gundevia, n. 25., p. 136.
28. Ibid, pp. 79-80, Gundevia gives an exhaustive account of Scott’s bias against the Government of India.
29. DR Mankekar, On Slippery Slope in Nagaland, (Bombay: Manaktala, 1967), pp. 19-29.
30. BG Verghese, India’s North-east resurgent, (New Delhi: Konark, 1996), p. 92.
31. NS Narhari, Security Threats to North-east India, (New Delhi: Manas, 2002), pp 217-18. Narhari is the former General Officer Commanding of Tezpur based 4 Corps and has done extensive research on North-east.
32. L Wati, n. 8., pp128-129. Also author’s interaction with Brig N Bahri who was the Brigade Major of 56 Mountain Brigade at Mokokchung and played a major role in preventing the rebels to cross the border.
33. NS Narhari, n. 31., p. 118.
34. The underground leaders signed the Accord as individuals and not as representative of NNC. This was later used by a section of the underground to repudiate the Accord.
35. NS Narhari, n. 31., p. 119.
36. L Wati, n. 8., p. 164.
37. BG Verghese, n. 30., p. 95.
38. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
39. NS Narhari, n. 31., p. 126.
40. Lt Gen Narhari (Retd) toured extensively in the North-east in the year 2000 to collect facts and impressions for his book, which was published in 2002.
41. J Johnston, Manipur and Naga Hills, (New Delhi: Gyan Publishers, 2002), pp 41-43. Manipur’s influence declined during its period of decadence just before and after the Burmese war of 1819-25. It was re-asserted during the time of Gambhir Singh, who reduced many villages, including Kohima, at which place he stood upon a stone and had his footprints sculpted on it as token of conquest. The Nagas greatly respected this stone and cleaned it from time to time.
42. Nirmal Nibedon, North-east India: The Ethnic Explosion, (New Delhi: Lancers, 1981), p. 28.
43. Nirmal Nibedon, Night of the Guerrillas, (New Delhi: Lancers, 1978), p. 74. Scato Swu confirmed this incident in an interview with Nirmal Nibedon.