Homeland Security

Nagaland: The Beginning of Insurgency - I
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Issue Book Excerpt: Lost Opportunities | Date : 09 May , 2011

Peace Mission and Cessation of Hostilities

The formation of a democratically elected government had raised the hopes of Nagas for peace. With the initiative of church leaders a Peace Mission consisting of Shri Jaiprakash Narayan, Bimla Prasad Chaliha, Shri Shankar Rao Deo23 and Rev Michael Scott was formed, which succeeded in bringing about a cease-fire with effect from September 6, 1964, applicable not only in Nagaland but also in the three sub divisions of Manipur, namely, Ukhrul, Mao, and Tamenglong. It was initially effective for a period of one month but later extended several times to enable the peace talks to continue.24

The formation of a democratically elected government had raised the hopes of Nagas for peace.

There were eight round of talks after the cessation of hostilities between the so-called Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) and the Indian delegation. The Indian delegation consisted of YD Gundevia, secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, Silu Ao, Chief Minister Nagaland, NC Santok, Deputy Secretary MEA and UN Sharma, Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland. The underground delegation was led by Zashie Hurie and included Issac Swu, the underground foreign secretary and Thinusillie, the self-styled Chief of the Underground Army. This was the first serious attempt to negotiate peace, which was held first at Chedema from September 1964 to January 1965 and then at Khensa from February to May 1965.

As the talks progressed, it became clear to Gundevia that the so-called FGN delegation had no authority to negotiate the essentials of the settlement. The Naga delegation was obsessed with protocol and was caught up in projecting the trappings and symbolism of being the representative of a make-believe sovereign state. There was also wide intellectual gap between the two sides.25 The underground delegation had lived in the jungles for a decade and had lost touch with the political forces, which had been set in motion by the creation of Nagaland as a separate state. The talks were a disaster except that the cease-fire continued to hold, which meant there were no clashes.

The Naga delegation was obsessed with protocol and was caught up in projecting the trappings and symbolism of being the representative of a make-believe sovereign state.

The Peace Mission made one last attempt to break the impasse by proposing that FGN could “of their own volition decide to participate in the Union of India and mutually settle the terms and conditions for that purpose. On its part the Government of India could consider to what extent the political structure between the governments of India and Nagaland should be adapted to meet their (Nagas) demand.” The Peace Mission made a prophetic observation that the “approach herein suggested is not only the fairest but also the only practical one in the given circumstances.”26 The Indian delegation welcomed the proposal but the underground scuttled it by submitting that the proposal had to be determined by a referendum.

In clear breach of the cease-fire agreement, the underground continued to coerce villages to pay taxes and forcibly recruit cadres and send them for training and procurement of arms to East Pakistan. When this was pointed out to them, they took the plea that the agreement did not prohibit movement of their cadres outside Nagaland and that the agreement prohibited smuggling of arms into Nagaland during the truce but did not prohibit receiving arms from a friendly country. As no arms had been smuggled into Nagaland, and were kept in sanctuaries in Myanmar territory, no violation had technically taken place.27 It is a good example of how the underground has consistently twisted facts to support its line of argument.

Role of Michael Scott

Michael Scott had served in India as domestic chaplain to the Bishop of Bombay between 1935-37, and chaplain of St Bishop Cathedral in Calcutta between 1937-39. The man was a veritable champion of underdogs. In 1960, he had helped Phizo to travel from Zurich to London on an irregular passport and helped him to obtain British citizenship. During the third Baptist Convention at Wokha, in February 1964, he was nominated by the church leaders to be a member of the Peace Mission. He was expected to represent the Naga case impartially. But all his actions were not only partisan but also hostile to the Indian Government.

The splinter group appointed Scato Swu as the Prime Minister, who had earlier resigned as the president of the FGN, and favoured peaceful solution of the Naga problem, continuance of the cease-fire and talks with the Government of India.

In April 1964, he came to Kohima with BP Chaliha who provided ten white jeeps to facilitate Scott to travel freely and meet Nagas including the underground. When he returned to Delhi from his visit to Kohima, Scott’s first act was to circulate a sheaf of papers accusing the Government of India and the Indian troops of foulest atrocities. Indian troops were accused of having butchered 34,000 men, women, and children in the Sema area alone whereas in the 1961 census, the total population of Semas was around 47000. The Indians were accused of the destruction of 79,794 houses. The total population of Nagaland and Tuensang in 1951 was 2,50,000 and it would be reasonable that total houses would be around 50-60,000 @ 5 person per house.28

Scott’s conduct at the negotiations, his public statements and the letters he drafted on behalf of the underground, were all unequivocally partisan and subjective. Dr Mankekar, the distinguished journalist, described Scott’s conduct “as passionately subjective and packed with defence counsel’s cynical tricks addressing a jury – a play upon emotions, suppressio veri, suggestio falsi, manipulation of facts, that straight away disqualified him for the role of a neutral arbitrator, which was bestowed on him by the two parties at the negotiations when he was appointed one of the three members of the Peace Mission.”29

Ministerial Talks

When the ongoing talks failed to produce any result, it was submitted by the underground delegation that the talks should now be held at ministerial level. Six round of talks between the underground led by Kughato Sukhai and the Prime Minister, Smt Indira Gandhi, were held in 1966-67, which resulted in a stalemate, as the underground refused to agree to any settlement within the Constitution of India. The underground lost a historic opportunity to find a lasting solution when they refused the offer of a settlement by Mrs Gandhi not within the framework of the constitution but within the framework of the Indian Union meaning thereby that the constitution could be amended to accommodate a settlement.30

The other development was the decision taken sometime in 1966 to send a group of Naga youths to China for training in guerrilla warfare.

As the ministerial talks progressed, Jaiprakash Narayan resigned from the Peace Mission due to intransigence of the underground leaders. Michael Scott was expelled from India as his attitude had become openly partisan and hostile. The Peace Mission, which had come into existence on 5 April, 1964 ceased to exist on May 7, 1966. A six-member Commission was later formed to investigate allegations of cease-fire violations.

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Brig (Dr) SP Sinha

Brigadier (Dr) SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)

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