Indian Defence Review

Technology

Rapid advances in technology must be continuously optimised and integrated into the Homeland Security infrastructure to incrementally upgrade security levels. Aside from facilitating national net-centricity, technology can effectively counter intrusion while solutions include surveillance and radio frequency identification. By 2018, India’s Homeland Security market is expected to be worth $16 billion and growing annually at 35 per cent against the global average of seven per cent. India’s share in global expenditure in the sector is also expected to rise to six per cent by 2020 from 3.6 per cent now, of which, government expenditure constitutes about 30 per cent of the spending within the country.

Modernisation

Modernisation efforts of the Security Service have been disjointed and erratic, even in context of force development. Modernisation for response to homeland security threats requires a holistic approach, major nuances of which are given in succeeding paragraphs.

Organisation

The NSA and Home Minister have talked of righting the police-citizen ratio plus providing additional CAPF to the LWE-affected areas. The CAPF and police forces also need to be modernised on priority, as recommended by various studies and commissions. They must be provided modern navigation and surveillance equipment, adequate fire power, mobility, wherewithal to operate by day and night, foolproof communications, anti-mine/IED equipment, survival equipment and rations.

Analyses of past incidents also indicate there is need to reorganise the CRPF units battling LWE on lines of the Assam Rifles/Rashtriya Rifles so that these units are administratively self-contained including medical cover, which in turn provides mental security to the rank and file. There is also a need to provide CRPF units their own officers rather than providing the IPS officers in order to provide better officer-soldier camaraderie which is essential in counter-insurgency environment. Modernisation of CAPF units battling insurgency and terrorists would need to be incrementally upgraded along the lines of infantry modernisation in the Army. CAPF units in CI operations should eventually be equipped with capabilities akin to the Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (Tac C3I) System being developed by the Army, in order to have a fully networked fighting element of the Security Sector.

Command and Control

The NSA has clarified that Article 355 of the Constitution unequivocally affirms that, “it shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.” Therefore, a threat of the magnitude cannot be treated as simply as a ‘Law and Order’ problem. It is logical that the Centre assumes control and has a 24×7 Operations Centre under the MHA. This needs to be connected to state-level Unified Headquarters (UHQ) and gradually further down to District HQ levels through the NATGRID. Other entities of the Security Sector would need to be inter-connected through the NATGRID.

Intelligence

With terrorism being a major threat to Homeland Security, it requires a blend of both foreign and domestic intelligence. Administrative lines of separation and geographical boundaries of agencies if not eliminated through integration result in poor intelligence – a fact that is capitalised on by terrorists. While advance warning of terrorist acts may not always be possible, a hundred per cent effort must go towards the rapid transit of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, with the analytic process being a synthesis or fusion decision support processes based on all source intelligence.

The new government has stated its resolve of going ahead with the National Counter Terrorism Centres (NCTC). The NCTC should have actually come a decade back but had to be shelved for fear by the States of the Centre misusing it. The NCTC again should be linked through the NATGRID to State Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTC) and beyond to District levels. It is obvious that the fighting elements of the Security Sector plus other entities would need to be in the loop, for two-way flow of intelligence including short, medium and long term assessments, on as required basis. It would be prudent to also incorporate an automated Decision Support System (DSS) for obvious operational advantage.

With relation to counter-insurgency operations, bulk of the hard actionable intelligence will come from ground level which quickly needs to be shared with the Security Sector plus affected States in the region. In case of terrorist threats which are trans-national in nature, NATGRID will need to be linked with the Global Intelligence Grid (GIG) to speedily receive inputs and act accordingly.

Geographical Intelligence (GEOINT)

Accuracy and updating of maps by the Survey of India is extremely poor. In April 2012, after careful study of Google Earth satellite imagery, a CRPF task force zoomed in on a couple of structures they identified as a ‘Naxal camp’ in Abujhmad jungle, which straddles the border of Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra. However, when they arrived in the area, the 15 to 20 thatched huts seen for the first time on Google Earth were actually the homes of Muria tribals of a village named Bodiguda discovered for the first time since Independence, the closest civilization being the town of Behramgarh, 29 kilometres away.

The importance of GEOINT in CI/CT operations requires no emphasis considering the information advantage. GEOINT comprises imagery, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial information. Today, UAVs are covering LWE but forces on ground cannot receive the latest intelligence in or near real time. At the apex level, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the central repository for all intelligence inputs pertaining to the three Services including Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). However, we are yet to integrate the aspects of topography with the DIA. Within the existing set-up, adequate resources in terms of remote sensing, ELINT payloads and cartography are not available to produce high quality fused data. Similarly, much more is required at the national level in terms of integration of various government agencies.

While isolated linkages between certain government agencies are already in place, this connectivity has to be extended to all necessary arms of the government over NATGRID for optimal exploitation of various multi-layered data sets. Ideally, a comprehensive GEOINT data set should be able to generate large scale maps, surface models to include natural and man-made structures, walk-through of critical infrastructure/buildings, computer models to predict and manage disasters and many other functions required to support aspects pertaining to national security.

CBRN

A significant report put under wraps was the recovery of a 1.5 kg Uranium mine by the Army in Assam in January 2013. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks have occurred in Japan in 1995 (Sarin Gas attacks on Tokyo Subway) and Anthrax attack in the US in 2001. Terrorists would have no compunctions in conducting CBRN attacks in India, which can be even more lethal if coupled with suicide bombing.

Our National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) has little specialisation to cope with such threats. The manpower for the NDRF is through three year deputation from the CAPF, primarily from the CRPF. Not only is there total lack of specialisation, the equipment for disaster relief in the event of a CBRN strike is little to say the least, both in terms of warning, detection and post-strike assistance. The magnitude of such a terrorist strike requires appreciation of likely target areas, holistic efforts to stymie it including the foreign roots, deployment of resources for detection and post-strike assistance, public education and rehearsals.

Placement of resources, public education and periodic rehearsals incorporating the citizens is an essential part, conveniently avoided in India under the euphuism of not wanting to cause panic, which is an excuse actually to not do anything and blame it on fate once disaster strikes.

Deterrent to State-Sponsored Terrorism

India has failed to establish credible deterrence against state-sponsored terrorism. We must do so using our Special Forces as the core of our asymmetric response, employing them covertly on politic-military missions at the strategic level.

Conclusion

The increased importance of Homeland Security requires little emphasis with the security environment in our neighbourhood likely to deteriorate further as the US/NATO pull out from Afghanistan post-2014 and evidence of Chinese and Pakistani links with terrorist/insurgent outfits operating in India, directly or by proxy, is confirmed. We need to speedily modernise our Security Sector along with periodic reviews of Homeland Security, a roll on the road map and its speedy implementation.