Indian Defence Review

At worst, if one does land up on the wrong side of the Maoists, relief can always be bought in exchange of a ‘reasonable’ consideration – after a good deal of friendly haggling. There is acquiescence all around! Yes, among those who should seek deliverance, there appears to be no pressing need to decimate the Maoists, propensity of official lip service notwithstanding.

A pressing need to be rid of the Maoists emanates from the centrality of mineral extraction in national development. Therefore, the Central and State governments, goaded by economic and industrial demands, have had to take up the cudgels to displace the rebels from resource-rich areas where the latter’s writ prevails. The governments propose to do so by the much publicised strategy of ‘clear-hold-develop’. It is in their violent opposition to that effort of the state that the Maoists come across as a real threat to the nation. To implement that strategy, therefore, the state has to find adequate forces to ‘clear’ Maoist-affected areas, then to ‘hold’ these areas against return of the rebels and finally build-up the capacity to design and execute appropriate development schemes. Obviously, the state does not have that kind of wherewithal; neither can it gear up in quick-time. But while capacity build-up may yet be achieved, the main hurdle will still remain in the irascibilities of the state-apparatus which, as discussed, have caused the rebellion to break out in the first place. To be subsumed, therefore, the phenomenon requires to be addressed with forbearance, in all sincerity, over a sustained period and by all stakeholders.

After it is neutralised, the issue of substitution of the Maoist’s control, also needs to be addressed. The method and time-frame in which the state would expand its governance over the vast remote lands needs to be considered. It is important to see that no scope is left for other predators in the garb of political netas and societal mai-baaps to walk in and carry on their exploitative trade, and so cause the germination of another uprising.

The above discussion validates the proposition that the Maoist rebellion offers no scope for a quick defeat; it needs to be single-mindedly addressed over a period for it to be rendered irrelevant and finally merged into the national mainstream.

Challenges to Surmount

In the overall context, effective counter-Maoist measures would be contingent upon extension of effective governance to fill up the vacuums left so far and following up with amelioration of people’s ire. In that, the baggage of corruption and political opportunism at the cost of just governance has to be jettisoned before the rebellious stranglehold can be weakened. Thanks to popular disenchantment with the Maoist whip, that tide of perception seems to be rising. There is fruition of legislative, administrative and judicial measures to that end. However, it would be a long haul yet.

The immediate challenge is to find adequate police forces to clear and control a landmass that covers one-fifth of the country, particularly when the locals are wont to excuse themselves from offering support. Clearly, the armed counter-measures would be progressed by the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) under the overall coordination of the state police. But there are just eighty-odd battalions of various police forces deployed in an area so vast. The strength is expected to be raised to 102 in next three years, whereas even by conservative estimates, 150 are needed. That would take in three to four years to build-up while imposing serious fiscal burden on the State. Even then, it would be tough to control the fluid spread of the rebellion over areas so vast and difficult. Resolution of these contradictions is, therefore, a challenge.

Similarly, the civic part of the counter-measures would pose herculean challenges to the state institutions. Even if funds are raised for the purpose, the State would have to create the requisite establishments to plan and execute the range and spread of needed development works. Furthermore, the culture of opportunism and callousness that prevails in the State departments would have to be purified before an egalitarian socio-economic transformation may be envisioned. That is unlikely to happen anytime soon.

An Awakening

Recently, policy makers seem to have got over their dithering afflictions in countering the rebellion. Towards this end, four concurrent measures are articulated – security, development, entitlement, and governance. Focus has been directed at developmental capacity building in the State governments. 106 affected districts have been earmarked for security and development; work in 30 of these districts has commenced.

Under the security-related initiatives, steps have been taken to strengthen the police forces under three centrally funded schemes, with the states pitching in to the extent possible – namely, the ‘Security Related Expenditure’, ‘Special Infrastructure Scheme’ and ‘Scheme for Construction of Fortified Police Stations’. Affected states are proceeding with recruitment to fill up existing vacancies in the police ranks. Besides, each state has been asked to raise up to four special counter-insurgency police battalions. This process is required to be protected against abuse and tuned to the capacity to absorb expansion. Progress is, therefore, gradual. States have also organised counter-insurgency training of their police forces under the aegis of the army. However, establishment of counter-insurgency schools in all states is yet make the desired headway mainly because internal bickering and land issues while some ad hoc training units perform that role.

On the development front, councils composed of the Collector, Police Chief, Forest Officer and a citizen’s representative have been formed in the affected districts to plan and monitor various projects. These projects are centrally funded under the ‘Backward Region Grant’, ‘National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme’, ‘Grameen Sadak Yojna’, ‘National Rural Health Mission’, ‘Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojna’, and ‘Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan – Ashram School’. Besides, there is the ‘Integrated Action Plan’ that is specifically dedicated to the improvement of living conditions in 82 rebellion affected districts. Finally, to improve the state administration’s access to Maoist affected areas, a ‘Road Development Plan’, providing for compensation to contractors working in such areas, has been dedicated to 34 districts. However, as discussed earlier, these initiatives would take time to fructify, and even more time to gain the people’s faith in the State administration – the caveat of continuous and concerted thrust being the key.

The State has woken up to the sense of entitlement among the local citizenry. Thus have been legislated the ‘Forest Rights Act’, activation of Schedule V of the Constitution, extension of ‘Panchayati Raj Act’, the ‘Land Acquisition Act’ and recently, the ‘Food Security Act’. The judiciary too has been active in protecting the local interests in matters of land alienation and human rights. These are landmark initiatives that would dilute the Maoist cause when implemented in the right spirit. The fourth element of the strategy, governance, too has received boost to turn it from a neo-colonial to a democratic realm. ‘Good governance’ is a byword, even if its translation to practical terms remains contingent to a profound cultural reorientation.

Finally, there are as many as four committees to review these initiatives – the Home Minister’s ‘Standing Committee of Chief Ministers’, Home Secretary’s ‘Review Group’, the ‘Task Force’ of Special Secretary (Internal Security) and Secretary, Planning Commission’s ‘Empowered Group of Officers’.

A Tide Favourable

A rebellion, to be seen as distinct from terrorism or downright nihilism, has to remain within certain bounds of probity even when engaged in acts contrary to social and legal norms. Contrarily, as the pressure on their activities mounts, the Maoist rebels are increasingly indulging in extortion and barbarism, proving themselves no better than those anti-people elements that they wish to eliminate. At some juncture, when the common man feels tormented, this could spell the Maoist doom. If managed effectively, such a situation would allow the State to find its feet in winning the people’s endorsement. Indeed, in most instances the world over, successful suppression of rebellion has been occasioned by high-handedness of rebels that drove the common people to join the State in countering it. The Indian state would be wise to seize that imminent opportunity.