Indian Defence Review

Myanmar: Division and States

Ethnic minorities constitute almost one-third of the total population; the minority communities are located mainly in seven states, and these are named after these communities. The following map¹ shows the divisions and states.

Ethnic Minority Communities in Myanmar

• Shah
• Kayah
• Karen
• Mon
• Chin
• Kachin
• Rakhine

Insurgency in Myanmar is the result of the ongoing tension among the ethnic communities of the country. Reasons for the same date back to 1948, when Myanmar received its independence and the constitution formed was around the Buddhist communities, ignoring the existence of other minority groups, which led to discontentment among the minority groups and the subsequent armed rebellion, which with time organised itself into a full-fledged insurgency. As a result, most of the country has become a conflict zone and most of Myanmar’s territory lies ungoverned, which is a perfect sanctuary for organised crime to sustain itself.

In 1989, an agreement of ceasefire was signed between the insurgent groups and the Junta-led army, which stabilised the conflict areas and restored peace and calm in the conflict zones. But in 1996, the ceasefire arrangement broke down and a major offensive against the Karen National Progressive Party (KNNP) was launched by the military leadership, resulting in the destabilisation of the region and eruption of large-scale insurgency and violence.

The impact of the insurgency is no longer a local one. It has for long started affecting its neighbours, and with passing time, the impact is quite visible globally. The existence of ungoverned areas in the conflict zones and increasing demand for money to run the insurgency movement has led to the establishment of organised narcotics trade, with Myanmar being the production and processing hub of heroin. Since the beginning of the global war on terrorism, a lot of Western attention has come to the area, but lack of insight regarding the geopolitical realities of the area has led to countries picking sides, and this has made it more difficult for the policymakers to come up with a solution of the problem.

Insurgency in Myanmar has existed since 1948, and the nature of the warfare in the region is modernised and the insurgent groups are using sophisticated weapons and battle gear. This has led to a dependence on large amounts of money, which is generally earned through indulgence in organised crimes. Major sources of income for these groups are:

• Narcotics trade
• Gun-running nexus
• Smuggling of contraband products to neighbouring countries
• Human trafficking
• Extortions

Narcotics Trade²

Myanmar falls in the area of the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia, which geographically includes northern Thailand and northern and western Laos. These places are the centre of poppy cultivation area since the early nineteenth century. In the last 15 to 20 years, the production of poppy in Thailand has gone down because of the drastic eradication and crop substitution measures taken by the Thai government. As a result, the production of poppy in Myanmar has increased, making it the world’s largest producer of poppy. In 1988, when the political turmoil took place, the government lost control over a lot of its area, and subsequent battles between the rebels and the army made it a safe haven for the narcotics trade to flourish. At present, Myanmar accounts for almost 90 per cent of world’s heroin production. Burmese poppy cultivation has traditionally been limited to several remote mountainous regions in the country’s north and east; the major areas include the Kokang hills of Shan state, the Eastern Shan hills, the Wa hill area and the Kachin state. These areas are all border zones, with extensive land borders with northern Thailand, Laos and China’s Yunnan province. Opium grown in these extensively cultivated areas is refined into heroin in a network of small concealed (and relatively mobile) factories scattered throughout the hills. The purest heroin (Number 4) is a white crystalline powder of high grade and is the major export form of the drug. Number 4 is manufactured principally to be injected, although it can be smoked as well.

Since 1987, Myanmar has been classified by the United Nations as a least developed nation and remains one of the world’s poorest countries. Its per capita income was US$220 per year in 1995. Heroin exports are a significant mainstay of the Burmese economy, although economic data on the narcotics industry is sparse.

Narcotics Smuggling Routes

Eastern Myanmar to Yunnan Province, China 

Myanmar shares a long, mountainous border with the Chinese province of Yunnan. The principal route for heroin trafficking into China is from the Burmese Wa and ethnic Shan areas across into Yunnan by road to the capital, Kunming, and then by air or road to Baise, Nanning, Hong Kong and on to the west.

Eastern Myanmar to Northwestern China

A second route for Burmese heroin also begins in eastern Myanmar, leads to Kunming city in Yunnan and then goes north and west, through Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, across western China to Urumqi in Xinjiang province and then across the Chinese border to Kazakhstan.

Myanmar/Laos to Northern Vietnam and into Southern China

A third route for heroin trafficking into China is a southern route from Myanmar and Laos across the Laos-Vietnam border to northern Vietnam and then into China through the China-Vietnam border zone of Pingxiang City, Guangxi province. It is not known whether this route involves only Laotian or both Laotian and Burmese heroin. Laos has several poppy-growing areas, one of which, the region of Xiang Khoang, borders both Vietnam and China Pingxiang and has had a recent and rapid outbreak of heroin availability since 1997–1998.

Western Myanmar to Manipur State, Northeast India

Manipur is a small landlocked state in the northeast of India. Its borders include the Indian states of Nagaland to the north, Assam to the west, Mizoram to the south and a 358 km border with Myanmar to the east. The Burmese border includes the large Sagaing Division and a section of the northern Chin Hills. Manipur is one of the poorest and least developed regions in India, with a 1996 per capita income estimated at 3,500 rupees per year, about one third of the Indian national average. Manipur has been governed under Indian security laws since the 1950s and is currently patrolled by Indian army and four other paramilitary forces, in addition to two Manipuri security agencies. The political situation is complex, with a large and longstanding insurgency seeking autonomy, many smaller ethnic insurgencies, numerous armed groups and several thousand political and economic migrants and refugees from Myanmar. A state of low-intensity chronic civil war pervades, and armed clashes, human rights abuses and violence are endemic.

Manipur appears to have no significant indigenous tradition of opium poppy cultivation. Local officials and drug users are consistent in reporting that heroin from Myanmar, called locally Number 4, began to appear in Manipur in 1982–1984. After 1984, the availability and use of heroin increased steadily, reaching epidemic proportions after 1990. Although precise numbers of addicts are difficult to assess, a 1991 estimate was 15,000 injection drug users (IDUs); it is clear that heroin use is common and has been attributed to widespread availability of Burmese exports. From Manipur, it is transported to Cox Bazaar, a port city in the neighbouring country of Bangladesh using the inland water ways where it hits the international water.

Gunrunning Nexus

Narcotics trafficking and arms trafficking are closely related. Narcotics products are generally the mode of payment for these insurgent groups for the purchase of small arms and its ammunition. Rise in the narcotics trade and gunrunning was seen after 1989, when the Communist Party of Myanmar fell and lots of its cadres started depending on the illicit drug trade to keep matters going.

The gunrunning or the trafficking routes are same as that for opium smuggling. The only difference is that the movement is inside. Small arms include a variety of products, ranging from automatic weapons to Chinese-made hand grenades and landmines.

The use of narcotics trade has also impacted the modus operandi of the insurgents in northeastern India. Earlier, insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Isaac Muivah (NSCN-IM), the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) depended on looting banks and extortions from tea gardens and oil refineries. Large amounts of money also came from kidnappings. Almost no opium trade existed in areas of rebellion, but by 1989, all major insurgent groups had started resorting to drug trade to finance their activities of terrorism.

Most of the weaponry that flows into Myanmar and the Northeast finds its way from Cambodia, which had surplus during the Pol Pot days. It is also reported that most of the arms cartel sourced there weapons from erstwhile East Block countries. The route to south Asia begins in the Rangong Islands, off the Thai coast, from where contraband is shipped through Andaman Sea and lands in Cox Bazaar, from where the arms are carried in smaller caches to different destinations in Myanmar and northeast India. Some of the arms are taken to Chittagong Hill Tracts, from where they enter the northeast region via Mizoram, Tripura or further up, through the North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong into Nagaland. Arms are carried even further up, to Sylhet, and enter Meghalaya through Dawki and Baghmara, from where they pass into Assam through Mankachar, in Assam’s Dhubri district, and then through Siliguri and Dooars into Bhutan.

Drug trafficking, which goes hand in hand with the gunrunning business, is generally carried on by the leaders of the liberation armies like the Karen National Progressive Party (KNPP). Arms, along with contraband commodities like MIFL, are the mode of payment, which is received in lieu of drugs, which in turn is used to fight against the army in Myanmar.

Human Trafficking³

Myanmar is a war-torn country that makes it more vulnerable to human trafficking because of constant illegal emigration to neighbouring countries like India, Bangladesh, Laos, China and Thailand. Many women and children are sold and are forced into prostitution; many men are trafficked, and most of them end up being bonded labourers in these countries. Internal trafficking is also a major concern in Myanmar as most of the children are picked up by the national army and then converted into child soldiers. However, this tradition is also followed by the liberation or the rebel armies. There are speculations in the open media that some of the refugees, mainly Rohingyans from the Arkan region, are recruited from the Bangladeshi refugee camps by the central Asian terror groups to work for them at relatively cheaper rates.

Myanmar-China Relations⁴

The bilateral relationship between Myanmar and China is very strong. It would not be wrong to say that China is the strongest ally of Myanmar. The strength of the relationship between both countries dates back to the year 1948, when Myanmar became the first non-communist country to recognise the foundation of People’s Republic of China. The relation was further strengthened by a set of bilateral treaties, out of which the primary one was the Treaty of Non-Aggression and friendship, signed in 1954. This treaty was based on five principles of peaceful coexistence. However, in 1967, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated with anti-China riots followed by the expulsion of the Chinese communities. The situation turned, and relations started to improve around the 1970s under the regime of Deng Xiaoping. Many treaties have been signed between the two countries since then, and the relations have further strengthened.

China has a four-point agenda as far as Myanmar is concerned:

• To get extensive access to the oil and natural gas reserves present in abundance in the country’s Arakan region and construct gas and oil pipeline from Myanmar’s Arakan coast to China’s Yunnan province. The entire stretch is close to 2,380 km. The idea is also to promote other imports, like textiles and steel.
• China has a major strategic interest in Myanmar. It desires to get direct access to the Bay of Bengal and dominate that area strategically. If China gains access to that route, it would gain overwhelming advantages in the Bay of Bengal and the greater Indian Ocean region. This would also add to the strategic advantage China wants from its Strings of Pearl plan.
• China wants to use Myanmar’s position to gain access to Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote its trade and strategic influence.
• For China, Myanmar is a vast market far promoting its products, and in order to do so, China has involved itself in a lot of infrastructure development projects, like roads and rail transport.

China is growing rapidly on the industrial front, and the resources it has are limited. To meet its energy requirement, China is looking towards its neighbours. Myanmar’s volatile political situation and its wealth of natural resources automatically attract China. To acquire the resources, China has shown great diplomatic and business skills by maintaining bilateral relations with the Junta government as well as the ethnic rebel groups. It has involved itself in a lot of infrastructure development projects, which in turn serve its interest as the transportation of resources becomes easy and economical. These projects also offer the scope of a new market and further enhance China’s approach to the Bay of Bengal, to gain an advantageous strategic position. Through the Bay of Bengal, China can gain access to the whole of south Asian region making India and the United States uncomfortable. The Bay of Bengal is considered to be the backwater of India, and Chinese presence in this area will be a matter of great concern for India. Although strategic concerns of the United States and India are identical in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal is closer to India’s littoral zone. To counter it, India has also started taking some steps. To start with, it has come up with the look-east policy. Though the policy is motivated by the Americans, it is essential for maintaining a stronghold in the Bay of Bengal. Other than that, India has also started strengthening its naval resources by making new bases around the cost of Vizag and in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India is also purchasing new naval equipment.

The reason Beijing is so proactive in gaining access to Myanmar is that China is presently heavily dependent on Iranian oil, which it transports through the Strait of Hormuz to port Qasem, an oil-and-gas terminal on the Gowadar coast of Pakistan. Port Qasim has been constructed by the Chinese for feeding its southwestern provinces, including the Uighur autonomous region. There was a plan to build a pipeline from the shore of Gowadar to the Chinese central province through Pakistan via the Karakoram Highway, built jointly by Sino-Pak militaries in the mid-60s, but which never came through. Due to the ongoing war on terrorism, the United States presence in the Af-Pak region, is making China nervous, compelling it to look for new options.

Myanmar-India Relations⁵

The relationship between India and Myanmar has traditionally been on and off, but with the changing geopolitical environment and the progression of China as a superpower, it has become a need of the hour for India to maintain a good bilateral relationship with Myanmar in order to check the pivot that China is evidently trying to build in and around the subcontinent.

Both countries enjoyed a cordial relations till 1962, but after 1962, these relations became strained because of the isolation policy adopted by Nu Wen, and its anti-Soviet stance (as India was pro Russia at that time) and refusal to join the Commonwealth added to the cause of a strained relationship with India. Then the final blow came when it withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1979. In 1988, when the democratic movement started in Myanmar, India accommodated a lot of its refugees in its northeastern states and the Myanmar policy attracted a lot of criticism from the international communities.

In 1993, a paradigm shift was observed in India’s policies in dealing with the military-led government of Myanmar, which resulted in the signing of numerous bilateral agreements between the two governments. Both countries have now started organising joint anti-insurgency operations to combat the menace of insurgency, narcotics and contraband smuggling.

Strategic Importance of Myanmar for India

• Myanmar is located at the tri-junction of east Asia, south Asia and southeast Asia.
• Myanmar is the second largest of India’s neighbours and the largest on the eastern flank.
• Myanmar provides the eastern littoral of the Bay of Bengal. An unfriendly Myanmar hosting a foreign naval presence would pose a threat to Indian security.
• Myanmar has a extensive border with China, which is in the north and contiguous with the Sino-Indian disputed border, which has many implications.
• India has both a land border (1,640 km) and a maritime boundary with Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. Four Indian states (Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram) border Myanmar (Kachin and Chin states and Sagaing Division).
• China can gain access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar.
• In terms of the insurgency in the northeastern states of India, some of the insurgent groups have established camps in Myanmar and are operating from the Myanmarese territory.
• There are also the issues of smuggling of arms (by both land and sea), drug trafficking and narco-terrorism and illegal immigration across the border from Myanmar.

The geostrategic position of Myanmar makes it strategically important for India – Myanmar exists at the tri-junction of east, south and southeast Asia, which lies at the approach of India’s access to the ASEAN countries and of China’s access to the Bay of Bengal. The facts that Myanmar is a cushion between both these powerful countries and there is increasing Chinese investment in the region make it even more important for India to take a stance to further strengthen the relationship in order to break the Chinese dominance in the region and to stop China from making a strategic pivot in the subcontinent. India is also worried about the infrastructural development done by China and its attempts to connect Myanmar through roads and railways, which would make it easier for China to move resources and establish a logistical base to put strategic pressure on India.

India and Myanmar have to strengthen the military relations in order to fight the insurgent groups that have existed for almost half a century and resulted in the existence of a strong military in the form of insurgent armies deriving the majority of their revenues from organised crime. Most of the insurgent groups of the northeastern states of India depend largely on Burmese insurgent groups for training and other operational and logistical needs, in exchange for which these insurgent groups participate in the illegal and financially leveraging narcotics trade, which with time has become narco-terrorism. As a result, many Indian insurgent groups, like the ULFA and BODO, have training camps in Myanmar and are operating from there. There is a big problem of illegal immigration and human trafficking, which takes place at the international level. As India lies on Myanmar’s approach to Bangladesh, India becomes a transit point and a lot of Indian insurgent groups get involved in the trade, which enables them to get funds for their activities.

Excerpted from the Article: A Geopolitical Insight into Myanmar with its Global implications