Geopolitics

Indo-Pak: Limitations of Peace Talks
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 17 Nov , 2011

“¦if Pakistan gives MFN treatment to India, it will not be doing any favour to us but will simply fulfill a basic WTO obligation it had evaded so far. Pakistan has done this by maintaining a positive list for imports from India.

It may be noted that even if Pakistan genuinely liberalises its trade regime for Indian products, the advantages will be much more for itself rather than India. In 2010-11, total trade between the two countries amounted to $2.6 billion. Once the MFN status kicks in, this figure may go up by a couple of billion dollars more. Even if it touches $10 billion in the years ahead, it would account for only a small fraction of India’s trade, but it will certainly count for something in Pakistan, particularly when Pakistani economy, critically dependent on American and Western/Japanese assistance, is at a near-collapse stage because of the dubious role in the global war against terror, something that has compelled the donor countries to reconsider their aid-strategy vis a vis Islamabad. Domestically, Pakistan, ruled as it is by an oligarchy that never pays any taxes, has fewer options to raise resources. Less than 1% of Pakistan’s population pays direct taxes. Under such circumstances, it is easier for Pakistan’s ruling establishment to open trade with India country rather than attempting any reforms at home.

While it is true that greater economic interactions always create more stake-holders for peace, the fact remains that Pakistan has not responded to real Indian concerns that have nurtured the hostility between the two countries all these years. As I have argued many a time in these columns, Pakistan’s policies towards India are controlled, in the final analysis, by the Army. Will the Army allow the country’s businessmen and political leadership to have normal relations with India in true sense of the term? Here the indications so far are not encouraging. The Army, which makes and unmakes Pakistan’s foreign and security policies, continues to promote terrorism in India. It wants India out of Afghanistan. It collaborates with China by keeping India in mind. It relentlessly augments nuclear and missile power against “enemy” India.

Editor’s Pick

In “Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State”, a highly readable volume, edited by Dr Maleeha Lodhi, a leading Pakistani academician, who once was her country’s ambassador to the U.S., one comes across how Pakistani nationalism is India-centric; Pakistan is scared of multiple identities, it rejects indigenous cultures. Worst of all, it is confused. It often plays jump rope between being Muslim and being Islamic, being Indian and being Arab.  Of course, the book reposes great faith in the rising middle class of Pakistan, which, it argues, is going to have a more rational brand of nationalism, not tied with India-centric history (that is full of venoms against Hindus). What this book has  emphasised is the need to bring the country’s politics in sync with the social, economic and technological changes that have been transforming the national landscape and creating a more ‘connected’ society. Electoral and political reforms that foster greater and more active participation by Pakistan’s growing educated middle class will open up possibilities for the transformation of an increasingly dysfunctional, patronage-dominated polity into one that is able to tap the resilience of the people and meet their needs.

 It (Pakistan) collaborates with China by keeping India in mind. It relentlessly augments nuclear and missile power against “enemy” India.

But is that going to happen? At the moment, it looks a Herculean task, given the rising fundamentalism in Pakistan. In a country, if a serving governor of the largest province (Punjab) and a central cabinet minister are assassinated by the fundamentalists but none in the government dares to attend their funerals, the judge who pronounces punishment for the murderer is forced to be banished from the country, and yet the urbanised middle class tolerates all this, it speaks volumes of its capacity. And when one talks of the fundamentalists, they are very clear that Pakistan’s real enemy is a democratic India. They cannot be satiated by their victories just over Afghanistan and Kashmir. They want to rule over the entire Indian subcontinent. The Pakistani Army, particularly the ISI, is perfectly in tune with this philosophy.

Pakistan is really in bad shape. The most important factor that keeps the country united is the factor of “a hostile India”. Any amount of  unilateral concessions that India may provide to Pakistan, and this is exactly what the Manmohan Singh government is doing, is not going to change the situation, at least in foreseeable future.  Thus while India must do what can (after all, we are different from Pakistan) to strengthen the peace constituency in Pakistan, there must never be any slackening on the front of our security preparedness. Unfortunately, the Manmohan Singh regime is not inspiring confidence on this score.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Prakash Nanda

is a journalist and editorial consultant for Indian Defence Review. He is also the author of “Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India’s Look-East Policy.”

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