CI-CT Force Structures
There is no gainsaying that the prolonged employment of the army in combating insurgency and fighting terrorists can only be at the cost of its primary task of war fighting. The Kashmir insurgency had been going on for a decade when the Kargil War erupted and the surprise and initial reactions was a result of the army’s pre-occupation with combating insurgency. While there was no visible dilution in the combat capabilities of the troops, it was their continued employment to block routes of infiltration and being used to fight the insurgency within, that ‘was’ and to an extent ‘remains’ a problem. By default, preparations for war fighting suffer since even surveillance devices are biased on keeping infiltration routes under observation, and not on the major attack approaches.
The inherent flaw in the J&K model is that since the PMF function under the Home Ministry and the army under the MoD, there are functional problems that even the Unified Command has not been able to mitigate.
In any case, rehearsals and preparations for fighting a conventional battle were relegated in priority and rarely was there time for practicing reinforcements and counter-attacks, which are an integral part of the battle, especially in mountains. Importantly, with the bias on combating insurgency, combat skills of soldiers like firing of missiles, mortars and directing artillery fire etc. had suffered – this needs to be corrected.
Effectiveness of the Unified Command
“The history of counterinsurgency warfare shows that the full integration of all government agencies under unified control (and preferable unified command) is the only way to synchronise all elements of power.”[10] The inherent flaw in the J&K model is that since the PMF function under the Home Ministry and the army under the MoD, there are functional problems that even the Unified Command has not been able to mitigate. Adding to the functional problems are that both the premier Intelligence Agencies R&AW and the IB report directly to New Delhi, and more times than not, bypass the state and the Unified Command, thereby, intelligence when it is received by the forces on the ground is generally outdated.
Another hurdle is the subordination of the police force. While being the largest and the most potent force combating insurgency in Kashmir, it is axiomatic that the army is an important stakeholder in the functioning of the Unified Command. It is equally important that no counterinsurgency operations can be successful without the willing cooperation of the police. This is linked to another factor. When the Kargil conflict required the full time attention of GOC 15 Corps, the DG RR was moved to take up the role of the advisor and oversee the CI and CT tasks.
In a way, this was a welcome move, as for the first time, CI-CT operations could be overseen by a full time commander, and not a ‘double hatter.’ Unfortunately, once the war was over, the original tasking was revived, and the DG returned to Delhi. What was also seen that once the military intelligence changed her focus on the war, operations for insurgency suffered and this became yet another reason for insurgency to be able to rear its head again; though debatable, this issue requires a revisit. As and when the role of the army is taken over by the state, as it should be, this task can be carried out by a senior police/PMF officer on ‘full time’ basis. The full time is underlined and the existing practice of both GsOC 15 and 16 Corps remaining as advisors needs review.
Development of infrastructure will not only ensure managing the security of the region in a more meaningful manner, but will also usher in prosperity and result in their closer integration of the state with the nation.
Infrastructure Development in Kashmir
The Indian reliance on the Zoji La axis has been the bane of Ladakh in all the wars thus far. In 1948, Ladakh remained isolated and was cut off after Pakistan launched Op Sledge and India’s strategic and operational weakness was exposed. In 1962, even though the axis had been upgraded from a mule track to a black topped road, the fact is that it remained closed for the better part of the year. The vulnerability of the road was again highlighted in the 1965 and the 1971 wars. Yet, even when Kargil happened in 1999, there were still no alternative axes for India to move additional forces and to sustain them. Supply lines were based on these temperamental roads, and even the railway line beyond Udhampur was to be operationalised. This vulnerability exists even today and alternatives to these roads and making them fit for all weather operations has still not been realised due to familiar bureaucratic delays.
While, Kargil was manageable with forces from within Northern Command, yet if a similar situation re-occurs, or a greater threat from China or a collusive Pakistan-China threat manifests, Ladakh and even the Kashmir Valley remains vulnerable as despite ambitious plans, construction/improvements etc. are running past completion dates and the situation is reminiscent to the situation before 1962. While this has been known to strategic planners since long, adequate steps in a time bound fashion have not been taken to open up Ladakh and even to the Kashmir Valley. Development of infrastructure will not only ensure managing the security of the region in a more meaningful manner, but will also usher in prosperity and result in their closer integration of the state with the nation.
Conclusion
As the nation celebrates the victory as the ‘Kargil Vijay’ Diwas, it is time to reflect on some fundamental issues. Firstly, was it really the resounding victory Indians would like to believe it was – could it have spiralled? Secondly, and more importantly, did India as a nation learn the right lessons from the bitterly fought conflict? If she did, it certainly is not reflected in any new doctrine nor enhanced capabilities – Pakistan remains as belligerent as she was, despite the transition of leadership to a democracy. This reality of Pakistan has to be realized – irrespective of being the seat of democracy, it is not Islamabad but the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi that calls the shots.
The fundamental question also remains that ‘has the nation created the (right) structures required to prioritise capabilities for meeting future security challenges?
Within house, has the civil leadership realised the human and military cost of its binding instructions of not crossing the LC? Not only did it make victory that much more difficult military terms, this gave the impression that India has accepted of the finality of the LC and acquiesced to Pakistan’s aggression in 1947-48.
The military remains as confused as ever – no direction for selective capability building. Each Service and Force being on a self-enhancing trip, more for Empire Building than with the aim of providing holistic security. The Army aspires to create offensive capability in the mountains in the form of a Strike Corps without ensuring development of the corresponding support of the Air Force; the Air Force aspires to be a dominant Aero-Space Power with no obligations to further the land battle, while the Navy wants to become a Multi-dimensional Maritime Force – all of them are right in their own ways, though their actions lack synergy and a pre-defined operational goal.
The fundamental question also remains that ‘has the nation created the (right) structures required to prioritise capabilities for meeting future security challenges? Has the leadership developed understanding of military requirements of the forces – how guns remain useless without shells and submarines defunct without batteries?’ These are fundamental questions, and more important than inducting a new submarine, combat aircraft or gun – the fact that the leadership does not have accountability, is the immediate cause of concern, a hollowness that should concern well-meaning Indians across the board, especially after a decade and a half after Kargil.
End Notes
[1]Khan Feroz Hassan, Lavoy Peter R, Clary Christopher, p-64, Chapter-3, Pakistan’s Motivations and Calculations for the Kargil Conflict, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil war, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2009
[2] Ibid, Preface
[3] A commonly acceptable definition of ‘Limited War’ has been given by Christopher M Gacek in his book ‘The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy. He has defined this as being “one in which the belligerents ‘restrict the purpose’ for which they fight to concrete ‘well defined objectives,’ that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement…The battle is confined to a ‘local geographical area’ and ‘directed against selected targets’ –primary those of direct military importance.”
[4]Kargil Committee Report.
[5]Behera Navnita Chadha, p-30, Demystifying Kashmir, Pearson-Longman, New Delhi, 2006
[6]Malik VP, General (Retd), Indo-Pakistan Security Relations in the coming decade: Lessons from Kargil for the Future, as available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ publications/idrvol_17(1)VPMalik.htm
[7]As quoted by Basrur Rajesh M, The Lessons of Kargil as learned by India, Asymmetrical warfare in South Asia: the Causes and Consequences of the Kargil war, Ed, Lavoy Peter R, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2009
[8]As quoted by Jones W Rodney, India’s Security Culture, A paper prepared for The Defence Threat Reduction Agency, SAIC, A United States Government Agency, 31 Oct, 2006.
[9]Kargil Committee Report: National Security Management and Apex Decision – Making.
[10] Walia Kaajal, J & K: A Strategy for Counterinsurgency Operations, as available on the net.
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Well Brig what you point out is the malady and this malady is known and has often been flogged to no use. The fact of the matter is:-
The Military planning in India is in itself is defeatist and reactive. It still continues to be so. Our war games smack of the impoverishment of a military mind. It appears the military brass just passes time till the situation blows up in somebody’s face. If the Civilian Government doesn’t have any strategic sense, it doesn’t mean that the Army should also follow the line. The reason why we didn’t react in any other way except for launching frontal attacks was because we actually had nothing up our sleeves. We have never war gamed scenarios where we would react to a given situation differently or to say offensively. All we do is discuss counter attacks to a meaningless end.
The Government or to say the Bureaucracy will never let the CDS happen in totality, they loath to see the concentration of power in our defence forces.
Everyone knows what the malady is – what’s the solution. How does the cat get belled?
Very insightful analysis highlighting the lessons that to be learned from the tactical victory at Kargil and what could have been, and should have been, a strategic victory.