India continues her quest for a coherent maritime policy. Her continental mindset however ensures that not one inch of her territory will be captured from across land borders. But perhaps incursions from the seas, which held India captive for over four centuries, do not evoke similar emotions!
For example, the sale of F-16 or main battle tanks to Pakistan arouses an intense anxiety to neutralize any advantage that our land neighbour may accrue and therefore the matter is taken up at all diplomatic and military levels.
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It is also well known that in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Indonesia, the centrality of the Army which the Burmese term ‘tatmadow’ governs both the countries internal as also external perceptions and is well integrated in their Constitutions. As the Burmese State Law and Order Restoration Committee (SLORC) recently stated: ‘We look up to India as an elder brother and are aware of your freedom struggle. But remember your leader was called Mahatma Gandhi, and not General Gandhi. There lies the difference between our two military forces. The tatmadow is central to our governance.’ But nonetheless, it is economic imperatives and not the Holy Grail of a liberal democracy that attracts military assistance from other industrial democracies in spite of their emphasis on a New World Order and the need to ensure human rights.
“¦the sea denial role of the enlarging Pakistan Navy merits being taken into consideration when evaluating a coherent maritime policy for India.
Pakistan has acquired 2 Hash; at (French Aqosta) submarines with US Harpoon missiles. Her previous four Hangor class (Daphne) submarines have been also retrofitted with the versatile Harpoons. In addition she has acquired the Babur (Devonshire) heavy destroyer and 2 Shamsher frigates (Leander class) and Tariq (Amazon class) from the UK with anti-submarine helicopters. Pakistan has also acquired on lease/sale 2 Alamgir (Gearings) and 4 Badr (Brooke) class frigates with Harpoons and other missiles together with 4 Saif (Garcia) class frigates. Besides she has a Squadron of Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft armed with Exocet air-to-surface missiles which are likely to be replaced by the US Orion armed with Harpoons and with AWACS early warming aircraft. China supplied the Huangfeng and Hegu missile and craft and transferred missile technology for the Hatf-VII missiles, She also supplied the nuclear-capable M-II ballistic missile!’; in 1991 which has attracted the attention of the missile cbntrol regimes.8 The United States provided $ 3.2 billion of military and security-related aid to Pakistan from 1981 to 1986 in view of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A second aid package of $ 4.2 billion was provided in 1987. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries supplied substantive military aid when the Pressler amendment stopped acquisitions from the US. In 1994, Pakistan spent Rs 23,795 billion on defence acquisitions and debt servicing which is equal to their net federal revenue of receipts at existing taxation levels.9
The 25 million overseas Chinese lend economic and moral strength for China to possess a credible maritime force in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing intends to further improve the Karakoram highway to Pakistan which will eventually connect China to seaports in the North Arabian Sea.
Hence, the sea denial role of the enlarging Pakistan Navy merits being taken into consideration when evaluating a coherent maritime policy for India. In addition to this, one must take into account Iran’s new base at Chah Bahar outside the Gulf from operating her 2 Kilo class submarines which were acquired from Russia. But West Asia is closely monitored by the United States forces in view of the highly strategic oil routes of the Gulf.
Indonesia has recently bought about one-third of the former German Navy and have in addition placed an order for Type 209 submarines. According to the Military Balance, Indonesia has also 17 frigates, 2 submarines and several amphibious and missile craft mostly from the UK, the US and Germany.
Australia has launched the first of the six Collins class submarines. In addition, Australia operates 5 modified UK Oberon class submarines. She has also acquired 3 Perth (US Adams) class destroyers with Harpoons, 5 Adelade, 2 Swan and 1 Parametta class frigates with missiles and 19 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft.10 This modernization is a part of their ongoing naval plans and is not seen as a 1hreat reaction in the Indian Ocean.
The fast enlarging Navy of Japan’s Self Defence Forces has already 17 conventional diesel submarines of the Harushio, Uzushio and Yuushio class armed with US Harpoon missiles. In addition, Japan’s Navy consists of 7 guided missile destroyers, and 55 frigates again, armed with the Harpoon missile as well as embarking Sea King helicopters. Moreover, she has 87 P-3C Orion aircraft as part of her 10 maritime patrol squadrons. Japan has also ordered 4 Aegis class destroyers (7200 tons) with Harpoons and advanced electronics and 6 AWACS and other airborne electronic and missile systems in order to ensure that her sealanes of communication for her merchantmen are not interfered with on the high seas.
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In the early eighties, China adopted a new strategy called People’s War under modem conditions for upgrading her defence forces by acquiring sophisticated weapons and long range ballistic missiles. According to the Military Balance, China has 47 submarines including nuclear ballistic submarines, 18 guided missile destroyers and 38 frigates with helicopters and missiles. Her coastal vessels comprise 215 missile craft, 160 torpedo craft and 495 patrol boats. Her Naval Air Force consists of 25000 personnel. Her 3 Fleets, North, East and South Sea Fleets are headquartered at Quingdao, Shanghai and Zhanjiang respectively.12 There appears to be a requirement for inducting sea control ships either built in China or acquired from Russia.
Chinas share of Asian Defence expenditure has therefore increased from 10.58 per cent to 11.8 per cent.
China did not hesitate to occupy the disputed Paracel Islands in 1974 and declared her intention to recover the Spratleys as also the Senkaku islands which are presently under Japanese control. The 25 million overseas Chinese lend economic and moral strength for China to possess a credible maritime force in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing intends to further improve the Karakoram highway to Pakistan which will eventually connect China to seaports in the North Arabian Sea. This can be both a strategic perception as also a trade requirement to support her maritime policies and perceptions of having access to ports in the underbelly of South Asia. Her interest in Mynamar is similarly to revive the famous Burma Road which runs from Kuming to Lashio as also the Stillwell Road from Myitkina to Ledeo in the North Eastern state of Assam.
In the context of the maritime perceptions it will be of interest to analyse Indias maritime perceptions and naval plans in consonance with her strategic thinking for the twenty-first century.
China is also assisting Myanmar to update her existing communication facilities from the Southern Chinese province of Yunnan to Yangon (Rangoon) through Mandalay. Beijing appears keen to modernize the ports at Sittwe near the Bangladesh border and Mergil on the Thai border as also Haingyi island in the Bay of Bengal for facilitating Chinese trade and commerce. In addition, radar stations have been upgraded in the Great Coco Island in the North Andaman group. China’s share of Asian Defence expenditure has therefore increased from 10.58 per cent to 11.8 per cent. In 1993, General Zhao Nangi of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences stated that ‘the PLA Navy would extend its naval operations into the Indian Ocean to prevent India from dominating these waters’. He added that ‘this is something we cannot accept as we are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India’s ocean’.
In the context of the above maritime perceptions it will be of interest to analyse India’s maritime perceptions and naval plans in consonance with her strategic thinking for the twenty-first century. India’s Navy after a spurt from 1982 83 to 1986-87 when submarines, frigates and sea control ships were acquired, albeit more as a replacement than an expansion of her naval forces. The Indian fleet remains stagnant at 15 submarines (Chakra having been returned to Russia) with the 4 Foxtrot boats requiring early replacement. The two aircraft carriers, with one requiring replacement, 5 destroyers, 13 frigates, 15 corvettes and 4 Kamorta patrol vessels of which more than half merit replacement. The induction of TU-142m (Bear) maritime aircraft and 13 Dorniers for maritime reconnaissance has already been noted.The two well-equipped naval dockyards at Bombay and Vishakapatnam and the five ship-building yards on the West and East Coasts have the skill and wherewithal to construct ships and submarines but are unable to extend credit to the Navy for ship acquisition. The Navy in turn cannot place the requisite orders in view of its inadequate budget allocation. This perhaps is a catch-22 situation where the credit pump could perhaps be innovatively primed.
A distinguished banker has suggested a scheme whereby the Indian shipyards could draw bills on the Navy which on their acceptance by the drawee, i.e., the Navy and countersigned by financial institutions or banks could become ‘securitized paper’. Such a scheme could be fitted into the industrial bill discounting scheme say of the Industrial Development Bank of India (IOBI) as ship building is rightly regarded as an industry for this purpose. The shipyard could then get working capital credit from the financial institutions during construction and on delivery draw medium-term bills of say 6 to 8 years which could be discounted. The rate of interest would need to be on commercial terms.
The illegal transfer of arms and fissionable uranium together with the spread of fundamentalism, technological bullying and nuclear discrimination has attracted self-appointed policemen to interfere in the internal governance of some weaker states.
But if the Navy finds the interest on commercial terms to be burdensome, a subsidy out of naval appropriations could be considered as has been the practice in some developing Asia-Pacific countries. This would result in the shipyards being kept busy while at the same time, the Navy could get the majority of its warships and submarines from within the country thereby adding to the incomes and employment for a sizeable segment of her industrial sector.
But budgetary allocations continue to suffocate naval development as seen from the defence expenditure which declined markedly from 3.59 per cent of the GDP in 1987-88 to 2.47 per cent in 1992-93. It then increased to 2.53 per cent in 1994-95. But the devaluation of the rupee also had an effect on the purchasing power of this defence expenditure. Moreover the defence budget for 1994-95 allotted 11. 9 per cent to the Navy as against the average figure of about 13 per cent during the past decade.13 The Arun Singh Committee had proposed that the inter-service ratio of 57:30:13 should be marginally adjusted to arrive at a ratio of 50:30:20 for the Army, Air Force and Navy in order to give a more symmetrical force structure to Indian peninsular architecture.
This will no doubt require the Indian Navy to evolve fresh doctrines, restructure training, indoctrinate personnel as also expand the objectives of Indian sea forces as also her merchant, hydrographic and fishing fleets. India has already taken the initiative to hold joint naval exercises with over a dozen navies to encourage open-mindedness and transparency of information on a reciprocal basis.
The global trend for liberalization, both politically and economically, has also lent itself to a new oceanic approach where maritime forces will need to diffuse the existing psychology for “˜preparing for war in order to ensure peace which in a way was the colonial and cold war theme
Delhi has also offered to cooperate with regional countries in combating narcotics whose stakes have increased to $ 400 billion according to Interpol. This laundering of money and allied narco-terrorism has brought in its wake a certain amount of instability to this region. The illegal transfer of arms and fissionable uranium together with the spread of fundamentalism, technological bullying and nuclear discrimination has attracted self-appointed policemen to interfere in the internal governance of some weaker states. Nonetheless, India has delineated maritime boundaries and has proposed joint maritime centres for combating marine pollution and environmental degradation.
Parliament is seized with the need to keep a close watch on the emerging scramble for resources, such as oil, food, water and non-renewable energy to diffuse conflicts such as in Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ruanda, Cambodia, West Iran, East Timor and the province of Acah. Even this limited maritime cooperation has significantly reduced in-built prejudices and instead encouraged direct contact between littoral and world navies. There have been programmed meetings between maritime forces of the Asia-Pacific region in which India, Australia and the US (with South Africa and France to follow) have played a credible role in using the medium of the oceans for bringing nations and people together. Whether the twenty first century is the decade of the Pacific or the Indian Ocean is perhaps irrelevant. But it is clear that the next century will be that of the oceans requiring a spectrum of innovative measures for preventing and resolving conflicts in every corner of our water planet which paradoxically is called Earth.
The global trend for liberalization, both politically and economically, has also lent itself to a new oceanic approach where maritime forces will need to diffuse the existing psychology for ‘preparing for war in order to ensure peace’ which in a way was the colonial and cold war theme. The new cliche should instead be ‘if you desire peace prepare to cooperate’. In this emerging perception navies are best suited for assisting the United Nations to achieve victory in their skirmishes for peace. One could do no better than to quote Eric Groves that ‘naval forces lend themselves extremely well to international action. The more this can be put into a wider international security framework notably the security machinery of the UN, the better’.14
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India’s maritime policy must hence necessarily identify and implement policies for promoting regional understanding and cooperation in order to do away with popular cliches such as hegemonistic ambitions, blue water capability and big brother interventions. The ongoing trends in peace-making, peace keeping and peace-building along with preventive diplomacy will perforce remove India’s sea-blindness thus encouraging her to make effective use of the seas and the ingredients of the power of the seas. Delhi will need to forge stronger maritime, commercial and economic links with France, South Africa, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Australia, Singapore and Malaysia and other littorals including Pakistan and Myanmar in course of time to break out of the present continental mindset.
Indias maritime policy must hence necessarily identify and implement policies for promoting regional understanding and cooperation in order to do away with popular cliches such as hegemonistic ambitions, blue water capability and big brother interventions.
In such a maritime environment, which spawns maritime strategies of nations, the sea and the sailors are a natural and readily available medium for bringing together the hearts and minds of like-minded nations which in turn will influence the texture of the country’s strategic, economic, cultural and industrial perceptions. Regional cooperation encompassing contemporary maritime strategy will perforce bring in their wake other cooperative programmes. This will further encourage multilateral understandings which are the precursor for regional cooperation thus enlarging the brotherhood of the seas for as the Norwegians say, ‘The land divides, but the seas unites.’
The sine qua non of the Indian Navy will therefore depend on a coherent maritime policy based on a correct understanding of international matrix and a sophisticated differentiation between the forces and factors that would help or hinder development. India’s maritime strategy should hence eliminate the fears of neighbours and defuse the factors that attract the attention of outside powers to intervene against India’s vital interests. An investment in national security will perforce be an investment in national development.
The challenge and dynamism of the seas to improve the standard of life and economic growth of developing continents may not be the single most important facet in the remaining decades of this century – but then it may. Therefore the emerging relationship between sea power and the power of the seas may well change the very basis of India’s strategic, economic and environmental security.
It will therefore be opportune for India, sandwiched as it were between a new economic revival and an emerging world disorder to plan ahead for striding into the twenty first century and not remain becalmed in the Indian Ocean which Mahan had prophesied would be ‘the Ocean of Destiny in the twenty-first century’. So to conclude by taking refuge from India’s sea-blindness in the Navy’s motto:
Notes
- Asian Strategic Review, 1993-94, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, Sapru House, Delhi, 1994, pp. 60-63.
- Dawn, Karachi, 11 June 1991.
- The Military Balance 1993-94, published by Brasseys for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 9. 149.
- The Military Balance, 1993-94, p. 158.
- The Military Blance, 1993-94, p. 154.
- Asian Strategic Review, 1993-94, IDSA, New Delhi, Aughust 1994, p. 46.
- Eric Groves, Navies in Future Conflicts, p. 171.
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