Indian Defence Review

India captured many outposts along the Punjab border in Ajnala, Amritsar, Khemkaran, Mamdot and Fazilka sectors with minimal tactical and economic advantage. On the other hand, in this very region, India had lost Chinna Bidhi Chand in Khalra sector and the Hussainiwala enclave across the Sutlej. The samadhi of Shahid Bhagat Singh erected there fell into Pakistani hands and was badly damaged, thus arousing considerable resentment in India.

In addition, the damage to the headworks feeding the Gang Canal which served the Bikaner desert was extensive and they could no longer impound sufficient water to fill the canal. Repairs could not be effected as the Pakistani troops holding the far bank would not allow this. Although alternative arrangements could be made to feed the canal from the upstream Harike headworks, the water which could be utilized to irrigate Bikaner was running waste while the area between Hussainiwala and the feeder junction suffered because of lack of water.

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Pakistan had a sizable lodgment between the international boundary and the Sabuna distributary about seven or eight miles west of Fazilka. This was rich cotton land. Some prosperous villages, including Pakka, fell into Pakistani hands. Loss of production and maintaining refugees were a heavy financial drain, and even after Pakistan vacated the area much expenditure was incurred to restore its accessibility as some 19 bridges over the distributary serving the area had been demolished by the defending Indian troops.

Apart from the burden of upkeep of the refugee population of the desert, its continued occupation was embarrassing to the holding troops because of lack of water and an inadequate logistic infrastructure.

India had captured Rukanpur, Ranhal, Bijnor and a few other border posts in the Bikaner sector. Similarly, in the Jaisalmer sector, the two important posts of Islamgarh and Batkhanwala Khu and some others about four to eight miles deep in Pakistani territory had fallen into Indian hands. Some progress had also been made in this regard in the Barmer and Kutch sectors, where Chad Bet was captured. The biggest territorial conquest in terms of territory was however in the Naya Chor and Chachro area of the Barmer sector, where two simultaneous thrusts towards Naya Chor and Umarkot had created a salient in the Sind sector of Pakistani territory.

Although impressive on maps and in terms of statistics, this was a vast expanse of empty, unproductive sand. Apart from the burden of upkeep of the refugee population of the desert, its continued occupation was embarrassing to the holding troops because of lack of water and an inadequate logistic infrastructure. Much work had to be done in the way of laying a sweetwater pipeline and storage tanks, restoring the railway line to Naya Chor and constructing desert roads with coastly duckboards to maintain the troops deployed there. These facilities, created at considerable expense, had to be abandoned, almost intact, at the time of withdrawal. Militarily, conquest was a prerequisite for an advance into the productive green belt. Since the momentum of the thrust had already fizzled out on reaching its fringes possession of this territory was of no consequence. Economically, it was a drain and certainly no longer cost effective. Its loss had made no dent in Pakistan’s economy, nor affected its political standing in Sind.

Immediately after the ceasefire the Indians claimed the occupation of about 3,600 square kilometres of West Pakistan territory against a loss of some 125 square kilometres of their territory. As described earlier, the statistics were impressive indeed, but like all such statistical juggling they were rather deceptive. From a purely economic point of view 125 square kilometres yielded more than 3,600 square kilometres, much of it desert, and the upkeep of the refugees and its attendant problems was proving more irksome politically for Indian democracy than Pakistani autocracy.

India felt UN had failed over the last 25 years to find an acceptable solution for the problem, and this should now be sought bilaterally. On the other hand, Pakistan contended that the issue should still remain filed with the UN”¦

As the snows melted, Pakistan tried constantly to reclaim its lost territories in Jammu and Kashmir and improve its defensive posture along the ceasefire line in the process. In May 1972, Pakistan made a surprise brigade attack on the Indian forward posts in the Kayan area of the Lipa valley. The Indian posts fell back, suffering heavy casualties. Similarly, the Minimarg Lake area in Gurais was becoming active and large tracts of snow earlier claimed to be in Indian hands were gradually shrinking. The same was the case in the Tartok area of the Partapur sector of Ladakh. These ceasefire violations were prompted by Indian tactical and administrative difficulties in the newly acquired territory.

Ceasefire violations mounted daily, with the desire of each side to improve its bargaining position. On the Pakistani side, the UN observer group was functioning as before the conflict in 1971 and was registering ceasefire violations as a matter of routine. India insisted on the other hand that with the outbreak of war for the third time along the erstwhile ceasefire line the observer group was no longer effective as a referee on mutual disputes. Although the observer group on the Indian side was not recalled, it was dissuaded from functioning in its traditional role of patrolling the ceasefire line. Thus one sided registration of ceasefire violations continued even after the Simla Agreement was ratified, and prevails even today.

The group exists in imposed hibernation on the Indian side while Pakistan utilizes its services. These contrary attitudes reflected the divergent political stances of the two countries on Kashmir. India felt UN had failed over the last 25 years to find an acceptable solution for the problem, and this should now be sought bilaterally. On the other hand, Pakistan contended that the issue should still remain filed with the UN, without prejudice to any understanding arrived at between the two countries. Bhutto wanted to keep his options open to be able to raise the issue in the UN should an understanding with India not be forthcoming.

The continued confrontation after the unilateral Indian ceasefire was hurting both countries in many ways. The upkeep of 90 000 prisoners, running refugee camps, with the attendant cost of rehabilitating the refugees in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Kutch, and the cost of maintaining the Army on a war footing was crushing India economically. On the other hand, the humiliation of defeat had cast a shadow of despondency over Pakistan, upsetting daily life. Almost every family in Punjab was affected.

The retention of war prisoners and the occupied territories were embarrassing Bhutto and delaying the return of normalcy to political and economic life in Pakistan. Under these pressures, both countries unobtrusively sought to start a dialogue to normalize relations in the subcontinent. Prime Minister Kosygin effected a thaw. When Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972, Kosygin suggested that “there was no reasonable way out of the situation except replacement of the policy of confrontation by a policy of peace and cooperation.” According to the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit, Bhutto was prepared to help establish peaceful conditions in the Indian subcontinent.

India and Pakistan had gone to war four times since 1947, but the fact remained that Pakistan had failed to resolve the problem by military means.

In an interview with an Indian journalist Bhutto had earlier enunciated the basic conditions for normalization. He reiterated that the people of Pakistan wanted peace. They wanted an end to hostility and conflict, not because of the recent military defeat but because tensions had proved unproductive and hindered economic development and growth. On the Kashmir issue too, Bhutto changed his stance, saying that “it was not for Pakistan to secure the right of self-determination for Kashmiris, it was up to them to fight for it if they wanted a different future.” India and Pakistan had gone to war four times since 1947, but the fact remained that Pakistan had failed to resolve the problem by military means. India had also failed to achieve a satisfactory political solution. It was for India to find a wav out.

Bhutto felt the accumulation of the problems created by the mutual distrust of a quarter century could not be solved over-night. They had to be tackled in a step-by-step approach. He recalled that “when you resolve all issues in one day-as at Tashkent-it simply does not work. This is the lesson to be drawn from our past experience.” He also indicated a preference for bilateral negotiations, saying: “I am allergic to third-party intervention. It is high time that the nations of the subcontinent solved their disputes without having to turn to outside umpires for help.”

In this regard, using Moscow as a channel of communication, Bhutto suggested a summit meeting with Mrs Gandhi as early as possible. He emphasized the need for the first meeting to be at the political level for a proper assessment of the situation and creating the framework for further implementation at the official and other levels. He felt that starting a dialogue at the official level would not work as the bureaucrats tended to be rigid and the advice they tendered introduced “needless complexities.”

Accordingly, after an exchange of formal notes between New Delhi and Islamabad, a meeting was arranged between emissaries of the respective heads of state to draw up the agenda for a summit. D.P. Dhar representing India and Aziz Ahmed Pakistan met at Murree at the end of April 1972 and agreed on the modalities and agenda of a summit to be held at Simla towards the end of May, but which eventually came off at the end of June.After a five-day meeting, Bhutto and Mrs Gandhi signed the Simla Agreement.1 It outlined the steps to be taken to promote friendly relations between the two countries and establish durable peace in the subcontinent. In addition to several political and economic steps, the military steps required to be undertaken were:

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From the very beginning India strove to withdraw the Kashmir issue from the UN with all its connected commitments and substitute direct negotiations between the two countries.

At a news conference held immediately after signing the Simla Agreement Mrs Gandhi admitted that though nothing very definite had emerged from the summit she was not pessimistic. It appeared that she was impressed by the internal difficulties Bhutto was said to be facing. Considering him better placed than any other Pakistani politician to deal with his country’s postwar problems, weighed down by her own economic burden of fielding armies on the border in a perpetual state of war readiness, and the upkeep of a sizable refugee population in the west, as well as the expense of maintaining the prisoners of war, it was felt that she had resiled from taking a firm stand and preferred to go along with Bhutto’s step-by-step approach, hoping to serve India’s interests in the process.

From the very beginning India strove to withdraw the Kashmir issue from the UN with all its connected commitments and substitute direct negotiations between the two countries. By delineating the line of control resulting from the ceasefire India hoped that the Karachi Agreement, arrived at earlier through the aegis of the UN, would automatically lapse. The observer group would as a result become redundant and would eventually be withdrawn.

After the line of control was delineated and militarily stabilized, an understanding was expected to emerge on Kashmir, and the issue would them be withdrawn from the UN. This would certainly take time, but India was prepared to take the first step. Since any precondition linking withdrawal of troops from the territories across the international border would amount to arm twisting, especially when India had an advantage over Pakistan in terms of area, the process of withdrawing troops was delinked from delineating the line of control so far as the agreement was concerned.

As regards prisoners of war and civilian internees, these were of two types; those who surrendered in East Pakistan to the joint command of India and Bangladesh; and those captured in the western sector. India contended that the future of the majority of prisoners, who had surrendered in Bangladesh, could not be decided without the concurrence of the government of that country, and that was not possible till Pakistan formally recognized Bangladesh.

Bhutto had his reservations. Notwithstanding the agreement on the line of control, he was not willing to withdraw the Kashmir dispute from the UN, nor was he prepared to rule out third-party participation in solving it.

Mrs Gandhi also referred to the Geneva Convention under which prisoners of war could be tried for war crimes. The Bangladesh Government had declared its intention to bring those responsible for genocide and other inhumane acts to trial. Since the repatriation of the majority of prisoners depended on the recognition of Bangladesh, the issue was shelved for consideration later under Article VI of the Simla Agreement.

Bhutto had his reservations. Notwithstanding the agreement on the line of control, he was not willing to withdraw the Kashmir dispute from the UN, nor was he prepared to rule out third-party participation in solving it. Although he believed in bilateralism, he said “we are living in a small world and it would be unrealistic to think that we can put a curtain round the subcontinent.” This implied that Bhutto accepted bilateralism so far as it served Pakistan’s interests, and yet wanted to keep open the option of third-party mediation when bilateralism no longer suited Pakistan.

About the prisoners of war, he was certain “they would have to be returned sooner or later,” and he depended upon the “humane considerations of India not to use them as a bargaining lever.” As for the recognition of Bangladesh, he gave the impression that his country was prepared to recognize realities, but at an opportune moment, and for this adequate preparation of public opinion in Pakistan was necessary. He made it known that the war crime trials in Dacca would make things difficult for him at home.

In passing, he beseeched Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to look beyond the immediate present as many larger issues lay ahead. Any hasty step, however attractive and politically expedient at the moment, might mar the chances of future reconciliation. He felt that those suspected guilty of crimes should be tried in Pakistan itself, under international supervision if required.

On the political plane, the severest criticism came from Atal Behari Vajpayee, then a Jana Sangh member of Parliament. He said that before the Simla summit Mrs Gandhi had promised the nation a “package deal,” but she had been out-manoeuvred by Bhutto to adopt a gradual approach. Vajpayee said: “In the process, important issues, such as vacation of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir, war damages, settlement of pre-partition debts, evacuee property, and the burden of looking after the refugees before the liberation of Bangladesh have been bypassed.”

It appeared that Bhuttos immediate concern was the withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistan-occupied territory. So far as the prisoners of war were concerned, he believed “India cannot keep the prisoners indefinitely.”

He further asserted that the agreement would mean that “India should give up some 5,000 square miles of Pakistani territory while Pakistan would continue its illegal occupation of 30,000 square miles of Indian territory in Kashmir.” According to him, “this amounts to a gross betrayal of the sacrifices of our jawans. The Government has started losing at the negotiation table what the brave jawans won on the battlefield.” Instead of consolidating the military victory to provide a lasting peace, he alleged the Government had through this agreement relapsed into a state of “self-delusion under ritualistic homage to peace, noninterference and friendship.”

Defending the Simla Agreement, External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh said that a gradual approach, starting with the withdrawal of troops to the international border and the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, would generate the necessary confidence for the growth of friendly and peaceful relations between the two countries to enable them to tackle other major issues. The Government also claimed that the agreement did away with third-party involvement and brought all issues, including Kashmir, to be settled through bilateral negotiation.

They implied that withdrawing this issue from the UN after 25 years of prolonged and futile deliberations and dealing with it bilaterally was itself a significant step towards its ultimate solution. On the other hand, Bhutto claimed in a marathon speech in Pakistan’s National Assembly on 15 July that “he had not compromised on principles, nor had he done any bargain ing.” Answering an accusation of a secret agreement with India, he stressed that he had not yielded on any issue. He refused to discuss the question of Bangladesh on Indian soil.

As regards Kashmir, he affirmed that Article 103 of the UN Charter clearly laid down that no agreement, including that at Simla entered into by the two countries, could supersede it The charter, not the agreement would prevail, if there was any inconsistency. He asserted that Kashmir had in fact been reactivated for the first time since Tashkent, obviously referring to the clause in the agreement leaving a final settlement of the dispute to a future summit. Allaying fears of any secret understanding arrived at behind the scenes, he said he would have got the prisoners of war and civilian internees back if he had agreed to a settlement on Kashmir on India’s terms.”

It appeared that Bhutto’s immediate concern was the withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistan-occupied territory. So far as the prisoners of war were concerned, he believed “India cannot keep the prisoners indefinitely.” Economic pressures and world opinion would ultimately bring about their repatriation. The Simla Agreement was ratified by both countries and came into force on 5 August 1972.2 As the first step towards normalization, Pakistan announced the repatriation of all Indian civilians, numbering 6,770, interned there from December 1971. India reciprocated by repatriating all Pakistani held in this country.

In implementing the Simla Agreement, both countries authorized their army chiefs to proceed with the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir as it resulted from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. Lt Gen P.S. Bhagat, PVSM, VC, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Northern Command, was to represent India, while Lt Gen Abdul Hamid fielded the Pakistani side. The Generals were assisted by their respective Directors of Military Operations and other staff officers. After the first meeting at Suchetgarh on 10 August,3 a series of meetings were held on either side of the border till the signing of the delineation documents on 11 December. The negotiations went through various ups and downs of seemingly irreconcilable opposing stands, but eventually the differences were ironed out amicably.

Notes:

1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 29, “Summit Talks in Simla,” p.10876.
2. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 34, “Simla Agreement Comes into Force,” p. 10936.
3. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 34, “Delineation of Line of Control in Kashmir,” p. 10936.

From the very beginning, the Indian side made it known that so far as it was concerned the ceasefire line of 1949 had ceased to exist. As a result of the 1971 conflict, a new line of control had come into being, and that needed to be delineated. The Pakistani side contended that the old line had been disturbed in limited areas as a result of the recent conflict, and only these areas required delineation. The Pakistani spokesman at Islamabad claimed that about 95 per cent of the line which had been accepted in July 1949 under the supervision of the UN observers still existed. According to him, the Suchetgarh meeting had no bearing on Pakistan’s “basic position,” which had been “safeguarded” under the Simla Agreement.

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Although the agreement did not visualize linking troop withdrawals with completing the delineation of the line of control, it was considered highly unlikely that the two could be delinked. The Pakistani spokesmen however categorically rejected both assertions, saying that “any impression that the demarcation of the entire ceasefire line was going to be discussed or that the meeting had any link with the withdrawal of troops to the international border was wholly wrong.” With such different approaches, the agreement could not be implemented. Pakistan had to be contacted at the prime ministerial level to bridge the gap between the differing views. Fresh talks were accordingly held between Aziz Ahmed and P.N. Haksar on 25 August.

The Pakistani spokesman at Islamabad claimed that about 95 per cent of the line which had been accepted in July 1949 under the supervision of the UN observers still existed.

Apart from the platitudes of the preamble, these officials made the following firm recommendations:

Swaran Singh made a statement in the Lok Sabha on the officials’ meet in which he referred to the outstanding issues individually. He said “some differences had arisen in the discussions between the Indian and Pakistani military commanders regarding the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. The discussions held between the Indian and Pakistani representatives have resolved these differences and it has been agreed that the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir will be delineated along the entire length, and maps showing this line will be exchanged by both sides in terms of the Simla Agreement.” He added that “withdrawals in terms of the Simla Agreement will now be completed by 15 September 1972, as mutually agreed by the two delegations.”

The President of Pakistan has also assured our Prime Minister in his letter that these affected persons would not only be welcome to return to their homes, but would be assured of safety of life and dignity as Pakistan nationals.”

He explained that “any delay in recognizing Bangladesh will hamper the process of durable peace and normalization of relations and retard the achievement of the objectives set out in the Simla Agreement. It is our earnest hope that Pakistan will not further delay recognition of the realities of the new situation on the subcontinent.

It is in the interest of the three countries of the subcontinent to resolve their differences by mutual discussions.” Swaran Singh said that “as for the question of the return of prisoners of war and civilian internees, we have reiterated to the Pakistan delegation that the question cannot be settled without the participation and agreement of the Government of Bangladesh.”

As regards India’s problem of maintaining the families which had fled from Sind to Rajasthan, Gujarat and Kutch and were residing either in Indian-occupied territory or in refugee camps in India, Swaran Singh said: “Pakistan has decided to send Rana Chander Singh, a member of the Sind Provincial Assembly, and two members of Parliament from Tharparkar to visit the area, even when it is under occupation of the Indian Army, to reassure the people, who are still residing there, and also to invite a number of their prominent leaders who are currently in India, with a view to persuading the affected persons to return. The President of Pakistan has also assured our Prime Minister in his letter that these affected persons would not only be welcome to return to their homes, but would be assured of safety of life and dignity as Pakistan nationals.”

The Simla Agreement was worded in such generalities that each side could interpret it to suit its own interests. Because of this vagueness, the delineation proceedings between the two military commanders got stuck even before they started, necessitating the official level meeting within 20 days of the ratification of the agreement. Meanwhile, from the time of the ceasefire, there were alleged violations along the line of control with the aim of improving the respective defensive posture of each side and generally to keep the line disturbed. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim referred them to the Security Council on 13 May 1972,1 clarifying the attitude of both countries to the use of UN agencies for observing the ceasefire.

He asserted that both sides claimed different lines of control when fighting stopped and the UN observers, without freedom of movement, had not verified the new line. He brought to the council’s notice that India had filed no complaints with the observers on the spot and, unlike Pakistan, was withholding cooperation with them. The observers did not enjoy freedom of movement on the Indian side. The report of alleged Pakistani violations were filed by India directly with the UN Secretariat and not with the observers stationed on the Indian side.

India has restrained from sending to you lists of ceasefire violations by Pakistan in the firm belief that if Pakistan is indeed ready and willing to settle difference and disputes between the two countries in a truly friendly and cooperative spirit direct bilateral negotiations provide the best means.

Samar Sen, India’s permanent representative at the UN, wrote in replying to Waldheim’s assertions, that “while the efforts towards peaceful negotiations are continuing, Pakistan has been making repeated allegations of violations of ceasefire without any mention of the fact that many of these incidents have been satisfactorily settled at flag meetings between the local commanders. Thus in March-April alone, 32 generally successful flag meetings took place to settle disputes and differences relating to the ceasefire. India has restrained from sending to you lists of ceasefire violations by Pakistan in the firm belief that if Pakistan is indeed ready and willing to settle difference and disputes between the two countries in a truly friendly and cooperative spirit direct bilateral negotiations provide the best means. Some of the flag meetings were held at the Indian initiative and others at the request of Pakistan.”

He further explained that “when the local commanders could not settle their differences they were solved by reference to flag meetings at higher levels. Additionally, facilities for direct communications are available between the military headquarters. in both countries. A bilateral and effective machinery thus exists for maintaining the durability of the ceasefire, and has been successfully used.”

On the military plane, there were ten meetings between Gen Bhagat and Gen Hamid Khan between 10 August and 7 December 1972, when the line of control was finally delineated. The differences which stalled the proceedings for almost four months were broadly of four kinds. Firstly, they concerned discrepancies in areas claimed to have been lost or gained by either side up to the ceasefire of 17 December, and these could be reconciled easily between the local commanders on the given guideline and did not present much of a problem.

Secondly, there was the question of territories annexed after the ceasefire, like that of the capture of the Kayan posts by Pakistan on 5 May. Pakistan contended that India was also guilty of such acts at various places and the whole question should be dealt with on equitable terms. The issue was resolved by Pakistan’s vacating the posts and parts of the Tarkundi forest in the Rajauri sector, with some adjustments on the Indian side. Thirdly, Pakistan claimed 12 small pockets of defacto control covering about nine square miles. It argued that although these areas lay on the Indian side of the erstwhile ceasefire line they had been under the administrative control of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir almost from 1949.

These areas generally lay in narrow valleys between spurs jutting out of the main ridges held by Indian posts towards Pakistan-occupied territory. The difficult terrain, the lack of accessibility to the Indian rear areas, and the general fear of passing through minefields and forward posts, led the local population to lean on Pakistan for their subsistence. The delineation embraced the changes brought about as a result of war and did not cater for administrative encroachments. But a verification proved the Pakistan claims to be on the whole correct. As such, de facto control of areas up to six square miles were conceded after a ground survey.

Notes:

1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 24, “UN-Secretary-General’s Report on Kashmir,” p. 10814.

Finally, there was the vital problem of interpreting the international border as applicable to Jammu district. Pakistan accepted the existing border between the Ravi and the Chenab as this suited its interests since the larger part of the occupied territory in Chicken’s Neck and the Shakargarh bulge lay in the region. But it contested the international border west of the Chenab as part of the ceasefire line. The line of 1949 ran well west of Manawar Tawi till it joined the international border running east to west near Moel village.

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The conflict of 1965 had brought the Pakistani occupation as deep as Jaurian village, but the status quo ante was restored under the Tashkent Agreement. The 1971 conflict resulted in extending the Pakistani occupation right up to Manawar Tawi and the village of Thako Chak lying on the Indian side of the border between the narrow strip covering the confluence of Manawar Tawi and the Chenab. The Pakistan representative insisted that Thako Chak, a hamlet, should be treated as lying across the line of control and not on the basis of the border.

The conflict of 1965 had brought the Pakistani occupation as deep as Jaurian village, but the status quo ante was restored under the Tashkent Agreement.

The question at stake was not the possession of this village but the basic principle of delineation, whether the border west of the Chenab was to be treated differently from that east of the river and why this should be so? The Indian representative insisted that the sanctity of the border had to be maintained equally on both sides of the Chenab. As a result, the talks were deadlocked and stretched to the first week of December.

Troop withdrawal, scheduled to be completed by 20 September as agreed at the officials’ meeting, was delayed till the delineation was completed, although supposedly delinked from this process. It was unwise in the first instance not to link the withdrawal of troops with delineation as India had no other bargaining lever to secure its interest. Why this was not done in the first instance is difficult to understand.

The time for the rabi crop had meanwhile passed, but despite the restive refugee problem Bhutto was sticking to his guns. He said the question was not who should gain control of a tiny village but whether “we are to give up territory without a consideration. This we cannot do. India is the larger and powerful country. It is up to India to give some territory, or to at least compensate us, if we give up something. It has a very big border. Surely, it can make some adjustment.” As for the rest of the normalization process, he boasted that China had vetoed the admission of Bangladesh to the UN the previous September at Pakistan’s bidding. Mrs Gandhi, on the other hand, hoped that a special effort would be made in Pakistan to view the problem of delineation “in the larger perspective of the immense benefit which would accrue to our people.” She regretted that Pakistan’s military representative “apparently regard India’s withdrawal from Pakistan’s territories as of lesser consequence than the dispute they have raised.”

Bhutto insisted that Pakistan would in no circumstances accept the Indian stand that the line separating Jammu from the Punjab province of Pakistan was an international border.

The talks between the two army chiefs, Gen Manekshaw and Gen Tikka Khan, at Lahore on 28 November1 failed to resolve the deadlock. The Simla Agreement had urged in Paragraph 4 Part (1) withdrawal forces by both countries to “the international border in the interest of durable peace.” The question was that of determining the international border so far as it concerned Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani toehold of the tiny village of Thako Chak in Jammu district, covering an area of 3.5 square kilometres; could not be treated any differently from the portion of the border between the Ravi and the Chenab. It was a question of principle.

Bhutto insisted that Pakistan would in no circumstances accept the Indian stand that the line separating Jammu from the Punjab province of Pakistan was an international border. He asserted that “India was insisting on acceptance of its stand to undermine the position taken by Pakistan that the whole of Kashmir was disputed territory.” It was amazing that while he had conceded the same border as international between the Chenab and the Ravi, since this involved Indian withdrawals from the Pakistani territories of Chicken’s Neck and the Shakargarh bulge, he was not prepared to yield a small village.

After a stalemate of about ten days, the Pakistani side suggested another meeting of the two chiefs, and this was held at Lahore for the second time on 7 December. The Pakistanis at last accepted the Indian stand that Thako Chak formed part of the international border as determined after 1949 and agreed to forgo their claim to it. It was agreed that Pakistani troops should withdraw from Thako Chak, and in return the Indian side agreed to make some adjustments in the line of control as compensation for the loss of this village.

In implementation of the agreement between the two chiefs, Gen Bhagat and Gen Hamid Khan meet for the tenth and last time at Suchetgarh on 11 December2 and jointly signed 19 maps delineating the line of control from Chhamb to Tartok, covering about 800 kilometres. Signing maps and their exchange signified completion of this phase of the Simla Agreement.

This delineation was approved by both governments almost the next day and the stage was now set for withdrawal of troops. A period of five days was allotted to complete adjustments along the line of control and formulate the other modalities of withdrawal from Pakistan-occupied territories. On completion of adjustments in the line of control both sides withdrew from the occupied territories to restore the status quo ante on the international border finally on 20 December 1972,3 almost a year after the Indian unilateral ceasefire of 17 December 1971.

The alleged loss of about 93 square miles of Indian-claimed territory was due to the original claims being based on the exaggerated reports of some commanders.

This enabled Swaran Singh to announce in the Lok Sabha that “the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir has been determined through bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. In accordance with the Simla Agreement, this line will be respected by both sides, neither side shall alter it unilaterally and both sides shall refrain from the threat of use of force in violation of this line.”

By 17 December, adjustment of ground positions of both sides along the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir had been completed with the exception of a few positions in the northern areas, where it was held up because of heavy snows. The adjustment of these positions was to be carried out when the snows melted. These positions were mostly in the Gurais and Tartok sectors. Along the line of control, Pakistani troops withdrew from the Lipa valley, occupied by them after the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. India ceded the villages of Dhum and Ghikot in the Uri sector in return for Thaka Chak. Along the international border, we gave up Chicken’s Neck and pulled out of the Shakargarh bulge, where there were 332 villages covering 533 square miles.

Withdrawal of troops on both sides in the Dera Baba Nanak, Arnritsar, Khalra, Khemkaran, Hussainiwala and Fazilka sectors had also been completed on 21 December. In the desert Indian troops withdrew from some 10,000 square kilometres of occupied territory in Sind province. On 21 December, the army chiefs reported to their respective governments that their forces had withdrawn to their sides of the international border in conformity with the Simla Agreement.

The Secretary-General of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, Aziz Ahmed, lost no time in giving his country’s interpretation of these developments. He said “the line of control, as stated by India’s Minister of External Affairs, Sardar Swaran Singh, is not an international border but obviously a new ceasefire line.” Explaining Pakistan’s stand, he continued that “the control line is a temporary line and will remain so as long as the Kashmir dispute is not finally settled. Under the Simla Agreement, this line will be respected by both sides, without prejudice to the recognized position of either side.” According to him, India had claimed the capture of 434 square miles of territory in Jammu and Kashmir, but according to the line now delineated India had only 241 square miles. Pakistan had claimed 59 square miles on the Indian side of the ceasefire line and had retained all the territory. In addition, he claimed Pakistan had been able to regularize the occupation of 12 pockets of the de facto control areas.

As part of the adjustment along the line of control, India withdrew its claim to the villages of Dhum and Chikot, measuring about 0.45 square miles, as a “gesture of goodwill following Pakistan’s readiness to withdraw from the 1.5 square miles area of Thako Chak. It was stated that this was considered necessary in the interests of peace. It is to Gen Bhagat’s credit that after prolonged and patient negotiations he managed to carve militarily a more viable line of control, improving India’s defence posture in this sensitive region. The alleged loss of about 93 square miles of Indian-claimed territory was due to the original claims being based on the exaggerated reports of some commanders.

Continued…: India’s Losses and Gains in Post-Independence Wars – III

Notes:

1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 52, “India-Pakistan Army Chief’s Talks on Simla Agreement Fail,” p. 11148.
2. Asian Recorder, Vol XIX, No 1, “Delineation Maps Exchanged with Pakistan,” p. 11157.
3. Asian Recorder, Vol XIX, No 2, “Troop Withdrawal by India and Pakistan,” p. 11172.