Indian Defence Review

The AFT was set up to exercise appellate jurisdiction with respect to orders, findings or sentences of court martial and exercise original jurisdiction with respect to service disputes. This ruling puts the very purpose of having an AFT somewhat infructuous and takes us back to square one. It is in fact, a leap forward into the past. It will bring about the same painful and frustrating delays and their impact on the military’s discipline and functioning as they existed before the promulgation of the AFT Act. The Delhi High Court, in its infinite wisdom, deep understanding of the Constitution and legal acumen, has turned the very idea and rationale of setting up the AFT on its head.

To avoid inevitable delays in the finalisation of defence services cases dealt by the AFT, in case these are subjected to review by the High Courts as well, the order of the Delhi High Court must be contested in the Supreme Court by the service headquarters.

Now article 227(4) of the Constitution, on which the Delhi High Court has relied in passing the above noted order, provides superintendence of High Court over all courts/tribunals falling in its jurisdiction but it specifically excludes court martial cases. Therefore and quite simply and logically, it cannot have power of superintedence over the Armed Forces Tribunal that has appellate jurisdiction over verdicts of court martial cases. Further when there is specific provision for appeal against verdicts/orders of the Tribunal under sections 30/31 of the Act to only the Supreme Court, then how could a writ petition be entertained by a high court.

High Courts are already overloaded with work and the backlog runs into a million cases and it is to bypass this legal quagmire and the necessity for quick disposal of defence services cases that the AFT Act of 2007 was promulgated by the government as an act of Parliament and as such became a law, where the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was in the consultative loop. In case the rulings of the AFT are to be subjected to review by the high courts and later by the Supreme Court then the purpose of establishing the AFT is defeated.

On an earlier occasion, a High Court gave a ruling that court martial should record a “speaking order”. Now the composition and working of a court martial is akin to the jury system, which for too obvious a reason does not record a “speaking order”. Unfortunately, defence services did not contest this ruling in the Supreme Court and court martial proceedings are now required to be accompanied by a speaking order. The judge advocate, who is on the court martial merely to render advice to the members on purely technical legal issues and has no voting right, is the only one who is qualified to write a speaking order. Consequently the judge advocate has come to exercise undue influence over the court, which in reality and practice has altered the very character and working of the court martial.

To avoid inevitable delays in the finalisation of defence services cases dealt by the AFT, in case these are subjected to review by the High Courts as well, the order of the Delhi High Court must be contested in the Supreme Court by the service headquarters. The need for early disposal of defence services cases hardly needs any emphasis.