Indian Defence Review

The US logic was that since Kayani had ‘developed strong working relations with his American counterparts’ it will be “in the best interest of the operation not to change leadership mid-stream.” On his part, General Kayani is said to have assured the Obama administration that his army would play in their “own sandbox” and not disrupt the civilian setup.3

The other issue of discontent within the leadership has been the extent of cooperation with the US in targeting the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership and cadre operating within Pakistan. In fact, even during General Pervez Musharraf’s tenure, some of this senior Corps Commanders had strongly opposed the beginning of the Drone attacks within Pakistan. This continues to be and may well become a factor in Kayani’s own future as the debate rages on how to protect Pakistan’s sovereignty with regard to the US war on terror.4

What were the reasons for the civilian government to persist with Kayani? There were several reasons, some transparent and others not so. First, the general impression is that he is a professional and one who wants to stay away from politics. Second, the need to ensure continuity in Pakistan’s war on terror and linked to this is the American decision to back Kayani. The US decision was based on their experience of Musharaff assisting them in the war on terror. From a position of stalemate, Kayani managed to turn the tide in 2008-2009 in operations against the Taliban. In addition, Kayani sought to restore the image of the army taking measures to improve the lot of the foot soldier. All this not only improved the sagging image of the army as the saviour and protector of Pakistan, but also made Kayani a sought after man to broker political deals.5 He did this and much more, but quietly, in keeping with his tendency to maintain a low profile.

All these factors were at play and known in the public domain. But beneath the veneer of government choice lay Kayani’s own perception that his continuance was essential for the survival of Pakistan. In this, Kayani had the backing of his Corps Commanders. This was because Kayani had packed the Corps Commanders with men of his choice.6

The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan reflects very poorly on both of them.  The number two ranking al Qaeda figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other members of the Taliban in Afghanistan, are widely believed to be on Pakistani territory.7 A few days after the Abbottabad raid, Kayani stated that ‘he’ would not tolerate a repeat of the US covert operation that killed Osama bin Laden, warning that any similar action would lead to a reconsideration of the relationship with the United States. He termed the US raid on the compound in Abbottabad where bin Laden was eventually killed, as a “misadventure.” Kayani then said that another similar raid would be responded to swiftly, a promise that seemed intended to tell the public that the Army was capable of stopping the Americans trying to capture other senior figures of the al-Qaeda. These statements came after Kayani’s meeting with his Corps Commanders at their monthly conference at the Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi.

“¦Kayani took queries for three hours after a 45-minute address to the 5th Corps in Karachi. The questioners focused on the perceived affront in Abbottabad “” and why Pakistan, in the words of one officer, did not “retaliate.”

Within the Pakistani establishment, there was anger at the American decision to carry out the raid on their own. Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir said at a press conference that Washington should abandon the idea that Pakistan was complicit in helping bin Laden hide. But Bashir did not elaborate, only saying that the ISI had a “brilliant” record in counterterrorism.8 Among other things, Kayani told his Corps Commanders that any similar action, violating Pakistan’s sovereignty, “will warrant a review on the level of military /intelligence cooperation with the US.”9 While admitting shortcomings in developing intelligence on the presence of bin Laden in Pakistan, the conference highlighted that the achievements of Inter Services Intelligence, against Al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates in Pakistan, have no parallel.10

The Killing of Bin Laden and the Pakistan Army

In April 2011, Kayani went to the Kakul Military Academy to greet passing out cadets. There he claimed that Pakistani security forces “have broken the back of terrorists” and that the Pakistan Army “was completely aware of internal and external threats to the country.”  It is ironic that Osama bin Laden’s compound was a mile away from the parade ground where Kayani spoke.11

Members of Pakistan’s army have said little publicly about the US operation that killed bin Laden and other events. But interviews with officers suggest that there is an internal debate and ferment. The impact of recent events on an expanded Pakistani effort against Islamist militants will clearly be felt in the coming weeks and months.