One of the few Services worldwide, which was born as an independent air force, the IAF was cast deliberately by the British in the role of a tactical army support arm. It grew up in the shadow of the Royal Air Force, which retained for itself, the fighters and bombers as well as the strategic responsibilities in this theatre.
The fledgling RIAF was thrown headlong into conflict within ten weeks of our independence, when Pakistan made an attempt to snatch away the state of Jammu & Kashmir by force. Our Spitfires, Tempests, and Dakotas, deployed with imagination, and flown with great skill and daring in difficult weather and terrain, performed a vast array of missions, which resulted in the invader being expelled from most of our territory.
Since 1947, we have seen four major conflicts; and in each case the IAF’s crucial contribution to the nation’s defence has been marked by visionary leadership, innovative strategy and outstanding gallantry in the air.
What happens in space is a pressing issue, which affects all three Services, and must be addressed with urgency.
Post-independence, while absorbing state-of-the-art equipment from diverse sources, the IAF has ensured that its doctrine kept pace. In consonance with emerging geo-political realities and the nation’s security needs, the IAF has been shaped by its leadership so that today it is a strategic force, honed to a fine professional edge.
Airpower has been undergoing a steady process of transformation and major drivers have been the quest for low observability (or stealth) and greater precision in weapon delivery. The effectiveness of airpower has thus seen manifold enhancement, and today a single F-117 can achieve as much destruction as squadrons of B-17s or F-105s used to earlier.
It is now apparent that the future will bring everything that science fiction writers visualised in books, and George Lucas used to show on screen. Real time cockpit information, directed-energy weapons, space-maneuvering vehicles, space based radars, and extensive applications of bio and nano-technologies are all just round the corner. Above all, information dominance will set the rules of the game. According to the USAF doctrine: “In the 21st century it will be possible to find, fix, or track and target anything that moves on the surface of the earth. This emerging reality will change the conduct of warfare and the role of air & space power.”
Asymmetric wars involving terrorism, low intensity conflict, and insurrections are going to be far more frequent than conventional wars between nation states. A major challenge for air forces will, therefore, be to adapt some of the advanced capabilities at their disposal to sub-conventional applications, so that they retain their relevance.
An interesting concept is multilateral aerospace cooperation. The USN has been proposing a similar concept, which they call the “1000 Ship Navy”. But we have to remember that maritime forces have the advantage of inhabiting a medium in which they can live and operate for long durations. As I mentioned earlier, air forces can only transit through the air but will need overseas operating basis to function multilaterally. But I am sure that ways and means can be found to make multilateral aerospace cooperation viable.
After a few flip-flops between “air power” and “aerospace power”, the USAF has finally settled for “air and space power.
There are legacy of issues which have dogged most air forces of the world, and led them to wage a sustained struggle to assert their individuality vis-à-vis the other Services.
In what has now become a classical dilemma, the army and the navy presume that air power is just an extension of their artillery, and the air force, should therefore be the handmaiden of land and maritime forces. Surface forces, both on land and at sea are traditionally most concerned about the “immediate threat” in the theatre or battlefield, because they could come under enemy fire in a matter of hours or even minutes. Commanders on land and at sea, therefore tend to develop “tunnel vision” which is restricted to their own, limited, areas of responsibility.
The average airman therefore has a conviction, that as long as hostile air elements are prevented from interfering with our surface operations, its tactical deployment should be accorded a lower priority. They feel that the vast potential of air power is best appreciated by an airman and best exploited strategically.
We cannot convert people to see things our way, by standing on podiums and hectoring them. This is a viewpoint that needs be understood, discussed, and appreciated by all those in uniform, so that a consensus can be evolved and implemented on the battlefield. It is an imperative because air power is acquiring rapidly escalating capabilities in terms of reach, presence, striking power and information dominance, and will be the key to joint operations.
Another new frontier looming large before us, which could present great opportunities as well as challenges is space. The Air Chief has of late, been emphasising the need to focus attention on this field, and recommending the formation of an “Aerospace Command”. The recent reports of an anti-satellite weapon test in our immediate neighbourhood have served to validate the Chief’s concerns, and one must complement him on his vision and foresight.
Reconnaissance and surveillance too are benign applications of aerospace power in peacetime. It can also make a big contribution to the war against terrorism and LICO.
Today, space capabilities provide us communications, position-fixing, navigation and time, missile-warning, as well as weather and reconnaissance facilities. The future will see growing dependence on space for facilities, which have a crucial impact, as much on military operations as on economic and commercial activities globally. Therefore, what happens in space is a pressing issue, which affects all three Services, and must be addressed with urgency.
But we need to tread with caution here, because the subject is beset with complexities. “Aerospace power” can mean one thing if it is just about C4ISR, and something altogether different if it implies weaponisation.
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