Proficiency of Pro-action
The first test relates to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. It had been a regular role for the standard infantry battalion to fight through urban areas to clear massive complexes. That kind of operation has been a part of training since as far as one might recall – setting up a command post, obtaining the layout and guides, forcing entry and despatching the enemy, all in a matter of hours. In this instance, there was a unit located just a small distance away; part of it was indeed moved to the location. Yet the terrorists had to wait for 40 odd hours to be sent to their doom, indulgent in their killing-spree all this while. While the civil administration, unprepared for such ruthless assault, stood confounded, neither the local military commander could take over the situation, nor could the battalion be sent-in to clear the premises. The National Security Guard, a police outfit actually even if manned by soldiers, had to act after over 12 hours to deliver the nation from the mayhem.
The ‘power-factor’ of the battalion, the Officer Platoon Commanders, has vanished…
Notably, this was not the first instance of asking for Special Forces to undertake missions which must perfectly be within the capabilities of a powerful entity like the infantry battalion. The reference of deploying the ‘most suited force’ may not be stretched to an extent where it becomes self-deprecating. May be it could have done good to a military unit’s faith if one did not have to wait at the sidelines while fire raged at hand.
Trust and Resilience
The recent incident on the Line of Control may be taken as a second test case. There are two issues here. One, no doubt, it was a tactical failure on the part of our troops to have been overwhelmed with no worthwhile riposte to show for. Notably, a failure of this magnitude is seldom a one-off incident; it may be indicative of professional laxity having found its way among the troops over time. The situation at the Line of Control was known to be ever-exacting and that was a weakness that could have been anticipated and probably prevented. However, even the best prepared troops are liable to slip up under conditions so hazardous.
The things to do in such situations is for the unit to, firstly, re-dedicate to the tactical tenets, and secondly, to deliver retribution as a matter of faith. With solidarity and resolve firming-in from local leadership, it is certain that the slip up would have been redeemed thus – stoically and forthrightly. Two, experience tells us that under conditions so excruciating, while setbacks are likely to occur, among hardened commanders such incidents trigger resolve rather than fluster. Therefore, neither was there a need for the army to be given a political “free hand”, nor was there a need for visitations from top commanders, ostensibly to chastise local commanders, with the infantry battalion at the target end, as it had been implied for public consumption. To that extent, this development may be indicative of systemic lack of faith within the military hierarchy and its miscommunication with the political authority. No doubt, this is a dangerous affliction.
It was a tactical failure on the part of our troops to have been overwhelmed with no worthwhile riposte to show for…
Cognitive Flexibility
By age-old convention, most wars have various forms of tactical operations undertaken under one overall plan – set-piece, irregular and Special Operations for example. Indeed, the so called ‘conventional war’ has always had unconventional tactical recourses built into it. The infantry battalion has been in lead role in such irregular or unconventional operations, its flexibility of structure, weaponry and training allowing it to be moved by any mode of transport and fielded in any of the kind of aforesaid operations – all with equal proficiency and without much ado. The final test may, therefore, be to evaluate that significant flexibility which the infantry battalion has traditionally possessed.
In this context, it may be a good idea to establish if the full complement of the infantry battalion, not just selected ‘gladiators’, continues to be mentally perceptive and realistically trained in conducting small team, special team or guerrilla type of operations with the same ease as it did in the 1971 War. With continuous engagement in counter-insurgency, an easing burden of training and dilution of leadership élan, the answer may not bring satisfaction – the reasons, genuine or otherwise, are not material here. For the admirers of infantry-power, that could be a telling call to ‘sit-up’.
Best Investment
For a nation that is satisfied with status quo and nurtures a tentative military strategy, India is deprived of a modern military industry and constrained in defence budget. Empowerment of the infantry battalion must be a cost-effective investment. In no way overlooking the salience of all components of the army, it may yet be unequivocally stated that be it a scrap with China or dislocating Pakistan’s misadventure across the Line of Control, suppression of insurgency or in dealing with terror attacks, an empowered infantry battalion would be an effective lead arm.
India is deprived of a modern military industry and constrained in defence budget…
Indeed, infantry-predominant Special Operations launched in conjunction with its traditional steadfastness in defence and aggressive riposte may be the right recourse to halt China’s gigantic war machine should such a situation be imposed upon us.5 In similar vein, infantry-predominant operations in conventional as well as special mode would make it costly for Pakistan to poke at India now and then – without provoking a nuclear exchange of which we seem to be terrified of. There would then be no need for our government to parrot stale indignations after every incident.
Practically independent of imported weaponry and equipment, investment in tangible wherewithal of the infantry battalion would be an indigenous effort, more or less. It should therefore, make sense to the technocrats, economists and the security establishment to promote the cause of quantum – not just incremental and disjointed – upgrade of the infantry battalion. Appropriately, the issue may not be confined solely to infusion of modern war-wherewithal. The organisational structure of the infantry battalion has to be correspondingly customised to reap the best dividend. Towards this end, it would be obligatory to revise operational procedures and correspondingly reconfigure the unit, its sub-units and manpower. This would be a time-consuming endeavour but unless deliberated well beforehand and formalised, advantages of the accruals would remain stifled. In fact, history is replete with instances when oversight of the gamut of modernisation has led to worsening of battle performance. It may, therefore, be wise for the military leaders to test this aspect with due seriousness.
The greater challenge yet remains in strengthening the intangible assets of the infantry battalion, some of which have been discussed in the earlier part. Suffice to state that there are signs of those unique characteristics stagnating, or even slipping. These signs need to be registered in true context and taken seriously. Truly, building upon the intangible assets is purely an in-house competence. It does not require approvals and sanctions from any quarters but our own.6
Empowerment of the ‘power-house’ is at the hands of military leadership – and it would do us good.
Notes
- Infantry’s battle-power came to limelight in the Battle of Saint Thoma (Madras) which took place between the Nawab of Carnatic and the French Compagnie in November 1747. Here, the Compagnie’s 1000 troops, 700 of them Indian Sepoys, led by their engineer officer Captain Louis Paradis, applied the ‘volley and charge’ tactics to rout the Nawab’s 10000 strong army. Later, the English followed this tactic during Robert Clive’s siege of Arcot in Sep 1951, while its classical execution under the command of Major Hector Munro carried the day in the Battle of Buxar in October 1764.
- The Industrial Revolution favoured development of efficient Flint-lock Muskets and Cannons. The Musket enhanced infantry’s fire power, and high-technology artillery prohibited cavalry charge on deliberate defences while making it easier for the infantry to break into such defences. Of course, the cavalry and horse artillery combine came to be deployed in shaping the battle and in pursuit.
- In these campaigns, the infantry had to adapt to diverse tactics and battle drills. For example, the Burma Campaign was more of a marine warfare while in the North-West Frontier, it was a warfare of skirmishes among the rocks and ridges with occasional storming actions like the capture of Dargai Ridge in October 1897.
- Infantry battalion’s microcosmic construct is represented by its anti-armour capability, mortar platoon for artillery, pioneer section for engineers and so on.
- It is no revelation that given the relativity of strength and characteristics of the terrain, resort to special/guerrilla operations in conjunction with aggressive conduct of defence offers the best counter to aggression from China. Artillery, armour and air would no doubt play major roles in that endeavour, but still, it must be the infantry battalion at the pivot.
- An infantry battalion is easily taken to the level of near-perfection. But ever-intent on fighting, the army fights within when it cannot find an enemy. Internecine turf war within the army bureaucracy aims at preventing others rather than elevating the one, and that is a hurdle to cross. Arguably, the second hurdle is the infantryman’s own rigid perceptions.
Please wait...
Part 2…..
4. Officer Strength. In a peace station you will not find more than 5 to 6 officers present in an Infantry Battalion. If you count the key appointments C O, Second-in-Command, Adjutant and Quartermaster who are the core management appointments, what is left for the rest of the Battalion is one or two officers and in some cases it will be young officers with little service and experience. Therefore the crucial factor of troop administration and management is missing and what is sorely affected is the Battlefield Leadership training and development.
5. Equipment is mostly antiquated and of substandard value. Training ammunition is short. Crucial equipment required for the conduct of operations is not available. When troops are inducted some of the weaponry is given to the units on adhoc basis as sector stores with which troops are not familiar. Night fighting capability is almost nil. A lot more specifics can be put across……….
Somebody needs to wake up and it’s the senior lot of the Indian Army and the Government.
The General has a very valid point about the Infantry being the Battle Winning factor. He has broadly touched most of the issues pertaining to the Infantry. However there are certain core issues that need to be addressed as far as the Infantry is concerned and these are.
1. Personal Equipment of an Infantry man remains to be of a very poor standard. An Indian soldier isn’t even authorised a mattress yet. He still sleeps on a ‘durrie’. Infantryman does the dirtiest of jobs and is the most poorly looked after soldier of the Indian Army.
2. Accommodation of our soldiers is sub- standard in peace areas and in operational areas its unliveable and pathetic. Even as a Commanding Officer I lived in something that was akin to a shanty. Everything is improvised and there is nothing standard.
3. Training – Various training modules have been put in practice for training the infantry battalions during peace time. However training is the first casualty on the arrival of the Battalion to a peace area. 35% of the battalion will be permanently out i.e. 25 % on leave and another 10 % on Army courses of Instruction and Administrative out Station Duties. Administrative duties are of such magnitude in the Indian Army that at the end of the day not a single man is available for carrying out training. Ask the Adjutant of an Infantry Battalion and he will tell it all. We are overburdened in Administrative management of our own unit. Guard Duties and fatigues and maintenance of the military areas have sadly fallen upon the Infantry battalions. A Command House Guard consumes an Infantry company for full 3 months. I guess the Army Commander knows what I am saying. Most of the training reports are just on paper only.
contd………….