Indian Defence Review

Experts estimate that about 80 different insurgencies are active around the world. Malaya, French Indochina, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, South Africa, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Congo, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, Xinjiang, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Chechnya have all seen the use of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in operations against insurgents in the past. Usage was limited in most cases because of the shortage of helicopters in the inventories of most military and para military forces barring perhaps the US and the Soviets, and not because their unique capabilities were not apparent.

Insurgencies have been in existence since the beginning of history and are as old as human conflict. They are, in essence, movements organised to overthrow a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict. All available options including psychological, political and religious are used to alienate the population from the state. The degree of organisation and an established leadership cadre with a proper command hierarchy is what distinguishes insurgents from armed mobs.

At the start of all insurgencies, there has been a marked asymmetry of military power as well as resources, between the state and the insurgents. In several cases, this asymmetry continued to exist right up to the overthrow of the state with the functioning of the state being undermined from within.

Conventional Warfare and Counter Insurgency

The aim of military forces engaged in a conventional conflict is to destroy the military capabilities of the opponent or to gain control of territory, or both. Enemy forces, infrastructure, communication links, economic and industrial assets and even the leadership as well as non-combatants become targets. Maximum use of available force is done to achieve a speedy victory while minimising damage to own assets and population.

The aim of the insurgents is to dismantle the control of the state over an area and more specifically, over the population of that area. Once this is done, the insurgents become the de facto state. This is achieved by subverting the authority of the state by political and mass agitations, destroying the infrastructure and then blaming the state for the lack of it, using armed action to ‘liberate’ both the area and the population and then assume the full functions and powers of the failed state. Provoking the state to use excessive force which results in damage and casualties to non combatants, is a method effectively used by all insurgents.

Counter insurgency operations aim to degrade the military capabilities of insurgents and either eliminate or win over their cadres with minimum destruction of infrastructure and loss of life in areas of operation. Military action is extremely selective. Unfortunately the training, ethos and equipment of regular military forces as well as the thought processes of military commanders often run counter to these tenets with disastrous results. Use of weaponry has to be decided upon not with their effectiveness against opposing forces alone but after considering the far reaching ramifications of their use against what are, more often than not, one’s own people.

This difference is why counter insurgency operations differ from conventional military operations. The military aspect is possibly the least important and is limited to facilitate the other organs of the state to restore normalcy. In conventional warfare, destruction of opposing regular forces and boots on the ground in enemy territory result in military victory. Whether it will guarantee achievement of all the aims for which the war started, is another story. It is clear that weaponry alone cannot prevail. At home, our experience in the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir, in the North East and in our heartland are also pointers to this.

History of Helicopters in Counter Insurgency Operations

Experts estimate that about 80 different insurgencies are active around the world. Malaya, French Indochina, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, South Africa, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Congo, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, Xinjiang, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Chechnya have all seen the use of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in operations against insurgents in the past. Usage was limited in most cases because of the shortage of helicopters in the inventories of most military and para military forces barring perhaps the US and the Soviets, and not because their unique capabilities were not apparent.

In Malaya, Indo-China, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia South Africa and Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, reconnaissance and surveillance, troop insertion and extraction, resupply and Casualty Evacuation (Casevac) and hot pursuit of insurgents by heli-borne troops were the main roles. A few air-to-ground strike missions providing fire support to ground forces were also flown. All these were generally daytime operations due to the limited capabilities of helicopters at that time.

In Vietnam, about 12,000 helicopters were deployed in total and gave unprecedented air mobility to the US and South Vietnamese military forces. Helicopters specially modified for the air-to-ground combat role began to be used. Night operations using helicopters became feasible. Losses were also huge, amounting to over 5,000. It is another matter that despite employment of the most modern and complex weaponry, wrong strategic assessments resulted in defeat in the end, once again proving that strategy prevails over tactics all the time.

The Soviets inducted dedicated combat helicopters (Mi-24) into counter insurgency in Afghanistan in 1980 and they proved to be the most reliable form of fire support to ground forces in that difficult terrain. Operating with the Mi-8 armed troop transport helicopter, they provided vital mobility and firepower. The Afghan insurgents regarded the Mi-24 as their biggest threat, a back-handed compliment to its lethality. This led to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supplying Stinger man-portable Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) to the insurgents. Some reports indicate that after initial increase in losses to Stingers, their effectiveness against helicopters, especially gunships, had waned. However defensive measures degraded weapon delivery accuracies and increased collateral damage, further alienating the population. Overall, the attack helicopter proved to be very effective in counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Helicopter losses between 1979 and 1989 were close to 350, more than half of which were before the advent of the Stingers. One option available to insurgents is to neutralise this threat by ground attacks on the helicopter bases. This has been tried with some success in almost all insurgencies and bigger conflicts such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan. There is an assessment that ready availability of helicopters in both Vietnam and Afghanistan, led to increase in impatience and aggressiveness in their use by military commanders in the counter insurgency environment which calls for time-consuming patience and avoidance of excessive force. This is one aspect we have to be careful about when using not only helicopters but also other highly lethal weaponry in counter insurgency scenarios.

Usage Of Helicopters

Helicopters have important roles in counter insurgency operations in areas of intelligence acquisition, surveillance and reconnaissance, Casevac, logistics resupply, transportation of combatants and non combatants, troop induction and extraction and in air-to-ground strike plus psychological operations such as voice and radio broadcasts and leaflet dropping. It is safe to assume that local insurgents will not have sophisticated air defence with early warning and acquisition radars, SAMs other than a few man portable systems and air assets.

Advantages

The ability to operate from unprepared surfaces without being dependent on sizable infrastructure such as runways is unique to rotary wing aircraft. This enables them to be located close to areas of interest and reduces reaction time despite having slower speeds. Helicopters have the ability to fly slow and low and to hover during surveillance, reconnaissance, psychological operations and for re-supply, troop induction and extraction, Casevac and for accurate delivery of firepower especially when using unguided munitions. Hover capabilities permit trained troops to exit by rappelling, eliminating the danger of land mines in Landing Zones being triggered by the weight of the helicopter resting on the ground.

The ability to loiter for extended periods of time over areas of interest is an advantage over fast jet fixed wing aircraft. Helicopters have the option to provide air mobility to ground forces to a degree unmatched by fixed wing aircraft. A recent development has been the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) integrated with helicopters. The former are ideally suited for reconnaissance, surveillance and for real time data collection because of their longer endurance, generally higher speeds and greater loiter times when compared to helicopters. They can even be controlled from helicopters directly or with the helicopter providing a data link to extend the range of the ground station. They can free up scarce helicopter assets by taking over the above roles. They are also lethal in air-to-ground strike roles as insurgents in a lot of countries are discovering.