Indian Defence Review

The Malignant Sub-Matrix

It is said that when a carpenter looks at a tree, he does not see wood or branches; he sees twenty chairs. Given the evident, long sustained and regrettable hostility between the bureaucracy and the armed forces, the former views the demands for a Mountain Strike Corps not only as complete waste of money on an unrealistic threat assessment, but behind that lurks the fear of tanks clattering up the slopes of Raisina Hill. Not unrealistically, the bureaucracy feels it would be the prime target! They are, therefore, inimical to any suggestions from the Armed Forces for enhancement in effectiveness.

The Armed Forces, long accustomed of getting a fraction of what the demand, have made a habit of exaggerating threats and the consequent demands for funding. This is not granted and over the years of finally making do without, their credibility as informed experts has been devalued.

The political element, habitually interested in its own wellbeing, has abdicated its role as the harnessers of these two powerful, competent and organised bodies resulting in bitterness and chaos. Indeed, the possibility exists that the common ploy of playing of two very organised and powerful bodies to keep oneself in the seat, may have happened.

All the above points can be elaborated, but gives the crux of the real problem – the Sub-Matrix within the Matrix. It is not funding and technical issues. ISRO is successful despite being literally “rocket science”, but because much of this malignant Sub-Matrix is not present in its sphere of activity.

Solving the Matrix

Technical challenges are not the critical problems in Indian weapons development. All serious technical challenges were met, usually within time. Neither is funding. Though often used as an excuse, never has a project actually ground to a halt solely because of running out of funds. There has been chaos because the political establishment failed to yoke the two others. This has resulted in each contender fighting its own perception of the problem with no respect for the others’ expertise rather than as a team working as an all-arms battle group.

It is, therefore, not enough to form a Chief of Defene Staff (CDS). That is a necessary secondary step. The relevant Ministries and the Armed Forces must be yoked to form a Weapons Development Group (WADOG) (by whatever name!). This task is cut out for the Political Leadership.

The Benefits of WADOG

Today, we are shooting ourselves in the foot by trying to produce weapons to international brochure specifications. It will take us no more than ten years to reach sanction-free weapons capability. During this period the Armed Forces will suffer from covert sanctions to coerce us to continue imports. This is beyond the AF’s competence and ability to resist. The benefits of a Cabinet WADOG vis-a-vis individual players as of now will be the following:

• Forewarned is forearmed. Intelligence gathering has to be strengthened.
• Clear, moderated, multi input identification of expected threats and their likelihood of requiring armed action.
• Planned action to contain such a threat
• Formulation of the National Policy about our military posture for say the next ten years. It will of necessity be a defensive, tactical rather than any grandiose strategic global one.

This can only be done by the three players – Political, Bureaucracy and the Armed Forces (PBAF) acting in coordinated concert with mutual respect for each other’s knowledge and competence. It is beyond the competence or the scope of any of the individual PBAF components to see the full picture any more than the blind men could “see” the elephant.

Once the likely threat scenarios are identified and a realistic and curtailed war task is agreed with expert inputs from the PBAF, the following consequences will flow.

• Given the climatic and terrain conditions a significant two-front threat is low in probability.
• The nature in warfare is different. Within limits of logic, the defence of the Northern front will be labour-intensive and will require supplementary “tooling”.
• Rather than numerical goals e.g. a 45-squadron air force, address on priority the real weakness which seems to be the tactical strike capability.
• Nevertheless large armed forces have deterrent value well beyond the treasury costs

Toughness, the ability to continue to fight even after taking substantial losses, can only come from a sizeable force. It is necessary, if not sufficient. If the high level plans are carefully made, we shall see realistic specifications emerging for our equipment. No country even super powers over equips its weapons as costs is always a constraint. The following examples will clarify.

Any American aircraft will have to cross either the Atlantic or the Pacific before it can deliver weapons. While crossing the seas, in-flight refueling is a must. Even the AT 37, an aircraft in the same category as our HJT 16 Kiran, has FR capability. For us, it will be a limited requirement.

• From Hawaii to Wake Island, the distance is 2,600 miles and Wake Island is only twelve miles long. This requires a navigation accuracy of .0024 radians. Striking Sukkur Bridge over the Indus (only as an illustration) from Jaisalmer is a distance of 150 miles. The accuracy required is eight times less and this can make the difference between possible and impossible. Much simpler less accurate equipment can be used rather than ransoming our capabilities to sanctions.
• The B2 bomber has an endurance of 40 hours and has a crew of four. Any conventional crew oxygen system would add to size and reduce performance. The oxygen systems become critical, if not essential. For us, its development should have been lower priority.
• Western aircraft are routinely certified to +/-50 centigrade. This requires special engineering and materials. Given our anticipated theatre of operations should we change the temperature certifications to + 50/- 25?

The point of citing these examples is to state that we could, if the choice was between being sanction-proof during the take-off stage of our weapons development and importing them, clearly a lower than international standard but adequate for our anticipated task has to be accepted by everyone. We can significantly reduce our immediate technical challenges and loads. The fixing of battle scenarios by the WADOG is, thus, the critical first step.

The Decline of Force Levels

Any country wishing to develop its independent weapons industry will run into a decline of its force levels. This is because the existing suppliers of weaponry will be loathe to lose a lucrative source of income and influence. In the early, 1920s, Soviet Russia by decree destroyed its imported war equipment. Such drastic action would be inadvisable in today’s context, but Iran’s maintaining of pre-Islamic revolution American weaponry for fifty years through war and peace, is both a source of inspiration and knowledge. Equally relevant is the case of China. Between 1960 and 1986, China faced actively hostile superpowers without blinking by relying on the huge size (which we have) and its nuclear deterrence (which we also have) to buy time until Deng Xiao Ping’s Four Modernisations were in place. Today, the calm patient China has moved forward to the power projection phase.

Summary

The present “Fire and Forget” style of weapons development has not worked and will not work in a hundred years. The development of weapons independence will need the active and sustained collaboration of the four constituents of the POBAT and that too in an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect. This, the cabinet must lead and ensure. Left to the politicians alone, they will ignore it till too late. Left solely to the bureaucracy, the threat will be downplayed in the name of looking for seeking diplomatic solutions. Quite understandably, the Armed Forces, acting alone, will over prepare for a worst possible scenario. The solution would be unaffordable and unsustainable. Left to the technocrats, we will have a technical chaos – an enjoyable technical picnic, but too often very little by way of timely hardware in service.

Yet the solution lies in the combined efforts of all the four above. An important side benefit of a combined ops type POBAT/WADOG is that it will eliminate the ability of an isolated individual or group to sabotage by taking a malignant decision. The first task will be to realise that that any attempts to become weapons independent will take about ten years and during this period the country will be vulnerable to various coercive measures from those who are presently supplying weaponry. Relying, therefore, on the passive deterrence of a large Armed Forces and the possession of nuclear weapons the POBAT/WADOG group must identify and quantify the following:

•  Forewarned is forewarned. The intelligence gathering and analysis systems must be augmented to be the best in the world. It will well pay for itself.

•  Identify the possible threat scenarios during this time and plans for their resolution as a total combined package.

•  Discuss the military stance of the nation which will be generally dissuasive and defensive during this period of weakness.

•  Make a holistic assessment of the forces level required. For example, the Air Force has a serious weakness in tactical strike and close air support. The LCA has to have priority over AMCA.

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•  If needed, prioritise development programmes across the services. Basic equipment and sustaining requirements first.

•  Bring into focus, the real needs and specifications. The superpowers’ specifications are actually minimalist for their needs. Our specifications must also be minimalist for our needs.

•  The reduced technical tasks will lead to swifter completion of projects and we shall see a reduction of expenditure of individual projects.

1. TSR2 McCelland T, Ian Allen 2010
2. Not much of an Engineer. Hooker, Sir.Stanley, Airlife 2010

It would be clear to any engineer how much more difficult it would have been to develop the TSR 2 in the 1960s. It is little wonder that this superior solution was unaffordable and finally cancelled.