Indian Defence Review

I would like to make an important point here before we move on. PLAAF modernisation is not aimed at India, so China would be reluctant to pit premium PLAAF assets against the IAF in any local war with India. It would prefer to minimise PLAAF involvement and limit it to third generation fighters, perhaps even improvised fighter drones? But make no mistake, the PLAAF has demonstrated its ability to rapidly relocate assets across the country in exercises and has made infrastructural investments in Tibet – airbases, radars, communication, roads and railway lines – that would facilitate such relocation.

Limited War with Improvised Drones

China has the technical ability to configure its unmanned fighters for air-to-air as well as air-to-ground combat using precision guided stand-off missiles. The country has developed a multi-layered national Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) comprising weapon systems, radars, and C4ISR platforms to counter air threats at varying ranges and altitudes to defend its key installation, borders and territorial claims. As such, China could employ drones in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) roles.

Air-to-Air Combat

PLAAF J-7Is avionics feature a data link that can facilitate “hands off” interception using ground and airborne radar targeting data fed directly to the autopilot for vectoring the aircraft. The PLAAF has a growing inventory of force multipliers such as AWACS and Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA). Using mid-air refuelling, PLAAF AWACS could remain on station 24/7 to control such interceptions.

Air-to-Ground Combat

In order to effectively attack moving ground targets in a heavily contested battle zone, a drone needs to be stealthy, fast, and small presenting a difficult to shoot down target. Such drones – the UCLASS of the US, the UK’s Taranis and France’s Neuron – are still under development. But consider a battlefield along the LAC and factor in the terrain. Target mobility would be low enough for stand-off attacking using PGMs and targeting data supplied by ISR drones. Such stand-off PGMs could well be launched by second generation fighter drones.

The PLAAF already has stand-off weapons with impressive accuracy. It also has its own constellation of navigational satellite that can provide positional updates to the stand-off weapons. It has been operating a large fleet of slow speed reconnaissance drones along the LAC to identify and accurately geo-locate targets. Any positional inaccuracy at the point of launch of the PGM by a second generation fighter drone would be corrected through mid-course satellite updates.

Economics of Operating Drone Fighters

The acquisition costs of a drone squadron raised by fitting electronic kits on retired fighters would be almost negligible. The operating costs would be more significant, but much lesser than those for a manned fighter squadron of the same aircraft type. While technology makes conversion of a manned fighter into a drone relatively simple, there would be a penalty on account of improvisation – higher operating costs! Because manned fighters are much heavier and more complex than a drone needs to be. Heavy not just on account of the weight of a fully geared up pilot, but also because of the increased structural volume to fit a cockpit, ejection seat, canopy, cockpit controls and displays, air conditioning, oxygen systems and radio set.

Also, a manned aircraft mandates better defensive sensor suite, back-up hydraulic and electrical systems. Weight addition has a domino effect and so does weight reduction! So typically a UCAV with the same weapon load and performance as a manned fighter would be around ten tonnes lighter than a manned fighter. The complexity of a manned system requires higher level of maintenance support. In other words, maintaining a squadron of improvised drones would require almost the same level of technical manpower as a squadron of manned fighters.

For the IAF, which has never been able to raise squadron strength to government authorised levels because of budgetary constraints, infrastructure and manpower costs of operating drone fighter squadrons may appear daunting. But for the PLAAF, which has dramatically cut its active fighter interceptor inventory from around 4,000 to around 900, would have a different view.

Pilot Requirements

For a pilot, operating a drone fighter as a launch platform for Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) would be far less stressful and challenging than actually flying a fighter. As mentioned earlier, interception could be automated. So would take-off and landing. A ground-based pilot would just manage the sortie, not fly it, taking decisions in case of system or sensor failures. Training of drone pilots would be largely simulator based. Piloting a drone is something that retired PLAAF pilots could do on an honorarium! The cost of operating improvised fighter drone squadron would be non-prohibitive for the PLAAF.

Employment of Improvised Drones in Limited Conflicts

So far we have established that:-

• The PLAAF has improvised drones in the form of unmanned J-6 and J-7 aircraft.
• The PLAAF also has the technological ability to employ them for stand-off precision strikes and interceptions.
• A limited war with China, though not in Indian or Chinese interest, is a distinct possibility.
• If war does break out, it will be in both India and China’s interest to keep it contained.

So, if push does come to shove, would the IAF see PLAAF improvised drones in action?

Limited War Implies Minimal Use of Air Power

One way of containing any military confrontation along the LAC would be to avoid cross-border use of airpower, as was done during the Kargil conflict. While such restraint would suit India, it would prove too limiting for the PLA whose endeavour would be to seize Indian territory without heavy losses. Any PLA ingression would definitely be accompanied by the use of helicopters and UAVs over Indian territory.

However, it is conceivable that China would avoid escalation by not committing the PLAAF to offensive operations across the border, such as striking IAF bases and Army formations across the LAC. China’s aim would be to seize Indian territory with minimum use of force so as not to alarm its other neighbours and the rest of the world. However, such restraint on the part of the PLAAF would expose its troops within Indian territory to IAF attacks and this is where PLAAF drone fighters could come in.

The PLAAF could attempt to foil an IAF fighter attack on advancing PLA troops by fielding improvised drones with BVR missile, controlled and guided by AWACs. The combination of PLAAF fighter drones, PLA MANPADS and mobile surface-to-air missiles, and the terrain could disrupt IAF operations to an extent where they become ineffective and result in high attrition. Drone-launched BVR missiles would force IAF fighter to jettison their offensive weapons load and take evasive action. Some IAF aircraft would inevitably be shot down.

If the IAF did manage to avoid heavy losses, China would have the option to up the ante through stand-off missile attacks on IAF bases, as well as Army supply routes and camps. The PLAAF would be able to unleash punishing blows without violating Indian airspace. Its own helicopter operations would be within its claimed territory. Any attempt by the IAF to go after the drones within Chinese territory would be escalatory. Besides, it would achieve almost nothing. Shooting down a Chinese drone fighter would hardly alter the course of the battle.

Chinese and Indian drones routinely patrolling the LAC during peacetime and intrusions are commonplace. PLAAF use of drones in a limited war would not be considered escalatory by China or by the rest of the world. US drones routinely violate Pakistan airspace and in the past have routinely violated Chinese airspace. Airspace violations or even attacks by drones are no big deal. Certainly not big enough for India to start a full scale war with China,  a war that India is unlikely to win!

For the use of drone fighters to be effective, the drones would have to be deployed in large numbers to ensure some are always airborne to disrupt IAF fighter operations. Guiding and controlling the drones would require 24/7 deployment of AWACs and their mid-air refueling. Currently, PLAAF AWACs and FRA assets are limited but in the near future augmentation is likely.

Conclusion

China has the technical capability to employ its J-6 and J-7 fighter drones in any future conflict. It is conceivable that such drones could be employed to deter IAF intervention in any PLA operation within Indian territory. However, there is no open source evidence that China plans to employ second and third generation fighter drones in any future conflict with India. The PLAAF is not known to have trained in such drone operations, but then the world would not necessarily know if it had.

One reason why China’s drone fighters may not be much talked about in US government think-tank reports is because they are not earmarked to counter US forces. They are likely to be Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam and India specific. The existence of drone fighter capability and a credible rationale for its employability should be factored into the IAF’s planning unless intelligence reports suggest otherwise. The IAF is not known for careful planning or out-of-the box thinking, something that was evident during the conflict in Kargil in 1999.