Indian Defence Review

The way we fight has undergone a rapid transformation in recent years with drones and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) increasingly being used on the battlefield for a range of tasks, from tactical air strikes to delivery of supplies and from surveillance to electronic warfare (EW) attacks. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict brought to fore the increasing importance of drones and their impact on the conduct of military operations. Their use in East Ukraine is only continuation of this trend and is indicative of a transformation taking place in the use and projection of air power.

The unmanned systems provide a capability due which it is possible to access or exploit the air space without manned aircraft and for a state (and/or a non-state actor) to have a viable ‘air force’ sans manned aircraft. This has been made possible by proliferation and easier access to UAS technology and is often cited as the main reason for the increasing use of drones and UAS in the tactical battlefield though these are not the only drivers of this change.

With the blue skies becoming more contested, it is not easy to operate without prohibitive costs which most nations can ill afford. In this, UAS affords an economical option to operate  in the air below the blue skies and this is a major driver for this change.

As the manned aircraft is gradually replaced by the UAS for tactical purposes, a major change that is expected is the shift of the main battlefield in the air from the blue skies to the air littoral, that is fast emerging as more challenging and contested for control of the air. This airspace, called the air littoral is generally located below 10,000 feet, is defined as the “area from the Coordinating Altitude to the Earth’s surface, which must be controlled to support land and maritime operations and can be supported and defended from the air and/or the surface.”[1]

This airspace has seen such an increasing access to and presence of aerial platforms, other than manned platforms, that their presence presents a threat to air control from below the altitudes of conventional air superiority.[2]

A look at the recent conflicts also show that the control of air is not absolute and even the traditional concepts of air supremacy are being challenged by presence of unmanned systems in the air littoral. While the analysts have generally focussed on conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria to understand the impact of drones, the other conflicts may have lessons of greater import.

The campaign in Mosul in 2016 saw the United States concede the control of the air for the first time in six decades as the Iraqi rebels were able to operate in the air littoral unimpeded even as the US and coalition aircraft were operating overhead, in the blue skies.

At one time, the rebels were able to operate 70 drones in a 24-hour period and the threat from these was considered to be so serious that the Iraqi offensive was nearly stalled. The coalition forces had claimed complete air-superiority at this stage but even then, the enemy drones were ‘right overhead and underneath (our) air superiority’.[3]

Air superiority is the second highest level of the control of the air and is said to have been achieved when a side holds more favourable position than the opponent. It is defined by NATO as the “degree of dominance in [an] air battle … that permits the conduct of operations by [one side] and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces”.[4]

As the experience at Mosul illustrated, the opposing air force is now capable of effective interference during conditions of air superiority also.It is this change i.e.  a technologically far superior air force while claiming air superiority cannot prevent its adversary from accessing and exploiting the common air space albeit separated vertically, that presents the real lesson and needs to be analysed in greater detail.

The reasons for the change need to be identified first to understand the future trajectory of this transformation and implications of the same. Proliferation of drone technology and easier access to non-state actors are the primary reasons. China has exported 220 drones to 16 countries in the last decade. Its customers include Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, UAE, Egypt, Pakistan and Serbia.

The Houthi rebels facing the Saudi Armed Forces have been supplied drones by Iran while Turkey supplied drones that helped Azerbaijan defeat Armenia in last year’s conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Ukraine uses Turkish drones while Russia has supplied them to the rebels in East Ukraine. The relatively easy access has resulted in wide spread use of drones and UAS in almost all conflicts with an increasing number of countries investing in UAS systems.

Ukraine has effectively used drones in its operations against Russia in recent times.[5] On the other side, after lagging the West for years in use of drones, Russia has well appreciated the importance of military drones and Russia and the rebels backed by it have used them effectively in Eastern Ukraine.[6] Russia plans to add 300 short range drones every year as it aims to have ‘hundreds of new drones’ for its military.[7]

China is already in leader in use of military drones and is now the world’s leading exporter of armed drones.[8]  It has invested heavily in developing drone swarms and loitering munitions. China hasintegrated smaller, tactical drones into their tactical firepower targeting and damage assessments.[9] India already has a large UAS inventory and as the standoff against China continues, more UAS are being procured for a range of tasks.[10]

The airpower scarcity is another reason for the shift towards UAS. This scarcity is more in terms of manned systems as the high end manned aircraft are getting costlier to procure, maintain and operate. The training of pilots is a long and costly process while the munitions and ordnance, logistic and support infrastructure add on to the cost of maintain the air forces.[11] With increased costs, maintaining a large high end air force is something that only select countries can afford with the advanced air forces also having to do with limited inventory that may be much less than what is their minimum desired force level.

In such a scenario, the need of maintaining a viable air deterrence thus becomes an obvious reason for looking at the unmanned systems as alternates to manned aircraft. In case of less advanced nations, the choice is clearly in favour of greater reliance on unmanned systems like drones and cruise missiles to meet their defence requirements.

With increased use of UAS has come the advancements in UAS platform technologies. The weapon loads are getting smaller- but more effective.  Raytheon’s Pyros is a 6 kilogram glide bombs with GPS, inertial, and laser guidance options for deployment from small UAVs with a programmable fuse for airburst, delay, or point detonation.[12] The intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) payloads are also getting smaller. While drones can now carry additional intelligence payloads beyond imagery sensors, small UAS are now capable of carrying electro-optical or infrared sensors to support intel­ligence collection.[13]

Harpy and Harop may be the two well known loitering munitions but Turkey and Iran have built some very lethal loitering munitions like the Kargu-2  and Ra’ad-85.[14] Realizing their potential, 16 countries have undertaken programmes todevelop them; the countries with indigenous programs include Austarlia, Belarus, China, Taiwan, Russia and the United States.[15]

Cruise missiles have long been under the radar but the threat posed by their proliferation is far too serious to be overlooked. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes them an attractive option over manned systems. For the countries ( and non-state actors) that lack modern air forces the cruise missiles offer the capability to carry out deep strikes.[16] Most importantly cruise missiles challenge  the traditional air superiority and have the potential of carrying out more than just effective interference. This implies that unmanned aerial systems have the potential to not only meet most of the demands of a traditional air power but also provide a deterrence value.  A look at recent conflicts is

The implications of this change of greater reliance on unmanned platforms are far reaching and are of great import. For air forces seeking to establish their control over the air, countering the adversary ‘air force’ will become more difficult. The traditional method used by air forces to gain control is by responsive presence, and localised occupation in way of combat air patrols. There is no persistent presence, given the limitations of aircraft unless the ground-based air defence systems (GBADWS) are counted in as the means to gain control of the skies.

In this also the GBADWS have serious limitations in detecting and tracking low profile and small UAS. Compounding this will be sheer numbers of UAS that will saturate the GBADWS. Countering the UAS with manned aircraft is simply cost-prohibitive besides some analysts believe that the mere threat of collision would be enough to deny the contested air littoral to the new-gen aircraft, giving free access to the adversary and allowing him to carry out strikes against targets in the battlefield.[17]

With limited capabilities of both the manned aircraft and GBADWS to counter the emerging threat, the concept of conventional air superiority may no longer be applicable as an air force will have limited capability to dominate the air space vertically and will not be able to deny its use to the adversary. The limitations of GBADWS were particularly exposed in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[18] 

Even the advanced Russian GBADWS were found to be inadequate in countering the drone threat[19]though the Russians were able to counter the drones during the attack on Khmeimem Air Base and Tartus Naval Facility in Latakia Governate in 2018 using a combination of hard and soft kill systems.[20]

There is thus a need to have a relook at the way the air defence is provided and investments be made in soft kill weapon systems that are more capable of countering the UAS. Another option is to target the adversary’s support network and communications so as to disrupt his drone operations, as was tried out by the US during the Mosul campaign.[21]

The means and methods to counter the emergent threats in the air littoral will be found in the days to come, and new tactics adopted to operate in the contested air space but it will be possible without any mishaps only if the implications of the change are well understood and course corrections is carried out. This correction is required not only in the inventory management but also in concepts and doctrines of war fighting.