Indian Defence Review

Political integration through negotiations, amnesty and rehabilitation should target the moderate elements that result from a decapitation and splinter strategy. For instance, the Italian Red Brigades lost public support when they kidnapped and executed the former Italian prime minister, Aldo Moro.26 The Italian government wasted no time in using suppressive military force with very strong legislations to bring about a decline in the Red Brigades followed by an amnesty scheme that offered leniency to terrorists and insurgents for their disassociation.27 This proved to be successful, where 389 members of the outfit gave up arms.28

The rationale behind this approach is that once the Maoists’ core is weakened and softened using decapitation and splinter strategies, the moderate remnants would be keen and willing to strive for a political integration. This move, however, should be supported by engineering or creating adequate political space for these elements. Such measures under this approach will initiate ‘cluster exits’, wherein small groups led by second-rung leaders embrace the political mainstream. For example, the surrender of Sabyasachi Panda (secretary, Odisha State Committee, and zonal commander) due to grievances against two CC members exposed the sectarian conflict within the party. Following his exit, the Maoists have not been able to recruit cadres, especially of Odisha origin.29

Another instance from the Northeast scenario would be an ideal example. An insurgent group in India’s northeast called Bodoland Liberation Tigers (BLT) laid down arms and integrated into the mainstream to govern Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in Assam. Moreover, it would be more effective if there is a time deadline attached to the rehabilitation offer instead of an indefinite one as it might not give any breathing space for the Maoists to regroup. A rehabilitation offer with indefinite time for a fence sitter would be counter-productive as any regrouping would ideally make him or her retract the integration decision.

The above has to be complemented by a pragmatic and universal surrender-cum-rehabilitation approach, which is an imperative for the success of preceding and succeeding approaches. The rehabilitation scheme is for Maoist cadres who surrender with or without weapons. However, the rehabilitation package focuses only on top- and middle-level cadres, neglecting the lower-level cadres, which form the backbone of the organisation.30 This segment has to be dealt with a developmental approach.

A developmental approach, on the other hand, should ideally target the base force with adequate investments in infrastructure, social welfare and other development measures, which would create more opportunities for the tribal masses. This has to be supported by other sets of measures, such as removing social inequalities and valuing their contributions to the society by granting incentives to their output in terms of forest produce, agricultural produce and their services productivity. The development approach should aim to initiate ‘mass exits’, where tribal villages shun Maoists and integrate themselves socially with the mainstream.

Conclusion

The movement has been marred by internal conflicts. This would be an opportune time to initiate an integration approach, where the Indian government could invite the Maoists for talks. The current status of the Maoists is an ideal situation for such an organisational approach with particular focus on the integration approach as the group is in disarray after a spate of killings, capturing and surrenders of its key decision-makers. Out of the 40 CC members and 14 politburo members of the Maoists in 2007, only 20 CC and 7 politburo members are currently free.31 The majority of them are from Andhra Pradesh, which has seen a very high surrender turnout – 600 cadres in the last three years, which is an encouraging sign.32

Any counter-offer for talks from the Maoists has to be treated with utmost respect and seriousness and, at the same time, with abundant caution as they could use this hiatus to regroup. The growth trajectory of the Maoists is a clear indication that the group will start ascending again once it gets enough breathing space. Depriving the Maoists of this space should the primary objective of an organisational approach. However, misadventures, like pitting groups against groups and encouraging vigilante justice, should not be pursued by the Indian government if any tangible impact has to be felt on the ground.

An organisational approach is bound to create a new breed of Maoists, who are more hard-core, highly motivated and better trained. These are the Maoists’ cream, which has withstood repeated government onslaughts. These remnants can only be negated by a strong military interventionist approach post the application of decapitation, splinter, integration and developmental approaches. However, to have an eternal impact, instead of an ephemeral one, these approaches should aim at exploiting the weaknesses inherent in the organisational and structural framework of the Maoists. These approaches should strive to target the Maoists’ ‘centre of gravity’, or the core, which would eventually bring its downfall. This exercise should be attempted with a human touch backed by a thinking process to bring the alienated Maoists back into the mainstream as they are also the sons of this soil.