Indian Defence Review

“Indian elites show little evidence of having thought coherently and systematically about strategy.” – George Tanham  

Nearly 200 years back, Napoleon had prophetically stated that “ let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world.”  Indeed, China has gone far beyond this truism for the world to acknowledge that, since the past decade, China is the world’s fastest growing economy, with the largest, if not the most powerful, Armed Forces in the world and foreign reserves at $ 3.2 trillion— far exceeding even of the sole superpower— now economically weary and the strategically fatigued US, all translating into China’s ever growing global clout.

China’s burgeoning financial and consequently its military might continues to be on a rapid upswing propelled by its ancient civilizational wisdom of realpolitik embellished by a strategic vision and nationalistic ambitions which are distinctly unparalleled. That China will be a super-power by 2025, if not earlier, will be understating a stark reality. If  the 21st century has to be an Asian century, as repeatedly proclaimed by many geo-political luminaries, China leads the way well ahead of the other players on the scene including India, Japan, S.Korea, Viet Nam, Malaysia etc. China is usually bracketed with India as the lead players in emerging Asia but India merely plods along never having risen yet to its true potential because of its inner contradictions. That China sees India as its main rival, globally, regionally, economically and militarily, makes the growing asymmetric chasm between the two neighbours and Asian giants a serious cause of worry, in the foreseeable future, for India.

China’s Stated Aims : An Analysis 

As China builds up a formidable military machine, it is conscious of inculcating a responsible image for world consumption in keeping with its growing global status. Thus China has been since 1998, issuing every two years White Papers on national defence with the latest in the series issued late last year—- on China’s National Defence in  2010. This paper comprehensively covers all macro-issues concerning national defence.

China’s stated aims in its aforesaid White Paper is the pursuit of a defence policy which ensures a stable security environment and permits the development of its economy and the modernization of its military. Importantly, it relies on military power as a guarantor of China’s strategic autonomy and aims to ensure that China continues to enjoy unrestricted access to critical strategic resources like oil and natural gas. China, further stresses that its national defence policy is primarily defensive in nature and that China launches counter-attacks only in self-defence. China further claims that it “plays an active part in maintaining global and regional peace and stability.” It continues to proclaim, that it follows a “no first use” nuclear doctrine and is a responsible nuclear and space power.

Most strategic analysts the world over and particularly its neighbours, however, dismiss China’s noble-sounding rhetoric as nothing more than a public-relations exercise as China’s actions in the past few years, all across Asia, have been anything but contributing to regional harmony. On the contrary, China is well on the way to have become a regional hegemon as many of its actions clearly show especially the turbulence it has created by its muscle-flexing in the many waterways which lap the Chinese coastline whether it is the South China Sea or the East China Sea including its many unfair claims on various island territories in SE Asia.

One of the manifestations of changing Chinese doctrine is the introduction of a new cliché in the lexicon of Chinese think tanks, namely ‘Grand Periphery Military Strategy’. This presupposes the fact that the People’s Liberation Army, surprisingly to many outsiders, lacked the capability of defending its ‘far flung borders.’ Now other Chinese military thinkers are reinforcing this newer strategy to be adopted in the face of rapidly changing geopolitical dynamics in South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. The Chinese move to expand high speed rail networks and equipping over 1000 railway stations with military transport facilities points towards concrete military steps being taken in this regard. This will ensure rapid offensive deployment as required to the many and diverse border regions of China. Thus proactive military actions along several theatres will be a possibility. The excellent fast rail network to Tibet is a pre-eminent example of adherence to the Grand Peripheral Military Strategy of China and further its connectivity to Nepal and the Chumbi Valley is being planned in the near future. In addition, the rail link being conceptualized along the Karakoram Highway linking Xingjian, through the disputed territory of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, to the warm water port of Gwadar in Balochistan along the Makran Coast is another example of Chinese strategic determination to extend its influence beyond its peripheries and dominate regions well away from its boundaries.

As one of the signatories of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific sponsored 81000 km long Trans-Asian Railway, China has come out with a plan to build high-speed rails to Laos, Singapore, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Thailand and Mynanmar along its southeast periphery. It has also got the signal to construct the China-Iran rail that will pass through the Central Asian countries of Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

Michael Caine and Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in their seminal work in, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future, have opined that “  the continued increase in China’s relative economic and military capabilities, combined with its growing maritime strategic orientation, if sustained over many years, will almost certainly produce both a re-definition of Beijing strategic interests…… that directly or indirectly challenge many of the existing equities.”

China’s Defence Spending 

Freeing China from restrictive Maoist economic thinking, in the mid 70s, then China’s leader Deng Xiaoping had unleashed market reforms which The Economist aptly summarized as “….. the most dynamic burst of wealth creation in human history.” This       growing economic clout is translating into military muscle and modernization of its forces at a pace which no country in the world can match .As is widely known, Chinese declared defense budgets are normally half of their actual value. From an annual defense budget of $ 92 billion last year, the budget this year has shot up to a whooping $ 106 billion, which, in real terms, would thus be around $200 billion just for a year! According to the widely acclaimed defence consultancy, IHS Jane’s, China’s defense budget is set to double by 2015 to a whooping $ 238 billion and exceed that of all major Asia-Pacific countries put together. Japan will remain in defense spending a distant second with around $ 64 billion. India with a falling rupee depreciation, heavy fiscal deficit and large government debts will be left far behind in defense allocations. The overall strategic implications for the entire Asia-Pacific region of China’s triple digit defense spending can be easily comprehended.

In the overall budget for 2011, for the first time the budget for Internal Security outstripped the Defence budget of the Chinese and this points towards internal stability concerns for China.

China’s Core Interests and Internal Imbalances 

It is not surprising to China watchers that China’s all pervading assertiveness has  led to the definition and usage  by both its official and unofficial institutions of its “core interests”  spreading to embrace newer sensitivities. Earlier, such interests used to be confined to a few areas where the Chinese Communist Party would brook no dissenting views. These included its national security, national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Tibet came in as a major “core interest” after its forcible annexation in 1951 and so did the island of Taiwan, which was ceded to Japan in 1895, and today is an economically vibrant self-governing democracy, calling itself the Republic of China. The People’s Republic of China has repeatedly warned the world that it will invade  Taiwan if it ever declares independence. More recently, the restive province of Xingjian( formerly East Turkestan) , the huge area in west of China which has seen frequent clashes between the local Uighur Muslims and the Han Chinese being settled there from mainland China, has also been added to the list of China’s “core interests”. China has vociferously warned of its “core interests” in the South China Sea as non-negotiable to nations like Viet Nam, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei which lie astride this waterway. It has cautioned the US to keep its naval vessels away from this waterway and only last year, it had aggressively cautioned an Indian naval vessel,INSAirawat which was sailing in the territorial waters of Viet Nam where India is oil prospecting. China has now also included the sustaining of its existing political system as a “core interest.”

Internal stability is currently the most critical constituent of China’s national security. The significant internal imbalances which worry China are Taiwan, Tibet, the restive Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, uneven regional development with the east, namely its coastal belt far ahead in development indices than its impoverished western region. In addition, Chinese concerns also embrace its demographic clock where its population is ageing at a rapid rate and it is estimated that by the mid-century, more than half of its population will be over sixty. Barry Naughton in his book on the Chinese economy has surmised that “ China will grow old before it has had the opportunity to grow richer.”  In addition China’s growing energy demands to fuel its growth is causing environmental problems both internally and internationally. Its unchecked modernization is also causing severe environmental degradation inside China with acid rain getting worse and its total agricultural land having decreased by 20 percent.

China’s Defence Modernisation  

China has shifted gears since the collapse of its major threat, namely the Soviet Union, in the early nineties of the last century. Their paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping had ordained that ‘small and medium local conflicts and not general wars were the most likely threats.’ Gradually the Chinese have, especially after the Gulf War, honed their doctrine to “ Local Wars under Conditions of Informationisation.” China’s military modernization strategy is based on the “PLA’s simultaneous transformation” through mechanization and informationisation. The Chinese have been rapidly building up their Information Warfare capabilities. There are reportedly 30000 computer professionals and two hacker brigades in the Chinese forces.

• Strategic Forces : China maintains nuclear deterrence employing land based ICBMs. China has currently around 250 nuclear warheads in its inventory with the arsenal growing. It has around 60 ICBMs ( DF-31 of 8000kms and DF-31A of 13000 kms range). By 2020, experts opine that it will have 100 ICBMs and 6 Jin class nuclear submarines each armed with 12 sea launched ballistic missiles. Besides DF-25 medium range ballistic missiles, China’s Second Artillery Corps has over 1000 short range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.
• Land Forces: The PLA is the world’s largest army with 1.6 million men. As per the Military Balance, it has 40 divisions to India’s 28 with 7660 main battle tanks to India’s 3900 and nearly 18000 artillery pieces to India’s a little over 10000. Besides there are nearly 60 divisions worth of the People’s Armed Police as an internal security force, the bulk of which are demobilizedPLAdivisions.
• The PLA Navy: For expanding naval ambitions not only in the seas surrounding it, but for naval operations against Taiwan and in the entire Asia-Pacific to thwart even the US flotilla and the navies of the other countries in its vicinity, the Chinese Navy is the focus of modernization. By 2020-25, it could have three aircraft carrier battle groups, 60 submarines including 10 nuclear and nearly 80 surface combatants. The Indian Navy may just have two/three carriers and 16-18 submarines with 2 nuclear submarines and 58 surface combatants.
• PLAAF : The Chinese Air Force is currently undergoing a feverish qualitative upgrade. Its vintage fleet is being rapidly replaced by third and fourth generation fighters like the Russian Su-27 and Su-30 and its Chinese copy, the J-11. The mainstay is the J-10 which is reportedly a F-16 equivalent fighter. It is also jointly developing the JF-17 multi-role aircraft with Pakistan and is programmed to receive 250 of these. Like India, it already has air-to-air refueling and the AWACS capability. By 2020, it will have over 2300 fourth/fifth generation combat aircraft compared to India’s 750 aircraft in the best possible modernisation scenario for India——— thus this asymmetry remains operationally unacceptable. Importantly, it is planning to build 60 airfields in Tibet alone.
• China tested its first anti-satellite missile in early 2007 and in 2010 conducted an anti-ballistic missile test. It has launched three manned missions and a lunar orbiter. It is planning for nano satellites that will serve as space mines and by 2020 plans to have 200 remote sensing satellites and a military space station—- the first in the world !
• Rapid Reaction Forces:  China is developing rapid reaction capability for catering to speedy and potent responses to varying battlefield contingencies. These high-technology based rapid reaction forces will cater for small scale intense local military operations or in support of pre-emptive operations. The Chinese already have a fully operational Airborne Corps and another Airborne Corps HQ is under raising. These forces could be tasked also in support of China’s “core interests” as specified above, in case required.

Types of Chinese Missiles

China’s Water Hegemony 

Tibet is the water reservoir of India. China virtually exercises control over the waters of rivers like the Tsangpo ( Brahmaputra), Indus and Sutlej flowing into India owing to is superior upper riparian position in the Tibet plateau. Substantiated reports convey the alarming fact that China plans to unilaterally divert the waters of the Brahmaputra to its vast arid areas in the north and west. It also has commenced work to dam some other rivers flowing into India. India’s hydel project on the Brahmaputra, upstream of Pasighat,has been hanging fire for a very long time. Chinese callous attitude in its areas in water management upstream of the Indian rivers has resulted in two devastating flash floods for India. In June 2000 parts of Arunachal Pradesh were suddenly flooded due to the bursting of Yiong River Dam or release of water from the dam. In 2005 again, the Sutlej river was flooded in Himachal Pradesh from the Pare Chu Lake in Tibet causing havoc to many low lying villages in some regions of Himachal Pradesh in the vicinity of the Indo-China border. In addition, its proposed construction of the 116 metres high Zangmu Dam on the Tsangpo in eastern Tibet in a high seismic zone can cause havoc to Assam in the event of a major earthquake in the region.

Though Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh himself assuaged the concerns of Indian parliamentrians in the Rajya Sabha in August 2011 regarding China’s diversion of waters from the Brahmaputra or damming it inside China, India will be well advised to ensure its satellite intelligence coverage of China’s activities in this field are zealously monitored. China has a propensity to keep its water strategies under wraps and does not allow any outsiders for on- site visits. It has disregarded UN recommendations on water and information sharing on earlier occasions.

A Wake-Up Call for India   

Notwithstanding the frequent and dozens of rounds of dialogue between India and China since the last few years to discuss many vexed issues between the two countries including the contentious border issue, Chinese actions towards India are hardly encouraging. China appears to be still suffering from the “ Middle Kingdom” syndrome and resents Indian aspirations as the second Asian power. Its ‘string of pearls’ stratagem aims at the strategic encirclement of India to confining India to the backwaters of the Indian Ocean and to restrict India merely to South Asia.

China’s nuclear weapons- cum- missiles nexus with its client state, Pakistan, and modernizing the Pakistani Armed Forces is singularly aimed against India. For China, Pakistan is a low-cost guarantor of security against India and China now a high value guarantor of security for Pakistan against India. Since the last two years or so, the Chinese footprint in the disputed POK region is growing under the garb of engineer personnel being stationed in the region ( approximately 7000 to 10000 personnel already there) and reports suggest that POK may be leased to China for 50 years or so. China and Pakistan appear to have decided to convert POK as Pakistani territory and in doing so, legitimize the 5180 sq kms of POK ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963 as Chinese sovereign territory. With these ominous developments, India thus faces another front to secure against Pak-China collusion.

China has successfully made serious inroads into India’s immediate neighbourhood through Nepal, Bangladesh, Mynamar and Sri Lanka providing them subsidized arms and military training facilities besides constructing strategic infrastructure for them.

China’s further mischief in issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from J&K visiting China and  laying territorial claims to Arunachal Pradesh, calling it Southern Tibet,  all point towards China’s evil machinations towards India. Despite India’s continuing friendly overtures towards China, at times bordering on the submissive, it appears that China will, most likely, adopt a confrontationist policy towards India. Competition for foreign markets and global influence are likely to spur multiple challenges between the two rising Asian giants and thus India needs to factor in the myriad Chinese stratagems in the long term perspective.

Prognosis and the Indian Response    

The not so “peaceful rise” of China and its provocative actions vis-à-vis India—– some as already stated in this article— portends more competition than cooperation between the two Asian giants. China’s own stated reunification policies points to the fact that it can use military power to regain certain parts in its neighbourhood which it perceives to be its own. Thus, India as it endeavours to resolve all contentious problems with China in a mature and peaceful manner, must get gear up to face the Chinese dragon squarely for China only respects strength. In order to do that we need to is, firstly, correctly assess likely Chinese threats both in the short-term and long term perspectives. In particular, the Indian government must not play down Chinese challenges in any form. Secondly, we must address with determination, the military asymmetry to counter the threat from China and ensure no bureaucratic sluggishness or procedural shortcomings in the identification of and procurement of our military hardware for all the three services in a speedy time-frame. The three services must be made capable for offensive operations in Chinese territory. Thirdly, we must pay adequate attention to further develop our strategic infrastructure leading to the Indo-China border. Nuclear and space assets require to be vastly improved as well as our electronic and cyber warfare wherewithal. Fourthly,  under an international umbrella we need to go  for either bilateral or regional water-management treaties between India and China and the other Asian lower riparian states. Fifthly, India needs to take the lead to energise all Asian groupings like the ASEAN to ensure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region with active cooperation of the US and Australia.

It is high time that India carried out a reality check of its overall capabilities vis-à-vis China. It now needs to upgrade its military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence. For effective deterrence, India needs to enhance the capabilities of its nuclear forces by fielding 5000 km range Agni IV and V Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles and sea launched long range missiles by nuclear subs to complete the nuclear TRIAD for our forces. The synergy of the three services and India’s future military build-up to deter the formidable Chinese will only be suitably energised if the country goes in for long awaited defence reforms in India’s higher defence management structure.