Geopolitics

China in Central Asia: Controlling the Narrative
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Issue Vol. 32.1 Jan-Mar 2017 | Date : 13 Apr , 2017

‘Fixing’ History

Given the combination of its own problems in Xinjiang and the issues of political stability and potential opposition to the SREB in some form or the other, another major effort by China at controlling the narrative is also underway. The Chinese are increasingly investing in efforts to control discourse, the mind-space as it were, on issues related to culture and history in the region.

Chinese scholars have suggested that the SCO provides a platform for India and Pakistan to help resolve their bilateral problems…

This sort of control is particularly important to China given that its borders with Central Asia are dominated by minority ethnic groups with trans-border ethnic ties. China’s original economy-oriented plans took this into consideration under the belief that a stronger economy in Xinjiang would dampen separatist tendencies or dissatisfaction among ethnic minorities on the Chinese side of the border. To an extent, this has worked. However, increased economic prosperity has not entirely subdued the Uyghur ethnic separatist movement. What is more, it also appears to be picking up a radical Islamist tinge at least in sections of the movement. Other ethnic groups have their own set of dissatisfactions even if these have not erupted into full-blown violence as in the Uyghur case.

As a result, China seems to have come around to the view that political stability within Chinese frontiers requires an understanding and possibly also the reordering and reinterpretation, of core aspects of ethnic history and cultural production across the region. Of course, this has always been a part of Communist China’s efforts in all minority areas. What is different in current efforts is that these efforts appear no longer driven by a communist worldview, but by an older sense of Han dominance on the one side and the historical sway of the imperial Chinese state over its neighbours on the other.

Now, in addition, scholars in Xinjiang are being encouraged through heavy state funding to focus on studying their own culture, traditions and literature as well as of their Central Asian neighbours. In particular, there is a focus on translating and studying the ancient epics common to the various ethnic groups of the region such as the 18th century (and possibly older) Kyrgyz epic Manas, for example, that exists in several versions and is popular also among Uzbeks and Kazakhs among others. However, the focus of scholars in Kashgar is on the epic of Oghuz Khan – whose ambition was to conquer the entire world including India – dated to the 13th or 14th century and possibly originating from Eastern Turkestan which thus makes it older than the Manas and only slightly later in origin than the Gesar, the epic that dominates Tibet and Ladakh.

India must also study the re-examination of Central Asian epics being carried out in Xinjiang and Tibet…

What does the focus on these ancient epics say about the Chinese state? Given that Oghuz Khan is considered the mythological founder of the Turkish people, a Chinese state-dominated narrative and interpretation promoted through the Uyghurs in the Turkic world has several implications. One, as a people belonging to a territory controlled by China, the Chinese state has legitimate access to historical memories and discourses in its extended neighbourhood. Indeed, the legend of Oghuz Khan has already been subjected to modification in the past by Mongol and Islamic rulers in Central Asia. The evil Chinese stepmother and half-brother of legend can be whitewashed. Already in Kashgar, the stories around important local figures of history who acted in opposition to Chinese imperial rule have been rewritten in public spaces to promote Chinese state objectives of ethnic unity.

Two, by trying to promote the Oghuz Khan as something on par with if not seeking precedence over the Manas as appears to be the case, there is also a hierarchical ordering of narratives in the wider region. This is evident from the fact that Uyghur scholars are dating the Oghuz Khan to the 10th century and stating that the Manas borrows from the Uyghur epic in terms of content and structure.

These could well be true but such assertions appear to be made in a vacuum at the moment away from challenge by other non-PRC scholars. For instance, the Uyghur scholars at Kashgar appeared to be working independently without having accessed Uzbek translations of the Oghuz Khan from the Soviet era. It seems obvious that, as in other aspects of Chinese state activity with respect to historical claims and assertions, the wait is only to find material that makes such claims stronger still and/or to complete the other diplomatic or economic efforts to ensure that these claims are not challenged and accepted more easily.

Indian soft power in South-east Asia is of little practical consequence today…

This is buttressed by additional claims of Kashgar having greater influence on Central Asia than vice versa, that the Uyghur oasis was the centre of Central Asian civilisation, once called ‘little Samarkand’ or ‘little Baghdad’. Uyghur madrassas are said to have exercised great influence on neighbouring people with neighbours coming to Kashgar to study. Today, this tradition continues with support from the Chinese state with students from the Central Asian countries studying in large numbers in Kashgar on scholarship. Of course, the references to the ‘one belt, one road’ are never far away with Kashgar seen as a base of both the old Silk Route and the current SREB.

Three, that the objective is essentially to shape future politics is obvious when a Kashgar scholar claims that epic literature is not just history but remains deeply influential among even the Uyghur young today. From here, it is but a simple extrapolation to wider Central Asia.

Ladakh as India’s Trump Card

The connection made in Kasghar between the ancient and the present, between the study of ancient epics and the BRI suggest that such linkages are hardly casual in nature. Given the long-term nature of these Chinese efforts, this is probably the more serious challenge to India. Just as Indian soft power in Southeast Asia is of little practical consequence, what little soft power it enjoys today in the Central Asian region because of present-day Bollywood or past historical connections, are likely to be wiped clean under pressure of both Chinese economic ingress and politicisation of folklore in the region.

New Delhi has constantly brought up the issue of lack of geographical contiguity in the case of its outreach to Central Asia…

New Delhi has constantly brought up the issue of lack of geographical contiguity in the case of its outreach to Central Asia. However, it has ignored the possibilities offered by Ladakh. Even if Ladakh’s geographical connection to the Central Asian Republics is through the narrow India-China international boundary at the Karakoram Pass and through Xinjiang, the Chinese diversion into the mythical and epic literatures of the region should encourage Indian policymakers also to promote examination and rediscovery of local lore and literature in its border areas and Ladakh’s role as a centre of culture and trade on the ancient Silk Road similar to the role that Kashgar and various Xinjiang cities see for themselves.

By converting Lehand Kargil into hubs of culture, literature and historical studies, not only can Ladakh’s own cultural traditions receive a fillip, but a contrast with the Chinese created with India’s role as a place where the Central Asia’s common cultures can be studied, discussed and promoted without prejudice and falsification of history as is the case in China. Dominating the Central Asian mind-space and discourses might be a new way to allow Ladakh to overcome the tyranny of geography. It might also allow India to fashion a new pivot to Central Asia.

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As part of this pivot, India must also study the re-examination of Central Asian epics being carried out in Xinjiang and Tibet and find ways of keeping these efforts honest and based on facts as far as possible. This would also be an endeavor to help bolster and maintain the plurality of historical traditions and narratives in Central Asia. One way could be to promote conferences and/or festivals centered around these epics in Ladakh that invites scholars and experts from all across the world and to do so on the same scale as other Indian government efforts such as the various region-specific forums and bilateral and multilateral think-tank forums that the Ministry of External Affairs currently sponsors.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Jabin T Jacob

is New Delhi-based China analyst.

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