Indian Defence Review

Throughout history, the Indian soldier fought in the defence of his motherland with unmatched valour and yet lost to almost every invader: even to those who arrived with an army of just a few thousand. What were the underlying causes of this unremitting chain of military defeats! Stephen Peter Rosen, professor at Harvard, in his book,’ Societies and military power: India and her armies, ‘argues, that even in the case of the British, their successes against armies of India did not lay in their superior technology because Indian guns, muskets and swords were better. Where then lay the causes for this unbroken sequence of military defeats!

These perhaps lay in the quality of leadership of these armies. They never developed and practiced the art of war and when surprised by the unaccepted, could not innovate, wrest the initiative and quickly master the situation. The First Battle of Panipat is the more glaring example of this failing. This obviously reflects on the quality of military leadership and its professional skills India provided to its armies. Philip Mason, ICS, in his book ‘A Matter of Honour,’ lays the blame for this long record of military defeats at the door of politics and the type of governments that had grown up in India.

Click for IDR subscription

The British addressed this failing in the profession of arms, by giving it honour, a place of pride and suitable perks and emoluments, so as to attract good soldier material and draw on the right leadership. It compensated in monetary terms the disadvantages of military service, such as early retirement, very slow and few promotions, hard and risk filled life etc. All of these rolled together has come to be known as ‘X factor.’ Under the British, the Indian military won many a laurel, built great reputation and came to be regarded amongst the very best. The carry forward of this was abundantly clear during the 1947- 48 Kashmir war, when the Indian military, with great skill and daring, retrieved Kashmir valley from the very jaws of invading tribal hordes.

“¦a soldier, after being retired at the age of 35/36, reaches the age of 60 years, his pay during service and subsequent pension is short by Rs 33,3 lakhs”¦

Once the Indian politico-bureaucratic combine came into play with its suspicions and bias against the military, it engineered the downward slide and by 1962 the deed was done. Once proud and valiant army was, by then, had been reduced to a second rate force which the Chinese had little difficulty in putting to heel. The very same Chinese, whom the Indian Army had thoroughly beaten and captured a number of its regimental colours and trophies from Peking which adorned most unit officers messes. The attitude of the political class and the government towards issue of national security had reverted back to what Philip Mason laments in his prognosis of India’s dismal war record. The consequences of this politico-bureaucratic approach towards matters military and national security are there for all to see.

Winston Churchhil writes that, “Indian Amy is not so much an arm of the executive branch as it is of the Indian people. Military professionals have a duty and an obligation to ensure that the people and political leaders are counseled and alerted to the needs and necessities of military life. This cannot be done by adhering to the notion that military profession is silent order of monks isolated from the political realm.” The needs and necessities of the military when aired were severely criticized and never heeded. Consequently this downward slide continued. In India a class of politicians and journalists has grown up who have come to form the view that for the military, it is not to reason why! Consequently the public at large is none the wiser and continues to remain oblivious of the true state of national security.

Since independence a concerted and sustained effort has been made to denigrate the military, strip it of honour and pride, the two essential prerequisite to draw the right leadership, thus making this career of arms so unattractive that it is no more a choice for the suitable youth of the country. Inspite of frequent tampering with the intake standards, large deficiencies persist. In the military deficiencies of as much as 12000 to 13000 officers has been there for years. Situation in the other two services in no different. Large number of officers, including senior officers, are seeking premature exit from the service.

Since independence a concerted and sustained effort has been made to denigrate the military, strip it of honour and pride, the two essential prerequisite to draw the right leadership”¦

The blame for this downward slide rests, not entirely with the political class and the government but equally with the higher leadership in the military which has singularly failed in its onerous duty to alert, forcefully enough, the political executive of the inherent dangers and consequences of this slide, in the quality of military’s intake into officer cadre and eventual fallout on national security.

To get an idea how this sustained downgrading of the military was brought about, consider what follows. At independence a brigadier drew more pension than a chief secretary of a state, due to the X factor. A decade later the chief secretary of a state had the status of a two star general (and now of an army commander!). The police, not withstanding the orders prohibiting copying of military ranks and uniform etc, went overboard to copy army badges of rank on the one hand and on the other, in cohorts with the bureaucracy, managed to establish untenable equivalence with various military ranks in the officer cadre.

On every scale, be it the warrant of precedence, pay and allowances, promotion avenues, etc, all central services have left the military far behind: in fact out of reckoning. A field marshal (who never retires) was ranked with the service chiefs and it took the Government of India more that three decades to decide his pay! When this was finally sanctioned he was already over ninety and had gone into a coma! Even civilian officers in defence headquarters have been made to jump over their superiors in uniform, protests from the service chiefs falling on deaf ears. This completely distorted working at defence headquarters when subordinates over night became senior to their superior officers. The issue of X factor has simply been ignored. Successive Parliamentary Committees of defence, though alive to these issues, have simply failed to get their recommendations accepted by the government.

This contrived and artificial relative status has brought us to a point where a DIG of police who figured between a Lt Col and Col, now stands equated with a brigadier. While this new equation is one part, the other is the delayed promotions in the military. Brigadier rank comes after around 28 years service while that of DIG (IPS) after 14 years. Others of equal status, such as director (IAS) after 12 years. Scientist F of DRDO after 17 years, DIG of CPO after 20 years and so on. This self determined equation runs right across the military’s rank structure.

The situation related to promotion prospects in the military and those in the civil services are poles apart. Just about 4 to 5 percent in the military make it to brigadier rank, while 100 percent in the IAS and IPS make to director/DIG. Only around 3 percent make to Maj Gen while in the IAS 100 percent become joint secretary and almost similar is the case with IPS officers. Similar vide disparity exits for other higher ranks. In matters of pay an IAS officer at 17 years service gains an edge of 12.9 percent over an army officer with the same length of service, at 25 years the gap increases to 17.3 percent and at 31 years service it jumps to 32.6 percent. Then there is proportionate cumulative effect of these differentials of pay on allowances, pensions etc which when compounded slips into traveling classes in railways and airlines, besides issues related to LTCs.

At the time of independence an army man drew from 75 to 80 percent of last pay drawn as pension due to the X factor. Now all of it stands reversed. Civil servants retire at the age of 60, which gets them 6 to 8 additional increments in pay compared to those in the military. 85 percent military men who retire at the age of 35/36 are disadvantaged the most. Converting this grossly unfair dispensation into monetary terms (basing on only the 6th CPC scales of pay etc) leaves one aghast at the unfair deal being meted out to our soldiers.

When a soldier, after being retired at the age of 35/36, reaches the age of 60 years, his pay during service and subsequent pension is short by Rs 33,3 lakhs when compared with his equal in the civil service at age 60. This figure at age 70 is Rs 42.760 lakhs. A soldier retiring at age 35 years would live through three to four CPCs and suffer their dispensations for retirees. Whereas his counter part in the civil will not only continue to benefit from successive CPCs while still in service for an additional 25 years, but on retirement will be effected by just one CPC, assuming 70 years as the average life expectancy. Earlier there was the condition of 33 years service to earn full pension, which at one stroke debarred almost 90 percent of military men from earning their full pension.At this point it may be in order to briefly recall the manner in which the government has handled the issue of Pay Commissions as they related to the defence services. The services constitute nearly 40 percent of the central government employees: their officers forming the largest officer cadre amongst the central services. Consequently better part of the exertions of the Pay Commission ought to relate to their case.

Click for IDR subscription

The Fifth Pay Commission report runs into over 2100 pages, in three volumes, out which, just 50 pages pertain to the case of defence forces. The commission assembled a staff of nearly 150 officers to assist it in working out the details of pay, allowances, etc of central government employees and prepare the report. It took officers from Postal Department, Forest Service, BSF etc for this task, but none from the defence services. The committee of secretaries constituted to review the recommendations of this Pay Commission took an officer from the police on the committee but none from the defence services. Besides much else this Pay Commission gave a brigadier more pension than a Maj Gen: this anomaly, the government of India continues to contest to this day in the Supreme Court.

Gen OP Malhotra as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, in a note to the Defence Minister in 1981, expressed serious concern at the long pending issue of warrant of precedence”¦

The earlier Pay Commissions were no better. The Post War Committee, ostensibly to rationalize the pay structure of the armed forces, linked it to that of the civil services. This came to be known as the New Pay Code, which as ‘divide and rule policy’ was not applied to the King’s Commissioned Officers, (KCIOs:) ostensibly to buy their silence. They formed the top brass of the army and could or could have raised objections to this new scheme to do down the military. In the case of those below commissioned rank pay was dropped by one third, but given a princely sum of Rs 5 as compensation for the X factor but no such relief was offered to the officers.

Surprisingly the case of defence services was not looked into by the First Pay Commission, but by a departmental committee of the MoD Same practice was followed at the time of Second Pay Commission. It is the Third Pay Commission which was, for the first time entrusted with the task of determining the pay and allowances of armed forces personnel. However the MoD came up with the most preposterous and absurd contention that the, ‘requirement of discipline in the armed forces does not permit them to put their case direct to the Pay Commission.’

Further the Pay Commission was not required to go into the service conditions (X factor) of defence personnel but was required to take these as, ‘given.’ Equally unbelievable is the fact that neither the military nor the Pay Commission objected to this absurd and untenable position of the MoD. This methodology resulted in the creeping back of the, ‘all inclusive,’ concept with the attendant disadvantages and washing away of the correctives that had been brought in to soften the, ‘all inclusive’ character of the pay structure.

For the purpose of pension, defence personnel remained equated with civilian employees, consequently condition of 33 years of service to earn full pension stayed.

The Third Pay Commission after examination of the advantages and disadvantages of military service came up with the most incredulous and absurd conclusion that advantages outweigh disadvantages! Truncated careers, extremely limited promotions, long separations from families, limited family accommodation in peace stations, hard living conditions in uncongenial and difficult areas, risk to life and limb and a hundred other travails of military life, acknowledged the world over, were seem as great benefits of military career. In ever democracy in the world these travails are recognized and termed as ‘X factor.’ and fully compensated through pay, allowances, perks and pension and given relief in income tax etc, but not in India.

Through a concerted efforts of the three service chiefs (in fact at the threat of resignation!) the Fourth Pay Commission accepted the grant of running pay band’ and rank pay up to the rank of Brigadier. However, due to mischief on the part of MoD, the rank pay was deducted from the basic pay and some twenty five years later the surviving military officers are still fighting this case which, as expected, is bitterly contested by the MoD in the Supreme Court.

For the purpose of pension, defence personnel remained equated with civilian employees, consequently condition of 33 years of service to earn full pension stayed. First nearly 90 percent of military men were compulsorily retired at the service of 17/24/28 years and then told, sorry you can’t get full pension because you did not serve for 33 years. This in short has been government of India’s version of justice and fair play for its defence personnel.

Not to do less than what the earlier pay commissions did, the Fifth Pay Commission took away the ‘running pay band’ granted by the Fourth Pay Commission and further lowered the status of service officers. It too did not subscribe to the concept of ‘X factor.’ It sought views from IDSA, an organ of the MoD, which made a host of outlandish recommendations. These ranged from reducing the strength of the army by 35 percent, disbandment of RR battalions etc and that too at a time when the army’s commitments in J and K and North East were on the increase and the security scene was getting all the more dismal. The Pay Commission axed every one other than the chiefs and army commanders, not without a purpose!

Successive pay commissions, aided and abetted by the government have made the service in the military so unattractive that besides lingering deficiencies of nearly 12000 officers, there is near exodus by those in service. Amongst short service commission officers approximately 25 percent decline to accept regular commission. Between 2001 and 2004, in all 2000 officers sought release from service. These included 2 Lt Gens, 10 Maj Gens, 84 Brigadiers and the rest being Majs / Lt Cols/Cols. The situation in the IAF, where large deficiencies existed, was no better. How many from the IAS/ IPS etc have opted to leave!

“¦nearly 90 percent of military men were compulsorily retired at the service of 17/24/28 years and then told, sorry you cant get full pension because you did not serve for 33 years.

It has often been stated, within the military circles, that while this gradual degradation of military’s status was going on, the higher command in the services did little to arrest the slide. Not really so. Gen OP Malhotra as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, in a note to the Defence Minister in 1981, expressed serious concern at the long pending issue of warrant of precedence and highlighted the fact that the order of precedence had been repeatedly changed to lower the status of service officers and this exercise seems to coincide with India’s wars, i.e. 1948, 1962, 1965 and 1971.

On the issue of lowering the status of service officers, the committee of secretaries which decides on the order of precedence, recorded that (please hold your breath,) “military officers had been placed unduly high in the warrant of precedence, presumably as it was considered essential for the army of occupation to be given special status and authority.” Pray, was it only the perception of a few babus or that of the government of India that the Indian army was an army of occupation in India !

Gen Malhotra, on the other hand pointed out that this committee of civil servants, while expounding the theory of ‘army of occupation, ’ ‘failed to realize that high place was accorded to the civil servants in the colonial bureaucracy, because they were the trusted paladins of the imperial power. It was the British Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George, who referred to ICS as the steel frame of the British administration in India. It was the civil services and the police which were the British instruments of oppression and were the willing and enthusiastic tools employed to crush national spirit, fervour and freedom movement.’ Remember the incident in Lahore where police arrested a tongawala for merely urging his lazy horse to move faster; at Hitler’s speed, (chal Hitler thee chalay.) It was they who were more loyal than the king!

On the other hand it was the Indian Army that held at bay for a hundred years, those wild tribes from the North West, who for a thousand years had ravaged the Indian subcontinent. It later stemmed the advance of Japanese army at Imphal and Kohima. The Japanese army was barbaric in the extreme. Indians in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and prisoner of war had a taste of cruelties of that army. Indian soldiers made tremendous sacrifices to keep the Japanese army at bay.

It was the mutinies in the army and navy which had much to do with the hastening of British departure from India. Therefore, it is nothing short of blasphemy to call Indian Army, ‘army of occupation.’ Later when the status of civilian officers working in Army Headquarters was enhanced, to the disadvantage of service officers working in the same set-up, General Rodriques as Chairman Chief of Staff Committee made a strong protest to the defence minister, but it elicited no response. May be the service chiefs could have done more: perhaps used the ultimate weapon of threat of resignation! Officers and troops have unwavering confidence and faith in service chiefs and the belief that they would not barter the interest of troops.It is through this sustained, calculated and deliberate efforts of the politico-bureaucratic combine that has brought about a situation where the more suitable youth in the country does not want to join the military’s officer cadre. It is indeed a sad state of affairs and does not bode well for the future security of the country. The security environments of the country are anything but reassuring and as such correctives needs to be taken, sooner than later.

Click for IDR subscription

Failing to get the government (after independence) to accept military service as a special calling and recast or arrest attempts the equivalence with the civil services, the military has been going about tempering with the rank structure and bringing about some proliferation of ranks. It is near impossible to come anywhere close to the civil services in this area, without dangerously damaging the military’s working systems. Even whatever is attempted, little as it may appear, will, in the long run damage the military’s functional aspects. Reversion to the pre-partition equation with the civil services would resolve most of the problems. Pay should be related to length of service to an extent (what running pay band was aimed to achieve) with due compensation for X factor, both for pay and pension.

“¦on demobilization of American Army at the end of Second World War, every soldier was given free college education. These men, who had faced dangers, innovated under adverse conditions, had acquired leadership qualities”¦

The argument that pay has to be related to work and scope of responsibility, as argued by the bureaucracy is belied when tested against the reckless proliferation of ‘higher level jobs’ in the police and civil services. Small sates have as many as 6 to 8 DGs in the police and 12 to 14 as IGs. Almost the same is the case with the other civil services. Surely their can be no jobs of appropriate work and responsibility for so many. As a minister from Kerala laments, that 30 percent of civil service employees simply do not work.

Thus having failed to convince the government to improve service conditions in the military, services have been tempering with the internal, such as lowering intake standard for the officer cadre etc. In an attempt to draw young men into the officer cadre, army has been using the services of advertising agencies, paying crores of rupees. These agencies using the ‘soap selling’ techniques and market oriented advertisements are promising a lifestyle of glamour, golf, riding fine ponies, waltzing with beautiful ladies in grand officers messes, para gliding etc and finally throwing at the prospective candidates, the poser, “do you have it in you, to take it all.” This desperate and perhaps ill advised and expensive step to hire advertising agencies is ill conceived and has fetched no worthwhile results.

While the deficiencies persist, there has been distinct fall in standards of intake. This is obvious from the increasing numbers who fail in the internal promotion examinations in the army. During the exams in 2009, out of a total of 4603 who took part B exam, only 23 percent passed and in the case of Part D exam, out of 3903 who took the exam, a mere 29 percent made the cut. In all there were 1944 officers who failed in every subject. Cases of malfeasance and bad conduct have been on the increase and that has much to do with the quality of intake and spanning the culture of corruption by these very officers who have entered the military due to lowered intake standards.

There is no glamour left in military career and this is too obvious for one to miss. Golf and polo will remain a distance dream for the vast majority and so also much of what is being promised in the advertisements. Military officers no more travel in uniform or wear it outside cantonments, because there is no glamour, charm and regrettably even respect and deference for it. No one ever visits a government office in uniform, because he is sure he would be cold shouldered and his work never done. As a military man and on top of it in uniform, he would loathe greasing palms, and nothing seems done by clean hands in a government office.

Military officers no more travel in uniform or wear it outside cantonments, because there is no glamour, charm and regrettably even respect and deference for it. No one ever visits a government office in uniform”¦

The youth of to-day is too discerning to miss the drawbacks that have come about in a military career. Ex-servicemen are the most visible element of government’s dispensation to servicemen. They could be, and during the British period were, the best form of advertisement for the services, but regrettably their condition and treatment at the hands of the Indian Government acts as the greatest disincentive to join the services.

Present day young men are well informed and discerning to be taken in by the gimmicks and absurd promises of advertising agencies. Army is in competition with vast range of other opportunities and avenues open to these young men. So the military has to put some thing concrete and viable on the table to draw the right material into the officer cadre, more so for short service.

Having failed to get justice for its officers, army is now considering recasting the very structure of the officer cadre in which 40 percent could be regular officers and the balance 60 percent short service commission. This way the career prospects of regular officer will vastly improve and consequently such a step will draw better material into the regular officer cadre. Further, it will result in considerable savings in the revenue budget of the military and pension budget of the government.

With such a large percentage of short service commission officers, who will serve for much shorter period, sent out of service with little opportunities for a reasonably good second career, short service will remain a poor option for the bright young men and consequently the quality of junior leadership, so important for the military, will remain sub standard. Such a state would impinge on the performance of the military. Therefore, it is imperative, in the national security interest, that the right material is drawn into short service commission cadre. The fact that they will serve for a short period, their standard and quality has to be really good to meet the exacting demands of the military.

The entry into the short service cadre can be made attractive if a suitable second career is offered. Thus if young men of ages between 17 to 19 with 10 plus two as educational qualification are taken and after six months of intensive training serve for five years and thereafter given free education in professional colleges along with a stipend of around Rs fifteen thousand per month or so for the duration of their education, military can look forward to getting the right material into the short service cadre. However the intake standards have to be so structured that these officers on completion of five years service are able to successfully pursue studies in professional institutions.

It is for the military top brass to make the political executive realize the urgency and the imperatives of getting the right material into the officer cadre and for such to happen there is no other option except to make short service commission attractive.

This can be done by reserving bulk of the vacancies in army’s own professional colleges ie, management, medical, law, engineering, technology, hotel management, dental sciences etc as well as obtaining reserve seats for others in the government colleges such as IITs, IIMs, Law school, etc. Some percentage (around 5 to 10 percent) should be absorbed in the civil services, CPOs and the state police. On joining government service, some of the service in the military should be taken into account in fixing their seniority. Around 5 to 10 percent could be considered for regular commission.

The military can work out the details of yearly release of short service commission officers and the number that can be absorbed in its own professional institutions, given regular commission, taken into the civil services and given admission in the civil professional institutions. It is for the military top brass to make the political executive realize the urgency and the imperatives of getting the right material into the officer cadre and for such to happen there is no other option except to make short service commission attractive. The government must get on board in this proposal. Such a scheme will not only bring about better working ethos in the civil services but will prove of immense value to the industry and other professions: where ever these young men will work.

It may be of interest to note that on demobilization of American Army at the end of Second World War, every soldier was given free college education. These men, who had faced dangers, innovated under adverse conditions, had acquired leadership qualities and were adept at taking risks, when joined corporate entities and industry, they gave these a new direction and impetus and America made enormous economic progress. To-day America faces corporate and industrial leadership deficit and is on the decline,: those veterans of the Second World War have since left the field.

‘Finally, it may be instructive to recall Churchill, that great architect of victory in the Second World War and consider what he had to say about the armed forces. He writes, “ Armed forces are not like a limited company to be reconstructed from time to time as the money fluctuates. It is not an inanimate thing like a house to be pulled down or enlarged or structurally altered at the caprice of the tenant or owner. It is a living thing. If it is bullied, it sulks, if sufficiently disturbed it will wither and dwindle and almost die and when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived by lots of time and money.” There is a lesson in all this for the political class in India.