Indian Defence Review

C-130J

It is typical of the Indian security system, that only in times of security crises, does the nation wake up to gross weaknesses in re equipping of the armed forces. Recall the Kargil conflict, when the army Chief was obliged to lament at a press conference that the army would fight with what they had!

As the post-Mumbai terrorist attack security scenario worsened, the rapidly depleting combat force strength of the IAF and its inadequate assets of air defence radars, on which even the Auditor General’s report has been less that flattering, was highlighted. It was left to an erstwhile Air Chief to pour cold water over brave talk of coercive diplomacy when he said ‘When your defences are weak, what are you going to coerce with?’

In a nut shell this has been India’s historical track record of defence preparedness rooted primarily in its archaic higher defence management system where responsibility and accountability are far removed.

Aviation and Space are the most significant technological influences of our times. Technological changes are altering the face of conventional warfare so completely that weapon systems, forces and budgets that were relevant to old military planning and doctrines are rapidly becoming obsolete. The resulting revolution in military affairs demands not an evolutionary change, but a well-conceived transformation of how security is managed, organized and executed.

Managing these complexities needs leadership at every level that is informed about these issues, is accountable for results and is committed to transformation. A leadership that is willing to discard old ideas, philosophies and prejudices and look at innovative solutions to new technological challenges. In short, our archaic bureaucratic approach to managing national defence research and production must make way for a corporate type mission oriented model.

In fairness, some progressive steps towards streamlining defence procurement were initiated when a Defence Acquisition Council under the Raksha Mantri and associated organizational changes were put in place. Defence Production was opened to the private sector with a 26% FDI cap and a comprehensive Defence Procurement Policy and Manual were issued in 2005 and subsequently updated. A major initiative in the DPP was the obligation of suppliers to a direct offset of thirty percent on contracts of value over Rs. 300 crores.

While these were welcome conceptual steps towards change, our security managers failed to recognize that the mindset of our defence research and production establishment was based on working as a department of the government .It was neither geared towards working with the private sector nor to delivering in a fiercely competitive and high technology international aerospace environment. This mindset needed concrete steps to usher in change. The private sector had been kept out of defence and therefore needed considerable encouragement and support to rise to the challenge.

Offsets, needed to be used as tools to make Indian aerospace industry a serious international competitor in the longer term with technology rather than commerce as its primary focus. Weaving all these threads into an achievable strategic plan needed a whole new approach. This has singularly been lacking and it appears that formulating an ideal Defence Procurement Policy has become an end in itself rather than a mere means.

Air Power constitutes not just the military components, but a rapidly growing civil aviation industry, the supporting infrastructure to keep this high technology industry well oiled and the R&D and industrial base that will be the foundation on which national air power will be sustained. Thanks to a strong base in the country, aeronautics also has the potential to be a generator of wealth, provided a cohesive national policy covering both civil and military sectors is drawn and institutions established and made accountable to execute this policy.

Some years ago the Aeronautics Society of India had put up a comprehensive proposal in this regard. An essential component of this reorganization plan was to model it on the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space, both of which have demonstrated that in a high technology field, India can achieve self sufficiency, success and export provided proper management models are put in place. It was hoped that because there was a precedent of this model in governance, bureaucratic resistance would be minimal. This hope lies belied and Indian aerospace continues to be denied this opportunity.

Consequently, inspite of a national policy of self reliance, vast investments already made across R&D and production and high quality research and engineering human resource availability, India continues to depend largely on imports in the aeronautics sector. This has a direct bearing on national security and discourages scientific and technical talent to contribute. The nation is denied the opportunity to create wealth which in turn will strengthen aerospace R&D and production and enhance security.

We have for over a decade been on the threshold of a great opportunity. In the military field, technology is the driving factor and within the military, aerospace more so. Our sole aim must be that through private-public partnership, focused R&D and effective offset programmes we should be able to achieve capabilities that will enable our aerospace industry to become an international player within a defined time frame. This needs a national aerospace policy driven by an Aerospace Commission tasked with a clearly defined mission. We have the technical and human resources to achieve this, but lack the political will.

In this context, writing in a defence journal on the eve of Aero India 1998, this writer had said ‘Indian government needs to recognize that India has to define its own unique structure and then introduce institutional reforms. Time is of essence. Aero India 1998 is an appropriate mile stone for the beginning of this exciting journey such that when Aero India 2000 heralds the new millennium, Indian aerospace industry will be well on the path of reorganization, reconstruction and a focused future. Only then can events as Aero India become meaningful trade promotional activities towards benefiting Indian aerospace.

On the eve of Aero India 2013, one can only lament on a lost decade of opportunities.