Indian Defence Review

Ahead of offering an Indian perspective on rising China, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (in Washington) said lately, “there is but a certain amount of assertiveness on the Chinese part” that we do not “fully understand.”1

The Indian Army is now revising its five-year-old doctrine to effectively meet challenges of a possible two-front war” with China and Pakistan, deal with asymmetric and fourth-generation warfare, enhance strategic reach and synergize cooperation with the Indian Air Force and Navy.

On the economic growth, Singh said that while there was no doubt that Chinese performance is superior to India’s, “there are other values which are more important than growth of Gross Domestic Product…I think the respect for fundamental human rights, the respect for rule of law, respect for…multi-cultural rights…I think those have values. So, even if the Indian performance with regard to the GDP might not be as good as the Chinese, certainly I would not like to choose the Chinese path.”2

The Indian Defense Minister A K Antony, addressing the 44th foundation day celebrations for the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, said, “We’ve to carry out continuous appraisals of Chinese military capabilities and shape our responses accordingly.

“At the same time, we need to be vigilant at all times”3 hoping that China would reciprocate India’s trust-building initiatives.

Indian environment minister Jairam Ramesh in Beijing dismissed speculation in some quarters that China would do a ‘side deal’ with the US before the Copenhagen conference on climate change in December and betray the cause of other developing nations like India.

Jairam Ramesh was quoted as saying, “After today’s discussions, it does not appear China will ditch us…Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is himself involved in discussions making it nearly impossible for Beijing to backtrack…They are playing for long stakes for leadership of the green technology movement…China knows that with 23% (carbon) emissions, it is the world’s biggest emitter.”4

“¦both India and China are under pressure to make binding commitments from the developed countries and realize that they need to work closely together, whatever their other differences, to ward off pressure.

Indian official were quoted as claiming that work on a link-road in Demchok in the south eastern Ladakh region has been stopped after objections were raised by the Chinese Army after repeated incursions in that area…After nearly 3.8 kms of road, the Chinese Army sought a flag meeting with Indian Army and raised strong objections over the construction as they consider the area as disputed.5

With reports suggesting that China was building over two dozen new airstrips along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Indian government said that there was no need to be “unnecessarily” worried as India was adequately strengthening herself.6

The Indian Minister of State for Defense, M M Pallam Raju, told reporters, “I don’t think we need to be unnecessarily alarmed. As a regional power, it (China) will strengthen their infrastructure. It will procure their arms and we are doing what we have to do to for strengthening our line.”7

Even as China objects to the construction of a road in the Ladakh region, India’s External Intelligence Agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has conveyed to the government that China is simultaneously building and repairing as many as 27 airstrips in Tibet.8

According to a senior Indian official, “Many of these 27 military strips have been newly built. Others which have been expanded too are seeing increasing Chinese activities. Like the intermediate range missiles stationed in the Delingha region, these airfields can be of strategic use for China only against India.”9

There can be no denying that these three leading Asian powers and the US have different playbooks: America wants a uni-polar world but a multi-polar Asia; China seeks a multi-polar world but a uni-polar Asia; and Japan and India desire a multi-polar Asia and a multi-polar world.

According to the official, some of the airfields which are being continuously upgraded are: Kashgar, Yarkand and Taskurgan in the western sector, Tingri and Shigatse in the middle sector and Doonshop, Kangbo, Chamdo and Phari Dzong in the eastern sector.10

In spite of the recent arrest of Arabinda Rajkhowa, an insurgent leader of Assam. There is little possibility of the Indian Government’s chances of laying hands on his boss and ULFA chief, Paresh Baruah. The Indian Government has received definite information from intelligence agencies that Chinese agencies have helped Baruah to set up base in China’s Yunnan province…Baruah was now mostly based on the Chinese side of the border even though he frequents northern Myanmar.11

According to an Indian analyst, both India and China are under pressure to make binding commitments from the developed countries and realize that they need to work closely together, whatever their other differences, to ward off pressure (at the UN climate summit in Copenhagen) on mitigation measures.12

After a display of public bonhomie in Copenhagen, The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi called on Indian Foreign Minister S M Krishna to invite him to China. Declaring a “new beginning” in bilateral relations, Yang repeated his Premier Wen Jiabao’s sentiments that China and India should continue to unify the stand in multilateral forums.13

The Indian Army is now revising its five-year-old doctrine to effectively meet challenges of a possible two-front war” with China and Pakistan, deal with asymmetric and fourth-generation warfare, enhance strategic reach and synergize cooperation with the Indian Air Force and Navy.14

A diplomatic concession extended by the United Kingdom to China over Tibet could weaken Indias case in the territorial dispute with China and might be used by Beijing to bolster its argument in border talks with New Delhi”¦

Unidentified sources were quoted as disclosing that work on the new war doctrine – to reflect the reconfiguration of threat perceptions and security challenges – is on under the aegis of the Shimla-based Army Training Centre Command, headed by Lt-Gen A S Lamba.15

According to an official, the Indian Directorate General of Civil Aviation issued a directive asking all airlines to “ensure that they do not check-in any passenger with stapled Chinese visa on their passports.”16

The directive came weeks after India declared as “invalid” the standalone paper visas given by the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, and consulates in Mumbai and Kolkata to Indian from Jammu & Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh.17

An Indian strategic affairs specialist writes, ‘The US administration has signaled its intent to abandon elements in its ties with India that could annoy China, including a joint military exercise in Arunachal and any further joint naval maneuvers involving Japan or other parties, like Australia…

‘As the US-China relationship deepens in the coming years, the strains in some of America’s existing partnerships could become pronounced. For example, building a stronger cooperative relationship with China is now taking precedence in US policy over the sale of advanced weaponry to Asian allies, lest the transfer of offensive arms provoke Chinese retaliation…

China said it will do what it takes to protect the rights of three Chinese engineers, who were arrested and charged with culpable homicide in India.

‘There can be no denying that these three leading Asian powers and the US have different playbooks: America wants a uni-polar world but a multi-polar Asia; China seeks a multi-polar world but a uni-polar Asia; and Japan and India desire a multi-polar Asia and a multi-polar world.’18

A diplomatic concession extended by the United Kingdom to China over Tibet could weaken India’s case in the territorial dispute with China and might be used by Beijing to bolster its argument in border talks with New Delhi, according to an Oxford University scholar tracking the issue.19

Scholar Steve Tang said that 14 months ago, a little-noticed statement in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary David Miliband, abandoned the 1913-14 Shimla Accord resulting out of a conference between Britain, China and Tibet. Under the pact, Britain has recognized China’s suzerainty over Tibet, but not sovereignty.

The agreement, initialed by all three parties, but not signed by China (because Beijing reportedly objected to the Sino-Tibetan boundary spelled out in it), also charted the frontier between India and Tibet known as the McMahon Line.20

China rejected reports that Indian Government computers had been attacked by Chinese hackers as “groundless”.

The area along the Line of Actual Control with China has “shrunk” over a period of time and India has lost “substantial” amount of land in the last two decades, according to an official Indian report.21

Arrests and Hacking

Relatives and business associates of the 21 detained Indian diamond traders are finding it difficult to build a legal defense for them because Chinese authorities have provided with very little information. The only piece of paper made available is a notice to the wife of one of the detained persons.22

China said it will do what it takes to protect the rights of three Chinese engineers, who were arrested and charged with culpable homicide in India. The statement comes at a time when the Indian embassy in Beijing and associates of 21 Indians arrested Indian merchants are looking for legal ways to deal with the case of smuggling imposed on them in Shenzhen in south China.23

The US policy projection comes at a time when there is much talk of India and China jostling for position and influence in the Indian Ocean region, and there are doubts and hand wringing in New Delhi over Washington sidelining India in Afghanistan in deference to a Pakistan-China flanking move.

China rejected reports that Indian Government computers had been attacked by Chinese hackers as “groundless”. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said, “I can say these accusations are groundless” pointing out that China itself was the “biggest victim” of hacking activities, thus: “China is firmly against hacking activities and will deal with relevant cases in accordance with the law.”24

The US Way

China has signalled it wants to go the US way and set up military bases overseas, possibly starting with Pakistan. The obvious purpose of creating PLA bases in Pakistan is to exert pressure on India as well as to counter US influence in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

An article by columnist Shen Dingli in a Chinese website said, ‘It is baseless to say that we will not set up any bases because we have never sent troops abroad. It is our right. As for the military aspect, we should be able to conduct retaliatory attack within the country or at the neighboring area of our potential enemies. We should be able to put pressure on the potential enemies’ overseas interests.”25

Angry over China’s repeated claims on Arunachal, students across the state are targeting Beijing’s biggest economic weapon – exports – albeit in a small way. The All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union (AAPSAU) President Takam Tatung said that from 8 February 2010, “Our activists will visit every shop to identify commodities made in China…The Union Government’s approach to the Chinese issue leaves a lot to be desired.”26

The United States is more comfortable with the rise of India than it is with the ascent of China, the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2010 has revealed. It has recognized “a more influential role in global affairs” for India including in the Indian Ocean region and beyond based on its commonalities with the US, while expressing Washington’s concern about the nature of China’s military development and decision-making processes.27

“As the economic power, cultural reach, and political influence of India increase, it is assuming a more influential role in global affairs…This growing influence, combined with democratic values it shares with the US, an open political system, and a commitment to global stability, will present many opportunities for cooperation.”28

The US policy projection comes at a time when there is much talk of India and China jostling for position and influence in the Indian Ocean region, and there are doubts and hand wringing in New Delhi over Washington sidelining India in Afghanistan in deference to a Pakistan-China flanking move.29

We in India think that we are equal of China and that in the decades to come we will surpass it in national power ““ when actually the opposite is a more likely future”¦

A TOI editorial observed, ‘The thaw that has entered US-China ties since Barack Obama became President of the United States looks over, for the time being…The rift in US-China relations is both an opportunity for India as well as a threat. Beijing threat to impose sanctions on American companies involved in arms sales to Taiwan sends a bad signal to the American business community, which has already complained about rising Chinese protectionism at its expense.

‘If western investment starts pulling out of China, India would be the logical destination for these companies to invest in. On the other hand, an aggressive China in the neighborhood would leave us distinctly uncomfortable.’30

An Indian columnist assessed India-China relations thus, ‘We in India think that we are equal of China and that in the decades to come we will surpass it in national power – when actually the opposite is a more likely future…China’s GDP today is roughly four times that of India. In addition, Chinese per capita GDP is roughly $ 4,000, India’s is $ 1,000…If the two countries continue to grow at the rates they have grown in the past decade (India at 6-8 percent and China at 10-12 percent), China will have an economy eight times larger than India’s in next 30 years…

‘For it to hit home, let us note that by 2040 India will be to China what Pakistan is to India…What are India’s choices as it faces a gargantuan China? It could build its military, enter into alliances, settle its disputes with China…If China grows as projected, even this counterbalance of forces may not be sufficient. Both options would in any case be provocative to China…

‘A third possibility is for India to settle its disputes with China when the power gap is relatively small…Finally, it could try to hide from China’s gaze by tiptoeing through the jungle of international politics and trying not to offend the dragon…A judicious combination of the four might be the best way to hold off China – easy enough to conceive, not each to achieve.’31

India is finally cranking up force-levels and infrastructure at the strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the countrys last military outpost, to counter Chinas strategic moves in the Indian Ocean Region”¦

‘India neither wants to be the regional cop or ‘headmaster’ of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), nor to be a part of any multi-lateral security cooperation axis seeking to contain China. Instead, it just wants to further bolster its ‘friendship across the seas’ to cover the entire Asia-Pacific region.32

‘This, at least, is the public stand, given that prickly China is always quick to take umbrage over any grouping of foreign navies that takes place in the region. Beijing, for instance, had lodged a strong protest against the 13th Indo-US Malabar naval war games in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007 after they were expanded to include the Australian, Japanese and Singapore navies as well.’33

TOI’s defense correspondent writes, ‘India is finally cranking up force-levels and infrastructure at the strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the country’s last military outpost, to counter China’s strategic moves in the Indian Ocean Region as well as deter terrorists, drug-traffickers and pirates from setting up bases in the largely uninhabited 572-island cluster.’ 34

On a related theme he continued, ‘With Sukhoi-30MKI fighters generating sonic boom over the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago, even as the 3,5000 km Agni-III missile created fireworks off the Orissa coast, India sent a strong message across the Bay of Bengal that it is ready to play the role of security facilitator in the larger Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

India may consider itself to be “a neutral player” in the entire power play in the Asia-Pacific region, with the US seeking to “contain” China, but there is no getting away from the fact that it remains deeply concerned about Beijings rapid modernization of its armed forces.

‘India might not want to be seen as a regional super cop in the IOR, nor as the prime mover of a naval military bloc in the Asia-Pacific region, But, yes, it has legitimate security concerns in the IOR, which falls in its strategic backyard, especially with China making strategic moves in the region…

India may consider itself to be “a neutral player” in the entire power play in the Asia-Pacific region, with the US seeking to “contain” China, but there is no getting away from the fact that it remains deeply concerned about Beijing’s rapid modernization of its armed forces.’35

Another TOI correspondent informed, ‘(Prasad) Kariyawasam (Sri Lankan high commissioner to India) sought to ally India’s concerns over the growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka and that the firmly entrenched President Rajapaksa might use the proximity with China as leverage against India. He said India will always be the most important country for Sri Lanka’.36

“There is a misperception. Our friendship with China is not at India’s expense. Sri Lanka will never do anything which will harm India’s strategic interest. We have a commercial and profitable partnership with China which should make India happy too, because it will lead to overall development which, in turn, will help Indian firms who are investing in Sri Lanka.”37

Once again, the TOI defense correspondent enthuses, ‘Brimming with confidence after last week’s successful Agni-III blast, India now hopes to test its first-ever intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) within a year. This nuclear-capable Agni-V missile will be able to hit even northernmost China.’38

“¦Qureshi said that Islamabad would welcome any role given to China to bring down tensions between India and Pakistan because of the trust and confidence it enjoyed with its close ally.

The Indian Defense Minister, A K Antony, said the Army was raising two new mountain divisions in the North-East, along borders with China, but dismissed suggestions that the move was against the neighbour. “I must tell you it is not against China, but these are being raised under the overall policies to strengthen the presence of armed forces in the North-East.”39

Addressing the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing, Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmoud Qureshi said that Islamabad would welcome any role given to China to bring down tensions between India and Pakistan because of the trust and confidence it enjoyed with its close ally.

“It is for the Indians to decide if they would be comfortable to have China talking to a third party to bridge the gap. As far as Pakistan is concerned they (China) have a blank cheque.”40

Reacting to Qureshi’s comments, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said India and Pakistan are both important friendly neighbours of China. He said China supports and welcomes the improvement in relations between India and Pakistan and backs efforts to settle their outstanding issues through dialogue.41

Ma stated, “China is conscious about Indias sensitivities when it deals with Pakistan. This visit (Qureshis) is important because of the security situation in Pakistan, which has become more serious after US president Barack Obama decided to send more troops to Afghanistan.

Qureshi also said that China played “a positive role” in defusing Indo-Pakistan tensions in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks.42

According to a Chinese scholar, known for his proximity to the Chinese Foreign Ministry told the visiting Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmoud Qureshi that it wants to avoid action like investing in ‘Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’ (PoK) which might hamper the proposed India-Pakistan peace talks.43

Ma Jaili, senior researcher at the state-run Institute of Contemporary International Relations, told TOI “China does not want to invest in PoK. Chinese government knows Kashmir is a sensitive issue and a disputed area.”44

Ma also stated, “China is conscious about India’s sensitivities when it deals with Pakistan. This visit (Qureshi’s) is important because of the security situation in Pakistan, which has become more serious after US president Barack Obama decided to send more troops to Afghanistan.

“China will consider supporting Pakistan by offering to train more military and para-military forces and extend financial aid. But it would do nothing to cause unease in New Delhi.”45

According to an Indian commentator, ‘It’s time for Indians to recognize Chindia for what it is – a chimera, a Greek mythological creature compounded of incongruous parts – and adjust our strategic vision. India and China are unlikely to become cooperative partners, except in a limited opportunistic sense, any time in the foreseeable future.

China does not want to take any chance of letting any other country coming on its way of declared policy of “˜peaceful rise.

‘They have historically commercial and cultural competitors in Asia. Today they not only champion radically different systems of governance, they have too many points of friction between them in the region for anyone to imagine their melding into an economic and strategic whole in the fashion of, say, Europe, or the larger West.’46

Conclusion

From a rag-tag economy in the 50’s to a second largest economy of the world today, China has established herself as an indispensable country in the global theatre.

The economic success has given China, confidence, to continue with the age-old tactics of ‘two steps forward and one step back’. The success has also made China more ambitious in the region too.

China does not want to take any chance of letting any other country coming on its way of declared policy of ‘peaceful rise’. The country is seen to have taken the policy to consolidate her position in the volatile and weak countries of the region; not to give any opportunity to be challenged by stronger countries specially India in the future.

Both India and China have been engaged in the war of words in the past few years but whether the two giants in Asia will find something in common to ward off the looming presence of the United States”¦

In an effort to build stronger linkages with South Asian countries, China has emerged as a major supplier of military hardware and technology to smaller and volatile South Asian countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma. It has sent chill wave to India as the country has to be more careful that China in the region might encircle it. This indulgence has been understood in terms of Beijing’s strategic vision of emerging as an Asian leader which has a direct bearing on the South Asian security and strategic environment.

With the success to eliminate Al-Quida leader Osama Bin Laden, the US would definitely like to engage at the center stage of South Asia through strategic partnership with India, which will put strain in China’s delicate relation with India.

Both India and China have been engaged in the war of words in the past few years but whether the two giants in Asia will find something in common to ward off the looming presence of the United States of America in the region in various pretexts, will depend more on the upcoming leadership in both the countries; in China after 2012 and in India after 2014.

On the other hand whether China becomes a threat in South Asia or becomes a very good friend of India to develop the region will largely depend on the commonsense of the leadership of both the countries. If the dual policy adopted by the United States; sometimes joining hands with India against China and sometimes joining China against India, is understood by the leaders of the region, then rise of Asia together under the leadership of ‘Chindia’ is inevitable. But commonsense is so uncommon and hence the threat.

Notes

1. Chidananda Rajghatta, “PM: Not like China, we want GDP with values”, Times of India, 25 November 2009.
2. Ibid.
3. Ram Kumar Kamat, “Sino-Pak nexus worries India”, Himalayan Times, 28 November 2009.
4. Saibal Dasgupta, “Ramesh dismisses talk of US-China ‘side deal’”, Times of India, 30 November 2009.
5. News item, “Leh road halted after China objects”, Times of India, 1 December 2009.
6. News item, “Chinese airstrips along LAC not a concern: Govt”, Times of India, 2 December 2009.
7. Ibid.
8. Sachin Parashar, “Coming, Chinese teams for CBMs” (sic), Times of India, 2 December 2009.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Sachin Parashar, “Baruah has set up base in China: Home ministry”, Times of India, 13 December 2009.
12. Nilovar Roy Chaudhury, “India, China to ‘harmonise’ developing country positions”, Himalayan Times, 17 December 2009.
13. News item, “New-found bonhomie will see Krishna head to China”, Times of India, 24 December 2009.
14. Rajat Pandit, “Army reworks war doctrine for Pak, China”, Times of India, 31 December 2009.
15. Ibid.
16. News item, “Stapled Chinese visas grounded”, Times of India, 2 January 2010.
17. Ibid.
18. Brahma Chellaney, “Asia’s changing power dynamics”, Himalayan Times, 7 January 2010.
19. Ashis Ray, “UK stand on McMahon Line bolstering Beijing’s claims”, Times of India, 10 January 2010.
20. Ibid.
21. News item, “India has lost substantial amount of land to China”, Times of India, 11 January 2010.
22. News item, “No info on detained Indians from China”, Times of India, 16 January 2010.
23. News item, “Beijing pledges for Chinese engineers”, Times of India, 16 January 2010.
24. News item, “China denies hackers attacked Indian govt”, Himalayan Times, 20 January 2010.
25. Saibal Dasgupta, “China eyes military bases in Pakistan”, Times of India, 30 January 2010.
26. News item, “Arunachal call for boycott of Chinese goods”, Times of India, 4 February 2010.
27. Chidanand Rajghatta, “US sees bigger role for India in global affairs”, Times of India, 4 February 2010.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Editorial, “Sixes And Sevens”, Times of India, 5 February 2010.
31. Kanti Bajpai, “Stumbling Tiger, Leaping Dragon”, Times of India, 6 February 2010.
32. Rajat Pandit, “Don’t see cop role in Indian Ocean”, Times of India, 7 February 2010.
33. Ibid.
34. Rajat Pandit, “Andaman outpost to counter China”, Times of India, 7 February 2010.
35. Rajat Pandit, “Missile, jets & a strategic message”, Times of India, 9 February 2010.
36. Sachin Parashar, “No link between Fonseka arrest and run for prez: Lanka envoy”, Times of India, 11 February 2010.
37. Ibid.
38. Rajat Pandit, “N-tipped Agni-V can hit all of China, Pakistan”, Times of India 12 February 2010.
39. News item, “N-E defence build-up not against China”, Times of India, 16 February 2010.
40. News item, “China gets role to cool Indo-Pak ties”, Kathmandu Post, 24 February 2010.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Saibal Dasgupta, “China to avoid PoK”, Times of India, 24 February 2010.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Gautam Adhikari, “A Tale of two Nations”, Times of India, 24 February 2010.