Indian Defence Review

Wang Lixiong, a well-known Chinese author, married to the Tibetan famous blogger, Woeser wrote an article, Roadmap of Tibetan Independence, in which he expressed the opinion that the violent reaction of the Chinese leadership can only create more problems for Beijing.

He made a judicious remark: “Street protests with violence similar to the ‘3.14’ [March 14, 2008] incident repeatedly occur in Mainland China. The tactics used to handle these incidents have already been very obtusely unskillful. But if the same tactics – news blockade, passively cooling down, not stimulating further conflicts, cracking down the hardcore while providing comfort to others, and finding scapegoats in lower level bureaucracy to calm down the anger – were used to deal with the March incident, the chain reactions throughout the Tibetan area that we had seen would not have been forthcoming.”

Why is it not done in Tibet?

For Mao and his colleagues, the 1962 attack against India was probably only a spank to an ill-prepared Indian Army and once the blow was given, the PLA immediately returned to its barracks in Tibet. Many things have changed since then in the Middle Kingdom, but the Tibetan factor has remained.

If one thinks about it, the recurrent resentment of the Tibetan population against the Chinese is strategically extremely dangerous for Beijing. The only answer is the Great Han Chauvinism which has been plaguing China since Mao’s days and has often been denounced by Chinese intellectuals.

For Mao and his colleagues, the 1962 attack against India was probably only a spank to an ill-prepared Indian Army and once the blow was given, the PLA immediately returned to its barracks in Tibet. Many things have changed since then in the Middle Kingdom, but the Tibetan factor has remained. Regretfully, the discontent in Tibet in 1959–1962 and its implications for the Chinese defense preparedness has never been studied.

The Tibetan resentment manifested in a 70,000-character petition sent by the Panchen Lama to Mao in April 1962. In September, during a CCP Conference, Mao denounced the ‘poisonous arrow’ sent by the Tibetan Lama and called him ‘an enemy of our class’.

In October–November 1962, a longer war with its supply base in Tibet would have been very difficult to sustain in the atmosphere of ‘rebellion’ prevalent on the Roof of the World at that time.

Whether the unrest in Tibet should be considered as a threat to China’s unity and security is debatable (today the Dalai Lama only asks for a genuine autonomy within the People’s Republic of China), but the leadership in Beijing should be aware that the situation is tricky and if a conflict arises in the region, the Chinese forces will have to face unprecedented difficulties.

Unfortunately, Beijing still reacts like an ostrich. On March 11, Kang Jinzhong, the Political Commissar of Armed Police Corps in Tibet told the media: “The people in Tibet and armed police stationed there enjoy harmonious relationships.” He added: “The armed police earnestly implement the country’s ethnic and religious policies. They love the people in Tibet and contribute to the stability and development in the region, while the local residents have shown sincere support for the armed police.”

Though an entire chapter of the WP is consecrated to the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF), nothing is mentioned about Tibet except the above short sentence.

Conclusion

China’s 2008 National Defense White Paper is a small leap forward on the path to transparency. It projects China as a responsible stakeholder. This is probably the main objectives of those who drafted the text.

The overall feeling while going through the WP is that the leadership in Beijing is serious about the “˜modernization of the Armed forces, though many serious issues have been kept under the wrap of secrecy dear to the Chinese leaders.

The overall feeling while going through the WP is that the leadership in Beijing is serious about the ‘modernization’ of the Armed forces, though many serious issues have been kept under the wrap of secrecy dear to the Chinese leaders. The defense budget is the most obvious case, though for the first time a chapter is consecrated to the subject.

Notes

1. The WP is available on http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20 content_1210227.htm
2. See http://web.mit.edu/chinapolicy/www/conference1/hartford.pdf
3. See our article in a previous issue of the IDR.
4. Quoted in: www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf.
5. See article in http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/layout/set/print/content/view/full 73?id=95974&lng=en.
6. The chapters are the following: I. The Security Situation; II. National Defense Policy; III. Reform and Development of the PLA; IV. The Army; V. The Navy; VI. The Air Force; VII. The Second Artillery Force; VIII. The People’s Armed Police Force; IX. National Defense Reserve Buildup; X. The Armed Forces and the People; XI. Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense; XII. Defense Expenditure; XIII. International Security Cooperation; XIV. Arms Control and Disarmament.
7. China Brief of Jamestown Foundation, Volume 9, 3, February 5, 2009, see: http://www.jamestown. org/programs/chinabrief/
8. Source: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2009-01/21/content_17162799.htm
9. See www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf.
10. India has the largest areas of ‘disputed territories’ with China.
11. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/03/incident.php
12. According to the WP: “As a component of China’s armed forces and subordinate to the State Council, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC. The PAPF consists of the internal security force and various police forces. The border public security, firefighting and security guard forces are also components of the PAPF. The PAPF is charged with the fundamental task of safeguarding national security, maintaining social stability and ensuring that the people live and work in peace and contentment. Routine guard duties refer to duties the PAPF performs to maintain internal security, which are mostly carried out by the internal security force. The basic tasks are: to guard against all forms of attempted attacks and sabotage; protect designated individuals and facilities; ensure the security of important international and national conferences and large-scale cultural and sports events; protect important airports, radio stations, and key and confidential units, and vital places in such sectors as state economy and national defense; protect important bridges and tunnels; ensure the security of prisons and detention houses; and maintain public order in state-designated large and medium-sized cities or specific zones.” The PAP has a strength of 6,60,000 personnel.