Indian Defence Review

Employment of the Military

With such adverse publicity for the government, the clamour to induct the military into anti-Naxal operations became louder. The Indian Army has expressed its willingness to train personnel to combat the Naxals but is itself reluctant and justifiably so, to get its own personnel involved in any operation on the ground against them. The mission of the Indian Army or for that matter any national army, is to deal with and quell external threat. Injecting troops of the Indian Army into internal conflict to battle elements that are essentially misguided citizens of India, will serve to detract this fine organisation from its primary responsibilities, dilute its core values and bring discredit. The situation the Indian Army finds itself in Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern states is an indication. Today, human rights activists are quick to denigrate the military on alleged excesses. They raise issues at international fora and bring disrepute to the country. Besides, induction of the Indian Army into an internal conflict will weaken the defences on the borders which the enemy may well exploit at a time and place of their own choosing. The IAF is in a somewhat similar situation with perhaps a little greater flexibility. Air power has many facets other than just firepower against an opponent.

Employment of air power to search and destroy targets has been carried out on a very large scale in Afghanistan and Pakistan by the US forces. The targets have been terrorists or their equipment. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) are the platforms used. These UAVs and UCAVs can remain airborne for long periods, carry out surveillance and send real-time intelligence back to control centres located in distant parts of the world. The UCAVs are then used in the attack mode to destroy the identified targets. On many occasions, despite the technical prowess that the US possesses, innocent civilians including women and children have been among the casualties leading to human rights organisations condemning such incidents. In the Indian scenario also similar mistakes can occur if air power is utilised to target Naxals or Maoists. It should be remembered that the level of technology at which Indian forces operate, is far below that of the US military.

Hence the possibility of error is greater. Any killing of innocents will help boost the Naxal propaganda while attracting adverse reaction both from within the country and outside. It must also be remembered that there is no let up of attacks against the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The anger against killing of innocent civilians by these ‘drone’ attacks is so great that incidents of ‘green-on-blue’ attacks have increased considerably.

An IAF Mi-17 was recently fired upon as it was transporting election officials and materials in Naxal affected areas resulting in a casualty. If air power is employed in an offensive role against the Naxals, the latter will certainly seek and eventually acquire the capability to shoot down helicopters. In the event of the Naxals succeeding in downing a helicopter then the clamour to retaliate will increase. This will lead to the demand to bring in the fighter aircraft – an escalation that is certainly not a desirable outcome.

After the Chhattisgarh massacre, even the then Home Minister expressed his support to induct the IAF against the Naxals, though he later toned down the statement. The then Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) very clearly stated that inducting IAF aircraft for offensive action was not desirable. Many commentators pounced on this statement and claimed that this was entirely a political issue and the CAS had no business to express such an opinion. While the merits of the CAS expressing an opinion can be debated, the essence of his statement remains valid. The CAS also commented on the state of intelligence available to combat the Maoists.

Another unspoken apprehension is that the induction of the IAF or the Indian Army may appear to be an admission of the strength and capability of the Maoists/Naxals. If the Maoists are successful in attacking or damaging a military camp or convoy, this would only serve to reinforce the air of invincibility about them.

Employment of air power to assist anti-Naxal operations should be restricted to casualty evacuation, resupply, ferrying of troops in emergency situations and providing medical relief. UAVs can be employed for surveillance, intelligence gathering and photo reconnaissance. It would be preferable for a force under the Home Ministry to tackle this problem.

The Border Security Force (BSF) has aircraft and helicopters which can be employed for this purpose. Additional helicopters can be acquired for the BSF and the IAF could impart necessary training to the BSF crew to carry out the tasks currently undertaken by the IAF. Improvement of intelligence gathering capability in Naxal areas, better training of local police and induction of modern weapons are measures that need urgent action.

The Final Word

In the final analysis, delivery of good governance is the only solution to solving the Naxal/Maoist imbroglio. Use of force may help temporarily brush the problem under the carpet but will not eradicate it. The social, economic and human rights contours of the problem are immense and a single-dimension approach will only exacerbate the issues involved. Integrating the alienated citizens of the country is a task that lies squarely in the domain of the central and state administrative machinery. Dragging in the military is neither a desirable nor a viable option. The IAF and the Indian Army have their objectives very clearly laid out and combating the Naxals/Maoists does not figure in those objectives. The IAF may provide all logistics support and assistance or train the Air Wing of the BSF for these tasks. Employing the IAF in an offensive role against our own citizens is, by all counts, is an alternative best avoided.