Indian Defence Review

Various Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Pictured are (front to back, left to right) RQ-11A Raven, Evolution, Dragon Eye, NASA FLIC, Arcturus T-15, Skylark, Tern, RQ-2B Pioneer, and Neptune.

Air-delivered weapons have been automated to an extent that target acquisition, weapons launch and guidance till impact require no human inputs. Getting the launch platform to the combat zone and recovering it to base is being done daily in routine UAV operations with limited human inputs. If both processes get fully automated, only target selection and attack decisions will require human intervention. The world over there has been an increase of conflicts where ground intervention is not a viable option. UAVs are increasingly being used is such situations. The UAV will evolve to be as potent as a manned aircraft in the strike role at first and inevitably in the air superiority role later. All air-delivered weapons can be UAV-delivered with no modifications to the weapons themselves.

The cost of manned aircraft has a significant element which has to cater for life support systems and redundancies for crew safety. UAVs can do without this, thus reducing costs as their development advances. The political leadership will be able to use plausible deniability and system failure to explain when things go wrong in UAV operations and there will be no risks with own personnel being killed or captured. They will certainly be a major force multiplier provided UAV weapon capabilities match those of manned aircraft.

The Path Ahead for the IAF

Up to the end of the 1965 conflict and to some extent in 1971, the IAF had limited all-weather and night capability. The IAF had WW II vintage weapons on aircraft of a later generation thereby restricting the latter’s full potential. This was partly because acquiring state-of-the-art weapons took a back seat when compared to the IAF’s quest for state-of-the-art flying platforms. This malaise is common to all three Services.

The IAF went to war in 1965 with WW II weapons barring the Soviet K 13 IR air-to-air missile which was ineffective in close range air combat. 1971 was more or less a repeat. Ground-based air defence weapons of the adversary were not state-of-the-art and so we could prevail with some innovations. In Kargil, in 1991, we found that unguided rockets had neither the accuracies nor the capabilities to perform as expected at high altitudes. Usage of precision guided bombs, the latest weapons in our inventory, was effective but only after some out-of-the-box innovations were employed to correct weapons errors at high altitudes. We should have foreseen that there was a possibility of conflict in our high altitude border terrain and validated our weapons before the conflict, not during it. Reactive crisis management is a good skill but as a fall back option and not as a substitute for flawed threat assessment.

In the foreseeable future extending up to the next 20 years or so, the IAF will have to prepare for the eventuality of a hostile adversary continuing a low intensity campaign using expendable manpower and based on inexpensive low level “donkey, tent and AK-47 technology”. Due to national political compulsions, it is likely to be a reactive defense on the part of the IAF, with restrictions on cross border retaliation. We need to develop a response which uses available technology to make the tasks of intelligence gathering, target acquisition and neutralisation easier without suffering avoidable casualties.

UAVs for surveillance and target acquisition and armed UAVs with unguided rockets can support counter insurgency forces on our borders. If the intensity of border skirmishes escalates as it did in Kargil, UAVs can firstly cover far more area faster in the reconnaissance role than foot patrols and armed with rockets, can provide critical fire support at short notice when compared to artillery, provided the capability is validated beforehand in peace time. If the option of cross-border interdiction of staging areas is allowed, the first option could be UAVs armed with precision guided munitions such as laser guided missiles and laser guided bombs. This provides the IAF with a graduated escalation option with the ability to use the same type of weapons to achieve similar results as with manned aircraft. This is nothing new and is being done in conflict zones in Iraq and Afghanistan now.

The other contingency is a short duration armed conflict in the West or the North or both along with conflict at sea. This is a conventional war and all options barring a nuclear first strike one are available. Considering the capabilities of the likely adversaries, use of precision guided stand-off weapons including cruise missiles in the air-to-surface strike role is inescapable to ensure results while avoiding unacceptable attrition levels. This is essential in attacks on strategic assets and in deep strike and interdiction since targets will be heavily defended. Attacks at low levels even by night with weapons which require attacking aircraft to overfly their targets caused unacceptable levels of attrition way back in the Iraq war in 1991 and are definitely not workable now.

For close air support especially in the plains with enemy armoured and mechanised forces present, attacks using short-range unguided rockets, guns and free fall as well as retarded unguided bombs will not be viable except in rare cases. Precision guided missiles with stand-off capability, cluster weapons with a guidance capability (the Joint Stand-off Weapon type is an example) and with either target illumination provided by UAVs, ground- based devices or by aircraft at stand-off ranges will be needed. In areas with lower threat levels or in situations where enemy ground defences have been suppressed by stand-off weapons, attacks at closer ranges with unguided weapons may be possible as also the use of helicopters in the strike role. Helicopter gunships are likely to be effective in surprise attacks on targets with lower levels of air defence protection, such as forward located early warning radars.

In the mountains, stand-off and precision guided weapons are an asset since attacking aircraft do not have constraints of positioning for weapons delivery imposed by having to be close to uneven terrain. They can also stay clear of the kill envelopes of air defence systems on high ground. The requirement is to validate the effectiveness of weapons at high altitude beforehand.

In the air-to-air scenario, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and airborne surveillance and Battle Management Systems are high value targets operating within secure airspace under SAM and fighter cover. These high value targets need to be attacked by long and medium range air-to-air missiles with initial guidance by external radar or other sources and final target acquisition by active radar and passive radar homers and IR seekers on the missile. The aim is to at least force the AWACS to shut down its radar, take evasive action and exit the area so that guidance to its own aircraft is lost.

In the Indian context of a war in the West, the lack of geographical depth of that country will force their AWACS assets to their Western borders and beyond if they are to be safe from such attacks. In the North, the adversary AWACS will have blind spots in the valleys leading to the Tibetan plateau unless it is well forward where it can be threatened by long range missiles. For combat at closer ranges, missiles with active built-in radar guidance and shorter range, all-aspect IR homing missiles are needed and are now available. All our fighters also have integral cannon armament.

As far as specialist weapons go, radar homing air-to-ground missiles are needed for neutralising surveillance, target acquisition and SAM radars. Thermobaric bombs with fuel air explosives are capable of creating blast over pressures and temperatures close to that produced by tactical nuclear weapons. These are effective against exposed personnel, vehicles and structures. Smart area weapons with sub munitions and stand-off launch capabilities are already entering our inventory. Kits to convert unguided bombs to precision munitions with standoff capabilities such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) with GPS and inertial navigation need to be inducted. Weapons are also required to penetrate fortified and buried structures such as command complexes, missile silos, nuclear weapons storage sites and dams.

In a nuclear scenario, air-launched nuclear weapons are difficult to neutralise before launch since launch aircraft have mobility at high speeds making detection difficult when compared to ground-based platforms. Submarine-based platforms will always be in limited numbers.

Weapons development in India has a dismal history. The IAF still does not have an IR air-to-air missile of local origin deployed. The same is the case with medium and long range missiles. Specialist weapons such as thermo-baric bombs, precision cluster munitions and deep penetration bombs have to be developed locally if we are to have the required numbers available. We could at least divert some more effort towards setting up local sources for smart and specialist weapons.

Smart weapons and missiles have much shorter storage lives than older weapons especially as far as propellants and warheads are concerned. Modular designs may be an answer in reducing replacement costs. Stockpiles are therefore low and resupply interruptions by foreign suppliers during conflict situations can cripple our capabilities. The IAF has to develop capabilities in-house and in most cases, the technology is not as complex as stealth aircraft design or spacecraft engine design.

Ultimately, warfare, as almost any other human activity, is influenced by economics. The erstwhile Soviet Union was driven to its break-up partly because it expended national resources beyond sustainable limits in an arms race. Saying that one must have the best weapons in large quantities is fine, but it is never achievable because in the final analysis, military might cannot be built up at the cost of a nation’s economic survival. Political and military decision makers have to strike an appropriate balance.

All the latest generation combat aircraft with fancy performance characteristics are just air show items if they cannot deliver weapons on the target effectively. Air-launched weapons modernisation, acquisition and local R&D have taken a back seat for far too long. The IAF does not need another conflict to speed up modernisation efforts in this vital area.