Indian Defence Review

When I reported on posting to Major General (later Lieutenant General) K.K. Singh, then Director of Military operations, on 12 March 1971, as his deputy, he said in his characteristic man-of-few-words style: “Events are moving fast. It is better that you get into the picture fast.” K.K. had over the years earned the reputation of being a military thinker and man of vision. Whatever he said, one always pondered over every word, for it had much deeper meaning than normal in a casual conversation. K.K. was never casual.

Events were indeed moving fast. In East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had raised a cry for rebellion against President Yahya Khan’s deliberate attempt to retard the democratic processes by indefinite postponement of convening the National Assembly of Pakistan. On 1 March 1971, Mujib called a general strike for the following day and a half-day strike the rest of the week, shuttering offices, shops and factories, and halting trains, buses and planes.1

The infuriated Bengalis rallied around Mujib and the functions of government in the eastern-province came to a halt.

The infuriated Bengalis rallied around Mujib and the functions of government in the eastern-province came to a halt. The offices of the central and provincial governments and of semi-government agencies closed their doors.2 2 Radio Pakistan gave accounts of militant students and agitated crowds taking the law into their own hands and indulging in the open plunder of non-Bengali property and killing of non-Bengalis.

This was an outburst of the simmering discontent that had engulfed the eastern wing of Pakistan under the “neocolonialism” perpetrated by successive military dictatorships. Except for religion, there was nothing common between the two wings. The Bengalis’ language, their culture, their dress, their food habits, and their very way of life was different from that of the West Pakistani. Even the economies of the two wings had a different basis, and the west, having held political sway from the formation of Pakistan, had exploited the eastern wing’s economic resources for the benefit of the western wing. Although jute and tea grown in East Pakistan earned most of the country’s foreign exchange, the major portion of it was used to develop the western wing. The more populous East Pakistan was denied protection from floods and cyclones which brought periodic devastation of life and property in their wake.3

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Under the tyranny of partisan rule, the politically conscious Bengali had raised a protest in the person of Mujibur Rahman and his six-point programme demanding autonomy for the eastern wing.4 To suppress the voice of dissent, he was tried for conspiracy,5 and India was blamed for allegedly aiding and abetting treason, the rulers in Islamabad little realising that the happenings in East Pakistan were a manifestation of their own misdeeds. The clear mandate Mujib won in the 1970 general elections brought Bengali aspirations—at least so they thought—to the threshold of self-rule. Instead, they found they were being thwarted initially by political manoeuvring between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Mujib, and later by the threat of being crushed under the heel of the military jackboot. Unable to bear injustice any longer, the Bengalis took to the streets to seek a solution for their continued oppression.

To suppress the voice of dissent, he was tried for conspiracy,5 and India was blamed for allegedly aiding and abetting treason, the rulers in Islamabad little realising that the happenings in East Pakistan were a manifestation of their own misdeeds.

By 3 March 1971, Mujib’s writ ran wide in East Pakistan. After the imposition of curfew in Dacca on 2 March,6 units of the Pakistan Army moved into the city and resorted to firing on the demonstrators. This caused some casualties, which further inflamed Bengali passions. The wounded were displayed at a public meeting addressed by Mujib. In his speech, he asked the army to go back to its barracks. In case the troops did not comply with this demand, he threatened that the people would have no alternative to offering resistance. The troops were promptly withdrawn7 by the well-meaning Lt Gen Sahabzada Yakub Khan, who had been appointed Governor and Martial Law Administrator a little earlier.8 This was a clear demonstration of Mujib’s power, derived from the people’s mandate, against the repressive policies of West Pakistan’s military dictatorship and was hailed as a popular victory.

Yahya Khan also resiled from the hard line he had adopted by announcing a new date, 25 March, for summoning the National Assembly9 and comparative calm ensued for a while. Speaking at a mammoth gathering at Ramna racecourse on the afternoon of 7 March, Mujib announced his willingness to participate in the session of the National Assembly provided his four demands—withdrawal of martial law, return of troops to their barracks, inquiry into army killings, and transfer of power to duly elected representatives of the people—were met before the start of the session. He also outlined a weeklong programme of non-cooperation starting 8 March to cripple the army regime.10 So overwhelming was the response to Mujib’s call that he and his associates had virtually become the rulers of East Pakistan. It seemed as if Bangladesh had in fact come into existence.

This was amply evident when Lt Gen Tikka Khan, newly nominated Governor and Martial Law Administrator, arrived in Dacca on 7 March to take over from Yakub Khan. The Chief Justice of the High Court of East Pakistan refused to administer the oath of office to the new Governor,11 duly appointed by the President of Pakistan as notified in the official gazette. Other judges of the court are also said to have declined to perform the ceremony. In the event, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan had to be rushed to Dacca to do so.

After the imposition of curfew in Dacca on 2 March,6 units of the Pakistan Army moved into the city and resorted to firing on the demonstrators.

This incident was a clear defiance of the military regime’s authority. Perhaps the dictatorship’s ever-weakening hold on East Pakistan had impelled Yahya Khan to appoint Tikka Khan for the task of bringing Mujib to heel. Tikka Khan was known as a tough, no-nonsense soldier who would not hesitate to use military force, even to the degree of brutality, to restore the military regime’s authority. He was known to have employed such methods against a tribal rebellion in Baluchistan with considerable success. After the swearing in, Tikka Khan is said to have summoned Mujib to his presence, but Mujib agreed to see the Governor only if he came to his house.

This was the parting of the ways between Tikka Khan and Mujib, and perhaps between East and West Pakistan. Unable to stomach this personal insult, Tikka was bound to react violently against ostensible defiance on the part of Mujib and his Awami League. To Pakistan watchers, as well as to the General Staff of the Indian Army, a strong military action appeared imminent.

Meanwhile, Mujib’s civil disobedience and non-cooperation movement was visibly affecting the governmental machinery and people of Bangladesh. It encompassed the provincial law and order agencies such as the police and paramilitary forces.12 The tirade against the Pakistan Army in the newspapers of Dacca, denouncing it as “alien and barbarous,” continued unabated and must have had some effect in subverting the loyalties of the Bengali rank and file, in the East Bengal Regiment in particular and the Pakistani armed forces in general, especially those stationed in East Pakistan and sensitive to the mood of the people.

Mujib was gradually paving the way for a total confrontation which would engulf the armed forces in its sweep. Tikka Khan, professional that he was, was hound to be preparing to combat such an eventuality. The news had trickled into Dacca from Sri Lanka that Pakistan Army personnel were flying over the island from the western to the eastern wing in civilian clothes.13 New Delhi had earlier banned overflights of Indian territory by Pakistani aircraft after the Pakistan-inspired hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane in January 1971. This made it necessary for Pakistani craft to take the circuitous route through Sri Lanka, and this was both expensive in terms of money and time-consuming.

Notes:

1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 15, “National Assembly Postponed Indefinitely,” p. 10092.
2. Ibid., “Hartal Continues,” p. 10093.
3. On 13 November 1970, cyclone havoc in East Pakistan claimed 2 million lives, as reported by The Times, London.
4. The six-point programme was spelt out on 24 February 1971 by Sheikh Mujib in addressing a news conference in Dacca.
5. In his broadcast to the nation on 26 March 1971, President Yahya Khan charged Sheikh Mujib with treason.
6. Asian Recorder, “Violent Demonstrations, Curfew Imposed,” p. 10092.
7. On 6, March it was announced that the troops called out in Dacca would return to barracks following an improvement in the situation as a sequel to Sheikh Mujib’s appeal to remain peaceful.
8. Radio Pakistan announced on 1 March the appointment of Lt Gen Shahbjada Mohammad Yakub Khan as the province’s Martial Law Administrator in place of the Governor, Admiral S. K. Khan.
9. Asian Recorder, “President Yahya Khan’s broadcast,” p. 10093.
10. Ibid., “Mujib’s Conditions for Attending Assembly,” p. 10094.
11. Ibid., Vol XV11, No 20, “March 9.”
12. Ibid., “SM Rahman Asks Defence Workers to Defy Martial Law,” p. 10096.
13. A Deutsche Presse Agentur report said that despite Ceylon’s restrictions Pakistani military aircraft had been passing from the west to the east wing through the island. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 18, “Ceylon’s Restrictions onPakistani Aircraft,” p. 10132.

Intelligence reports indicated that a part of Pakistan’s 16 Infantry Division, stationed at Quetta, was being inducted into East Pakistan to strengthen Tikka Khan’s hands. Reliance on air transportation at first restricted immediate reinforcements to lightly armed manpower, but in due course heavier weapons could be expected to fetch up by sea. Mujib, according to the Dacca press, openly objected to this surreptitious buildup of armed strength and questioned its motive. But the airlift of troops continued throughout Yahya Khan’s parleys with Mujib and Bhutto in Dacca in the second half of March.1

Perhaps the dictatorships ever-weakening hold on East Pakistan had impelled Yahya Khan to appoint Tikka Khan for the task of bringing Mujib to heel.

As the political negotiations between the President and the elected representatives of the majorities in the two wings were extended,2 there was a general feeling that an acceptable solution would be found. It was believed that Yahya Khan would not throw away the only chance of keeping the two wings of Pakistan together, especially so when both the Soviet Union and the United States gave the impression that they were helping to narrow the differences between the opposing stands. And if the problem still defied a political settlement, it was thought that it would be handled by Tikka Khan by means of military action, with partial success at least, to tide over this period of inflamed passions.

It was not beyond the realm of possibility for Tikka Khan to suppress the rebellion by imprisoning the Awami League leaders, suspending political activities, and generally forcing the people to acquiesce by the well-recognised method of carrot and stick commonly used by rulers. In either eventuality, the problem would remain within the confines of Pakistan’s internal affairs and would not concern India directly. But a crackdown on the democratic processes would arouse Indian sympathy for Mujib and his followers, perhaps also a few tears and some loud protests in international forums, but no more. India very much wished at that time to be left alone.

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India had its own problems. The Indian leaders had been busy in the preceding winter in parliamentary elections to consolidate their own position after the split3 in the ruling Congress Party. The elections brought a dazzling victory to Indira Gandhi,4 and this spurred her to establish a stable government in anarchy-ridden West Bengal.5 From the collapse of the coalition government in March 1970 and the imposition of presidential rule, some political murders were reported to have been committed in clashes between the Naxalites led by Charu Mazumdar and other political groups.6

Detailed analysis revealed that the composition of about 18 infantry battalions was all West Pakistanis and six all East Pakistanis while the supporting arms, comprising one armoured and seven artillery regiments, were mixed, with about 70 percent of West Pakistani and 30 percent of East Pakistani elements, the former predominating, at least in the higher ranks.

Guerilla-type action against law and order agencies, both in the urban and rural areas, had led to a shutdown of schools and colleges, and law-abiding citizens feared to tread the streets. The Naxalites denounced the elections as “treachery” and vowed to block them by eliminating candidates who opposed their ideology. Threats were uttered that political scores would be settled by bullets. To ensure orderly elections in the state in this atmosphere, about a division plus of the Indian Army was moved into it to supplement the state and central police agencies. All eyes were focused on the West Bengal elections, and the little news that filtered across the border from East Pakistan was only of academic interest, at least for the time being.

Our military intelligence was well served with information from East Pakistan. It was known with a degree of exactitude that traditionally the region had only one infantry division comprising four brigades with adequate supporting arms, a squadron or two of fighter and transport aircraft, and some naval presence in Pakistan’s territorial waters as well as in riverine waterways. Detailed analysis revealed that the composition of about 18 infantry battalions was all West Pakistanis and six all East Pakistanis while the supporting arms, comprising one armoured and seven artillery regiments, were mixed, with about 70 percent of West Pakistani and 30 percent of East Pakistani elements, the former predominating, at least in the higher ranks.

In addition, there was a paramilitary organisation called the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), comprising about 16 wings with an approximate strength of 13,000. With the exception of the majority of officers and junior commissioned officers, these wings were manned by East Pakistanis. This formation was responsible for manning the border in times of peace to ensure its integrity as well as to keep a check on the movement of civilians across it. It was estimated that reinforcements by air could have augmented the East Pakistan garrison with three or four infantry battalions with light arms. It was also known that this airlift had slowed down somewhat after Mujib’s protest and the threatened strike action by members of the staff of Pakistan International Airlines stationed in Dacca, but exact figures relating to this operation were not available.

Mujib was gradually paving the way for a total confrontation which would engulf the armed forces in its sweep.

The impact of the happenings in East Pakistan on the loyalty of rank and file of military personnel belonging to the province and their leadership was a foregone conclusion, but to what extent this would erode the battle efficiency of Pakistani units drawn from both wings could not be accurately forecast. It was felt that on the whole the West Pakistan units would remain unaffected, as the small proportion of junior Bengali officers on their establishment could easily be relegated to positions of lesser responsibility or be neutralised by house arrest and other action. On the other hand, the East Pakistan units, whose higher ranks were mostly officered by West Pakistanis, upset the calculations of observers.

The degree of cohesion and loyalty of a unit depends on a given situation, the pressures brought to bear upon the group, and its leadership. Since all these factors were of an indeterminate nature, the assessment could be only in broad terms, especially when the extent of penetration of Awami League influence in the army was not known. The possible effect of defections, desertions or outright mutiny and revolt by East Pakistani elements could not thus be accurately gauged. But considering the predominance of West Pakistanis in positions of responsibility, and their control of the channels of communication and other facilities for exercising command and control, their monopoly of heavier weapons in the way of artillery and armour, their numerical strength and their traditional martial background indicated that in an open trial of strength Bengali military personnel would come out only second best.

“¦ the East Pakistan units, whose higher ranks were mostly officered by West Pakistanis, upset the calculations of observers.

On the whole, it was felt that the situation would not deteriorate militarily to the extent that Tikka Khan’s professional, “business-like” hand would not be able to control developments, ruthlessly if necessary. And it would still remain Pakistan’s internal problem, albeit with some irritation to India, and nothing more. Politically, India looked forward hopefully to a fruitful conclusion of the political parleys in Dacca.

The negotiations between Yahya Khan and Mujib dragged on, but from cryptic press communiques and radio quotes they appeared to be leading nowhere. Rumours were afloat that these were stalling tactics on the part of Yahya Khan to build up the requisite military strength for the final crackdown. Now it is known, through Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem’s book Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, that Tikka Khan had been preparing for quite a while to update the plan titled ‘Operation Blitz’ and gear up the necessary machinery to put it into operation at short notice.

Although the press communique issued on 3 March looked hopeful, Pakistan Republic Day was celebrated in Dacca as Resistance Day. Bangladesh flags appeared on rooftops and rejoicing crowds paraded the streets while the army was confined to barracks.7 On the night of 25 March, Yahya Khan left Dacca unannounced, and the same night Tikka Khan struck throughout East Pakistan with a heavy hand.8 This led Bhutto to say “Thank God, Pakistan has been saved,” but news of this action was blacked out in the rest of the world for some time.

About midday on 26 March, as the Vice Chief of Army Staff was interviewing me as a routine on my posting, his telephone rang to convey the news that an East Pakistani non-commissioned officer and about 30 other ranks had walked over to one of our border observation posts on the periphery of the Belonia salient in Tripura and had reported that the Bengali elements in the Pakistani armed forces in the eastern wing had revolted and fierce clashes were raging, especially in the Chittagong area.

Notes:

1. Ibid., Vol XVII, No 18, “General Yahya Khan in Dacca. Negotiations with S. M. Rahman,” p. 10130.
2. Ibid., p 10130.
3. After the split in the Congress in November 1969, it had lost its status as a majority party. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 3, “Lok Sabha Dissolved, Fresh Election Ordered,” pp. 9957-58.
4. The Congress Party won more than a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha/
5. President’s rule was revoked on 2 April and Bangla Congress president Ajoy Mukherjee was invited to form a ministry.
6. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No1, “Total Naxalite-CPM Murders in W. Bengal,” p. 9940.
7. Op. cit., Vol XVII, No 18, “Pakistan Day Observed as Resistance Day;” p. 10132.
8. Ibid., under chronology or events since 1969, p. 10150.

This was the first news India got of Tikka Khan’s crackdown. All contacts with East Pakistan had been severed and Radio Dacca was silent. Terrified civilians started pouring into India across the entire India-East Pakistan border, an exodus which finally resulted in about 10 million refugees becoming India’s responsibility. The thunder of artillery, the crackle of machine guns and other noises of war began to be heard from the peripheral border areas, and blazing fires and spiralling smoke told a tale of destruction.

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The refugees spoke of the devastation, ruthless killing, rape, loot and plunder they had fled from. Then came about 40 foreign news correspondents, photographers and television cameramen, hurriedly deported from Dacca. They vividly described the tank battles which had raged in the streets of the city on the night of 25/26 March. From the Intercontinental Hotel, they had witnessed the razing of the university.

Terrified civilians started pouring into India across the entire India-East Pakistan border, an exodus which finally resulted in about 10 million refugees becoming Indias responsibility.

They had heard heavy mortar fire and the crack of rocket launchers. According to them, the military were employed against unarmed Bengalis with brutal ruthlessness. They feared that Mujib and his associates had either been murdered or imprisoned. They felt that the genocide perpetrated in Dacca was of the worst type, even more cruel than that in the Nazi concentration camps of World War II. Although the Pakistan Army had confiscated their films, cameras and tape recorders, some of them managed to smuggle out horrifying pictures of devastated towns and villages and streets littered with the dead and the maimed.

Meanwhile, Radio Chittagong came on the air with Maj Ziaur Rahman, a Bengali officer, announcing the formation of the provisional government of Bangladesh on 26 March.1 This was welcome news indeed to supporters of the liberation struggle, but the fate of Mujib and other top leaders of the Awami League still remained unknown.

The pattern of the Pakistan Army’s repressive operations between 25 and 31 March remained confused as the information available from the refugees and defecting troops was mostly confined to the peripheral areas. Except for the stories of correspondents coming from Dacca, and for those of affluent refugees who had bought their way out, nothing was known of events in areas deep in the interior. From all accounts, Tikka Khan was rather thin on the ground.

“¦Radio Chittagong came on the air with Maj Ziaur Rahman, a Bengali officer, announcing the formation of the provisional government of Bangladesh on 26 March.

Of the 12 to 15 fully West Pakistani battalions at his disposal, he was committed to having a brigade’s worth in and around Dacca, the seat of the rebellion, one brigade in Comilla looking after the region east of the Meghna river, including the major port of Chittagong and the tea-growing area of Sylhet, another in the general area of Jessore and Khulna, south of the Ganga, and a fourth deployed in the northerly area bounded by the Yamuna and the Ganga.

The troops were deployed in battalion and company group strength to hold important towns and communication centres, and columns were sent to relieve beleaguered garrisons. One column was reportedly making its way from Feni to Chittagong. The discernible pattern of operations seemed to be to secure Dacca, to break the Awami League hold on the local administration, to ensure the use of Chittagong naval base as the major port of entry for shipping from West Pakistan, to safeguard the functional airfields, to facilitate an aerial buildup in troublesome regions, to guard cantonments and arsenals, to clear the road, rail and inland waterway systems, to ensure the security of main towns, and in the process to disarm the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles and police.

News trickled out from Chittagong that Operation Blitz was kept an absolute secret from Bengali officers although all ranks could sense the impending clashes the day before. Chittagong housed the East Bengal Regimental Centre (EBRC), estimated to hold about 2,500 rank and file, including the newly raised 9 Battalion. 20 Baluch, the West Pakistan battalion in the cantonment, struck at EBRC personnel, who although mostly raw recruits gave a stiff fight, which resulted in heavy casualties. But most of the trained personnel, consisting of the permanent staff, managed to get away.

The troops were deployed in battalion and company group strength to hold important towns and communication centres, and columns were sent to relieve beleaguered garrisons.

8 EBR, an all-East Pakistani battalion, killed its commanding officer and moved to the hills overlooking the base under its second in command Ziaur Rahman. He took over Radio Chittagong2 and raised the first cry of armed revolt against the military dictatorship.3 Zia was joined by elements of EPR and EBRC,4 and together they attacked 20 Baluch, which was firmly entrenched in the EBRC lines, with much success. Later, they occupied the whole of Chittagong town, causing damage in its non-Bengali colonies. They destroyed textile mills set up by some of West Pakistan’s 22 ruling families to exploit the protected markets of East Pakistan.

But in their enthusiasm they lost their sense of priorities. The naval base was untouched. With the help of newly arrived reinforcements, the naval establishment managed to secure Tiger Pass, connecting the town with the port, and that kept the base out of reach of the rebels. Later, a relief column from Comilla, as well as the efforts of the beleaguered 20 Baluch, cleared the town by 31 March and took control of the Chittagong radio station two days later. Ziaur Rahman made his way along with his comrades towards India. On his way, he occupied the Belonia bulge till ousted by a heavy Pakistani punitive attack mounted on the arrival of reinforcements.

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Almost simultaneously, five other EBR battalions stationed in East Pakistan, the whole of EPR and the armed police revolted. On the heels of the Chittagong mutiny, 2 EBR Battalion, located at the heels of the Chittagong mutiny, 2 EBR Battalion, located at Joydevpur, north of Dacca, with its companies dispersed at Tongi, Ghazipur, Tangail and Mymensingh, revolted around 28 March, killing the few West Pakistani officers and their families. They stiffly resisted efforts to disarm them and gradually made their way to Tura in the Indian state of Meghalaya.

8 EBR, an all-East Pakistani battalion, killed its commanding officer and moved to the hills overlooking the base under its second in command Ziaur Rahman.

1 EBR Battalion, located at Jessore, was disarmed about the same time after a heroic but unequal struggle. 10 EBR, a national service battalion consisting of students under training, was sent on forced leave and later disbanded after seizing their arms. But 3 EBR, located in the Saidpur area, and 4 EBR, in the Comilla sector, escaped being disarmed humiliatingly. Along with their officers and arms, they moved first towards Hilli and Sylhet respectively, and later came to India under heavy military pressure from Pakistani troops.

Bengali elements in mixed units were easily subdued, but some of them managed to get away to join their comrades in open revolt. The revolting EBR battalions organised EPR, the Mujahids, the Ansars, the police and ex-servicemen as well as civilians to resist alien army rule in the name of the newly emerging Bangladesh. In addition to their own arms, the rebels looted Pakistani armouries and police stations, gathering considerable quantities of arms in the process. The EBR battalions organised resistance sectorwise, and wherever they entered India they coordinated the activities of EPR and other rebellious elements in their respective areas. But overall coordination of the revolt and its connected activities was however lacking.

They stiffly resisted efforts to disarm them and gradually made their way to Tura in the Indian state of Meghalaya.

EPR detachments concentrated on attacking Pakistani border outposts and surrounding isolated garrisons. Exploiting the minimum Pakistan presence in inaccessible areas, and the undue time Pakistani troops took to react in others, the sector commanders organised some bold forays deep inside Pakistani-held territory. Some enterprising local commanders of the Border Security Force who had learnt of Pakistani atrocities from the refugees and revolting Bengali elements, often joined in the raids, especially in the Jessore and Sylhet regions. Finding a vacuum in these areas and full of enthusiasm, some of them told visiting news correspondents covering the refugee exodus that the occupation of East Pakistan would be easy. Such talk created a powerful lobby in India which urged the Prime Minister to take immediate action to liberate Bangladesh.

Meanwhile, Tikka Khan asked for and got more troops to deal with the troublesome province. Pakistan 9 Infantry Division and 16 Infantry Division were flown from the western wing to strengthen Tikka Khan’s hands. This was achieved at the considerable risk of denuding the striking forces north and south in that wing. It is said that 9 Infantry Division was ordered to move from Kharian in the west on 30 March. Its flight in PIA Boeings started from Lahore on 1 April and the whole divisionless heavier arms, had concentrated in East Pakistan by 5 April. This speaks well for Pakistani military efficiency.

Bengali elements in mixed units were easily subdued, but some of them managed to get away to join their comrades in open revolt.

9 Infantry Division quickly reinforced the thinly held region east of Meghna from Sylhet to Chittagong. One of its brigades was airlifted to Sylhet, where the besieged garrison was in great difficulty. The second brigade was flown to Comilla to take over from the old 14 Infantry Division Brigade, which in turn moved to Chittagong. The third brigade moved to Mymensingh, thus achieving adequate strength closer to the border to push the rebels out of the peripheral areas.

The mode of operations was to send strong battalion columns into the outlying areas to crush the general revolt, clear the rebel-held areas and generally pacify the affected civil population. The Dacca brigade, having accomplished its task, was rushed north to relieve Rajshahi. The columns are claimed to have moved at great speed, covering about 300 miles in seven days in an assortment of transport from cycle rickshaws to river boats with ad hoc logistic support.

The rapidity of these operations seemed to have a salutary effect on the rebel strongholds, especially in the interior. These columns devastated villages and towns in their path, slaughtered resisters, and generally created havoc of the Chengez Khan type. The heroic resistance of politically inspired freedom fighters in Chandpur and Akhaura was overcome at great cost to the Pakistanis.

Exploiting the minimum Pakistan presence in inaccessible areas, and the undue time Pakistani troops took to react in others, the sector commanders organised some bold forays deep inside Pakistani-held territory.

Meantime, Pakistan 16 Infantry Division enabled Tikka Khan to rationalise the formation’s operational boundaries so as to dominate the rebelaffected areas with greater, and perhaps crushing, strength. 9 Infantry Division was assigned the area east of the Meghna, including the Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong sectors, 14 Infantry Division Mymensingh, Dacca and Jessore, and 16 Infantry Division the whole northern region. With this added strength and more stabilised logistic support, the columns fanned out over the entire countryside, especially near the border with India. They pushed the rebels towards India and sought the pacification of these areas with an iron hand.

These operations mainly involved fighting small company and battalion actions, with tank, gun and air support. Tikka Khan’s mode of operation seemed to be to hit hard and crush rather than pacify. To secure two vital crossings at Bhairab Bazaar on the Meghna and Golando Ghat on the Padma, he attacked with brigade groups and a preponderance of air and gun support. In the former action, 4 EBR Battalion, holding the bridge, was badly mauled and lost a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. It was militarily imprudent for the revolting troops to engage in set-piece battles in such circumstances, but then the habits of regular soldiers die hard.

By about 10 April, Tikka Khan was able to restore a semblance of normalcy in that after having pushed the rebellious troops, the Hindu and other minorities and non-cooperators across the Indian border, and also having crushed the Awami League, he contrived to carry out his mandate of reestablishing Yahya Khan’s writ in Bangladesh. Having accomplished this, he relinquished the soldier’s role in favour of Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, who took over as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Pakistan Eastern Command. Tikka Khan reverted to the role of Governor and Martial Law Administrator. For the time being, there was nothing much for Niazi to do except stabilise what he had achieved and further strengthen the army’s hold on the land and people.

The mode of operations was to send strong battalion columns into the outlying areas to crush the general revolt, clear the rebel-held areas and generally pacify the affected civil population.

The tempo of the operations continued unabated. By the end of April, the army had reoccupied most BOPs, recaptured the rebel stronghold of the Belonia bulge, covering approximately 57.9 sqaure kilometres, cleared the rivers and sea routes to the ports of Chalna, Khulna and Chittagong, and restored rail communications in most areas. Except for a few small pockets in outlying and inaccessible peripheral areas, the rebellion had outwardly been suppressed by the end of May.

In its early stages, news poured into India of the barbarities perpetrated by Tikka Khan and his West Pakistanis, and the Indian press glorified the heroic defiance of the rebels. So overexuberant were the Indian publicity media over the rebel activities that they headlined Tikka Khan’s supposed killing by a daring assailant. Sympathisers of Bangladesh were jubilant, but their jubilation soon died down when Tikka Khan appeared in person in a live television show which was beamed from Dacca all over the world. This was an immature propagandist gimmick which for quite a while destroyed the credibility of its perpetrators.

Sources of information which had dried up in the period of repression were reactivated and a clearer picture of the situation in East Pakistan became available. The press in Dacca painted Tikka Khan as a benevolent ruler who had promised that nobody under his protection would be “allowed to die of hunger” and had honoured his promise in deed. India was painted as the inspirer of the revolt which had resulted in wanton destruction of life and property.

By about 10 April, Tikka Khan was able to restore a semblance of normalcy in that after having pushed the rebellious troops, the Hindu and other minorities and non-cooperators across the Indian border, and also having crushed the Awami League, he contrived to carry out his mandate of reestablishing Yahya Khans writ in Bangladesh.

The beaming Niazi was depicted as a soldier’s general, constantly visiting forward troops and having a crack or two with a lonely soldier. The soldier was praised for his forbearance, professional efficiency and deep concern for the coreligionist population. Normalcy was shown through reopened schools and colleges, functioning of secretatriats and the administration at the district level, reopening of mills, rehabilitation of the tea industry, and general shopping activity in the streets of Dacca. Giving credence to this news as only half the truth, it was estimated that at least normalcy was on its way back and would return fully unless something was done to disrupt it soon.

To relieve the regular army from border-holding duties, Tikka Khan raised a paramilitary force, known as the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF), to replace the old EPR by enlisting about 6,000 officers and men—but this time with a difference in that about 90 per cent of the rank and file was from West Pakistan. A start was also made to raise Mujahids from among the loyalists Biharis, as also Razakars. This force was to protect railway and road bridges, industrial and electrical installations and communication centres and other vulnerable targets from terrorist attack as well as create confidence amongst the local population. Maj Gen Jamshed, a former director of EPR, was flown posthaste from West Pakistan to command this force. These measures were designed to strengthen Tikka Khan’s grip on the administration of the province and win back the confidence of the Bengalis.

But the exodus of bewildered refugees continued unabted, and by the end of May India had about 10 million of them as its responsibility.5 The financial burden of refugee relief was estimated by the World Bank, as quoted in the New York Times, at about $700 million in a full year.6 This was roughly half of India’s defence budget in 1970, and the nation groaned under this additional economic pressure.

It may be said to the credit of the Pakistani military machine—and Tikka Khan that, defying the logistic nigntmares of a distant overseas base, long and circuitous air routes, lack of an administrative infrastructure and stockpiling for a force not more than a division plus, and utter disruption of road, rail and sea communications, it crushed a movement, at least temporarily, launched by 75 million people acting unitedly. Internationally, Pakistan’s military image soared for the time being, and India’s credibility sank correspondingly low. The Indian people watched the entire drama helplessly. But then they had their own problems.