Most of these forces displayed a long-term perspective about their operations in the region with a consistent and compelling rationale for maintaining presence.
American Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean
The American presence in the Indian Ocean had Diego Garcia1 at the core of its larger strategy. There were three major considerations for the US presence in the Indian Ocean.
For the Indian Navy, presence on the Indian Ocean was a new reality that it needed to cater for in its future plans.
- First and foremost was the American desire to maintain a geo-strategic presence. It was a strategy based on long term considerations and not aimed at immediate objectives or securing access to oil (as was generally believed to be the case).2
- The second reason was to protect its vital interests in the region. Having made heavy investments over decades to safeguard their key interests in the Indian Ocean, the US positioned its forces in a manner to maintain and reinforce presence in the Persian Gulf. The US Fifth Fleet clearly intended to remain in the area with a huge intervention capability pre-positioned in Diego Garcia.
- The third reason was conceivably to do with the new threat of terrorism that the Americans faced in the 90s. By maintaining presence, they aimed to root out non-state terrorist outfits and strangulate their access to funds and arms.
French Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean
France saw its perceived commitment to its “˜Overseas Territories in the Indian Ocean “” Djibouti and the Island of La Reunion as overriding and catered for the defence of her island territories and erstwhile French colonies (which also had a considerable majority of French speaking people) in the Indian Ocean, by maintaining a substantial naval presence.
A very substantial proportion of Frances oil supplies came from the Persian Gulf. France considered her naval presence necessary to guard her oil routes. To appreciate how important the region was in her plans it may be useful to highlight that during the Iran”“Iraq war is 1980″“88, it formed a multinational force with USA and Britain that opposed the threat of closure of the Straits of Hormuz and the consequent disruption of oil supplies.
France also considered her presence in Djibouti as a stabilizing force in the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1980s, and saw itself as a significant equalising agent.
Chinese Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean
In the early 90s, there were strategic drivers for Chinas presence in the Indian Ocean.
- Need to Secure SLOCs. China was investing heavily to develop markets in Central Asia, Africa and South America and needed to secure the SLOCs to ensure the uninterrupted flow of raw materials from Africa and finished goods to its key export markets.
- Constant Energy Supply. Chinas growing economy needed to ensure uninterrupted energy supplies. To secure themselves against disruptions through the sea route, the Chinese were in the process of developing overland pipelines3.
Japanese Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean
After World War II, Japans security policy had been based on five basic tenets:-
- A commitment never to develop nuclear weapons.
- Civilian control of the military.
- An exclusively defence oriented military strategy.
- Dependence on the US”“Japan Security Treaty.
- Ensuring the security of oil supplies.
Japan got its oil supplies from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. The country was totally dependent on imports for its oil and gas supplies. This overwhelming reliance on oil and gas imports required secure shipping lanes.
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