Indian Defence Review

In 2008, India faced six major acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. Of these, four in Jaipur (May), Bangalore (July), Ahmedabad (July) and Delhi (September) were committed by some members of the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which has had contacts with the LeT. In messages sent before and after the attacks, they described themselves as the Indian Mujahideen (IM). The IM came to notice for the first time in November 2007 when it organized three explosions in three towns of Uttar Pradesh. In a message sent to sections of the media that day, it accused the Indian criminal justice system of being unfair to Muslims. All these four were acts of reprisal terrorism with no strategic objective.

During these strikes, the IM did not attack foreigners either in Jaipur, which has the second largest foreign tourist traffic after Goa or in Bangalore, which is one of the favourite destinations for foreign business companies.

India has been facing terrorist attacks by home-grown jihadi groups since 1993. The defining characteristics of these attacks were:

• No suicide or suicidal (fedayeen) terrorism. No Indian Muslim has so far indulged in suicide terrorism in Indian territory. The only instance of suicidal terrorism by an Indian Muslim was in Glasgow in UK in June, 2006.
• No barbaric methods such as slitting the throats of the victims. Such barbaric methods are the signature modus operandi of jihadis from Pakistan.
• Reliance more on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) than on hand-held weapons.
• No attacks on foreign nationals except once in 1991 when the J&K Liberation Front (JKLF) killed one Israeli tourist in Srinagar.

Of the remaining two terrorist strikes in 2008, one in Assam in October was committed by a local ethnic group with the help of elements from Bangladesh and the other in Mumbai in November by 10 Pakistani members of the LeT.

The defining characteristics of the Mumbai attack were:

This was the first attack of suicidal (fedayeen) terrorism in the Indian territory outside J&K. All previous fedayeen attacks were in J&K.

This was the second attack in Indian territory outside J&K in which all the principal perpetrators were Pakistani nationals. The first one was the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.

This was the second attack of jihadi terrorists on India’s economic infrastructure. The first was in March, 1993 — also in Mumbai.

The LeT terrorists attacked a mix of targets — human beings as well as economic capabilities, the man in the street as well as the elite and Indians as well as foreigners.

• This was the first attack by jihadi terrorists on foreigners in Indian territory outside J&K. Since 9/11, there have been 13 targeted attacks on foreigners in the Indian sub-continent — 12 in Pakistani territory and the Mumbai one in Indian territory. Of the 12 attacks in Pakistani territory, five were on Chinese nationals, four on American nationals and one each on French, German and Danish nationals or interests.
• This was the first terrorist attack on Israelis and the Jewish people in the Indian territory outside J&K. It came in the wake of intelligence warnings that the LeT and the SIMI were planning to attack Israeli tourists in Goa. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad had reportedly told his American interrogators that Al Qaeda had wanted to attack the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi. Mumbai has two establishments associated with Israel and the Jewish people — the Israeli Consulate and the Narriman House. The terrorists came by sea and attacked at night. They chose the Narriman House and not the Consulate because it is near the sea and had Jewish people living there, whereas the Consulate has no Jewish people at night.
• There was a mix of modus operandi (MO) — urban warfare of the kind waged by the Hezbollah in Beirut and orchestrated acts of mass casualty terrorism of the kind waged by Al Qaeda; and old terrorism involving the use of hand-held weapons, hand-grenades and explosives and new terrorism involving the use of the latest communications and navigation gadgetry. The TV visuals from Mumbai during the 60 hours that the attack lasted brought back to the minds of professionals visuals, which used to come out of Beirut.
• There was a mix of strategies — a strategy for disrupting the Indo-Pakistan peace process was combined with a strategy for acts of reprisal against India’s close relations with Israel and the West. A strategy for discrediting the Indian counter-terrorism community and policy-makers in the eyes of the Indian public was combined with a strategy for discrediting them in the eyes of the international community and business class.
• There was a mix of attacks on the man in the street in public places such as a railway station, a public square, a hospital, etc and on the business and social elite in the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi/Trident Hotels. These are not ordinary hotels patronized by tourists who travel on a shoe-string budget. These are very expensive hotels patronized by the cream of the international business class, who visit Mumbai not for pleasure, but for business.
• The terrorists did not indulge in classical hostage-taking tactics, where one takes hostages in order to put forward a demand. They took hostages and locked themselves in buildings in order to force an armed confrontation with the security forces.
• The grievances of the Indian Muslims were not the cause of the terrorist attack. Pakistan’s strategic objectives against India, such as forcing a change in the status quo in J&K and disrupting India’s economic progress and strategic relations with the West and Israel were the principal motive.
• Reprisal against the US-led coalition in Afghanistan for its war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban was another motive.

There was considerable criticism of the Indian counter-terrorism community — some justified and some unfair. In September, 2008, there were reports from the Indian and US intelligence that LeT terrorists in Pakistan were planning to carry out a sea-borne terrorist strike against sea-front hotels in Mumbai, including the Taj Mahal hotel. A high-alert was issued. Security was tightened by the Police, the Navy, the Coast Guard and the security set-ups of the hotels. The terrorists, who had planned to strike on September 26, postponed their attack. There was no fresh information in October. No terrorist strike came. The alert was reportedly downgraded in November. The attack came on November 26. It is always a dilemma for the counter-terrorism community as to for how long should a high alert be continued.

There was also criticism of what was described as the slow response of India’s special intervention forces, such as the National Security Guards (NSG). While some Western analysts criticized their response as too slow taking about 60 hours, some Israeli analysts criticized it as too hasty, without trying to tire the terrorists out by indulging in talks with them. The NSG did not have the luxury of many options since it was not a classical hostage situation. Their objective was to save as many lives as possible from three different places which were under the control of the terrorists.

There are two ways of assessing the performance of the NSG and the Police. The first is from the number of people killed by the terrorists in these three places — about 100. The second is from the number of people, whom they rescued alive — nearly 1000. Let us applaud them for saving so many people despite the difficulties faced by them.

The most objective assessment of the performance of the NSG and the Police came from Ami Pedazhur, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Texas at Austin, and the author of the forthcoming book The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism. In an article contributed by him to the New York Times (December 19, 2008), Pedazhur wrote: “It is clear that the Indian security forces made some mistakes. However, mistakes are inherent in such crises. At the same time, given the complex nature of the attacks, it seems likely the death toll could have been much higher. After the initial confusion, the Indians seem to have done a thorough job of gathering intelligence and carefully planning their counter-attacks. The execution itself was careful and thorough.”He added: “The Mumbai attacks showed just how difficult it is for large, multi-ethnic states to protect themselves from terrorism, something Americans have known well since 9/11. There is certainly much for New Delhi and Washington to learn from the Israeli experience, but there is no one-size-fits-all solution. While Israel has much to be proud of in how it has handled terrorism, it also has much to be humble about.”Counter-terrorism is much more difficult in India than in any other country because of its large size, federal constitution which gives greater powers to the State governments in respect of crime control and law and order, multi-party system and coalition governments at New Delhi and in many States. Moreover, India is located right in the centre of the Islamic world with Islamic countries to the East, West and North-West of it. It has the second largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia.Actions against jihadi terrorists — whether home-grown or externally sponsored — have to be attentive to the sensitivities of the Muslim community while acting against the terrorist elements from them. This often creates a Hamlet-like situation for the counter-terrorism community. Political consensus on counter-terrorism related issues is more difficult to achieve than in other democracies.