Indian Defence Review

Come September — Retribution and Retaliation: The unstinted support of the local population, which Sir Michael Howard had defined as the ‘forgotten dimensions of strategy’, emboldened the waterborne guerrillas to launch attacks on Pakistani land forces using captured and requisitioned motor launches mounted with infantry weapons provided by the Mukti Fauj forces of Colonel Osmani. The West Pakistani forces had gradually fallen back on their earlier plan of holding vital border outposts to prevent the Mukti Bahini striking from behind their defence lines. Nevertheless, the frogmen chose the riverine environment of the Sunderbans to infiltrate deep into East Pakistan and strike from the rear.

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However, as was the case initially with the land forces, the frogmen who were basically an underwater guerrilla group, suffered heavy losses when they took on the Pakistani patrol boats. 1wenty-one guerrillas perished and severe damage was inflicted on their civilian river craft. A leak in intelligence was suspected particularly as there was a requirement to liase with several local units in the area which was also a concentration area for the Razzakars. The tragedy was even more heartrending as these operations were not within the purview of the frogmen wing of the Mukti Bahini. This heavy loss of life tended to undermine their confidence, which is a major prerequisite for carrying out underwater operations. Moreover, their families could not bury their dead or honour the living for fear of reprisals.’

A leak in intelligence was suspected particularly as there was a requirement to liase with several local units in the area which was also a concentration area for the Razzakars.

The frogmen thereafter restricted their targets to underwater operations. On a moonless night in September, 160 frogmen carried out highly successful coordinated strikes, particularly as the earlier vigilance had slackened primarily due to monotony and boredom for round-the-clock vigilance with no sign of action.

The second attack on Chitta gong was led by Nur Mohamed and Rehman, who were both ex-naval personnel dismissed after the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The other pair were Nazrul Islam and Abdur Rehman. Their launching pad on this occasion was Gupta Island in the middle of the Karnaphuli river. Their primary targets were freighters Al Murtaza and Imtiaz Baksh. Two other vessels, Teviot Bank of UK and the Greek freighter Avlos which were alongside disembarking stores and supplies for the Army were also targeted. Two limpets were attached to each of the above major targets. One explosive was bolted to minor targets such as barges, harbour Claft and pontoons. Lacking adequate resources, on completion of every strike it was necessary to retrieve unused mines in order to maintain adequate quantities for the next strike. This by itself was a hazardous task but was necessary for guerrilla operations. Alan, Ahsannullah, Mondol and Mukherjee attacked the coaster Dwarka, two barges and one tug at Khulna/Chalna ports.

Two other vessels, Teviot Bank of UK and the Greek freighter Avlos which were alongside disembarking stores and supplies for the Army were also targeted.

Mohinuddin Haq, Manzur and Nooruzzaman spearheaded the attack on the river port of Barisal where they sank the coaster Shipta Dingha as also two tugs, one river steamer, one ferry and the buoy laying vessel, Path Finder.

Altaf Mehmood, Hafeez and Swapan led the attack on the inland port of Chand pur and sank one launch, three ferries and a coaster as also a launch and a terminal pantoon at Aricha Ghat. One pontoon and a ferry were sunk at Goalanda Ghat as also three barges in the Gabkhan Channel. At Ashuganj, one coaster was heavily damaged. A ferry was set on fire at Jaganthpur Ghat as all limpet mines and explosives had been expended. At Faridpur, Bura Miah, Mustafa, Zheer and Bachu dressed as police constables had a field day by sinking two passenger launches which included the tourist luxury boat Shikapur Faridon. They also captured three mechanized crafts which they hid in one of the minor tributaries of the river.

The toll in September was 6000 tons of shipping sunk and an additional 17,000 tons damaged. The discrepancy in the total was partly due to the delay in obtaining ‘confirmed kills’ due to the strict censorship in the East. In some cases, the results of an earlier attack were credited to the following month. Moreover, it was natural to exaggerate. The above figures particularly of the large ships were confirmed in due course by Lloyd’s casualty list as the majority of ships were insured with Lloyd’s of London. On the whole, the claims were comparatively accurate although in some cases the vessels which had settled on the bottom were refloated at a later date.

The discrepancy in the total was partly due to the delay in obtaining “˜confirmed kills due to the strict censorship in the East.

The effectiveness of the frogmen’s control over major river routes could also be seen from the order to all vessels to fly the Pakistan flag on. leaving harbour or face a death sentence. But nonetheless all craft lowered their flag when transiting guerrilla-controlled waterways for ensuring their safety as also express their loyalty to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who was awaiting a death sentence in a jail in West Pakistan.

Odyssey of October — The Noose Tightens

The month of Ramzan witnessed yet another coordinated attack by 150 frogmen on East Pakistan ports and inland waterways. On this occasion operations were also shifted to the mighty Meghna river which flows into the sea via the Tetulia. Shahbazpur and Sandwip channels leading into the entrance to Chittagong. The river and its tributaries were choked with weeds and floatsom which provided an ideal cover for frogmen operations.

Mahboob, Sharif, Niranjan, Kazi and Badal spearheaded the third attack against (the main port of Chittagong. The timing of the attack was determined by tides, period of darkness, ship movements and the prevailing security measures in the port.

A single explosion was at times not adequate to sink the bigger coasters which were mostly the newly contracted Chinese vessels being delivered at a faster rate.

The coasters Nasim. Sher Afghan, and Lalsira were sunk. A smaller tanker and two coasters were damaged. Only one limpet mine could be attached to the hulls of these minor targets owing to the strong tides and eddies in the river. Therefore a single explosion was at times not adequate to sink the bigger coasters which were mostly the newly contracted Chinese vessels being delivered at a faster rate.

The security in Chittagong had also been increasingly stepped up. Patrol boats with searchlights, continuous searches of port workers of every shift and strict vigil on loading and unloading ships required more training and discipline from the frogmen, who had by now built up an enviable operational experience to back up their training. Further, these attacks achieved the aim of tying up a large number of soldiers which in turn diffused the strength of the battalions confronting the Mukti Bahini.

In the Barisal area, one coaster was sunk and a depot for buoys and navigational markings was set on fire. Simultaneously, the navigational buoys at Sandwip and Hathia islands were holed Clnd sunk. The buoyage system in the wide rivers is critical for navigating vessel in the narrow navigable channels. Pontoons and ferry terminals at the inland ports of Narayanganj and Naggarbari were destroyed by Samad, Ashfaq, Masund and Khaled who were all former university students and had by now gained adequate experience to plan and mount operations by themselves. Two launches were captured at Harinagar and Jamalpur and taken to Mukti Bahini hideouts.

Lloyd’s casualty figures

The tote for October 1971 was 8000 tons of shipping sunk and a further 16,000 tons damaged. In addition, pressure was mounted on transport in the inland waterways system particularly from Chittagong, and Khulna to Narayanganj and thence to the provincial capital of Dacca. The armed forces on internal security duties had to spend more time in ensuring their own safety than in carrying out search and attack patrols for ferreting out Mukti Bahini’s concentrations.

Sector Commanders tended to retain the services of the well-trained frogmen who also had the experience for handling explosives and delay charges.

The Mukti Bahini Sector Commanders, as already identified, actively assisted in updating intelligence, providing guides and locating safe hiding places for the frogmen. But the highly motlvated and well-trained underwater guerrillas tended to keep to themselves as the sine qua non for their success and safety depended on surprise, innovation and audacity where leakage of information was invariably fatal to their operation. Moreover, Sector Commanders tended to retain the services of the well-trained frogmen who also had the experience for handling explosives and delay charges. Therefore, the frogmen guarded their quota of limpet mines with a fervour, which in hindsight, was similar to the elan built up by the highly motivated Special Service Groups of today.

The Mukti Bahini land forces also improved their performance considerably after being blooded in their earlier engagements. Bombs exploded nightly in Dacca. Bridges were blown up. Railway tracks uprooted and explosives planted in defence headquarters. West Pakistan Army patrols were consistently ambushed and were in a state of seige both physically and psychologically.

With the end of the monsoons, Pakistan had augmented her forces to four divisions with well-established cantonments at Chittagong, Comilla, Dacca, Jessore and Khulna. It was almost a replica of the British cantonment pattern of command and control. Communication arteries from ports to these cantonments hence became vital targets for the Mukti Bahini. It was therefore necessary to attack the only refinery in the Eastern region which was located at Chittagong. The transportation of fuel for the increasing number of mechanized units and air links in East Pakistan thus became a major task for Pakistan.

Anguish and ecstasy

Bangladesh, however, paid a fearsome price for their resistance. Whole villages were levelled out as colle2tive punishment. Women were raped without ~ny concern of their being Muslims or Pakistani citizens although the Hindus bore the brunt of the atrocities. When I visited Dacca on 17 December 1971 carrying a message from Indira Gandhi to Begum Mujibur Rehman regarding the safety of the Sheikh, the bunkers around the airport resembled brothels with condoms and other sex items littering the military fortifications – a damning indictment of Pakistan’s military norms and that too against their own citizens. Torture and murder were the order of the day. The looting of provisions and stores by the Pakistan Army invariably had a note: ‘Send the bill to Indira Gandhi’.

The World Bank official, Peter Cargill, wrote a damaging report on Pakistan’s administrative incompetence and military brutality. The Bank stopped further economic assistance in spite of the initial efforts of Robert MacNamara to only limit the assistance. The Washington Post and the ‘deep throat’ of American conscience however cut into the efforts of President Nixon and his administration to step up assistance to Pakistan. The secret visit of Kissinger to China brokered by Pakistan was the price paid by democracy.

The armed river launch could only see the outhnes of the freighter and promptly opened fire scoring nearly 50 direct hits on the conspicuous bridge. Fortunately, no one was hurt.

Nearly ten million refugees crossed into West Bengal, Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Mizoram. There was an unending stream of deprived citizens carrying all their worldly possessions in a bundle. They belonged to many religions and worshipped different gods but they were all united in running away from death in the figure of the Pakistan soldier who did not differentiate between a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian or Buddhist. They were all Bengalis and hence a fit target for the genocide unleashed by the martial law authorities on 25 May 1971 – which day was observed as the beginning of the ‘Amar Bengali’ movement.

Mujibnagar became the Headquarters for the exiled Government of Bangladesh and was initially located at Theatre Road, Calcutta. 4 The Bangladesh Government in exile appointed Colonel M.A.G. Osmani, as Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladeshi armed forces on 14 August 1971 to ensure that there was some sort of coordination and control over the thousands who desired to liberate their ‘Sonar Bangia’.

The millions of refugees who entered India had to stand pitifully for hours for a handful of rations which cost India Rs 2 per head. Children suffered most from malnutrition, dysentery and cholera which affected nearly 46,000 by end September. S Life-giving milk and other protein foods were available in some of the camps but the rush for survival was so great that many children failed in their efforts to avoid hunger. A doctor remarked that the children died so quickly that they did not have time to treat them.

November Nemesis — Death-Knell of Ports and Waterways

Surface action at Chalna

The floods of East Pakistan, the breakdown of law and order and the deployment of service personnel for countering the increased hostility of the local population had their effect on the morale and discipline of officers and men of the Pakistan Navy. This was compounded by informal mobilization and the stoppage of retirement. Rear Admiral Shariff, the Flag Officer Commanding East Pakistan, gave a detailed briefing at Naval Headquarters, Karachi on 9 November 1971. He spoke of the increasing role of the Navy in East Pakistan and the urgent need for additional equipment and personnel. He concluded that although it would be a long-drawn-out and dirty campaign, the hard-core insurgents would be subdued. Thereafter, it was business as usual at Naval Headquarters until jolted by the commencement of hostilities.

The secret visit of Kissinger to China brokered by Pakistan was the price paid by democracy.

The Mukti Bahini forces had by now built up sufficient confidence and experience to take on the depleted West Pakistani forces. They sailed their two captured river launches with a mixed crew of twelve ex-naval and freshly trained frogmen to reach Akram Point which was \the entrance to Pusur river on 10/11 November 1971. The launch was armed with a captured 40/60 Bofors gun and with her low silhouette the vessel was difficult to detect in the mist covered environment. At this juncture, the British 7000-ton freighter, St. Albans, commenced entering the Pusur channel. The armed river launch could only see the outhnes of the freighter and promptly opened fire scoring nearly 50 direct hits on the conspicuous bridge. Fortunately, no one was hurt. The Captain instantly reversed course and returned to Calcutta for repairs. The British Naval Adviser at Delhi, Captain Hans-Hamilton requested assistance from the Indian Naval Ordinance personnel at Calcutta to patch up the ship which was completed with a sense of urgency.

It was also explained to the British High Commission in Delhi that the despatch of the British aircraft carrier, HMS Bulwark, and an attendant destroyer ostensibly to evacuate British citizens from East Pakistan would convey the wrong signal to the Bangladeshis as did the announcement of the despatch of the US Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal. It was also pointed out that in view of the large British investments in East Pakistan,’ any feeling that Britain was siding with the oppressors of East Pakistan would imperil their investments as there was never any doubt that ‘Bangladesh’ would be liberated.

The RN ships turned back from the vicinity of the Maldives and in hindsight kudos should be given to the British High Commission where the Naval Advisor kept himself fully informed of the need to protect British ‘interests and investments in both segments of Pakistan. This was in stark contrast to the United States authorities who refused to see the writing on the wall of the confrontation between a democracy and a military dictatorship.

Mining the Pusur river entrance

The Mukti Bahini naval forces were elated with the success of their riverine operations which prevented external supplies reaching the beleaguered Pakistan Army. However, Greek and, Panamanian ships flying the flags of convenience continued to bring in supplies as they were attracted by the ‘high war-risk rates’.

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The frogmen then mined the entrance near the fairway buoy on the Pusur river. They used a submarine-delivered mine with a ship-count mechanism which was possibly smuggled out of the Chittagong Ordinance depot and very akin to the ones embarked by Ghazi.

The explosion of the vessel striking the mine was dramatic. No lives were lost but the vessel went to the bottom partly blocking the navigable channel.

The first victim of this innovative mining operation was the Greek freighter Chrysovalendu which had defied local sentiments by bringing in much-needed military supplies at lucrative cargo rates. The explosion of the vessel striking the mine was dramatic. No lives were lost but the vessel went to the bottom partly blocking the navigable channel.

The morale of the security forces dipped to an all-time low. The port authorities marked a narrow channel and doubled the security measures. However, another Greek freighter, the 8000-ton Mastrostellos which also tried to run the gauntlet, struck another mine and lay disabled thus completely blocking the Pusur channel. A remarkable achievement without using a mine layer or even a suitably converted vessel as there was none in the area. The Port Director formally closed the second largest port in East Pakistan – a recognition of the highly motivated and effective Mukti Bahini maritime wing, which merits this saga being further investigated and carved into the history of the liberation of Bangladesh.

November tote

The November attack by 172 waterborne guerrillas with each pair of frogmen now carrying two limpet mines and hand grenades were more effective. The operations were switched from night to early mornings to take advantage of the winter river mist and poor visibility. The frogmen led by Lieutenant Zia neutralized the Gabkhan canal. The mini bulk carrier, Minilabour was disabled at Khulna and the Columbia Trader at Mongla in spite of continuous aerial reconnaissances by light aircraft and helicopters.

Two frogmen failed to rendezvous after the attack and it is presumed they made the ultimate sacrifice. The freighter Mercara and Skyter were extensively damaged.

The Somalian freighter Berlion was also attacked in Khulna. Siddiqui’s (not Tiger Siddiqui) cavaliers sank an inland water tanker and a large barge at Chittagong. Two frogmen failed to rendezvous after the attack and it is presumed they made the ultimate sacrifice. The freighter Mercara and Skyter were extensively damaged.

In Narayanganj, the coaster Minilion with 800 tons of wheat as also a motor launch and a ferry were sunk. At Chandpur, Sharif and Bura Miah, captured three large barges and sank the coaster MV Shamy. The Chandpur power house was also attacked. At Tarorhat and Mohanpur, Imam and Rahman sank the coaster Lili and another smaller vessel. At Alashpur, the frogmen sank the inland waterways vessel, Jaipur and the large self-propelled barge Gafoor. The launches Subhan and Kalpana were captured. At Bhadur Ghat, a largesized barge and steamer were sunk.

At Barisal, Alam and Kutubdin affixed limpets near the waterline of MV Slettar and Africa Proctor and hurriedly left the scene as the ebb had commenced. Sentries on board noticed the exposed limpets and removed the explosives.

The kills rose to 20,000 tons sunk and another 18,000 tons damaged in November 1971. Eid was celebrated mainly by Bihari Muslims and West Pakistani soldiers. The Bengalis carried on with their dedicated task of liberating their motherland and gave no respite to their ruthless oppressors who found it difficult to proclaim to their overlords in Islamabad that there was any semblance of normalcy.

This small band of waterborne guerrillas, albeit literally like fish in water, brought the major ports of Chittagong, Chalna, Mongla and Khulna to a standstill. They effectively paralysed the vital inlandwaterways transport system of estuarine East Bengal. The Port Directors closed the ports. Foreign companies put an embargo on their ships entering East Pakistan ports. The Lloyd’s casualty list in London could not be doubted and soaring insurance rates made it uneconomic for even ships under ‘flags of convenience’ to exploit the high cargo rates. But before another sledgehammer attack could be delivered, conflict with India broke out and the Mukti Bahini naval forces joined up with the Indian Border Security Force to liberate ports and waterways of their beloved ‘Sonar Bangia’.

December Liberation — Force Alpha Enters Khulna

With the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan on 3 December 1971, two Mukti Bahini vessels arrived at the Border Security base at Hasnabad on 6 December 1971. The Commandant of the 72 Battalion Marine Special Force, Commander H. K Mukerjee, IN (Retd), fuelled, stored and provided guides to the two Mukti Bahini vessels which were provided with communication sailors and wireless sets.

The Bengalis carried on with their dedicated task of liberating their motherland and gave no respite to their ruthless oppressors who found it difficult to proclaim to their overlords in Islamabad that there was any semblance of normalcy.

Frogmen with demolition stores were then embarked. The BSF vessel, MV Chitrangada and the Naval Seaward defence boat, INS Panvel, were added to this force.

Force Alpha secures an identity

Commander M. N. Samant of the Indian Navy was appointed as the senior officer of ‘Force Alpha’ with instruction to liberate the Khulna, Mongla and Chalna. A large yellow cloth (15′ x 10′) was to be permanently displayed on the bridge of the vessel as an air recognition signal for both Indian Army and Air Force units advancing in this area. Strict wireless silence was to be maintained during the passage to Akram PT via the Sunderbans.

MV Chitrangada, which was a slower vessel, was sailed at about 2300 hours on 7 December 1971. The rest of the force departed Hasnabad on 7 December 1971 and effected a rendezvous by about 1630 hours on the same day despite a Pakistani WIT station breaking in on the Calcutta naval frequency and instructing Panvel to transmit continuously in order to obtain an accurate intercept bearing. The entire force arrived, without opposition, at Akram Point after midnight. Panvel picked up two medium contacts on her rdar of ships leaving harbour at speeds superior to Force Alpha. The message was relayed to the Eastern Fleet (Rear Admiral S. H. Sharma) flying his flag on board the aircraft carrier Vikrant. The Pakistani freighters Anwar Baksh and Baqir were intercepted and became prizes of war. Force Alpha continued to remain at Akram Point.

Palash was also set on fire but was able to beach on the Eastern shore. Panvel manoeuvred to escape the air attack. Some of the crew of the vessels that were hit jumped into the water.

The Force again got underway at 1500 hours on 9 December to arrive at Mongla by about 2300 hours as most of the channel buoys remained lit. However, about 2 km from Mongla, they saw the anchorage ablaze. Hence, they anchored for the night and entered Mongla harbour at first light on 10 December, Four medium-sized merchantmen, Mastrostellos (earlier mined in the channel), Rigoletto, Nordpole and a foreign freighter were in flames. The Somalian vessel, Lightning, which was attacked in August, was lying alongside the Khulna Shipyard jetty. The Pakistani merchantman, Makran, was masquerading as MV Dora. The Ocean Enterprise also changed its name to the Panamian ship Clandente. They were both boarded. Ansar and the mooring vessel Mahir were also seized. MV Chitrangada remained behind to render assistance as also search for survivors. Panvel, Padma and Palash sailed on to Khulna. They were loudly cheered by the local villagers lining the banks and responding to the throaty cry of ‘Joy Bangia’.

Khulna surrenders to Force Alpha

Force Alpha entered the port of Khulna at about 1130 hours and manoeuvred close to the Western shore which was in the centre of the city. At about 1140 hours, three IAF Gnats were sighted and the yellow identification flag on all the vessels was prominently displayed. However, the Gnats dived to attack Padma which was disabled. Palash was also set on fire but was able to beach on the Eastern shore. Panvel manoeuvred to escape the air attack. Some of the crew of the vessels that were hit jumped into the water. They were in turn fired upon by Pakistani forces. Panvel closed the stricken ships and opened fire at the miscreants with 40/60 Bofors and LMGs. The local population watching the naval action from the opposite shore cheered lustily as Pakistani soldiers retreated. This was more like a bullfight than war at sea! However, at 1240 hours, a second attack by three Gnats developed. Fortunately they recognized the yellow flag just in time and instead straffed the Khulna shipyard, steel mills and government offices.

Lieutenant S.K. Mitra and Sub-Lieutenant Bandopadhya of the Indian Navy were captured by the Pakistani forces. They were treated well in custody as the liberation forces were fast approaching and were subsequently released. The officers rejoined the ship and both rose to the rank of Commander. The dead included 5 Mukti Bahini naval personal, 2 Mukti Bahini guides, 1 Lance Naik of BSF and 3 Indian naval personnel. 7 others received minor injuries.

Panvel and Chitrangada embarked the casualities and returned to Hasnabad by 1800 hours on 18 December. The wounded and dead were transferred to the Barrackpore Military Hospital. Within days the Pakistan Army surrendered and Bangladesh was born. Commander Samant, Lieutenant Commander Noronah and Leading Seaman C. Singh were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. Vir Chakras were awarded to five others. So ended the remarkable conflict in inland waters with 400 Mukti Bahini frogmen sinking or damaging over a lakh tons of shipping in the embayed Indian Ocean. And yet this saga of courage and achievement lies buried and unreported even after a quarter of a century – an unsung epitaph to the sacrifice and determination of the sons of Bangladesh.

Epilogue

The Mukti Bahini guerrillas had done their duty by inflicting a crippling damage on the East Pakistan ports, inland waterways and shipping. In toting up this score, which had since been confirmed by Lloyd’s with minor discrepancies, one has to view not only the sinking of ships or damage to jetties and immobilization of ports and navigable channels but also to the vast amount of international shipping that kept away from East Bengal ports in spite of the high rates of compensation announced by the Government. The Mukti Bahini frogmen I held East Pakistan in a state of siege in the highest traditions , of war at sea and that too without possessing a single oceangoing I vessel.

the frogmen attained their aim of closing the major ports of Chalna/Mongla and Chittagong, which paradoxically was mined by the departing Pakistani authorities using Chinese fabricated mines almost on the day prior to the surrender.

In four months, the frogmen attained their aim of closing the major ports of Chalna/Mongla and Chittagong, which paradoxically was mined by the departing Pakistani authorities using Chinese fabricated mines almost on the day prior to the surrender. The hunter thus became the hunted. The port, as will be observed, was cleared by the minesweepers of the Indian and Soviet navies although some personnel were more keen in salvaging the gold thrown into the river than in hunting the mines! Colonel Osmani of the Bangladesh Army said after the war that even if the Indian Army had not intervened they would have driven away the Pakistani forces in due course. Be that as it may there is little doubt that the Mukti Bahini frogmen accelerated the liberation of East Bengal.

In early 1972, I and Rear Admiral S.H. Sarma, the Fleet Commander of the Eastern Fleet, visited Dacca and Chittagong primarily to oversee the progress of minesweeping. They met some of the frogmen who were reticent to talk of their courage and achievements. The few naval personnel were happy to join the embryo Bangladesh Navy which by this time had a few officers deported from Karachi. But the highly motivated frogmen, mostly students, did not seek any kudos or political recognition or reward except the liberation of their beloved’ Sonar Bangia’. Freedom fighters from Mozambique, Libya and Somalia eagerly sought the details of the unique riverine guerrilla operations which however was left exclusively to the liberated Government of Bangladesh to tackle.

The land forces of the Mukti Bahini were perforce in the limelight. Their senior officers became political heavyweights and their careers took them to the top. Generals Zia-urRahman, Khalid Musaraf and Air Marshal Khondkar were well aware of the achievements of the frogmen who however were content to return to their homes and institutions without fuss or fanfare. This in hindsight was in the traditions of the silent service.

To end by quoting Churchill’s oft quoted cliche ‘perhaps none owed so much to so few’ which aptly describes in the hitherto untold saga of the liberation struggle of Bangladesh.

References

1. Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947-72, Naval Headquarters, Historical Section, Islamabad, 1991, p. 285.
2. Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession, University of California. 1910. Table 2. Results of Pakistan National Elections, 1970, p. 32.
3. Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession, University of California, 1990, p. 132.
4. Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession, University of California, p. 142.
5. Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession, University of California, 1990, p, 153.