Indian Defence Review

Exploitation of East Pakistan: The East Bengal segment of Pakistan deeply resented the exploitation of the eighteen districts that comprised the four divisions of East Pakistan. The major source of exploitation was the foreign exchange earnings from their 40 jute mills located at Chittagong, Chandpur, Saidpur and Dacca and the tea gardens at Kaptai, Kishoreganj, Fenchgong, Chatak and Chittagong. But only one-fifth of the foreign exchange earnings were made available to the Eastern Wing.

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Further, it was East Pakistan that supplied most of the domestic requirements of paper, sugar, textiles, betelhut and tea. The paper mills at Chandragaon and Khulna, sugar factories at Darsana, Khulna, Gauripur and Thakurgaon arid the textile mills at Bogra, Narayangunj,’ Kaliganj, Tungi and Dacca were the main production centres. But nonetheless, out of Rs 100d million spent on development in the fifties and sixties, only Rs 300 million was the share of East Bengal. Therefore, rice production remained stagnant as tractors, fertilizers, import of seeds, etc. were unfairly apportioned to this former rice bowl which now paradoxically depended on the import of grain.

“¦according to World Bank figures, the ratio of per capita income between West and East Pakistan which was 100:82 in 1957 dropped sharply to 100:62 in 1971.

Similarly, only half the volume of East Bengal exports were allowed to be spent on imports for East Pakistan. Besides, 75 per cent of the heavy industries of Pakistan continued to be located in the West. Hence, according to World Bank figures, the ratio of per capita income between West and East Pakistan which was 100:82 in 1957 dropped sharply to 100:62 in 1971. And in addition, the per capita income of West Pakistan was 32 per cent higher than East Pakistan.

This in turn affected the employment potential among the rapidly growing population of East Pakistan which was further aggravated by only 15 per cent of Pakistan’s Government employees being recruited from East Pakistan. And in the predominantly Punjabi armed forces, Bengalis accounted for only 5 per cent of the total armed forces. Only in the Navy did Bengali officers account for 19 per cent of the technical cadre but only 5 per cent of the non-technical branches.

Further, in the context of culture and language, Bengali was denied its rightful place as the language medium in law courts or competitive examinations. It was not taught in many schools and colleges. Bengali theatre, music, literature and paintings were discouraged as being alien and pro-Indian. In short, Pakistan considered their Eastern Wing more as a colony for exploitation than as an integral part of their nation state.

The waterways of revenge

The major seaport was Chittagong situated on the Karnaphuli river which handled 31 lakh tons of cargo in 1969. This tonnage doubled in 1971 due to the induction of four Pakistan Army divisions with their logistic requirements to stem the deteriorating law and order situation. A few months earlier, Major Zia-ur-Rehman had turned his guns against Pakistan soldiers who had been sent to crush the Bengali dock workers on their refusal to unload arms from the freighter MV Swat.

No other naval establishments were located in East Pakistan in spite of the Awami League clamouring for maritime establishments in East Bengal”¦But Islamabad continued to maintain that the defence of East Pakistan lay in the West.

The West Pakistan authorities had earlier embarked a large contingent of East Bengal Rifles for onward passage to Karachi. These troops had also revolted and the ship was forced to turn around and disembark them at Chittagong thus making the East Bengal Rifles (EBR) the nucleus for the emerging partisan forces. Chalna was the main port for the inland waterways transport system for the Khulna region which utilized the Pussur river for servicing this deltaic region. The naval base PNS Bakhtiar was located in Chittagong. In 1970, PNS Titumarwas commissioned in Khulna. No other naval establishments were located in East Pakistan in spite of the Awami League clamouring for maritime establishments in East Bengal. This would have not only created employment but also harnessed the natural reservoir of Bengalis who were well versed in maritime crafts such as merchant seamen, fishermen, coxswains for harbour vessels, marine mechanics and experienced sailors. But Islamabad continued to maintain that the defence of East Pakistan lay in the West.

East Bengal in turn, realized how defenceless the region was particularly during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict when the Pakistan Air Force units based in East Bengal attacked Indian Air Force stations of Kalaikunda and Bagdogra. India, however, did not carry out reprisals. Although this was resented by Indian Air Force personnel, it turned out as a negative factor for Pakistan during the ensuing civil war.

East Pakistan waterways

The primary river routes in East Bengal were:

The Chinese had supplied 28 such vessels with a capacity of 20,000 tons of cargo or alternatively transporting one battalion of troops per coaster.

1. Chittagong-South of Sandwip-Gazipur-Chandpur-Dacca.
2. Chittagong-South of Sandwip-Gazipur-Barisal-Khulna.

The waterway between Chittagong and Khulna bifurcates at Gazipur with the ‘Kache route’ between Barisal and Khulna being used by vessels with draughts of 12 feet. These vessels navigated down to Barisal along Morrelganj to the top of the Bay and then via the Pussur river to Sandwip and onwards to Chalna and Khulna. The alternative was the ‘Madhumati route’ for vessels with draughts of less than 6 feet. These shallow draught vessels proceed to Khulna via the upper route through Patghat and Gopalganj.

The logistic requirements for these cantonments were the transportation of two lakh tons of cargo and 1.5 lakh personnel.

However, for both routes, the bottleneck was the 80feet wide Gabkhan Canal which was between Jalakathi and Pirajpur and hence was a primary target for the riverine guerrillas for targeting coasters which daily carried 800 tons of cargo from Dacca to Chittagong and Khulna. The Chinese had supplied 28 such vessels with a capacity of 20,000 tons of cargo or alternatively transporting one battalion of troops per coaster. Normally it took one day to load, two days to unload and a day to reach their destination. The US had contracted to give nine such mini-bulkers of 2500 tons and seventeen coasters each of 600 to 1000 tons to Pakistan ostensibly to transport foodgrains and not for military purposes.

The inland river ports of Chandpur, Naranganj, Daudkhandi, Barisal, Phulchari Ghat, Khulna, Goalundo Ghat, Nagarbari, Jalakatti. Ashuganj and Jamalpur tactically linked the major military cantonments of Dacca, Comilla, Syhlet, Jessore, Rangsur, Rajshahi, Bogra, Khulna and Chittagong. The logistic requirements for these cantonments were the transportation of two lakh tons of cargo and 1.5 lakh personnel. The requirement doubled by mid-1971 because of the reinforcements being flown in via Sri Lanka. Overflights over India were banned when an Indian Airlines Fokker aircraft was hijacked and blown up at Lahore airport in January 1971 which incident’ was well covered by the Pakistan television and press.

The following draughts in the riverine transport system were the controlling factor for routing vessels.

The preoccupations of Naval Headquarters hence continued with the induction of the three Daphne class submarines and their support facilities together with the problem of malfunctioning torpedoes and the overdue refit of Ghazi.

1. Chittagong-Narayanganj – 12 feet (last quarter – October to December) – 9 feet.
2. Naranganj to Bhairab – 9 feet.
3. Bhairab to Sylhet – 4 to 5 feet (draught increases during monsoons) .
4. Narayanganj-Goalundo-Aricha upto Jumna river (Padma route) – 6 feet.
5. Narayanganj to Khulna (Madhumati river) – 6 feet.
6. Narayanganj via Koche route – 12 feet.

Railways and roads of East Pakistan

The waterways were the prime arteries for transport particularly in the South. Nevertheless there were 2700 km of railways in East Bengal. The principal rail routes were

1. Dacca to Chittagong.
2. Dacca to Sylhet.
3. Dacca to Darsana with a ferry service between Jaganath Ghat and Serajganj Ghat.
4. Dacca to Khulna with a ferry service.
5. Dacca to Rajshahi with a ferry service.

There were also 1948 km of all weather roads in East Pakistan. Hence, while the Mukti Fauj attacked the railways, roads and bridges, the frogmen concentrated on ports, inland harbours, ferries, pontoons, buoyage and all types of vessels.

Naval Headquarters, Karachi

Nonetheless with dark clouds of insurgency building up in East Pakistan, Naval Headquarters at Karachi were confident that the Pakistan Army would bring their Eastern wing under control. The preoccupations of Naval Headquarters hence continued with the induction of the three Daphne class submarines and their support facilities together with the problem of malfunctioning torpedoes and the overdue refit of Ghazi. Meanwhile, a replacement programme for the frigates revolved round the acquisition of three Vosper Type 21 frigates which was however more theoretical than practical as the ‘forgotten Navy’ had not been allotted the necessary funds. In a brief flirtation with the Soviet Navy in 1968, Pakistan Naval Headquarters communicated a requirement for four Foxtrot class submarines, five Kynda class destroyers and 8 Komar missile boats. Ayub Khan only approved the missiles boats which curiously were rejected by the Pakistan Navy.1

In the meantime, Karachi was harried by signals from Commodore Commanding East Pakistan (COMCEP) for personnel, patrol craft, fuel, spares and urgent strengthening of the naval forces in the East as the Army required naval flotillas not only to transport stores, personnel and fuel but also to provide the ground force with strategic and tactical mobility. They also needed an amphibious element for riverine tasks. In addition, they requested the Navy to take over port operations and the inland waterway transport in view of the rising tempo of insurgency compounded by the desertion of Bengali personnel.

A marine base in East Pakistan was commissioned as PNS Haider. One marine company arrived at Chittagong on 27 November 1971 by ship and two companies by PIA flight but without weapons. The commandos borrowed .303 rifles from the police and from the naval base, PNS Bakhtiar and carried out an operation against the Mukti Bahini forces near Juldia. Subsequently, they took up positions on Patanga beach till they were disbanded after the surrender.

The commandos borrowed .303 rifles from the police and from the naval base, PNS Bakhtiar and carried out an operation against the Mukti Bahini forces near Juldia.

The Army which was being hemmed in by hit and run attacks which cut down their mobility now appreciated the Navy’s role and made continuous demand for more support. Nonetheless, due to the breakdown of law and order and the hostility of the local population, the Mukti Bahini achieved a measure of success which in hindsight was far beyond their expectations. East Pakistan was reinforced by four divisions from the West, but the riverine environment enabled the Mukti Bahini frogmen to sink or cripple over a lakh tons of shipping, immobiliie jetties and wharves as also block navigable channels. This was the curtain raiser for an entirely new concept of guerrilla warfare in cloistered waters which kept the Khans from West Pakistan completely off balance.

Crisis in Pakistan – Encore the Bhutto Connection

The election which followed the devastating cyclone of November 1970, turned out to be an accurate precursor to the happenings of 1971. The Awami League led by Mujibur Rehman won a total victory as a result of their undermentioned six-point programme.

1. Pakistan should have a federal form of government with a Parliament elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.
2. The federal government should deal with only defence      and foreign affairs, leaving all other subjects to the provincial governments.
3. There should be two separate freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency with two separate reserve banks.
4. The powers of taxation and revenue collection should vest with the provincial governments.
5. Economic, fiscal and legal measures need to be taken to remove the economic disparities between the two wings.
6. A separate militia or paramilitary force should be created for the defence of the Eastern Wing.

The Army which was being hemmed in by hit and run attacks which cut down their mobility now appreciated the Navys role and made continuous demand for more support.

The Awami League won 160 out of the 162 seats from East Bengal and thus gained a majority in the overall Pakistan National Assembly of 313 seats. The Awami League also. secured an absolute majority of 261 of the 300 seats in the Provincial Assembly of East Bengal.

The only other party to emerge from the battle of the hustings with any degree of mass support was the People’s Party led by Zulfikar Bhutto which gained 82 seats in the National Assembly with Independents and other parties winning 59 seats.2 NI the other parties including the three factions of the Muslim League, and extremist parties both of the left and the right made poor showing.

The election results came as a shock both to the ruling military clique and to Bhutto’s People’s Party. Both had calculated that small splinter groups would gain ground and thus hold the balance between the People’s Party and the Awami League. The military junta had also hoped that the resultant political stalemate would help them to continue in power. On the other hand, Bhutto had visualized that he could grab power with the help of the smaller parties. The Awami League’s resounding victory at the polls had dashed their hopes and sparked off the crisis.

The election results came as a shock both to the ruling military clique and to Bhuttos Peoples Party. Both had calculated that small splinter groups would gain ground and thus hold the balance between the Peoples Party and the Awami League.

Immediately after the election results, President Yahya met Mujib and described him as the future Prime Minister of Pakistan and fixed 3 March as a tentative date for holding the National Assembly. Bhutto and Mujib met on 27 January in an effort to find common ground but the talks failed after parleys for four days. Bhutto then threatened to create a crisis and wanted the Assembly session to be delayed. Vice Admiral Ahsan, who was by then the Governor, sent a telex message to the President on 28 February requesting a date for summoning the Assembly. The Governor of East Pakistan was thereupon dismissed and Major General Sahibzada Yakub Khan, who was later to become Pakistan’s long-serving foreign minister during the Zia regime, was appointed ‘Governor and Martial Law Administrator. He also impressed on Yahya Khan the need to come to Dacca. When the President refused, Major General Yakub Khan resigned on 31 March and there was a strong move to bring him to trial by court martial. Lieutenant General Tikka Khan was appointed Governor and Martial Law Administrator.

President Yahya Khan postponed the holding of the Assembly indefinitely thus setting in motion a civil disobedience movement in East Bengal. The French philosopher, Andre Malraux, said in his foreword to the Indian Council of World Affairs when volunteering to fight In East Pakistan, The electoral victory of the Awami League was troublesome for Rawalpindi… but it did not exterminate its opponents… If politics is an art, then it is one of reconciliation and not of assassination. Volunteers from France were ready to fight for Bangladesh.

At that time, France was hardly aware of India’s stand. They were only motivated by the memory of Biafra, the exodus of refugees and the systematic extermination of the Bengali elite.

Yahya Khan then called for a conference of all political leaders in Dacca on 10 March 1971. Mujib declined the invitation which he said was due to the mechanization of ‘murderer No. 1 – Zulfikar Bhutto’ and instead announced that he would make an important statement on 7 March 1971. He also demanded the withdrawal of troops to their barracks. President Yahya forestalled Mujib and announced on 6 March that the National Assembly would meet on 25 March 1971. With massive support of people from all walks of life, Mujib was in virtual control of the civil administration by 15 March 1971. The entire government machinery was taking orders from him. Such was the nationalist fervour that even the Governor designate to East Pakistan, Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, was not administered the oath of office by any of the judges of the Dacca High Court.

With massive support of people from all walks of life, Mujib was in virtual control of the civil administration by 15 March 1971. The entire government machinery was taking orders from him.

President Yahya arrived in Dacca on 15 March 1971 for talks with Mujib in an attempt to find a solution. He was assisted by Generals Tikka Khan, Ghulam Umar, Farman Ali Khan, A. G. Mitha, S. M. G. Peerzada and Air Commodore Masud. It was not considered necessary to include a naval representative. Mujib, in turn was assisted by Tajuddin, Kamal Hossain and Syed Nazrul Islam. Wali Khan and Ghous Bux Bizenjo of the Awami League also arrived at Dacca on 13 March. On the evening of 14 March, Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan of the Muslim League and Maulana Mufti Mehmood of the Jamait-ul-Islam reached Dacca. Bhutto, who had earlier declined to participate in the talks ultimately reached Dacca on 21 March and had separate meetings with Yahya and Mujib.

On 22 March, President Yahya Khan postponed the meeting of the National Assembly indefinitely. Mujib was dissatisfied with the way the Army had been handling the situation and declared that 23 March, which was Pakistan Day, would be observed as ‘Resistance Day’ in East Bengal. There were demonstrations, parades, students marching in military formations with the Bangladesh flag fluttering openly while crowds trampled the Pakistani flag. Major General M. K. Majid and Colonel Osmani, two Bengali officers led a procession to Mujib’s House in Dhanmandi and were joined by the students of the Joy Bangia brigade. And finally the Awami League team arrived at the President’s house flying the Bangladesh flag.

President Yahya Khan left Dacca secretly at midnight on 25/26 March after other political leaders had departed. At 1000 hours on 26 March 1971, Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, on the instructions of Yahya, imposed martial law in East Bengal and executed orders for military action ‘to reinstate public order and central authority’. These orders had been approved as early as 20 March even when talks between President Yahya Khan, Mujib and Bhutto were underway.

On arrival at Islamabad, Yahya Khan whipped off decrees banning the Awami League, charging Mujib with treason and postponing the National Assembly indefinitely. The new constitution, he declared, would be handpicked by him. Autonomy for East Bengal was rejected. Islamabad’s rule would continue. There was to be no constitutional transition or transfer of power. Strict censorship was imposed. Major Generals Farman Ali and Khadim Raja visited brigade commanders and orally delivered the operational orders which contained the following instructions.3

1. Treat the Awami League as rebels.
2. East Pakistani units and police to be disarmed.
3. Awami and student leaders were to be arrested.
4. General Tikka was appointed Governor and he ruled with the grace of a Nazi Gualeiter in former occupied Europe till he was replaced in August 1971.

The breakup of Pakistan commenced, as it were, on the night of 25 March 1971.

Continued…: Untold Heroism of Mukti Bahini Frogmen: Prelude to Liberation – II