Indian Defence Review

The Russian Threat : The element which was to play a major role in Britain’s foreign policy toward Tibet and thereby decide the fate of Tibet as a nation, is what has been called the ‘Russian threat’.

One of the origins of this myth — or reality — was an information passed by a Japanese monk called Ekai Kawaguchi to Sarat Chandra Das, the most famous of the Indian Pundits,13 who was spying for the British Government.

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He reported that a caravan of 200 camels had arrived in Lhasa from the North east. The camels were said to be carrying boxes covered with skins and the caravaneers refused to answer any questions about their contents. Kawaguchi was told by a Tibetan official that the boxes were a gift of rifles and ammunition from Russia.

The general feeling in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that Tibet was not a priority.

An individual played a major role in this game: Agvan Dorjiev. This enigmatic person helped fuel the speculations about a presumed alliance between Russia and Tibet.

Born in 1854 in the Buryata14 region of Russia and having shown great capacity in his Buddhist studies, the high lamas of Buryata recommended that Dorjiev be sent to Mongolia and Tibet to continue his studies. At the age of 26, he reached Lhasa where he became very renowned for his extraordinary scholarship and debating skills. He was noticed by the Thirteenth Dalai Lama who appointed him as one of his debating partners. Thus begun the connection between Tibet and Russia.

In this context, it was decided to send a mission to Russia. For the Tibetans, it was a preliminary mission to check the possibility of a shift in their foreign policy.15 At the same time it was clear that Dorjiev had no decision making power.

“¦the Chinese were going to sign a Treaty with Russia surrendering their suzerainty of Tibet to Russia, circulated in Lhasa but were immediately denied by the Chinese Foreign Office.

The delegates travelled to St. Petersburg via India, China, Mongolia and Buryata. On reaching St. Petersburg in 1899, Dorjiev had some meetings with important personages at the Tsar’s court such as Count Lamsdorff, Count Witte and General Kuropatkin. The general feeling in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that Tibet was not a priority. Some Russian officials like Count Lamsdorff suggested that Russia could open a Consulate in Tibet, but the Tibetans themselves were more than reluctant. First of all, the delegation had no power to take such a decision without consulting the Dalai Lama and Dorjiev also knew that the opening of a Mission in Lhasa would have marked the end of the Tibet’s closed-door policy. If one country was allowed to have a representation in Lhasa, many other countries would immediately put pressure on the Tibetan Government to have the same privilege.

In fact, it appears that Dorjiev’s dream was to have a sort of Choe-Yon relationship16 between Russia and Tibet, similar to the one the early Manchus had with the Lamas of Tibet, but excluding other big powers, particularly the British.

The British crown and specifically the new Viceroy Lord Curzon were not ready to accept this new entrant in Central Asian politics.

Some rumours that the Chinese were going to sign a Treaty with Russia surrendering their suzerainty of Tibet to Russia, circulated in Lhasa but were immediately denied by the Chinese Foreign Office. What perhaps lent some credence to the rumours was the continued Russian occupation of Manchuria as well as the refusal of the Tibetans to deal directly with the British.

However, the mission of Dorjiev was not secret; in fact it was widely reported in the Russian press. The Journal de Saint Petersbourg reported the audience with the Tsar in these terms: “On Saturday, the 30th September, His Majesty the Emperor received Aharamba Agvan Dorjiev who is the first tsanit-hamba17 to the Dalai Lama of Tibet, in the Palace of Livadia.”

Sir G. Scott, the British Ambassador to Russia at St. Petersburg inquired about the character of the Tibetan Mission from Count Lamsdorff. He was reassured that though the Tibetan visitors had been described as Envoys Extraordinary of the Dalai Lama, their mission could not be regarded as having “any political or diplomatic character.”18

“¦some Tibetan ministers thought that France was a good bet as they had been the first to offer their support. Some others thought of the British as an ally.

Nevertheless, London cabled back to its envoy that “His Majesty’s Government could not regard with indifference any proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or disturb the existing status of Tibet.”

Soon after the audience Dorjiev left for Tibet, reaching Lhasa in February 1901 via a strange (but at that time usual) route: Peking, Calcutta, Darjeeling, Chumbi Valley, Gyantse and Lhasa. The return of Dorjiev caused a lot of debate in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama had forwarded the letters of Dorjiev to the Kashag.

Percival Landon, a British journalist explained the prevalent opinion in Lhasa:

“Briefly stated, his [Dorjiev’s] arguments were these: you have no strength in the country to resist the invaders, your natural protector and suzerain China, is a broken reed; even at this moment she is entirely under the domination of the British. If you remain any longer trusting to her support, you will find that she throws you as a sop to the Indian Government. The English are a rapacious nation and heretical nation; they will not respect your religion… On the other hand, if you will ask aid of Russia, you will secure the most powerful protector of the world.”19

Nevertheless some Tibetan ministers thought that France was a good bet as they had been the first to offer their support. Some others thought of the British as an ally.

In Lhasa, it was finally decided to send Dorjiev back to Russia with a high-ranking delegation. In March 1901, one month after his return to the Tibetan capital, he left again for Russia with a delegation.

Tibet being a country situated between Central Asia and Western Siberia, Russia and China are mutually obliged to care for the maintenance of peace in that country.

Though Dorjiev was received with honour, the Russian Government was not so comfortable with his visit. The visit of Dorjiev’s delegation nevertheless got a lot of coverage in the local as well as the British press. While the British papers saw the visit as a danger to the interest of the Crown, Russian journalists were more interested by the exotic side of the delegation.

A note of the Marquis of Landsdowne to Sir G. Scott dated 18 February 1903, explains the reluctance of the Russian Government to get entangled in Tibetan affairs. The British Foreign Minister notes:

“During my conversation with the Russian Ambassador today I have referred to the question of Tibet, which we had discussed on the 11th instant. The interest of India in Tibet was I said of a very special character. With the map of Central Asia before me, I pointed out to His Excellency that Lhasa was within a comparatively short distance of the northern frontier of India. It was, on the other hand, considerably over 1,000 miles distant from the Asiatic possessions of Russia.”

The Tsar’s Government could probably understand this argument.

Commercial Agreement between Russia and China

In the meantime the rumours of an agreement between Russia and China on Tibet continued to circulate. Tension was mounting when Claude White, the Political Officer in Sikkim, proceeded towards the Tibetan border.

In case of a third powers contriving directly or indirectly, troubles in Tibet, Russia and China oblige themselves to concur in taking such measures as may seem advisable”¦

As a result of the forward policy of the British, an agreement was signed between the Russians and the Chinese in 1902.

This treaty, known as the “Commercial Agreement between Russia and China” has not been acknowledged by many historians, but it certainly was one of the direct justifications for the events of 1903-04. The main articles run as follows:

“Article 1: Tibet being a country situated between Central Asia and Western Siberia, Russia and China are mutually obliged to care for the maintenance of peace in that country. In case trouble should arise in Tibet, China, in order to preserve this district and Russia in order to protect her frontiers, shall despatch thither military forces on mutual notification.

Article 2: In case of a third power’s contriving directly or indirectly, troubles in Tibet, Russia and China oblige themselves to concur in taking such measures as may seem advisable for repressing such troubles.”

Some parts of a lengthy report of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India are quoted here. This dispatch dated January 8, 1903 detailed the future British policy for Tibet. First, doubting the usefulness of negotiations, Lord Curzon wrote:

London was also of the opinion that the Russians should be requested to make a public statement of their foreign policy regarding Tibet and China

“…What we are concerned to examine is not the mere settlement of border dispute or even the amelioration of our future trading relations with Tibet but the question of our entire future political relations with that country, and with the degree to which we can permit the influence of another great Power to be exercised for the first time in Tibetan affairs.”21

Curzon made it clear that the ‘addiction’ of Lhasa to its policy of isolation was only temporarily ‘tolerated’ by British India. Curzon was not against having a tripartite conference, but it had to be on British terms: it should be held in Lhasa and the Tibetan Government should participate as an equal.22

The most famous statement of the Viceroy follows:

“In our view, the attempt to come to terms with Tibet through the agency of China has invariably proved a failure in the past, because of the intervention of this third party between Tibet and ourselves. We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction, a political affectation which has been maintained because of its convenience to both parties.”

The only solution was then to open a dialogue, but how could a dialogue be started with the recalcitrant Tibetans?

To conclude, he suggested to London that a ‘trade’ mission be sent to Tibet under military escort to negotiate a trade agreement.

The iron was hot, it was time to strike. The dispatch became the cornerstone of British policy towards Tibet.

For Curzon it had become evident that the only way to establish ‘amicable relations and communication’ was to use force, if necessary. It was the continuation of the Forward Policy of Hastings.

The report ended with a cautionary note, the British Government should not “regret that action was not taken while it was still relatively free from difficulty”. The iron was hot, it was time to strike. The above dispatch became the cornerstone of British policy towards Tibet.

The answer from the Secretary of State for India came on February 27, 1903. Although it was decided to follow a forward policy towards Tibet, London was still very cautious about the plans of Lord Curzon:

“…His Majesty’s Government cannot regard the question as one concerning India and Tibet alone. The position of China, in its relations to the powers of Europe has been so modified in recent years that it is necessary to take into account these altered conditions in deciding on action affecting what must still be regarded as a province of China.”

London was very prudent about the reaction to the larger issues raised by the armed mission to Tibet. It had “accordingly come to the conclusion that it would be premature to adopt measures so likely to precipitate a crisis in the affairs of Tibet as those which your Excellency has proposed”.23

London was also of the opinion that the Russians should be requested to make a public statement of their foreign policy regarding Tibet and China and they should be warned of the British Government’s “intention to meet any action on their part by more than counter-balancing measures of our own.”

However, the Russians remained non-committal over their Tibet policy and a year later Lord Curzon would have his way and be able to implement his forward policy.

To summarize Curzon’s arguments: first, the Manchus were weak and their suzerainty was merely a ‘constitutional fiction’; second, nothing was to be allowed to ‘threaten’ the smooth functioning of the British empire; third, the British should use, when necessary, the strength of the Nepalese army; fourth, Tibet needed to be brought under the British ambit to nip the Russian influence in the bud, while no political motive should be ‘shown’ in taking Tibet under British influence.

This was the outline of the mission that Younghusband was to take to Tibet the following year.

Notes

1. Younghusband, Sir Francis, India and Tibet, (London: John Murray, 1910), p. 11.
2. Cooch Behar, in the modern state of West Bengal.
3. At that time the Panchen Lama was known as the Tashi Lama or Lama of the Tashilhunpo. He was usually referred by the Tibetans as the Panchen Rinpoche.
4. The discussions were in Hindi. The Panchen Lama was quite fluent in the language.
5. Younghusband, op. cit., p. 19.
6. Fourteen years later, the Gurkhas would invade Tibet.
7. Younghusband, op. cit., p. 22.
8. The pass between Sikkim and Tibet.
9. The National Assembly.
10. Against the fortifications which were, according to them, on their territory.
11. We could even say till today.
12. Kuleshov, Nikolai S. Russia’s Tibet File (Dharamsal, Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 1996), p. 3.
13. The Indian Pundits were sent by the Government of British India to survey unknown Himalayan areas including Tibet and to gather intelligence reports. Most of the time the British chose natives from the border regions and gave them training near Dehra Dun.
14. Even today, Buryata is a Republic of the Russian Federation. Most of the population is Buddhist and owe allegiance to the Dalai Lama who has visited the Republic several times.
15. ‘Foreign Policy’ is a big word, because nothing such as a declared ‘foreign policy’ existed.
16. One of the bases of this Choe-yon relationship would have been the patronage given by the Tsar to the Buddhist population of Buryata and Kalmyk.
17. Tsentsab or debating partner.
18. British Parliamentary Papers, op. cit., p. 111.
19. Landon Percival, The Opening of Tibet (London: 1905), p. 22.
20. Prof. Edwin Maxey, Tibet, Russia and England on the International Chess Board, (Boston: The Arena, 1904) p. 28-31.
21. Text of Lord Curzon’s letter in Taraknath Das, Dr, British Expansion in Tibet (The Modern Review: April 1926), p. 438; also in British Parliamentary Papers on Tibet (1855-1914), p. 187.
22. The idea will be used again by Sir Henry McMahon in 1913 for the Simla Convention.
23. Taraknath Das, op. cit., p. 439.