Indian Defence Review

Mossad’s Indirect Attack on Iran:

February 2012: Iran convinces the Azeri ambassador to complain that Mossad used Azerbaijan as a base for covert operations against Iran. Over the next few days, a war of words arises between Iran and Israel.  The situation comes to a head when Israeli Mossad assassins carry out Iranian nuclear scientist assassination-style coordinated attacks on Israeli embassy cars in New Delhi, India and Tbilisi, Georgia. Despite the fact that Iran has no record of assassinating Israeli or other foreign leaders, diplomats or scientists (which they shouldn’t of course), the finger was pointed at Iran. Iran obviously refuted its involvement in both cases. In fact Iran claims has that Israelis attacked their own embassies to demonize Iran and fuel anti-Iran hysteria in the US and Europe. To an extent Israel was successful, and USA did immediately condone the attacks.  However, the International community is not unaware of Mossad’s role in the attacks.

The Want of Stealth in Covert Operations

Covert operations play a vital role in Intelligence. With the increase in the number of covert missions today, many agencies are getting caught and being apprehended for their furtive operations. This lack of stealth in covertness poses a risk to the Global Intelligence network at large.

To put this into perspective it is necessary for this Ad Hoc Committee to point out some loopholes in surreptitiousness that have resulted in agencies being caught. These are a few examples that we believe bring shame to the Intelligence Coterie. The Intelligence Coterie cannot condone such discrepancies any further.

1. National Intelligence Agency (NIA) South Africa October 2005

In October 2005, the NIA was rocked by allegations that senior officials had been engaged in spying on African National Congress member Saki Macozoma. Following an investigation by the Inspector-General of Intelligence, three senior officials, including the director were suspended. The alleged spying took place against the backdrop of a developing power struggle between factions in the ANC. In December 2005, the Sunday Times newspaper claimed that the South African Police Service was preparing to raid the offices of the NIA as part of investigations into the matter.

2. AgenciaBrasileira de Intelligencia (ABIN) Brazil September 2008

On September 1, 2008, President LuizInacio Lula da Silva suspended the leadership of the ABIN, including its director, and ordered an investigation into allegations that appeared in Veja magazine of phone tapping of senior figures including the heads of both the Senate and the Supreme Court. The ignominy of being caught for something so simple and novice as wire trapping is unbearable for the ABIN till date.

3. DepartamentoAdministrativo de Seguridad (DAS) Colombia 2008 

October 2008: The head of the DAS Maria del Pilar Hurtado stepped down from her post after allegations that the agency had conducted surveillance on left-wing parties (opposition to the President, Uribe). The incident has been dubbed “The Colombian Watergate.” in reference to the Watergate scandal in the United States involving President Richard Nixon and wiretapping. Hurtado has taken asylum in Panama, which is not permitting her extradition back to Columbia.

December 2011: Due to ongoing scandals, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announces that the DAS was to be dissolved. DAS‟s “official” functions included intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence, collection of evidence at crime scenes, providing security for high-ranking officials and immigration control.  Now, the purpose of the new agency that may be set up will purely be for “domestic-only” purposes.

Role of Intelligence Agencies in Counterinsurgency (COIN) 

Counterinsurgency or COIN is defined as the blend of comprehensive intelligence and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective elements, but military forces do play an enabling role.

Furthermore, a historical review of COIN warfare reveals that no single mission has been effectively carried out without the use of proper “actionable intelligence.” Potent COIN warfare, in its essence, attains greater potency through not only human intelligence (HUMINT) but also intelligence gained through national technical means (such as signals, imagery, measurement and signature intelligence; SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT, respectively).

It is incontrovertible that no set of rules can be universally applicable to all the diverse situations of insurgency that now exist and will arise. However, history does repeat itself and hence successful COIN tactics from the past can be put down and followed by all governments and Intelligence Agencies in the years to come.

Modern counterinsurgency successes have featured three universal characteristics: the existence of a powerful police and intelligence organization under the direction of a single authority; a robust physical presence throughout the country which feeds the intelligence picture; and the establishment of a professional indigenous police and military force to augment, and eventually, replace external forces. These characteristics have been in place in all the successful counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, the absence of any one of these three, places the overall outcome in jeopardy.

It is necessary to mention that insurgency and guerrilla warfare are closely linked. The essence of guerrilla warfare lies in Mao Zedong belief that “The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea.”Though that may be true, we can safely say that it is of paramount importance for intelligence agencies to provide the information to the military sector. The military sector must then make a distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants.

Role of Intelligence in Counterterrorism 

The work of intelligence against terrorism today is undoubtedly a gruelling task. The significance of intelligence in counter-terrorism stems from three main drivers: Its role in pre- emption and disruption of terrorist activity; its role in post-incident investigations; and its contribution to preventive/protective security measures.

The role of intelligence is counterterrorism is the same as its role in any field of modern warfare. Its work is split into 4 stages of the intelligence cycle: The first being planning and direction. In which the intelligence officials direct assets and resources to certain ends; next is the collection of data. As discussed above this includes HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT and OPINT (open sources, such as television or radio); the third stage is processing and analysis of the information in which raw information is converted to “intelligence” per se; the final fourth phase is the dissemination of data which implies that the intelligence is sent to the required agents, decision makers and others that work in liaison with the agencies.

From the organizational point of view, the security and intelligence agencies of many nations have taken serious steps to improve their capabilities and this Ad Hoc Committee of Intelligence Agencies would like to take this opportunity to commend the work of these agencies. The FBI has tripled its counter-terrorism force since the World Trade Centre attack and the CIA has created its Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) to deal with the threat at the highest civilian and military levels. The German BND authorities have greatly enhanced their security units dealing (and successfully at that) with right-wing activities. The Russian GRU has formed new elite units in order to cope with the threat of terrorist attacks against its nuclear facilities, and so on. Not just regional, but bilateral international cooperation has improved.

However, without a comprehensive and firm policy of all the intelligence agencies and political leaders involved, terrorism will continue to present a real threat to future generations. It is your job, Heads of Intelligence Agencies to present your respective agencies explicit policy at this conclave. The policy that is specific to the current terrorist related situation that your country is facing today.

Role of Intelligence in Promoting Security

As explained earlier, Intelligence Agencies follow a particular cycle, the “intelligence cycle” that begins with the planning phase and ends with dissemination. This cycle is most definitely followed in promoting homeland or national security. However, there are a few specifications.

Firstly, shall there be a threat to national security, Agencies must first understand the threat, and investigate its legitimacy After assessing the threat and converting raw data to intelligence they give their material to the important political decision makers. Next they carry out their covert or non-covert activities to curb refute the threat to security. It is necessary to be aware that failure to work within a specific and compact timeline could and would result in a catastrophic scenario.

These threats are called Key Intelligence Questions or KIQs. KIQs can be broadly divided into two categories: Immediate or on-going KIQs, which would include an imminent or direct threat to homeland security; next, Long-term or Strategic KIQs. These KIQs include adapting to the changing situation of certain threats to security (such as narco-terrorism) or focusing strategically on a certain situation that might emerge.

The purview of threat to national security is actually quite vast; it ranges from a nuclear threat, to a biological, chemical, cyber or even an economic one. It is only Intelligence Agencies that are first aware of the threat and have the ability to do something about it within an appropriate time frame. It can be said that that safety and security of civilians lies in the hands of primarily and only Intelligence Agencies.