Indian Defence Review

Dysfunctional Polity: The duopoly of Pakistan’s polity denoted by Zulfiqar Ali–Benazir Bhutto family of Asaf Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif family continues unabated in the feudal, precapitalist politics of the country. Much of it is also zero sum; the animosities between the two families are also so deep and the political divide so wide that the country is increasingly becoming ungovernable.

The stark choices that the people of Pakistan have between the two camps are best exemplified by the report in Dawn about the Wikileaks expose of conversations by Arab peers of Zardari and Sharif. The Dawn, in its Washington datelined report of 30 November 2010, said that the crown prince of United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, described the Pakistan president as “dirty but not dangerous” while Sharif as “dangerous but not dirty.”

The inability to tax is a part of the broader failure to govern and provide security to its citizens. The country basically survives on the financial and other aids of various countries and the remittances of workers employed abroad. The

To depict the current state of the country, the Saudi Arabian king, Abdullah, had an equally graphic expression. The Dawn quoted him as saying, “When the head is rotten, it affects the whole body.” He considered Zardari the biggest obstacle to Pakistan’s progress.

Consider some statistics. The South Asian Terrorism Portal of the New Delhi–based Institute of Conflict Management has calculated the civilian deaths in Pakistan from 2003–2009 in the battles against Islamist insurrection to be about 7,600. The number of deaths amongst the security forces is less at 2,900, while the number of terrorists killed would be about 14,600: a grand total of about 25,100.

There is another set of statistics. According to the IMF, Pakistan’s gross domestic product at U.S. dollars would be about $178 billion in 2010; an increase of about 2.75 per cent over the year. Its national income $1,068 and its average inflation rate would stand at 14 per cent. The unemployment rate in 2009 was 15.3 per cent; and its public debt was more than 45 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP).

A crescendo is rising in the country about the government’s inability to tax the rich; or even implement the existing laws to collect taxes from them. The tax-to-GDP ratio of the country has sunk to a dismal 9, while even a few years ago, it was at 12. Even the finance minister of the country, Abdul Hafeez Shaikh, had to say, “There are so many powerful people in Pakistan who are attached with some kind of business or the other. If this is the case then this means that the government is not able to levy tax on them.”5

 The army leadership of the all-powerful corps commanders and the chief, Kayani, knows their weaknesses.

The inability to tax is a part of the broader failure to govern and provide security to its citizens. The country basically survives on the financial and other aids of various countries and the remittances of workers employed abroad. The zero sum nature of Pakistan’s politics makes it all the more difficult for accommodations to be made and policy coalitions to be developed. The stark choices the people have between Zulfiqar Ali–Benazir Bhutto family and the Nawaz Sharif family gives only an inkling of the feudal, precapitalist nature of the country politics.

Such is the distrust among the scions of these two families that a Zardari monologue to the U.S. ambassador, Anne Patterson, clearly shows the fault lines of Pakistan’s politics. The Wikileaks revelation of a cable by Patterson about a meeting with President Zardari on 5 January 2009 has the latter speaking about Sharif and family, and their politics. Patterson wrote, “Zardari said that he was increasingly losing patience with Nawaz Sharif’s government in the Punjab, and he believed that a confrontation was looming. He said that Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz Chief Minister Shabbaz [sic] Sharif had tipped off the J(amaat) U(d) D(awa) about the UNSCR 1267 mandated asset freeze, resulting in almost empty bank accounts. (Information from M(inistry) O(f) I(nterior) does indicate that bank accounts contained surprisingly small amounts.) Zardari suggested Lahore Principal Officer might mediate between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Governor and Shabbaz [sic] Sharif who increasingly are publicly at odds. Ambassador noted that his government had been ‘holding over Nawaz’s head’ the Supreme Court’s decision on Nawaz’s eligibility to run for office. Zardari replied, ‘yes, but it doesn’t seem to be doing much good anymore.’ Zardari dismissed Nawaz’s ability to bring crowds into the street in the Punjab if his party was removed from the Punjab government.”

The overwhelming power of the army was evident in that one single cable. The army is still considered the fount of all foreign and other national security policies. It still remains the final arbiter in the domestic political arena.

The impression changed in the middle of the year, as Nawaz Sharif deftly attached his party to the civil agitation of lawyers and nascent democracy activists about reinstating former chief justice Ifthikhar Chaudhury to the Supreme Court. As we have seen in the first section, this even tested the patience of the army.

The army is keeping them on a short leash. The army leadership of the all-powerful corps commanders and the chief, Kayani, knows their weaknesses. They hate Zardari for his corruption and distrust Nawaz Sharif for his corruption and his attempt to seize power all on his own. In a dramatic show of strength, Kayani gave an impression to the U.S. ambassador that neither did he want an army rule, nor did he want a fresh election, but he wanted the president of the country to be removed. In a cable on 12 March 2009, Patterson wrote: “The scenario Kayani hinted at was one in which he would pressure Zardari to resign (and presumably leave the country). This would not be an official Army ‘coup’ it would leave the PPP government led by Prime Minister Gilani in place and preclude the need for elections that likely would bring Nawaz to power.”

The overwhelming power of the army was evident in that one single cable. The army is still considered the fount of all foreign and other national security policies. It still remains the final arbiter in the domestic political arena. But it has eschewed direct power because it does not earn the opprobrium of the people for a political mess besides confronting the security challenge.

Pakistan’s perceptive political observer and columnist, Irfan Hussain, writing in the Dawn on 13 November 2010, held, “. . . now, apart from the fact that Kayani does not seem to want the job, the establishment is aware that a coup would immediately trigger an American law that prohibits aid to a military regime that overthrows an elected government. And this is one gravy train our generals don`t want leaving the station without them, despite their hysterical objections to the Kerry-Lugar Act that has made this American munificence possible.” In reality, Pakistan cannot afford to lose American magnanimity in terms of direct aid or indirect prodding of world financial institutions to help the beleaguered country.

In the recent past, Zardari has had two major reverses. First, the National Reconciliation Order of the Pervez Musharraf government that provided him and his cohorts immunity from prosecution for corruption and other charges, was reversed by the Supreme Court. And second, in the wake of agitations for the reinstatement of Supreme Court chief justice, he also had to give up the sweeping powers that Musharraf had arrogated to the position of the president through the 17th amendment to the Constitution. The 18th amendment, which Pakistan’s parliament passed in the middle of 2010, divested Zardari of the authority to appoint Supreme Court judges and the army chief, besides myriad other powers.

Even after a month, the relief aid from international donors was negligible. The amount that came in was largely in the hands of international and national NGOs than in grasp of the government.

Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, has kept the PPP government under pressure. Cyril Almeida, a prominent journalist with the Dawn, wrote on 7 November that the favourite parlour game of the country was to speculate how long this government would survive. He said in his article, “Here’s what is known. Two and a half years into power, the PPP is perceived as politically vulnerable. The government’s anaemic response to the floods, rising prices, particularly of foodstuff, electricity and fuel, and a very real governance deficit magnified by the media have combined to create a political opening.”

An impression has gained ground in Pakistan that if elections are to be held tomorrow, Sharif will win. If that is to be the case, the conventional wisdom is that he will still have to deal with the pervasive suspicion of the army about his intentions. But Almeida reflects a different view. In his writing, he has quoted Pakistan’s member of the National Assembly, “But if change is desired, the even worse relations between Nawaz Sharif — the only other obvious political option — and the army stand in the way. Khwaja Asif, a self-described ‘belligerent’ against the present government, tried to downplay the rumours: “Yes, there was a genuine grouse with the army for the last many years, but many of those generals, Gen Aziz, Gen Mehmood, Gen Usmani, have gone now. Shahbaz Sharif has good relations with the army and he does what Nawaz Sharif asks.”

But these were issues related to the politics of power. In terms of the practicing political class of Pakistan, this really means residual powers after the major part of the cake has been consumed by the army and the security agencies like the ISI on the one hand and the mullah-militant combine on the other. Even this power could be effective if it were to be used for bringing in a level of “egalitarianism,” as some of Pakistan’s commentators term it, for the people of the country who live on the margins.

The country’s historic floods of this year have shown that the politicians are incapable of delivering public goods and services even in times of dire need. At its peak, 6 million were homeless and about 17 million people were in some way affected. Despite the country’s status as a frontline state in the fight against Islamist terror, the reactions of its Western or West Asian allies were symptomatic of a lack of faith in Pakistan’s political institutions.

Despite the countrys status as a frontline state in the fight against Islamist terror, the reactions of its Western or West Asian allies were symptomatic of a lack of faith in Pakistans political institutions.

Even after a month, the relief aid from international donors was negligible. The amount that came in was largely in the hands of international and national NGOs than in grasp of the government. While Asaf Ali Zardari was much reviled for his leisurely sojourn to his Surrey estate in the United Kingdom during this hour of crisis, it still has to be said that after the 18th amendment, his role was not that significant. The prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, was present in the country as were many other political leaders like Shahbaz Sharif and Nawaz Sharif. But their efforts were so wanting that till the army got into the act of providing actual relief, the situation was not stabilised.

There were also reports that like the infamous earthquake of a few years ago, the void in government institutional delivery was filled by militant institutions like Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the like. They took this as an opportunity to connect with the people, which could help them in the future in terms of their mobilisation.

Many Pakistan commentators feel that Zardari survives by default. He survives because the army does not have a choice, stuck as it is between him and Nawaz Sharif. And the Americans consider him a man of convenience. Zardari is seeking redemption through a process of what he calls “political reconciliation.” In September 2009, he even proposed a truth and reconciliation commission for Pakistan. Though that idea did not gain much traction amongst the political and military elite of the country, he still advocated a form of reconciliation amongst the political parties as the problems of the country needed joint and concerted action.

Right from the beginning, the elite of the country had perpetuated a myth about its raison dêtre. While it was not formed as an Islamic country, but merely a nation of the subcontinental Muslims, the Islamic twist to its story was given by the rulers to suit their convenience

But in the view of at least one political analyst of the country, it is set to rebound on him because it has turned into just another patronage system by which sections of the elite are being co-opted to side with the ruling Zardari–Gilani combine. The gains accruing from Mr. Zardari’s legalistic measures, or their hazards, may not count for much but it is his fancied “reconciliation” that confuses people and undermines the principles of parliamentary democracy. Kunwar Idris wrote in the Dawn of 14 November, “To his [Zardari] mind, the alternative to reconciliation is confrontation. In fact political parties are in a state of confrontation while staying within the boundaries of his make-believe reconciliation.

“Quite a few politicians and clerics are riding Zardari’s gravy train and yet blame him for all the ills. PPP ministers in Punjab grumble that they never get to see the chief minister, much less advise him, decisions are made in a cabal and not in the cabinet and bureaucrats ignore their orders. Sitting in the opposition they could have played a useful role but it was a hard choice between the perks of power and the rigours of opposition. Their party chairman’s reconciliation drive came to their rescue with the cost borne by the people.”

Idris refers in his opinion piece to the PML-N and PPP coalition that rules the crucial province of the Punjab. In his opinion, the alliance in the province is make-believe. In the context of Pakistan’s zero-sum politics, it appears to be so.

Conclusion 

This analyst has been of the view that Pakistan’s real problems stem from its flawed history. Right from the beginning, the elite of the country had perpetuated a myth about its raison d’être. While it was not formed as an Islamic country, but merely a nation of the subcontinental Muslims, the Islamic twist to its story was given by the rulers to suit their convenience.

Pakistans Islamic connection was found to be a suitable vehicle on which the interests of the feudal class and the bourgeoisie could ride.

This seems to be the growing view in sections of Pakistan’s thinkers. Shahid Javed Burki, one of Pakistan’s historians, wrote in the Dawn of 9 November 2010: “. . . identified religion as the motivating factor behind the movement for the creation of Pakistan. The question of why a segment of the Muslim population of British India came to believe that separation from the Indian mainland was the only way to protect their interests acquired importance in the writings on the founding of Pakistan. Increasingly, the answer came to be provided in religious terms.

“This interpretation of history is not only wrong, it is also dangerous. What we are seeing now in terms of the rise of extremist Islam in the country can be attributed to this line of thinking. This approach to history has also resulted in casting ‘Hindu’ India as the eternal enemy. I have advisedly put the word ‘Hindu’ in quotation marks since India is not by any stretch of the imagination a Hindu state. It is a secular state that defines itself as such in the constitution it has followed carefully and dutifully. It is no doubt a Hindu-majority country but has permitted all religious communities to exercise their rights according to the law of the land.”

Burki goes even further in his debunking of Pakistan’s current history writing. In his article, provocative titled, “History must not lie,” he wrote, “As I have written in several of my own works, the Pakistan movement may have used the idiom of Islam as a way of drawing mass support; it was not a movement for creating an Islamic entity but an attempt to secure a better economic future for the Muslims of British India. This is why there was a paradox in the way the movement achieved its ultimate objective — the creation of Pakistan.

“¦.if the still minority Deobandis were allowed to gain an upper hand, that would complete the fundamental transformation of Pakistan into a medieval”¦

“The movement was led by a group of people who belonged to the Muslim minority areas of British India and who felt that their economic future would be threatened in a state in which the Hindu majority would rule. However, they created a state in the part of British India in which Muslims constituted a large majority and felt secure about their economic future even after the departure of the British from India. It was for this reason that Punjab and the Frontier were at best lukewarm to the idea of Pakistan. But once Pakistan came into being these two elements coalesced to define a view in which the economic betterment of the citizenry was the main goal to be pursued.

“However, then Islamists under Gen Ziaul Haq entered the picture and began to distort the original idea of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s famous words uttered as he was preparing to launch the new state of Pakistan — ‘You are free. You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the state’ — meant nothing to these ideologues. They got busy in rewriting the meaning of the idea of Pakistan.”

In the process, the crises—multiple crises—they have created have given birth to the acute sectarian divide by which the Barelvi majority feel threatened in the country they helped create. The army has become a representative body of an ethnic majority. And the political class can no longer get off the tiger it set out to ride.

“¦the problem arose when capitalist development in Pakistan remained stymied in the face of strong feudal influences. As a result, the natural liberalism that follows capitalist development could not take place in Pakistan.

Pakistan translated meant “land of the pure.” That search for purity was itself a misnomer as Burki says that the country was born from the conflicts of interest between the Hindu and Muslim bourgeoisie under a colonial yoke. The growing Muslim bourgeois felt stifled and numerically subdued under the predominance of their Hindu counterparts. So, they wanted a land of their own where they could enjoy their primacy, unfettered.

This bourgeoisie’s nationalism was limited to serving their own interests, which was not in a contest with the Western imperialists. So, they actually collaborated with the British representatives of the imperial interests and got their own country. Since they themselves were malformed, they did not get into a competition either with the feudal landlords, who too had made a common cause for the founding of Pakistan. In turn, neither of the two segments of the ruling classes of the new country found it awkward to further deepen their collaboration with Western imperialists in a divided world.

The resultant exploitation of the common people of Pakistan was unprecedented. But the sheer economic logic of all this could not have served as the engine of nation building, which required a corporate agenda on which every individual could be mobilised. So, Pakistan’s Islamic connection was found to be a suitable vehicle on which the interests of the feudal class and the bourgeoisie could ride. Plus, a common religion like Islam, with its egalitarian precepts, could also create a kind of social leveller that could hide the true class struggles. And it could act as a detriment to the creation of a genuine class consciousness.

But the problem arose when capitalist development in Pakistan remained stymied in the face of strong feudal influences. As a result, the natural liberalism that follows capitalist development could not take place in Pakistan. Nor was there any surplus that could be generated and allowed to percolate to the bottom rungs of the society. Pakistan’s successive “democratic” governments proved especially inept in delivering the fruits of governance to the people. This loosened the bonds of the people with the nation state.

“¦the Islamist entities considered the state sufficiently weak for them to seek to replace them. That is the description of the current battle. And the elite of Pakistan””both bourgeois and feudal””are increasingly losing their grip on the situation.

The space left by the retreat of the state was filled up by the activism of religious non government entities, which were often funded by ideologically radical Islamist nations, like Saudi Arabia. Part of the strength of the entities was also bolstered by the sectarian political interests and state institutions like the army for various reasons, including fake national enterprises like competition with India.

At some point in time, these Islamist entities considered the state sufficiently weak for them to seek to replace them. That is the description of the current battle. And the elite of Pakistan—both bourgeois and feudal—are increasingly losing their grip on the situation. So, the bonds that hold the country together are showing wear and tear.

That is the perspective from which one needs to view the Barelvi–Deobandi conflicts. The fear is if the resurgent Barelvis decide to take on the Deobandis with the same arms with which they are being bombed and killed, as Shah Mohammad Quereshi has been quoted as hinting, there would be a bloodbath and a civil war. On the other hand, if the still minority Deobandis were allowed to gain an upper hand, that would complete the fundamental transformation of Pakistan into a medieval, Islamist outpost of the world—an anachronism to the twenty-first century. This, of course, Pak bourgeoisie does not want to countenance. But the question remains, do they have the ability to reverse the tide of history?

Notes and References

1. A dispute exists, like much of his political legacy, about Jinnah’s religious denomination. While his birth records show that he was an Ismaili Shia, many in Pakistan claim that he had converted to being a Sunni later.
2. In a report “Govt’s writ fully restored in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” published in Dawn on 26 November 2010, the correspondent Ismail Khan quoted an unnamed senior military official as saying that the political leadership has to take “ownership” of a North Waziristan operation despite General Kayani’s having a blanket authorisation from the government for it.
3. B. Raman wrote about the inception of Sipah-e-Sahaba in Paper no. 484 of South Asia Analysis Group, titled “Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Bin Laden & Ramzi Yousef,” published on 1 July 2002. South Asia Terrorism Portal of Institute of Conflict Studies wrote Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Ssp.htm>.
4. Writing the New America Foundation’s Counterinsurgency Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, in April 2010, Khattak detailed in a 16-page article entitled “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in the Swat Valley,” a sort of after-action report. It was supremely detailed in nonmilitary parts of the story.
5. On 23 November 2010, Dawn gave front-page coverage to an ongoing debate in the country’s senate subcommittee about the introduction of a reformed general sales tax—a demand of the IMF. The debate is entitled “Hafeez lets out steam on senators.”